Defeat Surveillance-Strike-Complexes with Surveillance Strike Maneuver Capability

06/24/2007

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A detailed presentation of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and how an enemy Surveillance Strike Complex (SSC) was defeated by a Surveillance Strike Maneuver Capability, achieving decisive victory. This presentation lays the reality-based doctrinal foundation for the U.S. Army transformation and why it must be based around air/sea-transportable and numerous light tracked armored fighting vehicles with robust mobility that overcomes SSC fire effects not vulnerable rubber-tired armored cars nor hoping for mouse-clicking firepower to defeat the enemy---Air-Mech-Strike Force structure---in order to to achieve decisive world-wide strategic operational maneuver (AWSOM).

VIDEO: Introduction to the War

Yom Kippur War 1: Bar-Lev line undermanned, Israelis ASS U ME Arabs couldn't attack without air superiority via air forces overlooked SAMs

www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vjRyw7YMfc

Yom Kippur War 2: Smokescreen generators enable engineers in rubber boats to cross, get foothold, amphibious BTR-50s swim across others, 10 cuts in sandwalls by water hoses (idea of a LT) for 10 Russian-made ribbon pontoon bridges, 2 armored divisions across with 500 tanks within 24 hours, IDF tanks knocked out by RPG/Sagger ATGM teams, infantry in M113 Gavins counter-attack the AT teams, Super Shermans with 105mm guns reinforce Golan Heights held by a LT and a platoon of tanks

Yom Kippur War 3: IDF invades Syria, puts Damscus at risk, changes focus to over-extended Egyptian army in Sinai

www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6ju0tOdfjo

www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6ju0tOdfjo

Yom Kippur War 4: IDF Paras and tanks under Sharon cross Suez canal and encircle Egyptian army, taking out SAM sites, surrounded, they sue for peace

www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6T7SIIZ_aQ

For a detailed written account online of the 1973 war, the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute No. 21: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory by Dr. George W. Gawrych is available in PDF format.

The U.S. Army has been in ethical and technotactical crisis before; even after WWII our former enemies were giving us valuable advice which goes unheeded even today:

"Very important to avoid making reconnaissance equipment heavy. For this reason, we tried through the war to develop a decent light tank for the reconnaissance units, but we were never successful.... the eight wheeler [reconnaissance vehicle] had the serious disadvantage of being too large and heavy, while the four wheeler was not really mobile enough in cross-country work. You know the eight wheeler was so big and heavy because the reconnaissance troops, naturally, wanted as big a cannon as they could get. Well, that does not work."

--Major General Hermann Balck, German Army 1932-45, in a taped interview on 12 January, 1979, page 40. Performed under contract number DAAK40-78-C-0004, Columbus Laboratories, Tactical Technology Center, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201.

This is NOT Strategic Maneuver or sound C3D2 to defeat SSCs: where did our Soldiers learn such bad habits?---Fort Lewis, Washington: "From Here to Eternity" Garrison U.S. Army Unready For War: As Seen From Space

James Jones, an Army combat veteran revealed the bankrupt and snobby Army culture as being unready for WW2 in his book; "From Here to Eternity". As Japanese planes are bombing and strafing U.S. Navy ships and Army/marine planes parked in neat rows to ward off "saboteurs" our entire force in the Pacific was nearly wiped out resulting in us almost losing the war on day 1. Despite the obvious need to drop the rank snobbery, work together and stop the non-tactical "parade ground" military, after WW2 we reverted right back to "From Here to Eternity" and suffered grievous losses in Korea, Vietnam, and now in Iraq. We are today, parking both ships, planes and trucks, troops, tanks and buildings in easily targeted rows, both in CONUS and overseas.

Are We Headed For Another Pearl Harbor?

On the 21st century, non-linear battlefield dominated by high explosives we simply CANNOT afford to play BS barracks games and keep living in rows of buildings with our air, ground and sea platforms parked in rows, uncamouflaged.

If you have ANY doubt about the dangers we face of reliving "Pearl Harbor" which we compound by base closures compressing even more targets in smaller areas, look at the satellite imagery of U.S. bases using google maps.

1. GO TO

www.maps.google.com

2. Type in

fort lewis wa

you will see a street map

3. Click on "Satellite"

Click on + to zoom all the way in on to see the clusterfucks of Stryker and other wheeled trucks

Move <--- and ---> to shift view from space to keep the wheeled truck narcissist wagons in view etc.

Here's the photo of Fort Lewis, Washington taken from space by a satellite with key features of the U.S. Army "garrison" BS mentality explained:

1. HUGE parade ground for brass to self-worship themselves with troop standing in hot sun for hours at a time. Troops have to waste hours mowing this huge lawn. Parade grounds and useless golf courses should be ripped out of every Army post and the space used for tank cross-country open terrain maneuver training or at the very least a firing range. You will notice there is no maneuver training area on Fort Lewis--they have to drive over 100 miles southeast to Yakima training center--more time and resources wasted, when we do not have the time or the money to waste. Is it a wonder our troops are so road-bound and easily blown up by roadside bombs in Iraq?





2. HUGE motor pools of Stryker, Humvee and FMTV vulnerable wheeled trucks in Fulda Gap Olive Drab Green paint that makes them clearly seen against gray pavement. Troops waste many hours obssessing over these flimsy and tactically unsound trucks under the hot sun to micro-manage and alleviate the anxieties of the brass and their bean counters that they will work. However, the hot sun and temperature elements are degrading the rubber tires, optics, paint constantly.

So as mother earth kills the life of these flimsy vehicles, they make an easy Pearl Harbor-esque target for enemies who could with GPS guidance destroy them en masse with just a few direct hits. ALL vehicles should be painted in universal TAN or BROWN and dispersed and co-located with their units in the field at all times under concealing vegetation and/or nets to keep the sun off, or better yet IN ISO containers. Some "war on terror" we are waging, huh? We didn't declare war on 9/12/01 and we are still not at war.

3. You will see 5 x CH-47D Chinook heavy lift helicopters and a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter again in absurd "Fulda Gap" green camouflage paint making them easy targets on the ground and in the air. These aircraft should be GRAY for effective camouflage in the air and be covered in camou nets on the ground. The main runway of Gray Army airfield is only 6125 feet x 150 feet and the secondary runway is only 1867 feet by 46 feet. This is good enough to fly-away by USAF C-17s and C-130s, but the Stryker truck is too heavy to fly by C-130 even stripped down anywhere unless you want to go to Spokane, Washington. Only 3 Strykers can fit into a C-17 which we do not have many total, and only a squadron of 12 at nearby McCord AFB. If the Army were wise and transferred Stryker trucks to MP units where their road-bound fatal weaknesses would be offset by a less lethal mission and re-equipped with M113 Gavin and M8 Buford AGS light tanks, they could fly 4-5 at a time in C-17s and 1-at-a-time in C-130s to strategic distances (over 1, 000 miles). Moreover, if the main runway was lengthened to over 8, 000 feet, cargo 747s could fly brigade Gavin/Buford sets and all required personnel rapidly to any place in the world with international airports. This was what an Army that was serious about getting ready to fight anywhere in the world would do.

4. Here you see a feel-good sports field and 400 meter tracks for absurd sports PT in t-shirts, shorts and running shoes which has no combat relevance. Also notice the tennis courts. More evidence that the U.S. military garrison lifestyle is all about narcissism and not combat effectiveness.

5. Here you see the comfortable Rank Hath Its Priveliges (RHIP) officer's housing adjacent to the parade ground for narcissist ceremonies. This is disgusting and not leadership-by-example. These housing units should be torn down on all U.S. military posts/bases and everyone made to live off post in REAL civilian houses to have real civilian cultural lives instead of living in the cloistered artificial lifestyle that leads to snobby and disrespect of people with less money, rank and status--people like our foreign enemies and civil populace that we are trying to win to our side. Amerocentric snobbery does not win hearts & minds.

6. All over the post are multi-story troop barracks and enlisted family housing units where the underclass lives and the under 21 year olds can be frequently visited by their over-bearing "mother may, I?" chain of command to nitpick over the condition of interior paint and the state of the lawns around the buildings. So while America's enemies study how to kill us with the latest technologies, our troops spend their days picking up trash and mowing lawns in the hot sun or freezing cold after starting the day without enough sleep doing absurd sports PT to numb them down to better control them and remind them that they are somehow inferior to the careerist narcissists running the show who want to look good and get themselves promoted. Is it a wonder troops think 5-ton trucks weigh 5 tons? Is it a wonder they do not know what a RPG can or cannot do? Is it a wonder our troops are ignorant of warfare and think they can ride around in wheeled trucks and just shoot the enemy as if it were a TV western gun duel? The sad truth is they enter the combat zone sleep-deprived for months and years at a time and are falling asleep at the wheel and dying. They are getting blown up by a push of a button by roadside bombs before they can even get a chance to shoot their hand weapons. War is not an event to prove manhood and adulthood you should already have, its not a game or a duel. Its about winning or losing, living or dying. And we cannot afford any longer to waste time on 19th century parade ground BULLSHIT on today's lethal, non-linear, 4th generation warfare battlefields dominated by not just bullets but high explosive weaponry.

Let's be brutally honest, shall we?

Where is the constructive effort to be good at warfighting?

U.S. military is not "AMATEUR hour"; amateur implies at least we are TRYING; we are not trying; U.S. military is PHONY.

Air Force & Navy when they fly aircraft and sail ships are kept somewhat honest and combat capable because if they at any second fail they can be dead falling from the sky or in the water where man really doesn't live. To warfight they need to actively operate air/sea platforms.

In contrast in land combat, man lives on land; he does not need a platform to exist on land that automatically has a war function. He is under no compulsion to be combat ready even by platform default. Man can die on land from EXPOSURE however, and since he lives on land all the time for a peaceful, civilian life his answer to this is FIXED BUILDING SHELTER. Since man has a civilian existence means that has no military platform utility, both the Army and marines have been corrupted by building and lawn care as convenient excuses/time wasters by people who are phonies who do not want to be combat ready, they want to be phony narcissist snobs and extended adolescents paid middle-class wages.

Actives: wake up each morning sleep-deprived, roll call troop formation, do non-sense sports PT, then breakfast, some more troop formations, "leaders" meetings, paperwork, Mondays wasted in motor pool doing PMCS on tactically unsound Humvee SUV trucks, Tuesday/Wednesdays building and lawn care, Thursday meetings, Friday paperwork. WHERE IS THE TIME TO DO ACTIVE WARFIGHTING EXCELLENCE? The entire daily and weekly routine established by the narcissist egomaniacs to baby sit the economic weak co-dependants is geared around BULLSHIT (lawn and building care) not active thinking cat vs. mouse warfighting.

www.combatreform.com/sleeplessarmy.htm

Reserves: one weekend a month they arrive and waste Saturday and Sunday with roll call formation, sports PT then lunch, then yadda yadda meetings, then time to go home for the day. Two weeks in summer is fun time away from wife and kids.

Solutions

1. Get rid of static buildings: force ground troops to every day do combat things by making them live every day in tactically-sound, portable, fortifiable "Battle Boxes" THERE IS NO GARRISON. There is only the FIELD.

www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxconcept.htm
www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxes.htm

2. Make Reserves go to war for 24 hours each month

www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/realreadyreserve.htm

3. Get rid of phony narcissists and economic bennie boomers and replace with warfighter enthusiasts

www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/weakcodependantarmy.htm

4. Cat & Mouse Warfighting Experimentation Needed

www.combatreform.com/cluelessarmy.htm

Once we cut out all the BULLSHIT we will face the tools we have in front of us and start grappling with how we will use them in war and how to better use them by ACTIVE THOUGHT. Force everyone to FACE THE TOOLS THEY HAVE IN FRONT OF THEM their minds will be forced to THINK about what it is they have. FORCE THEM TO BE IN A WAR SETTING AND THEIR MINDS WILL PONDER hey, what if I left on foot over there to patrol and an enemy sapper team is already there?

The same intellectual development and innovation that I undertake will happen with the troops, what we call FIELD CRAFT. How can you have FIELDcraft when you are NOT IN THE FIELD but in garrison doing LAWN CARE?

A few examples:

Drive vehicles and lay smoke screens with OPFOR to perfect what it takes to evade optical weapons engagement

Off-road, x-country driving of TRACKED armored fighting vehicles to avoid roadside bombs/RPG ambushes

Finding out how to hide vehicles from thermal imagery

Shoot actual soft nose RPGs at vehicles and practice evading them

Actual hardening of combat vehicles and loading arragements perfected not static BS "this is the SOP we've always used so go back to sleep"


A U.S. Army Colonel writes:

"In 1941, it was not obvious to American military leaders what the impact on land warfare of new technology would be. In retrospect, a couple of observations from World War II seem relevant to force design and technology in the current war. First, the U.S. Armed Forces were much more successful integrating the arms readily available within their own services than in coordinating the use of weapons employed by other services. In other words, in most operations there was little or no 'jointness'.

Second, U.S. Army ground forces proved to be more skilled and tenacious in defensive operations than in offensive operations against the German Army. There were several reasons for this. American offensive combat power - armored forces - were extremely vulnerable to German shoulder fired anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust - a forerunner of the Russian rocket-propelled grenade - as well as anti-tank guns and mines.

Though thoroughly mechanized by 1944, the mobility of U.S. forces could not compensate for the vulnerability of thin, ineffective armor protection because American medium, offensive tanks and tank destroyers lacked gyro-stabilized tank-killing guns and could not fire accurately on-the-move to destroy enemy heavy, defensive tanks when encountered.

The length of training for masses of Citizen-Soldiers that preceded assignment to operational units was short and unit cohesiveness was poor. As a result of all these factors, attacks on the ground only succeeded when American numerical superiority was assured and artillery fire could be delivered in massive volumes.

One comes away from this discussion with a sense that the need for effective, joint integrative command and control on the operational and tactical levels of war is as acute as ever. With the growing lethality of modern weapons, superior technology in terms of devastating firepower, armor protection and mobility is just as important today. And the unit cohesion that springs from genuine training readiness and confidence in the chain of command is an unchanging requirement. So, it is a safe bet that developments in these three dynamic areas should profoundly influence the Army's current transformation".

The challenges of future nation-state surveillance strike complexes in the 21st century will be even greater than the German Army in ETO in WWII. We must boldly face ourselves warts and all, and make improvements based on professional, honest candor and transform ourselves to gain a Surveillance Strike MANEUVER capability with existing and off-the-shelf equipment quickly before a nation-state with a superior SSC ends our reign as a superpower keeping the world free.

Table of Contents

PPT Slide 1 SSC lay-out

PPT Slide 2 Egypt attacks

PPT Slide 3 SAM/RPG umbrella

PPT Slide 4 Tank killers

PPT Slide 5 ATGM belts

PPT Slide 6 ADA stops CAS

PPT Slide 7 IDF reorganizes

PPT Slide 8 Maneuver formula

PPT Slide 9 IDF finds gap

PPT Slide 10 3D Air Assaults

PPT Slide 11 2D break-out

PPT Slide 12 Cost of surprise

PPT Slide 13 Who won?

PPT Slide 14 Israel saved

PPT Slide 15 Plan B needed

PPT Slide 16 Strike first

PPT Slide 17 Recovery unlikely

PPT Slide 18 2D/3D maneuver

PPT Slide 19 Operational Art

PPT Slide 20 2D frees 3D

PPT Slide 21 3D can free 2D

PPT Slide 22 Tactical Art

PPT Slide 23 AMS 2D/3D needed

Author: 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne)

Email: itsg@hotmail.com

Home Page: www.combatreform2.com

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