The
Structural Transformation of the Bourgeoisie in the Third World
[The
bourgeoisie] creates a world after its own image.
The
Communist Manifesto
Table
of Contents
Introduction
A
Short Note on the Theoretical Apparatus
The
Era of Bourgeois-Democratic Revolutions in the West
The
Era of Bourgeois-Democratic Revolutions in the Third World – In the
Mirror of the First World
The
First Wave of Popular Nationalist Mobilisation in the Third World
The
Second Wave of Popular Nationalist Mobilization in the Third World
Ideological
Foundations of the Second Wave
Rapprochement
and Compromise
The
Incomplete Bourgeois-Democratic Movement in Pakistan
Colonialism
and Pakistan
Independence
The
Calm Before the Storm: 1947 to 1968
The
Anti-Ayub Movement and the New Challengers
Anatomy
of the Pakistan Peoples Party
Pakistani
Nationalism
Policies
Towards the Establishment
Policies
Towards the National-Bourgeoisie
Policies
Towards the Working Class
The
State
Foreign
Policy
The
Social Composition of the PPP
Transformation
of the Pakistani National-Bourgeoisie to Conservative Old Age
Conclusion
40
In
the last two or three decades politics in the Third World have undergone a
marked and visible structural transformation.
Historian Eric Hobsbawm notes,
…none of the successful movements of liberation in the backward world
before the 1970s were inspired or achieved by traditional or
neo-traditional ideologies. …Fundamentalist
religion as a major force of successful mass mobilisation belongs to the
last decades of the twentieth century. (Hobsbawm 1994 pg. 201, 202)
Since
the religiously inspired Iranian revolution in 1979, political movements
espousing Jihad have become increasingly influential and visible in
Islamic countries. Similarly,
in Latin America movements based on liberation theology have emerged and
gained influence in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Even in secular and democratic India, the Bharatia Janata Party (BJP)
has been able to win the popular vote and form the central government.
After the events of September 11th and the resulting
“War on Terrorism”, these religious ‘anti-modernist’,
‘anti-secular’, and ‘anti-democratic’ movements are receiving more
and more attention in academic and popular circles.
The growing impact of these movements deserves serious attention;
however, much of what is written is descriptive and fails to explain the
rise of these political movements based on traditional ideologies in
historical context. This book argues that the structural transformation of
politics is a product of the dialectics of the life cycle of the
bourgeoisie within Third World countries.
Marxists
have shown that the life cycle of the bourgeoisie in Europe passed through
three phases of development: an adolescent phase, a mature revolutionary
phase, and finally a conservative phase.
The bourgeoisie in Europe emerged as a class in the 16th
century within the context of a feudal monarchy.
It rose to revolutionary maturity in the 18th and 19th
century resulting in an era of bourgeois-democratic revolutions across
Europe. Thereafter, the
bourgeoisie perceived that its interests were more threatened by a workers
revolution than by feudal restoration.
As a result towards the end of the 19th century, and
especially after the Paris Commune of 1871, the bourgeoisie in Europe
became a conservative class.
In
the second section, the book will examine whether the life cycle of the
bourgeoisie in the Third World mirrors, with certain modifications, the
above-mentioned development of the bourgeoisie in Europe.
On this basis the book attempts to delineate the principle phases
in the development of the bourgeoisie in the Third World: the adolescent
phase, the mature and revolutionary phase, and finally the conservative
phase. Briefly, the book
argues that the bourgeoisie within various regions of the third world
emerged as a class in the 18th and 19th century
within the context of colonial rule.
Just as the bourgeoisie in Europe outgrew its womb of feudal
society, similarly the bourgeoisie within various regions of the Third
World outgrew the womb of colonialism.
In the 20th century this class rose to revolutionary
maturity resulting in an era of anti-colonial movements, revolts, and
reforms in the Third World. This
era of popular nationalist mass mobilisations burst forward with the end
of the First World War and lasted till the 1980s.
Certain authors divide this period into further parts:
The first wave of mass mobilisation began at the end of the First
World War and culminated in the creation of independent states across the
Third World, and the second wave began in the mid-twentieth century and
ended around the 1980s. After
the 1980s the bourgeoisie in various regions of the Third World exhausted
its revolutionary potential. On
the whole, by this time the bourgeoisie in the Third World perceived that
its interests were more threatened by a workers revolt than by Western
hegemony. Thus, with the
beginning of the conservative phase of the bourgeoisie in the Third World,
the secular democratic popular nationalist mass mobilisations faded away.
Ironically, at this moment working class movements in all parts of
the world were also decimated as a repercussion of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Thus, in the
last decades of the 20th century, the bourgeoisie within the
Third World was no longer prepared to undertake the task of popular mass
mobilisations against encroachments on national sovereignty by Western
hegemony. On the other hand,
working class movement in the world were demoralised, devastated, and
shattered by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The eclipse of the nationalist mass mobilisations of the
bourgeoisie and the socialist mass mobilisations of the working class
created a political vacuum in which forces based on religious or
traditional ideologies became increasingly visible resulting in the
aforementioned structural transformation of politics in the Third World.
In
the third section, the book investigates whether this framework of
structural transformation helps to explain political developments in
Pakistan. In other words, the
third section offers a microcosmic study of Pakistan in relation to the
structural transformation of politics in the Third World.
In particular, the paper attempts to explain the rise and fall of
the Pakistan Peoples Party in the context of the structural transformation
of politics in the Third World. The
industrialisation during the so- called decade of development (General
Ayub Khan 1958-1968) resulted in the mobilisation of new forces of change
that were influenced by the sweeping waves of Afro-Arab and Asian unity.
Thus, the rise of the Pakistan Peoples Party coincided, mirrored,
influenced, and was influenced by the second wave of popular nationalist
mass mobilisations across the Third World.
Through the quasi-theocratic Zia era, the PPP retained its mass
support. Ironically, only
with the restoration of democracy did the party begin to lose popular
support creating an enormous political vacuum that no political force has,
as yet, filled. The decline
in the ability of the PPP to spearhead the popular movement in Pakistan in
the last decade of the twentieth century is indicative of the changing
character of the bourgeoisie in that country.
In sum, the paper will examine whether the rise and fall of the
PPP—that represented a bourgeois-democratic reform movement—is linked
to the life-cycle of the bourgeoisie in the Third World as a whole.
A
central term that requires clarification is the concept of class.
Class is a historically constituted relationship of a stratum of
society to the means of production. Since
the relationship to the means of production conditions all social
relations, therefore, class is the sum totality of all historically
constituted social relations that are conditioned by the relation to the
means of production. The
Marxist method of determining the class basis of a given political
movement begins by first deconstructing the rhetoric to identify the
principle demands of the movement in question.
These principle demands correspond to objective interests of
particular classes in society. Therefore, the analytical process of extrapolating the
principle demands of a political movement to the objective interests of
classes in society reveals the class basis of a political movement.
Although
the paper continuously uses the terms “the bourgeoisie in Europe” and
“the bourgeoisie in the Third World”, the use of these terms is not
meant to imply complete homogeneity of interests between or within the
bourgeoisie of different nations, countries, states, and regions.
Naturally, the “bourgeoisie in Europe” and the “bourgeoisie
in the third world” is not a class with a completely homogenous set of
interests and views. Nonetheless, the bourgeois class is identifiable as a stratum
of society whose interests are connected with the preservation and
promotion of private property and capital as the dominating form of
economic intercourse. Defined
in this manner, the internal complexity caused by competition and
antagonism between various conglomerates of bourgeois interests does not
undermine the concept of the bourgeoisie as a class in history.
Thus, the author holds the view that it would be incorrect to
conclude from the internal complexity of any social category, such as a
class, that the social category itself does not exist.
In conclusion, while the bourgeoisie is an internally complex
social category, it is nonetheless, discernable and identifiable with
respect to other classes in society.
The Era of
Bourgeois-Democratic Revolutions in the West
In
the early Nineteenth century Hegel introduced the profound and influential
notion that human history represented an idea or consciousness in the
process of dialectical motion. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels combined this notion of
dialectics with Feuerbach’s materialism to develop a view of history
that has come to be known as ‘dialectical materialism’.
Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach,
The
great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex
of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in
which the things apparently stable, no less than their mind-images in our
heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into
being and passing away...
For
it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute, sacred.
It reveals the transitory character of everything; nothing can
endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of
passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.
And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere
reflection of this process in the thinking brain.
(Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach p.22)
Marx
and Engels came to the conclusion that the dialectic of class struggle was
the motor of history and declared, “the history of all hitherto existing
societies is the history of class struggle” (Marx & Engels, 1983,
pp. 204). Thus, according to
this dialectical view of history, classes were constantly in the process
of coming into being and passing away, birth and death, generation and
degeneration. Moreover, different modes of production and periods of
history—primitive communism, slave, feudal, capitalist, or
socialist—could be delineated in accordance with the class in power
(Marx & Engels, German Ideology, pp. 48).
Classical
Marxism explained the history of Europe in this Hegelian dialectical
schematic. The history of the
rise and fall of the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie of Europe was
eloquently captured in more contemporary style in the trilogy by Eric
Hobsbawm entitled The Age of Revolutions 1962, The Age of
Capital 1975, The Age of Empire 1987.
According to Marxists, the first elements of the modern bourgeoisie
emerged from the chartered burghers of the fifteenth century and gained
strength through the development of navigation and the exploration of new
markets in newly acquired colonies of America, India, Africa, and China
(Wolf 1982, Hobsbawm 1962, Wallerstein 1979). During the 16th
century the bourgeoisie had not as yet become the dominant class but was
gaining maturity within the womb of feudal society. From the mid-seventeenth century to the late eighteenth
century the big-bourgeoisie rose and built a world market for its goods
thereby extending and consolidating its influence on the world stage. With
the rise of the big-bourgeoisie the further growth of productive forces
came into increasing contradiction with the dominant feudal relations.
Feudal economic, political, and cultural institutions together with
attitudes, ideas and relations had all become, in the words of Marx,
“fetters on the further development of productive forces” (Marx &
Engels, German Ideology, pp. 70).
This contradiction, that is the contradiction between the backward
feudal relations of production and the highly developed capitalist
productive forces, led to a period of political convulsions.
It resulted in an era of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions all
over Europe.
For
Marxists, the French Revolution of 1789 epitomised the classical form of
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. France made a clean break
with feudalism, the monarchy was overthrown in a bloody revolution, and
feudal landholdings were broken up. This revolutionary republican path later led to the
materialization of a liberal democratic capitalism (Moore 1966).
The French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic wars propagated
and proliferated the political, economic, cultural ideas of modern
capitalism across the European continent.
After
a short period of peaceful development, another wave of bourgeois
democratic upheavals simultaneously hit several European countries in the
year 1848. But the year saw a curious new development. The proletariat as
a political force also came to occupy the European revolutionary theatre.
Although the proletariat was as yet at a relatively infantile
stage, nonetheless, it was far larger and more concentrated than it had
been during the French Revolution, and therefore, a prominent contender
for power. This third force competing for power against both the feudal
lords and the bourgeoisie terrified the latter.
Alarmed by this new development even the hitherto revolutionary
republican bourgeoisie in Paris ordered the shooting of workers in the
June days of 1848. The conduct of classes during the upheavals of 1848
proved that the bourgeoisie was transformed from revolutionary youth to
conservative old age under the impending threat of a workers revolution.
Thereafter the transition to capitalism in Europe did not proceed
on the revolutionary republican path but proceeded through peaceful
changes and reforms. The transition to capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe
occurred without a complete revolutionary break from feudalism.
At the time in these countries small bands of revolutionary
intellectuals were hoping for the transfer of power to workers owing to
the politicisation in the revolutionary atmosphere.
At the same time, the bourgeoisie feared the emergence of working
class power and recoiled from the tasks of bourgeois-democratic liberation
from feudalism. Thus, during the transition to capitalism in Prussia and
Central Europe, the feudal landholdings owned by the Junkers were not
broken up. Lenin called the
latter path to capitalism the Junkers path.
The bourgeoisie colluded with feudal monarchies to introduce
capitalist reforms by careful and gradual means.
Thus, the feudal monarchies of Central and Eastern Europe underwent
a transition rather than a revolution.
Barrington Moore further developed this idea in his famous book The
Social Roots of Dictatorship and Democracy and argued that whereas the
revolutionary republican path lead to liberal democratic capitalism, the
Junkers path always remained more susceptible to fascism and dictatorship
(Moore 1966).
The
Paris Commune of 1871 proved to be the final nail in the proverbial coffin
of the youthful and revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie. Marx’s
eloquent defence of the revolutionary workers of Paris in the Civil War
in France argued that the Paris Commune of 1871 had completed the
development of the bourgeois democratic republic in Europe.
Thereafter, the bourgeoisie of Europe was no longer a youthful and
revolutionary class but a conservative force.
After the crushing of the Paris Commune a unique period of calm and
peaceful development ensued (1872 to 1904). Lenin summed up this
historical period by the phrase, “The West had finished with their
bourgeois revolutions. The East had not yet risen to theirs.” (Lenin
1977, pg 18)
Figure 1:
The Phases of Development of the Bourgeoisie in Europe
Adolescence
Revolutionary
Conservative
(16th century to 1789)
(1789
– 1871)
(1871 onwards)
16th
century
1789
1848 1871
Present
The
above figure, although admittedly a crude application of quantitative
tools to understand qualitative phenomenon, nonetheless helps to simplify
and explain the dialectic of development of the European bourgeoisie.
If one could quantify ‘revolutionary potential’ and plot it on
an axis against the passage of time, the curve would roughly have an
inverted U shape as shown above. The figure, as long as it is viewed with
a little humour, helps to show that the bourgeoisie in Europe reached the
pinnacle of its revolutionary maturity during the French revolution of
1789. The upheavals of 1848 occurred in the context of a more conservative
bourgeoisie that feared a workers revolution.
On a world historic scale, the point around which the bourgeoisie
swung from supporting, arousing, and leading revolutions to opposing and
crushing them was 1848. The revolutionary workers of the Paris Commune of
1871 struggled in a period when the bourgeoisie feared a workers’ revolt
more than it feared the forces of feudalism and reaction.
Therefore, the year of 1871 marks the end of the transition to
bourgeois rule in Europe.
In
conclusion, the central factor that transformed the bourgeoisie in Europe
from a revolutionary to a conservative force was the growth and developing
of a revolutionary workers movement.
Fear of a workers revolt drove the bourgeoisie ever deeper into the
arms of reaction. In accordance with this understanding of history one can
delineate three periods in the development of the bourgeoisie of Europe.
1.
The first period of adolescence began with the birth of the
bourgeoisie in the 15th and 16th century. During
this period the bourgeoisie was a subjugated class struggling for power
under feudalism. This period of subordination to feudalism came to close
in the late 18th century (more specifically with the French
Revolution of 1789).
2.
The second revolutionary period opened with the storming of
the Bastille and the guns of the French Revolution 1789. This period of
revolutionary upheavals and bourgeois-democratic revolutions lasts nearly
a hundred years till the crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871. At the end
of this period, the bourgeoisie emerged as the dominant class of Europe
and the world and the political transformation from feudalism to
capitalism was in the main complete.
3.
The third conservative period began after the crushing of
the Paris Commune of 1871. The bourgeoisie of Europe passed from history
as a revolutionary class. A period of relatively peaceful transformation
replaced the earlier revolutionary epoch. The bourgeoisie was now a
conservative force on the stage of world history.
This
schematic of class struggle presented above is a deliberate simplification
of the overall movement of classes during the transition of feudalism to
capitalism. The actual
process of transformation from feudalism to capitalism abounds with
entanglements, complications, twists and turns, incomplete
transformations, and other unaccounted factors. The actual process of history is always infinitely more
colourful than the grey matter of theory that must inevitably be based on
simplifications and generalisations. The above schematic is merely an
attempt to summarize the very broad and general movement of class struggle
during the period of capitalist development.
The
Era of Bourgeois-Democratic Revolutions in the Third World
– In
the Mirror of the First World
At
the beginning of the 20th century much of what has come to be
known today as the Third World was under colonial domination by a handful
of European countries. Britain
and France, the major colonial powers, controlled most of Asia and Africa.
Holland, Portugal, and Belgium, the relatively smaller colonial
powers, controlled another substantial portion of the world.
In the 20th century Japan joined the list of imperialist
countries with the colonisation of parts of East Asia.
The expansion of trade into these ancient lands led to the creation
and emergence of a ‘native’ bourgeoisie.
Political developments in the 20th century were shaped
by the development of this native bourgeoisie in the Third World.
There
were, however, two factors that distinguished the development of the
bourgeoisie in the Third World from the development of its counterpart in
Europe. First, while the
bourgeoisie in Europe emerged within and later struggled against feudal
society, the bourgeoisie in the Third World emerged within and later
struggled against colonial society. In other words, the bourgeoisie in the Third World had to
struggle against another advanced bourgeois force to gain power.
Second, this conflict between the bourgeoisie in the Third World
and their former colonial rulers occurred in the context of the rivalry
between the capitalist and socialist camp.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that essentially bourgeois
forces utilised socialist slogans in the Third World not only to appeal to
their own people but also to obtain assistance from the Soviet Union in
the struggle against Western hegemony. These two factors were instrumental
in shaping the ideological, political, and organisational tools that the
native bourgeoisie utilised in the process of its growth and development.
The
first task that history bequeathed to the native bourgeoisie was the
acquisition of independence from colonial rule.
The dislocation caused by the First World War and the international
influence of the October revolution in Russia resulted in the first wave
of popular nationalist mass mobilisation against colonialism.
Lenin in his writings on China characterised the bourgeoisie of the
colonial countries as a “young revolutionary class”.
He wrote,
One
is naturally inclined to compare the provisional President of the Republic
in benighted, inert, Asiatic China with the presidents of various
republics in Europe and America, in countries of advanced culture.
The presidents in those republics are all businessmen,
agents or puppets of a bourgeoisie rotten to the core and besmirched from
head to foot with mud and blood—not the blood of padishahs and emperors,
but the blood of striking workers shot down in the name of progress and
civilisation. In those
countries the presidents represent the bourgeoisie, which long ago
renounced all the ideals of its youth, has thoroughly prostituted itself,
sold itself body and soul to the millionaires and multimillionaries, to
the feudal lords turned bourgeois, etc.
In
China, the Asiatic provisional President of the Republic is a
revolutionary democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class
that is rising, not declining, a class that does not dread the future, but
believes in it and fights for it selflessly, a class that does not cling
to the maintenance and restoration of the past in order to safe-guard its
privileges, but hates the past and knows how to cast off its dead and
stifling decay (Lenin, 1977).
Similarly
in his famous article Backward Europe and Advanced Asia Lenin wrote.
In
civilised and advanced Europe, with its highly developed machine industry,
its rich, multiform culture and its constitutions, a point in history has
been reached when the commanding bourgeoisie, fearing the growth and
increasing strength of the proletariat, comes out in support of everything
backward, moribund and medieval. The
bourgeoisie is living out its last days, and is joining with all obsolete
and obsolescent forces in an attempt to preserve tottering wage-slavery.
Advanced
Europe is commanded by a bourgeoisie which supports everything that is
backward. The Europe of our
day is advanced not thank to, but in spite of, the
bourgeoisie, for it is only the proletariat that is adding to the
million-strong army of fighters for a better future.
It alone preserves and spreads implacable enmity towards
backwardness, savagery, privilege, slavery and the humiliation of man by
man.
In
“advanced” Europe, the sole advanced class is the proletariat.
As for the living bourgeoisie, it is prepared to go to any length
of savagery, brutality and crime in order to uphold dying capitalist
slavery.
And
a more striking example of this decay of the entire European
bourgeoisie can scarcely be cited than the support it is lending to reaction
in Asia in furtherance of the selfish aims of the financial
manipulators and capitalist swindlers.
Everywhere
in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining in
strength. The bourgeoisie
there is as yet siding with the people against reaction. Hundreds of millions of people are awakening to life,
light and freedom. What
delight this world movement is arousing in the hearts of all
class-conscious workers, who know that the path to collectivism lies
through democracy! What
sympathy for young Asia imbues all honest democrats!
…
All
the commanders of Europe, all the European bourgeoisie are in alliance
with all the forces of reaction and medievalism in China.
But
all young Asia, that is, the hundreds of millions of Asian working people,
has a reliable ally in the proletariat of all civilised countries. No force on earth can prevent its victory, which will
liberate both the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia (Lenin, May
10, 1913 CW vol. 19, pp. 99-100).
This
notion proved correct when the nationalist movement in China exploded with
student protests in Peking in May 1919 and eventually led to the creation
of the Koamingtang (Nationalist) Party headed by Sun Yat Sen. Similarly
Sarekat Islam, the principle national liberation organisation of
Indonesia, was also influenced in the same period and eventually Sukarno
emerged as the leader of the nationalists (Jansen, 1979, pp. 95-98).
In India, the All-India Congress was founded at the turn of the
century and emerged at the head of a mass movement.
In Africa, Kwame Nkhruma and the Pan-Africanists emerged soon after
as the principle representatives of anti-colonial nationalism on the
continent (Basil Davidson 1980). On
the continent of Latin America, Spanish colonial rule had already been
overthrown before the beginning of the 20th century and around
twenty Latin republics were on their way towards the development of
capitalist states (Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 181).
Nonetheless, Latin America was not unaffected by the ripples of
nationalist and revolutionary currents and student unrest in Cardoba
Argentina in 1918 led to the strengthening of left-wing nationalist
movements and all across Latin America. Moctezuma and Emiliano Zapata became the symbols of this new
upsurge (Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 191). In
conclusion, all over Asia, Africa, and Latin America the anti-colonial
nationalist movement emerged at the beginning of the 20th
century. On the whole, the
principle objective of this first wave of mobilisation was to elevate the
native bourgeoisie to the position of the ruling class within the context
of their respective states.
Post-war
historians, especially those connected to Cambridge University, have
highlighted the instrumental role of the native elite in colonial
societies in organising an all-encompassing nationalist struggle (Seal,
1968). Further, these
historians have shown how these anti-colonial nationalist movements were
ideologically committed to Western secular-democratic values including the
preservation of private property. While
it is true that many of these political leaders utilised religious
symbolism to arouse popular support, it would be incorrect to conclude
from this observation that the driving force of these movements were
traditional or neo-traditional ideas.
These movements were essentially inspired by the concept of nationalism.
Nationalism as a political tendency was distinct from movements
inspired purely by religion. Even
where religious symbolism was utilised it was bent to meet the needs of
the nationalism movement. Thus,
the use of religious symbolism represented political pragmatism whereas
the actual goal of the movement was inspired by nationalism.
Elie Kedourie in Nationalism in Asia and Africa explains how
the very fundamental concepts of the anti-colonial nationalist movement,
such as the right of nations to self-determination, were based on, if not
directly imported from, Western political understanding (Kedourie 1970, p.
28). Moreover, the first
generation of anti-colonial nationalist leaders were most often men either
directly educated in the West or well versed in European political
understanding. For example,
Sun Yat Sen of China, Ataturk of Turkey, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi of
India, Mohammed Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Sukarno of Indonesia, Kwame
Nkhruma of Ghana were all educated in the West.
These Western concepts of nationalism were utilised by the emerging
bourgeoisie in the Third World to mobilise the general population, filling
them with energy for independence, and in certain cases even calling them
to arms (Albertini, 1961; Hobsbawm, 1994).
From the vast work of these historians it is not implausible to
conclude that an emerging bourgeoisie in the colonies rose to
revolutionary maturity and organised the anti-colonial struggle in the
early 20th century.
This
first stage of struggle was brought to completion with the end of the
Second World War and the process of decolonisation.
European empires, weakened from mutual exhaustion and destruction,
could no longer hold on to their respective colonial possessions and the
anti-colonial nationalist movements came to power in the immediate
post-war period. In a matter
of a few years the number of internationally recognized independent states
in Asia quintupled. In
Africa, where there had been only one state in 1939, there were now about
fifty new internationally recognized independent states.
Latin America also witnessed the birth of a dozen new independent
states. In certain colonial
states, especially those threatened by Japanese expansionism, the tasks of
national liberation coalesced with the general anti-fascist war effort.
For example, in China, Vietnam, and Korea, the real or perceived
failure of the native bourgeoisie to lead the national liberation movement
and the international impact of the Soviet Union catapulted communist
movements to the commanding heights of those societies.
On the whole, by the mid twentieth century the first and
fundamental task of the anti-colonial movement, that is political
independence from colonial rule, was on its way towards completion and the
bourgeoisie in the colonised world was emerging to take power.
Although
the process of decolonisation was well underway by 1950, nonetheless, the
bourgeois-democratic emancipation in the Third World was not yet complete.
First, certain colonial powers simply refused to decolonise.
For example, Portugal and Belgium obstinately held on to their
African colonies (Davidson, 1980). Similarly
the settler-colonies of Kenya, Algeria, and South Africa refused to widen
the franchise of state power to include the African population (Davidson,
1980). Second, in other newly formed countries, the first generation
nationalist leaders were able to consolidate legal and administrative
control over the structures of the state; however, the work of
transforming these state structures into participatory institutions had
only just begun. The legacy
of colonialism had bequeathed societies with a rigid class structure and
highly centralised state power. Thus,
by the mid-twentieth century a series of unfinished tasks, with respect to
the bourgeois-democratic emancipation of the Third World, still remained
at large. These unfinished
tasks gave birth to what John Kautsky calls a “second-wave revolution of
modernizers” leading to popular movements, revolutionary coups,
insurrections, and mass movements from 1950 to 1980 across the Third World
(Katusky 1972, p.197). The
principle contradiction during the second-wave was between the traditional
bureaucratic-military oligarchies usually opposed to “any effort to
convert the dominant paternalism into a more efficient bureaucracy” and
the national bourgeoisie composed of local producing groups that struggled
for secular-democratic reforms and a non-aligned position with respect to
foreign policy (Cardoso & Galetto, 1979).
Despite
individual variations the second-wave of popular nationalist mass
mobilisations were bound by certain common ideological tendencies,
political, economic, cultural and international guiding assumptions and
commonalities. Before delving
into the historical events of the second-wave mobilisations, the
ideological foundations of the popular nationalist Afro-Arab-Asian and
Latin American solidarity need to be understood.
18th century
WWI WWII
1979
Present
If
we plot ‘revolutionary potential’ against the passage of time for the
bourgeoisie in the Third World (for the purpose of comparing it to figure
1), the shape of the curve would be a narrower inverted U curve.
The figure is meant to demonstrate that the national bourgeoisie in
the Third World emerged as a revolutionary force after the First World War
and reached the pinnacle of its revolutionary maturity in the period after
the Second World War. The Iranian revolution of 1979 marks the death of
the revolutionary period of the national-bourgeoisie. Moreover, the curve
helps to demonstrate that the bourgeoisie in the Third World travelled the
historical distance of the bourgeoisie-democratic transformation in a far
shorter period. In other
words, the Third World has experienced a quicker pace of historical
development—a notion that helps to explain the existence of highly
advanced modes of production side by side with feudal and sometimes
pre-feudal modes of production in Third World countries.
The revolutionary era of the bourgeoisie in Europe lasted nearly a
century. In comparison, the
bourgeoisie in the Third World emerged quicker owing to the influence of
colonial trade and experienced a shorter and more intense revolutionary
era lasting a little more than half a century.
In
conclusion, the era of Bourgeois Democratic revolutions in the West was
completed in the 19th century, in the East it was completed at
the end of the 20th century.
The Incomplete
Bourgeois-Democratic Movement in Pakistan
In
order to better appreciate the dynamics of class struggle in Pakistan, it
is necessary to understand the principle features of the body politic of
the country. In other words,
it is necessary to grasp both the generalities—that connect developments
in Pakistan to Third World politics—and the peculiarities—that
distinguish the particular features of Pakistan with respect to the Third
World. In this third and last
section, the book will first argue that nationalism in the Muslim
community in India and the eventual demand for Pakistan was not the
product of an anti-imperialist national-liberation struggle, but instead
arose in reaction to the anti-colonial struggle led by the All-India
Congress. Consequently, after
partition and independence the state and society of Pakistan had two
distinctive features: A highly centralised bureaucratic colonial state and
a multinational and diverse society.
Second, the paper will attempt to summarize the politics of
Pakistan from independence leading up to the anti-Ayub movement
(1947-1968) and show how the contradiction between a centralised state and
a multinational society resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
Third, the book will critically analyse the anatomy of the Pakistan
Peoples Party and argue that the latter should be considered the
representative party of the national-bourgeoisie of Pakistan.
The rise and fall of the PPP mirrors the second-wave of popular
nationalist mobilisation across the Third World.
In
colonial India, the development of trade, commerce, and industry created a
nascent capitalist class concentrated around Bombay, Gujarat, Calcutta,
and Uttar Pradesh. This colonial capitalist development, however, proceeded
unevenly with respect to different communities.
Furthermore, the reaction of different communities to colonial
capitalism was also dissimilar. Among
the Muslims, the ideological and spiritual legacy of the defeat of the
Mughal Empire along with the defeat of the broader Islamic empire—that
once stretched from Africa to Indonesia—not only destroyed the
self-confidence of the community but also made them extremely resistant to
all ideas emanating from the West. In
the early period, ideologies of Islamic revivalism were the principle form
of resistance to British colonialism and Muslims pinned their hopes on the
ideologies of Abdul Wahab or Jamaluddin Afghani.
The failure of these pan-Islamic movements, based as they were on
traditional ideologies and historically obsolete classes, to mount a
successful challenge to colonialism further deepened the ideological,
political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim community.
In conclusion, the development of capitalist relations of
production was strongly resisted especially in the early period of
colonialism, and consequently, the uneven development of capitalism
resulted in a nascent capitalist class that was divided along religious
lines. Naturally these
divisions, old prejudices, and discriminatory practices were unreservedly
reinforced, reinvented, and exploited by the colonial authorities.
The
break with traditional ideologies in the Muslim community came after the
defeat in the 1857 “War of Independence”.
The utter defeat of this revolt demoralised and demolished the
confidence of the community. Thereafter, the ideas of Syed Ahmed Khan found an increasing
audience. In this atmosphere
of demoralisation, he advocated engaging with the British Empire, learning
English, complete cooperation and loyalty to the British, a modern and
liberal interpretation of Islam, and open hostility to any revolutionary
or national liberation programs. The
colonial authorities, delighted by both his loyalty and liberalism,
knighted him for his services to the Empire.
Moreover, in order to further these loyal and liberal teachings and
also train young Muslims to enter the colonial administration, the British
set up Aligarh University under his directorship.
Aligarh University emerged as the hub of the intellectual life of a
new class of increasingly Westernised Muslims who were applying for jobs
in the colonial administration, engaging in trade, commerce, business, or
professions such as law, teaching, medicine and so on.
Hamza Alavi calls this the “salariat” class—according to
Alavi, the salariat is a class that acquires its means of living through a
salary from the colonial administration.
In fact, this “salariat” should be considered a nascent
bourgeoisie since it was predicated on a mode of life where
commodity-exchange was accepted as a universal principle.
This view is also born out by the political developments of this
class, specifically, the manner in which the Muslim League came to represent the
interests of this nascent bourgeoisie among the Muslims.
In conclusion, the penetration of Western ideas among the Muslims
was extremely slow at first; however, with the defeat of movements based
on traditional ideologies and the growth of the colonial administration
and the economy a small nascent bourgeoisie among the Muslims developed
but owing to its size, strength, and ideological orientation it was
entirely subservient to the colonial empire.
At
the beginning of the 20th century, the anti-colonial movement
gained enormous strength and was headed by the All-India Congress in the
Sub-continent. However, the
nascent bourgeoisie among the Muslims began to feel increasingly
threatened owing to the fact that their mode of existence was tied to the
colonial administration. They
feared that with the departure of the British their interests would be
threatened by the better organised Congress party and the Hindu sections
of the emerging bourgeoisie in India.
Therefore, this class, organised as the Muslim League, began to
campaign for constitutional guarantees to safeguard the rights of
minorities. It was in
connection with the necessity to safeguard the interests of this class
that the idea of a separate state for the Muslims of India was circulated
in the 1930s
and the name “Pakistan” was coined.
But at that time this idea was only prevalent in the Muslim
minority provinces. For
example, Viceroy Wavell remarked, “The Pakistan idea is stronger in the
Muslim minority provinces than in the Pakistan provinces…
[The Muslims in these areas] fear marginalisation by the
numerically dominant Hindus at the centre of a unitary structure of
government advocated by the Congress party” (Noman, 1988, pp. 4).
At
this point the Muslim League did not command mass support and in the
election held in 1936 they were more or less wiped out.
Out of a 109 seats the Muslim League won only 2 from Punjab and 39
from Bengal (Waseem, 1990). In these Muslim majority provinces regional parties were able
to procure the majority of votes and seats.
After this defeat the hitherto, for the most part, secular
democratic Muslim League embarked upon a qualitatively different course of
action. First, the Muslim
League began to utilise Islam to gain popular support with such slogans as
“Islam in danger” and “Pakistan ka matlab kya, La illahah
illalallah”.
Second, the Muslim League began to explicitly campaign for a
separate state. At its 27th
conference held in Lahore in March 1940, the party passed what has come to
be known as the Pakistan Resolution
arguing for a separate state for the Muslims of India. This combination of
Islam and modern nationalism appealed not only to the ruling classes of
the Muslim majority areas, in the Punjab these slogans appealed to the
Muslim peasantry who were indebted to the Hindu merchants, moneylenders,
and traders, and in Bengal these slogans appealed to the Muslim tenants
who worked under a class of Hindu landlords.
At the popular level the notion of a Muslim or Islamic Pakistan
raised expectations of fairness and justice.
The secular Congress or the regionalist parties could offer no
comparable program to counter this illusion.
Thus, the contradictions between different economic strata were
expressed in communal tones. In
the decade following the defeat of in the 1936 elections, the Muslim
League was transformed into a party with popular support and it came to
represent not only the interests of the nascent bourgeoisie in Muslim
minority provinces but also the landowning interests in Muslim majority
provinces (Talbot, 2002). By
1946 the Muslim League could demonstrate that it commanded electoral
strength
and street power.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s political strategy to convince the colonial
authorities that the Muslim League should be considered the “sole
spokesman” (Jalal, 1985) of the Muslims of India had borne fruit only
after an uneasy marriage with landed interests in Muslim majority
provinces and Islam.
In
conclusion, while the All-India Congress expressed the political
aspirations of an advanced, highly developed, modern, and secular
bourgeoisie that confidently strove towards independence, the Muslim
League expressed the political aspirations of a backward, underdeveloped,
dependent, and subservient colonial nascent Muslim bourgeoisie in alliance
with landowning interests from the Muslim majority provinces.
As a consequence, Pakistan was not the product of a prolonged
national-liberation movement but rather the product of legal and
constitutional negotiations between the anti-colonial movement led by the
All-India Congress on the one hand and the Muslim League and the colonial
authorities on the other. As
a result, the manner in which Pakistan was created (including the fact
that its Eastern and Western wings were separated by over a 1000
kilometres of Indian territory) gave rise to the enduring opinion, on both
sides of the border, but especially in India, that Pakistan was an
“artificial state”. In
conclusion, Pakistan, far from being created as a result of a
bourgeois democratic liberation movement, was created in reaction to the
bourgeois democratic anti-colonial liberation mass movement led by the
Congress party. In a word,
the society that became Pakistan in 1947 never experienced a 1789.
Independence
and partition in 1947 had an enormous and deep impact on the psychology of
the newly created Pakistan. The
unexpected horrific forms of communal violence created a bitter divide
between the new Pakistan and India. Approximately
24 million people crossed the border both ways and communal rioting took
the lives of some 250,000. These
events had a long lasting effect on the psyche of the Mohajir (migrant)
population. On the other hand, the manner in which the new ruling classes
in Pakistan descended upon the property of the emigrating Hindus and Sikhs
while refugee camps swarmed and teemed with endless streams of poverty
stricken, starving, broken, and often brutalised refugees from India,
forcefully demonstrated that the so called ‘land of the pure’ was not
the utopia imagined by the Muslim community.
The moment was captured eloquently in Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s poem
“Subeh Azadi August 1947”.
Politically,
two notable features stood out with respect to Pakistan after
independence. First, since
the creation of the state preceded the creation of a ‘Pakistani
nation’, in fact since the creation of Pakistan was based on the
two-nation theory that precluded the understanding that the country was
composed of multiple nationalities, the state was plagued with problems of
national integration from the outset.
A historically unique set of circumstances and an exceptional
confluence of interests had brought different communities together to
accept the two-nation theory and form a state.
These disparate elements were not, as yet, a united, integrated,
and cohesive bourgeoisie. With
the creation of Pakistan the circumstances that brought these diverse
interests together no longer existed and the conglomeration of interests
fractured. Thus, the Muslim
League splintered and new parties emerged to represent the new alignment
of class forces. The question
of national integration posed the most serious threat to Pakistan as a
state and society and divided the politics of the country into two camps:
those who supported a centralized government and those who supported a
federalised government with wide provincial autonomy.
Second,
since Pakistan was born in reaction to a mass based liberation movement,
it inherited an undemocratic, rigid, and non-participatory neo-colonial
state structure (Feroz, 1973; Ali, 1996, Ali, 1983).
Colonial politics had conditioned the state structure to protect
the interests of the British Empire by ensuring that politics remain
within a certain perimeter. Thus,
the principle function of the colonial state was to act as a repressive
institute to undermine mass mobilization and participatory democracy.
After independence little or no effort was made to alter the
structure of the state to include subaltern classes into the body politics
of the country. In the words
of Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan inherited a “Viceregal” state (Sayeed,
1980). Similarly, Hamza Alavi
used the term “the condition of the over-developed post-colonial
state” (Alavi, 1982). The temptation to utilise this Viceregal
overdeveloped state against civil society proved far too great for the new
elites to resist (Malik, 1997). The
civil and military bureaucracy continued to intervene in politics in much
the same manner as the colonialists before them (Waseem, 1990, pp. 26).
The political system was aptly described by Saleem H. Hashmi as
“the government of the secretaries, by the secretaries, and for the
secretaries” (Kennedy, 1987, pp. 5).
The state elite viewed political problems as ‘law and order
situations’ and attempted to solve these complex issues in a
heavy-handed manner and hostility with India was used as a justification
for rigid centralisation (Jalal, 1990, pp. 89).
In conclusion, it follows from theoretical consideration and
historical analysis that the Viceregal overdeveloped state was the
dominant player in the Politics of Pakistan.
In
sum, the principle contradiction in the early period of Pakistan’s
history was between the national movements within Pakistan and the
Viceregal state.
The
most vocal opponents of federalism were the ruling interests of West
Pakistan. The ruling
interests of West Pakistan were a combination of the nascent bourgeoisie
from Muslim minority provinces in India and the Punjabi landlords.
The nascent bourgeoisie from Bombay and U.P. represented by the old
guard of the Muslim League that had settled for the most part in Karachi
and Hyderabad. Owing to their
superior education, they became the building blocks of the new financial,
industrial, civil, bureaucratic, and state institutions of the country.
With the development of the economy, they developed political and
economic ties with the land owning interests of Punjab.
The landlords of Punjab were a powerful political force especially
owing to the fact that the bulk of the recruitment for the army occurred
in that province. Furthermore, the Punjab supplied vital agricultural surplus.
These ruling groups were joined by the smaller religiously inspired
Jamaat-e-Islami that became the staunchest opponents of provincial
federalism. This
conglomeration of interest groups is known as the Establishment in
popular political discourse in the country.
The opposition and distrust of the Muslim League towards the
regional nationalists had its origins in the independence movement itself.
The establishment took the view that the regional nationalists were
not strong supporters of Pakistan and could not be relied to “safeguard
the two-nation theory” or the political-ideological borders of Pakistan.
On
the other hand, the federalists argued for wide provincial autonomy and
were a diverse coalition of interests.
The Bengali nationalists were represented mainly by the Awami
League (1953) led by Suhawardy and Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman.
The Awami League was backed by a mass based movement with a
well-established constituency and was composed of educated personnel that
could run the state machinery. They
also possessed the economic strength of the Bengali agricultural economy.
However, they lacked any influence in the armed forces of Pakistan
and also lacked an
independent army. The
National Awami Party (1957) led by Maulana Bhashani of Bengal was soon
joined in West Pakistan by the Pathan nationalists (led by Ghaffar Khan
and his son Wali Khan and Badus Samad Achakzai from the Pukhtun area in
Baluchistan), the Baloch nationalists (led by Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ghaus
Baksh Bazenjo, Attaullah Mengal, and Akbar Bugti), progressives from the
Punjab (led by Mian Iftikhar uddin), and certain elements of the Sindhi
nationalists. The newly
formed Communist Party of Pakistan (1948), was forced underground in 1954
when Pakistan moved into the sphere of influence of the United States and
became a formal member of the anti-communist military pacts of CENTO (the
Central Treaty Organisation included Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) and
SEATO (the South East Asian Treaty Organisation included Philippines,
Thailand, and Pakistan). Thereafter
the CPP worked in close contact with the regional nationalists in the NAP.
On the whole, these anti-establishment federalists were an anathema
to the central government that was trained in the colonial spirit of
absolute centralisation.
In
conclusion, in the early period of Pakistan history one can speak of an establishment
composed of the civil military bureaucracy various factions of the Muslim
League and the Jamaat e Islami. And
on the other hand one can speak of the forces that were considered
anti-establishment composed principally of the regional nationalists and
smaller left parties.
The
exploitative and oppressive nature of the relationship between the central
government and the provinces prevented any constitutional agreement
between the different interests that now composed Pakistan during the
first decade. According to
Omar Noman nearly 70% of the foreign exchange earned by the sale of jute
produced in East Pakistan was used to finance industrial development in
West Pakistan (Noman, 1988). Furthermore,
this economic exploitation was compounded by national oppression.
For example, the first constitution (proposed in 1956) declared
Urdu, spoken by only 3.3% of the population, as the “official”
language of the state. This discrimination towards other languages, especially
Bengali which was spoken by 55% of the population, infuriated all the
nationalities in Pakistan.
The
establishment was unwilling to alter the relationship with the
provinces or to make anything other than token concessions.
Since the ruling interests of West Pakistan were unwilling to
change the exploitative and oppressive nature of the relationship with the
provinces, the regional nationalists were justifiably infuriated by the
second-class status accorded to them in the new Pakistan.
As a result, the political forces reached a deadlock that was
broken only by brute force with the intervention of the army in 1958.
General
Ayub Khan undertook an ambitious plan of modernisation.
Pakistan moved firmly into the US sphere of interest and Harvard
University trained thinkers such as Gustav Papanek and Samuel Huntington
were advising the government’s development policy.
Amongst other measures, the military government created the Basic
Democracies
system to undermine the basis of regional nationalist politics.
A new highly centralised constitution with a modern Family Laws
Ordinance
was introduced in 1962.
However,
the most significant changes occurred in the sphere of the economy where a
strategy of state corporate capitalism was implemented (Noman, 1988).
The government undertook a deliberate program of concentration of
capital justified on the basis of the theory of “functional
inequality”.
There is little doubt that this economic plan increased aggregate
growth to phenomenal levels. Industrialisation proceeded at breakneck speed and Pakistan
grew by an average of 6% during the entire decade (Noman, 1988).
Moderate land reforms were undertaken to break-up very large
landholdings and Green Revolution technology—including HYV seeds,
tractors, tube wells, and small machines (Ali, 1982)—was introduced on a
mass level at subsidized rates. Pakistan’s
hitherto sluggish economy burst forward on the path of modern industrial
capitalist development.
Ironically
the Ayub modernisation did not help to consolidate the establishment but
strengthened the hands of the opposition.
The deliberate concentration of capital and the green revolution
had the impact of increasing regional and class inequities (Zaidi, 1991).
Modernisation not only created a new class of entrepreneurs but
also created an enormous new industrial working class that was becoming
more and more organised and radical.
Similarly, in the countryside the green revolution increased
landlessness and inequality and the contradictions between the tenants and
landed interests began to assume an antagonistic character (Khan, 1981;
Ahmed, 1973). In sum, the economic changes brought about by Ayub Khan had
altered the economic base of society and greatly strengthened the classes
that desired democratic reforms. Furthermore,
demographically a new generation was coming of age all over Pakistan.
More young people were in touch with the West and the radical
changes in international politics were not lost on them.
The contradiction in Pakistan between the obstinate rigidity of the
Viceregal system and the growing democratic forces coalesced with the
second wave of popular nationalist mass mobilisation across the Third
World in the dramatic year of 1968 (Ali, 1973).
Spontaneous
student protests in 1968 sparked a nation wide movement against the Ayub
dictatorship. In East
Pakistan the people mobilised in millions under the Awami League.
In West Pakistan the astute foreign minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto almost as if in anticipation of the coming changes created the
Pakistan Peoples Party in 1967 that played a decisive role in the anti-Ayub
movement. The Ayub
dictatorship fell under pressure from popular protests just as Samuel
Huntington’s famous book lauding Ayub Khan as a modern Roussaeu was
hitting the shelves. Ayub
Khan resigned and handed over power to General Yaya Khan who wisely
decided to hold the first democratic elections in the history of Pakistan.
The
anti-Ayub movement and the first democratic election marked a watershed in
the political history of the country.
In East Pakistan the Awami League was able to win an astounding 151
out of 153 seats. In West
Pakistan the PPP was able to win 81 out of 131 seats.
In NWFP and Balochistan NAP and JUI were able to form a coalition
government at the provincial level (Wilder, 1999).
In accordance with the rules of democracy, the Awami League was
entitled to form the central government.
However, the ruling interests of West Pakistan—principally the
army and the bureaucracy—prevented the Awami League from doing so
because they did not want the latter to alter the exploitative
relationship
between the eastern and the western wings of Pakistan.
This deadlock resulted in the disintegration of order and civil war
between the West Pakistani army and the Bengali nationalist followed.
The India armed forces intervened in 1971 and after a few days of
fighting the Pakistani troops capitulated and Bangladesh was born.
In
conclusion, the contradiction between the highly centralised state and
political forces based on contradictory interests resulted not only in
political instability, military dictatorship, but the dismemberment of the
country itself.
Amidst
this chaos, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took power on the 20th of
December 1971. In the view of
the author the PPP was an archetype of the second-wave of popular
nationalist mass mobilisations across the Third World.
In terms of the character of its Pakistani nationalism, its
policies towards the different classes in society (specifically the
classes composing the establishment, the national-bourgeoisie, and
the working class), its position on the state and foreign policy, and,
most importantly, its social composition suggest that the PPP represented
a national-bourgeoisie opposed to the traditional civil-military
establishment. The rise and
fall of the PPP, therefore, is linked to the rise and fall of the
national-bourgeoisie as a class across the Third World.
The
main figure of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, built his
political constituency on the basis of anti-India Pakistani nationalism.
During the 1965 war with India, Bhutto gained popularity by his
belligerent stance when he declared in the United Nations that Pakistan
would wage a “thousand years war on India”.
He won mass approval especially in the Punjab were anti-India
Pakistani nationalism was always high.
Being a man in touch with the times, he skilfully combined this
nationalist rhetoric with the slogan of “roti, kaprra, makan” [bread,
clothing, shelter] (Aberle). The
1970 election manifesto of the PPP is a skilful combination of popular
nationalism combined with social democratic rhetoric.
The
PPP’s virulent Pakistani nationalism prevented the party from grasping
the significance of regional nationalism in Pakistan.
On this score, Bhutto and the PPP remained Pakistani chauvinists
throughout their political history. For
example, during his negotiations with Mujib in 1971 he witnessed the
carnage first hand but on his return from Bangladesh he declared, “by
the grace of God Pakistan has been saved” (Bhutto, 1971) and covered up
the genocide committed by the army in East Pakistan.
In the opinion of Bengali writers, his book The Great Tragedy betrays
the thinly concealed “Pakistani chauvinism” for whereas for Bhutto the
dismemberment of Pakistan was a tragedy, for the Bengalis, it was liberation.
When
the PPP was in power, Bhutto continued his nationally chauvinist policies
towards the nationalist movement of the Pakhtun and Baloch.
For example, in November-December 1972 the Jam of Las Bela rebelled
against the provincial government of NAP-JUI and the provincial government
arranged a tribal lashkar
to quell the rebellion. Further,
the following month a cash of arms was discovered in the Iraqi embassy and
the central government claimed that they were being smuggled to
Baluchistan to prepare for an insurgency.
On February 15 1973, Bhutto, claiming that constitutional order had
broken down in the province, dismissed the NAP-JUI provincial government
and sent four divisions of military (some 80,000 troops)
into Balochistan. The NAP-JUI
provincial government in NWFP immediately resigned in protest (Harrison,
1981). The use of the army to
quell this regional nationalist movement shows that Bhutto had learnt
little or nothing from the lessons of 1971.
On
the whole, the position of the PPP with respect to India and with respect
to the regional nationalist movements within Pakistan shows that the
party’s stance on the national question was in line with a ‘Pakistan
based capitalism’.
In
1972 the PPP nationalised 256 companies including the principle assets of
the 22 big families of Pakistan and broke the power of monopoly capital in
Pakistan (Shahid ur Rahman Who Owns Pakistan, Hassan, 2000; Burke,
1988; Noman, 1988). From this
simple fact, it becomes clear that the PPP did not represent the interests
of the very large capitalists. At
the same time, the PPP upon assuming power undertook a civil service
reform in which more than 1,300 of the top bureaucrats were expelled on
various charges and a new system of lateral entry into the Civil Services
of Pakistan was introduced (Burke, 1988).
This action was hailed at the popular level as a blow against afsarshahi
(officer class). In 1972
the government declared a land ceiling of 150 acres for irrigated and 300
acres for non-irrigated land. Although
land reform only benefited some 75,213 families (Viqar & Amjad, 1984;
Zaidi 1997) and did not break the power of large landlords;
nonetheless, it was a significant blow to the prestige of landlords
because land was taken without compensation and distributed free to
landless peasants (Zaidi, 1997; Khan 1981).
In 1977 another land reform was announced, but never implemented
owing to Zia’s Marshall Law, declaring a 100 and 200 acres ceiling for
irrigated and non-irrigated land respectively (Zaidi, 1997).
Thus, it is clear that the PPP attacked the three principle
interests of the neo-colonial state: the bureaucracy, the monopoly
capitalists, and the large landlords (Feroz 1973).
From these facts it is not implausible to conclude that the PPP did
not represent the aspirations of the establishment.
The
economic policies of the PPP were geared to give special incentives to the
small and medium scale urban and rural capitalists.
The Finance Minister Dr. Mubashar Hasan’s engineered a policy of
public ownership of large-scale industry and banks and encouraged the
development of small and middle scale capitalists (Hasan, 2000).
The government recommended that banks give preferential treatment
to small and middle scale capitalists and agriculturalists (Zaidi, 1997)
and export promotion schemes and subsidies of various sorts for big
capitalists, that were a hallmark of the Ayub’s era, were discontinued.
In agriculture the Agricultural Bank of Pakistan was instructed to give
credit preference to small and middle peasants.
The
only action that appears to go against the interests of the small and
middle scale capitalists was the nationalisation of rice husking and
flourmills. The
nationalisation of these mills, however, allowed the government to lower
the price of basic necessities thus not only boosting voter confidence but
also the rate of profit of the entire capitalist class.
Therefore, the losses in direct revenue were small in comparison to
the gains for the entire national-bourgeoisie.
Thus, it is not hard to conclude that the nationalisation of these
mills did not go against the larger fundamental interests of the small and
middle scale capitalists.
In
the early period, the PPP government removed repressive laws on trade
unionism and set labour laws in accordance with ILO standards.
At the same time education was declared universal and free and
private schools were nationalised. Health
care was also declared universal and free.
However, contrary to expectations, the PPP did not allocate large
sums of money to social services and the bulk of government spending still
went to the army (Viqar & Rashid, 1984).
When
growing labour militancy resulted in spontaneous factory seizures by
workers in 1973 this represented a turning point for the PPP with respect
to the labour movement. The
PPP sent in the army and the police to take back the factories in Multan,
Karachi, Kot Lakhpat, and Faislabad that workers had taken over.
In Karachi and Multan the army shot and killed many workers which
resulted in the estrangement of the labour movement from the PPP.
Furthermore,
a strong factional struggle broke out within the PPP between the leftwing
of the party and the rightwing of the party.
The leftwing was represented by people like Mubashir Hasan, J.A.
Rahim, Miraj Mohammed Khan, Rafi Raza, Sheikh Rasheed.
The rightwing of the party was connected to rural landowning
interests and represented by Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Sadiq Querishi (Hasan,
2000, pp. 172-210). Increasingly, the PPP was criticised from the left for
purging the radicals from the party and not proceeding with the
socialisation of property. After
1973 the leftwing lost Bhutto’s favour and was gradually purged from the
levers of power in the party and state. Mubashar Hasan’s book The Mirage of Power captures
this transformation in detail. The
book shows how independent working class movements, such as the kachi
abadi movement (squatter colonies) in Lahore, threatened Bhutto who
began to build a new political base among landlords and the army. By 1977 the PPP relied heavily on large landlords to win the
election. In other words,
fear of growing labour militancy transformed the party into an
increasingly conservative force demonstrating that the PPP was caught in
the classic dilemma of the national-bourgeoisie.
The
1973 constitution, presented by the PPP, was the only constitution in the
history of the country that was approved by a representative assembly
chosen in a universal free and fair election (Raza, 1997).
Asides from injunctions to Islamic Socialism, the constitution
upholds private property along with certain provisions for social justice
in a federal state. In sum, the constitution upholds the fundamental principles
of a bourgeois-democratic republic (Raza, 1997).
The
PPP government did not built a ‘peoples army’ on the model of China,
as promised in its early manifestoes, but strengthened the existing
Pakistan Army. Bhutto, hoping
to create a stronger constituency within the army (Hasan, 2000, pp. xi),
not only rearmed the army but also launched the plans to build the
so-called ‘Islamic Bomb’. Till
his last days when Bhutto was in his death cell, he continued to appeal to
the patriotic sentiments of the armed forces and insisted that the
opposition was funded by the US to undermine the plans to build
Pakistan’s first atomic bomb (Bhutto, 1977a, 1977b).
In sum, the PPP was not interested in “smashing the bourgeois
state” to build a “dictatorship of the proletariat” but in simply
strengthened the existing post-colonial state.
Bhutto
was a master statesman at the international level and foreign policy was
his speciality. As the
foreign minister under Ayub Khan, Bhutto advocated Afro-Arab-Asian and
Latin American solidarity for the Third World (Bhutto 1964, 1966, 1969b,
1976). His book entitled The
Myth of Independence is an amalgamation of basic anti-imperialist and
dependency theories that were extremely popular among Third World
intellectuals in the 1960s (Bhutto, 1968b).
Bhutto advocated friendly relations with the socialist block and
especially China. He termed
this foreign policy ‘bilateralism’ which implies a non-aligned policy
with respect to the two super-powers (Burke & Ziring 1990; Talbot
1998).
On
the basis of building Afro-Arab-Asian and Latin American solidarity Bhutto
built links with Islamic countries through the Second Islamic Summit
Conference hosted in Lahore in 1974. The conference brought together diverse elements ranging from
conservative leaders such as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah of
Iran, to radical leaders such as Colonel Gaddaffi of Libya and Yassir
Arafat of Palestine. On the
whole, the foreign policy of the PPP was non-aligned and built on the
ideological basis of Afro-Arab-Asian and Latin American solidarity.
Anwar
H. Syed analysing the social composition of the PPP writes,
Among
the party’s 66 Punjabi MNAs 26 were 40 years of age or younger, one had
received only religious education, 20 had passed high or higher secondary
school, and 45 held bachelor’s, and in some cases higher, degrees. Their
number included six businessmen, three doctors, two engineers, one
journalist, 24 lawyers and 30 who listed “agriculture” or
“farming” as their occupation. (Syed,
1992, pp. 85, 86)
Two
of the 20 Sindhi MNAs belonging to the PPP had only had religious
education, six had passed high school, and ten held college, or higher,
degrees. Seventeen of them were “farmers” and two were lawyers. Four
of the Punjabi and two of the Sindhi “farmers” also listed law as
their occupation, and one of the Sindhi “farmers” said he was also a
businessman.
It
is noteworthy that he majority of those elected on the PPP ticket from the
Punjab were lawyers, professional people, and businessmen rather than
landlords. A few of those who called themselves “farmers” 2 were
indeed great landlords, but most on the list were probably no more than
well-to-do middle-level landowners. By contrast, all but two of the
party’s Sindhi MNAs were substantial landlords, and several of them were
among the great waderas of Sindh.
[T]he
PPP polled strongest in those urban and rural tehsils which have
been undergoing recent change as measured by the socio-economic indices
described above. In stagnant
areas, even though they may be at a higher level of development, the PPP
did generally less well and the older Muslim Leagues, the Islamic Parties
or independents fared better (Burki & Baxter, 1975, pp. 173-74).
This
ample evidence supports the view that the Ayub modernisation created and
mobilised new political forces that became the base of a new bourgeois
class that was represented by the PPP.
In
conclusion, the historical record of the PPP’s performance in government
from 1971 to 1977 shows that the party was built on the ideological basis
of a Pakistani nationalism that excluded regional nationalist loyalties.
Nonetheless, the PPP opposed the establishment and the interests of
the bureaucracy, monopoly capitalists, and large landlords.
At the same time it was opposed to independent working class
movements and in the final analysis favoured small and middle scale
capitalists. The PPP
reequipped and strengthen the Pakistan army and did not hesitate to build
the so-called ‘Islamic Bomb’. At the international level, Bhutto
favoured a non-aligned foreign policy and pursued Afro-Asian-Arab and
Latin American solidarity. The
social composition of the PPP composition was a mixture of professional
and landed interests that derived mass support from the urban and rural
poor especially in areas that experienced rapid modernisation during the
1960s. On the basis of these factors, it is reasonable to conclude
that the PPP represented the national-bourgeoisie in Pakistan.
In
1977 Bhutto after having promised a new land reform program felt confident
of his popularity and decided to hold an early national election.
Opposition parties quickly united to form the Pakistan National
Alliance (PNA)—a coalition of parties whose interests were hurt by the
left-leaning policies of the PPP. When
the Election Commission announced a result heavily in favour of the PPP,
the PNA charged Bhutto with having rigged the election and began a
campaign of street demonstrations. Bhutto
called out the army to restore order.
Powerful interests within the army who were already displeased with
the left-leaning policies of the PPP used the deadlock between the PNA and
the PPP as justification to declare Marshal Law.
Thus, the PPP was overthrown in 1977 by a coalition of right-wing
military generals supported by sections of the middle classes.
General
Zia understood that in accordance with the 1973 constitution he had
committed a treasonous act. In order to eliminate his political opponent, Zia put Bhutto
on trail in a murder case. On
April 4th 1979, despite the split verdict of the Supreme Court and appeals
of clemency from foreign heads of state, Bhutto was executed. In the same month, the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan broke
out and Pakistan became a frontline state in the cold war.
General Zia embarked on a plan of “Islamisation” to prepare the
ground for the Mujahideen struggle against the Afghan communists and fight
the ideological influence of socialist ideas and the PPP inside Pakistan.
After
his execution, Bhutto became a martyr in the eyes of the urban and rural
and the PPP became a symbol of democratic resistance to Military rule.
As anger against the establishment grew, the Movement for
the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) emerged in 1983.
The Sindhi nationalists were the staunchest allies of the PPP
whereas the Baloch and Pakhtun nationalists did not join the MRD.
The 1980s also witnessed
the creation of a new regional nationalist party in the shape of the
Mohajir Quami Mahaz. The MQM
was based on the Urdu speaking Mohajir community in Karachi and Hydrabad
and was supported by the establishment in order to undermine the
influence of the MRD in the urban industrial centres of Karachi and
Hydrabad. Al-Zulfiqar,
led by Bhutto’s son Mir Murtaza Bhutto, was a left split from the PPP
and became infatuated with urban guerrilla war and formed links with the
Afghan communists. Nonetheless,
the Benazir led opposition through the MRD remained the principle motor of
popular mobilisation.
In
1985 Zia held party-less elections to stem the tide of growing criticism
to military rule by offering concessions to the democratic movement but
this partial restoration of democracy did not adversely affect the
popularity of the PPP and Benazir returned to a tumultuous welcome in
1986. The euphoria created
the illusion that Benazir’s return heralded a popular democratic revolution.
This illusion was put to the litmus test when the end of the cold
war changed the geo-strategic interests of global actors and the third
wave of democracy swept across the world.
Zia was killed in 1988 in an air crash that remains clouded in
mystery and elections were held once again in Pakistan.
More or less the same class forces that put together the PNA came
together to form the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) to oppose the PPP but
the latter was able to defeat the IJI and form the central government.
On
a popular level people expected a return of the radical PPP of the 1970s
but Benazir not only accepted the conditions of the army but also of the
IMF to implement a process of privatisation and Structural Adjustment
Policies (SAP). The fact that
the PPP had succumbed to the policies of the IMF, despite immense popular
support, demonstrated that the national-bourgeoisie in Pakistan had
reached a level of rapprochement and compromise with the West where it
preferred to risk losing mass support but did not wish to risk losing
support the of the West. Naturally,
the Structural Adjustment Policies of the IMF were extremely unpopular
with the urban and rural poor and consequently the PPP began to loose
popularity. In addition,
rumours of corruption became increasingly undeniable tarnishing the image
of the party.
During
this ‘democratic’ decade (1988-1999), both the PPP and the Muslim
League came to power twice. The
president dismissed the democratic governments (the PPP in 1993, IJI in
1995, and the PPP again in 1997) under the 8th amendment—a
relic of the Zia period that allowed the army to control the parliament.
However, the restoration of democracy failed to satisfy the
aspirations of the people and they increasingly became disillusioned with
the process of democracy itself. By 1977 the PPP had lost its former popularity and the Muslim
League was able to form the central government with an unprecedented
mandate precisely because the PPP voter did not turn out to vote (Wilder,
1999).
By
the 1980s, as stated earlier, the second-wave of popular nationalist mass
mobilisation across the Third World was fading away.
In Pakistan repressive conditions combined with the legacy of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto allowed the PPP to continue as a motor of mass
mobilisation till the 1990s. However,
with the restoration of democracy the class basis and internal
degeneration of the PPP could no longer be concealed from the voter.
The decline in the popularity of the PPP has created an enormous
political vacuum that no party or movement has, as yet, been able to fill.
In this political vacuum, movements inspired by traditional or
neo-traditional ideologies based on religion have become more prominent
and visible. Thus, on the whole, the rise and fall of the PPP runs
parallel to the dialectical development of national-bourgeois movements in
the Third World that in turn mirror the rise and fall of the bourgeoisie
in Europe in the 19th century.
This
paper has tried to construct a framework to view the structural
transformation of politics in the Third World through the prism of class
struggle by arguing that the life-cycle of the bourgeoisie in
Europe and the Third World passes through three stages of development:
adolescence, revolutionary maturity, and conservative old age.
Admittedly this attempt has only laid down the bare minimum of
historical facts and fails to take account of all the intricacies,
particularities, twists, turns, and complications in the history of the
development of the bourgeoisie. Nonetheless,
this schematic helps to identify and delineate the principle phases of
development of history. Naturally,
a deeper and wider appreciation of the complexities of history can help to
flesh out the intricacies of the narrative.
The value of the paper, as it stands, lies in the fact that it
attempts to string together into a single theoretical whole the
dialectical movement of classes and the resulting structural
transformation of the bourgeoisie through world history.
The increasing visibility of movements inspired by traditional or
neo-traditional ideologies provides testimony to the fact that the secular
democratic movements led by the national bourgeoisie in the Third World
have recoiled from the tasks of waging an anti-imperialist and democratic
struggle.
Therefore,
those social forces that expect the emergence of an anti-imperialist
struggle on the class basis of the national-bourgeoisie, or those social
forces that expect the emergence of a democratic polity on the economic
basis of reformed capitalism, or those social forces that expect the
creation of a secular and liberal culture on the basis of
bourgeois-democracy are essentially harking back to a period of history
that has long passed and exhausted its revolutionary potential.
The class that could create a reformed capitalism, the national
bourgeoisie, has completely outlived and exhausted its revolutionary,
anti-imperialist, or democratic potential.
The national-bourgeoisie has achieved complete rapprochement with
imperialism and the status quo. Those
social forces that are still hoping to fight for democracy without
challenging capitalism are essentially utopian and are unable to
understand the movement of classes or the trends of 20th
century history. History
shows that the era of Bourgeois Democratic revolutions in the West was
completed in the 19th century, in the East it was completed at
the end of the 20th century.
The
future belongs to a developing working-class movement through out the
world. Only a working class
movement based on Marxism-Leninism can lead the struggle against
imperialism, reaction, and capitalism.
Only a struggle based on the class foundation of the working-class
can continue the struggle for democracy and the liberation of the Third
World. It is even possible
that the Third World that entered the world of capitalism last, precisely
for that reason, will enter the world of socialism first.
Bibliography
Ahmad, Saghir Peasant Classes in Pakistan, in Gough, Kathleen and
Sharma, Hari P. (ed.) (1973) Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,
Monthly Review Press, New York and London
Ahmed, Feroz Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan, in Gough,
Kathleen and Sharma, Hari P. (ed.) (1973) Imperialism and Revolution in
South Asia, Monthly Review Press, New York and London
Ahmed, Iqbal (1988) Pakistan ka Siyasi Nizam, (Trans. The
Political Culture of Pakistan), Karachi Press
Ahmed, Viqar; Amjad, Rashid (1984) The
Management of Pakistan’s Economy 1947-1982, Oxford University Press
Alavi, Hamza (1982) Capitalism and
Colonial production, Croom Helm, London
Albertini, Rudolf von
(1961) Decolonization: the Administration and Future of Colonies,
1919-1960
Ali, Karamat (1982) Pakistan: The
Political Economy of Rural Development, Vanguard Publications Ltd.
Ali, Mubarik (1996) Jagirdari aur Jagirdarana Culture (Trans.
Feudalism and Feudal Culture), Mashal Press, Pakistan
Ali, Tariq Explosion in South Asia, in Gough, Kathleen and
Sharma, Hari P. (ed.) (1973) Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,
Monthly Review Press, New York and London
— (1983) Can Pakistan
Survive: the Death of a State Pelican Books
— (2000) On the Abyss, HarperCollins Publishers India
Baxter, Craig (1991) Zia’s Pakistan, West View Press
Belokrenitsky, Vyacheslav, Capitalism
in Pakistan: A History of Socioeconomic Development, Patriot
Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p. 99.
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (1964) Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Classic
— (1966) Reshaping Foreign Policy, Classic
— a (1968) Political Situation in Pakistan, Classic
— b (1968) The Myth of Independence, Classic
— c (1968) Let the People Judge, Classic
— a (1969) Awakening the People, Classic
— b (1969) Pakistan and the Alliances, Classic
— a (1971) Marching Towards Democracy, Classic
— b (1971) The Great Tragedy, Classic
— (1976) The Third World New Directions, Classic
— a (1977) If I Am Assassinated, Classic
— b (1977) Speeches Delivered Before the UNO and the Security
Council, Important Press Conferences, Speeches and Statements vol. 1, 2,
3, 4, Classic
Blood, Peter R. (1994) Area Handbook Series, Pakistan, a Country
Study, Federal Research Division Library of Congress
Burki, Shahid Javed (1988) Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977
(second edition), Macmillan
— (1991) Pakistan Under Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq
Westview Press.
— (1999) Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, (third edition)
Westview
—
Ziring, Lawrence
(1990) Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press
—
(1975) Craig
Baxter, ‘Socio-Economic Indicators of the Peoples Party Vote in the
Punjab: A Study at the Tehsil Level” in W.H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in
Transition, Islamabad
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto (1979) Dependency and
Development in Latin America Berkeley: University of California Press
Davidson, Basil (1980) Africa (8 part documentary series on
Africa).
Facts
about Pakistan,
Karachi Press, 1985
Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1984) Nuskha e hai wafa, Maktabai Karwan, Lahore
(Urdu)
Gardezi, Hassan N. Neo-colonial Alliances and the Crises of Pakistan,
in Gough, Kathleen and Sharma, Hari P. (ed.) (1973) Imperialism and
Revolution in South Asia, Monthly Review Press, New York and London
Halliday, Fred (1983) The Making of the Second Cold War, London
Halperin, Sandra (1997) In the Mirror of the Third World: Capitalist
Development in the Third World Cornell University Press
Harrison, Selig S. (1981) In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch
Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Harriss, John Capitalism and Peasant Production: The Green Revolution
in India, in Shanin, Theodor (1971) Peasants and Peasant Societies Basil Blackwell.
Hasan, Mubashar (2000) The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry Into the
Bhutto Years 1971-1977, Oxford Univeristy Press
Hobsbawm, Eric (1962) The Age of Revolution, London
— (1975) The Age of
Capital, London
— (1987) The Age of Empire, London
— (1987) The Age of Extremes, London
Holland, R.F. (1985) European Decolonisation 1918-1981,
Basindstoke
Human
Development Report [1995 and 1993]
Published for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), New York,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, [1995 and 1993].
Jalal, Aisha (1985) The Sole
Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan Cambridge
University Press
— (1990) The State of Martial Rule Cambridge University Press
Jones, Philip Edward (1979) The Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group
response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation
unpublished Pg.D. dissertation
Kautsky, John (1972) Political Consequences of Modernization, New
York
Kedourie, Elie (1970) Nationalism in Asia and Africa, New York
Kennedy, Charles H. (1987) Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Karachi, New
York, Oxford University Press
Kurian, George Thomas (1978) Encyclopedia of the Third World, Facts
on File, New York, NY, Oxford, England
Lenin, V.I. (1977) The Historic Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx,
— Imperialism the
Highest Stage of Capitalism,
— Backward Europe and
Advanced Asia,
— The Revolution in
China,
— On the National and
Colonial Question, all in Selected Works, Progress
Publishers Moscow
Mahmood, Moazam ‘The Pattern of Adoption of Green Revolution
Technology and its Effect on Landholdings in the Punjab’, in Ali,
Karamat (1982) Pakistan: The
Political Economy of Rural Development Vanguard Publications Ltd.
Malik, Iftikhar H. (1997) State and Civil Society in Pakistan, Macmillan
Marx, Karl & Engels, Fredrick (1983) The Portable Karl Marx edited
by Eugene Kamenka, Ludwig Feuerbach, The Manifesto of the
Communist Party, German Ideology Penguin Books
Moore, Barrington (1966) Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon.
Noman, Omar (1988) The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-85, KPI
London and New York
Pakistan Peoples Party Election and Party Manifesto (1970 - 1968 -
1977) from www.ppp.org
(PERU) Pakistan Economic Research Unite (1973)‘The General Elections
1970: an Analysis of Socioeconomic Trends in West Pakistan, Karachi
Raza, Rafi (1997), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 1967-1977, Oxford University
Press
Rizvi, Hasan Askari (1973) Pakistan Peoples Party: the First Phase
1967-71 Progressive Publishers
— (1980) Politics in
Pakistan, The Nature and Direction of Change, Praeger Special Studies
Seal, Anil (1968) The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Cambridge
Syed, Anwar H. (1992) The Discourse and Politics of Zulifiqar Ali
Bhutto, Macmillan
Talbot, Ian (1998) Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst &
Company, London
— (2002) Khizr Tiwana:
the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India, Oxford
University Press
Waseem, Mohammed (1990) Politics and the State in Pakistan Oxford
University Press
Wilder, Andrew (1999) The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Behaviour in the
Punjab, Oxford University Press
Wolf, E. (1982) Europe and the Peoples Without History, Berkeley
1982.
Wolpert, Stanley (1984) Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University
Press
Wolpert, Stanley (1993) Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Oxford
University Press
Zaidi, Akbar S. (1991) Regional Imbalances and the National Question
— (1997) Issues in the
Pakistan Economy Oxford University Press
![[Company Logo Image]](_borders/hammer.gif){kind=small}
