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The Defence of Hellenism |
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With all the recent publicity of the "Cyprus Issue", is the current Hellenic policy adequate to meet our security? For one to gain an adequate understanding of the present situation and this exact issue, a full comprehension of Cypriot security, military issues, and possible outcomes is required. To be sure, Cypriot security is paramount both for Cyprus and Greece, but for Hellenism in general, also. |
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The division on Cyprus is the most important undermining element for Cypriot security, bar Turkey. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was indeed a well planned US political move which greatly contributed to US influence in the region. Though the Cypriot National Guard scored kill/death rates of an astonishing 8:1 ratio, the war of attrition was clearly won by Turkey before the war had started. The invasion itself was by no means a "tactical surprise", or won by superior strategy and tactics. It was obvious that 1) Turkey was preparing an invasion, and 2) The US planned the assault, assisted it material wise, and organised the botched putsch over Archbishop Makarios. Thus, the invasion was bound to succeed from the start, but the question remains, why was Greek assistance too little too late? Obviously the CIA played its part here, but the lack of Greek-Cypriot co-ordination played an even more damaging role. The prime incident outlining this fact was when Greek Special Forces, "O Tolmon Nika" were flown in from Crete to perform covert operations. The transport aircraft flew at 300 feet to Cyprus, evading both US and Turkish radar and jets. One quarter of the men would never live to tell the tale! Cypriot AA guns shot down two of the Greek aircraft, and killed the Special Forces occupants. A simple secure radio-call could have stopped that. Though this incident is extremely displeasing to hear, there were literally hundreds more heroic and successful accomplishments of O Tolmon Nika in Cyprus. The past is the past, no changing it now. But the future remains to be written, are we on the right track to protecting Hellenism? |
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The common defence pact between Greece and Cyprus is definitely the most intelligent line of strategy Greece has used in decades. It will solidify the defence of Cyprus, and opens the possibility of attacking Turkey's vulnerable southern flank. But is Cyprus really a modern day Trojan Horse? The moving of the S-300 PMU-1s (SA - 10) to Crete tarnishes this image indeed. Even though the TOR - M1s (SA - 15) are an exceptional air defence asset, they can not destroy Turkish jets inside Turkey. But, for now Paphos Airbase is satisfactorily protected from air strikes. In the event of another Turkish assault, inevitability Turkish F-16s and F-4s will be on the seen in under 10 minutes. Greek Mirage 2000s and F-16s will take much longer indeed. Thus, there is no other option but to supply Cyprus with air assets of its own. 20 F-5s would be satisfactory to hold off Turkish air superiority until Greek jets land at Paphos. Ofcourse, the number will be limited as dogfights in the Aegean and Thrace will be exploding. The key for Cyprus is layered defence, similar to Guerilla warfare, defend - strike - retreat - defend - strike etc.. Thus antitank weapons are essential, Dragon and TOW squads would suit Cyprus perfectly. The T-80U tanks were an intelligent buy indeed, this will certainly give momentum to a layered defence, force Turkey to react, rather than Cyprus reacting. But what about the Navy? Well, bar from various patrol boats, Cyprus has no real assets. The Excocet land to sea missiles are gold to say the least, especially with their proven track record in the Falklands war in the 1980's. The Hellenic Navy would take at least a day at best to reach the new naval base with a formidable force, with Greece's Navy acquiring a slight edge over Turkey's. Thus it seems essential Cyprus acquires at least 15 - 20 small attack craft, and various sea transport vessels to complement its arsenal. Work on speed rather than firepower, a scalpel rather than a sword. It wouldn't hurt to make some friends in the region either. The outcome of all this is not assured a success, even if we have "God on our side." |
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A successful defence of Hellenism will require us, the Hellenes to work very hard. A network will need to be implemented to secure a total Hellenic response, which is probably our greatest asset, similar to the Jews in their wars in the 60s and 70s. Thus, though we have O Theos with us, we need to work ourselves to fully protect, both Orthodoxia, and Hellenism. |
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For various other issues and a full pictorial insight into the Hellenic Defence Force go tohttp://www.geocities.com/damianos/Hellenic.html |
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See this article written by me, published at Skopies.net at; http://www.skopies.net/english/greekarmy/ |
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