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The Development of Post-Fordist Relations of Production

 

A Marxist Critique

 

 

With the discovery of a new instrument of warfare

the firearm, the whole internal organisation of the 

army was necessarily altered, the relations within 

which individuals compose an army and can work 

as an army were transformed, and the relation of 

different armies to another was likewise changed.

Karl Marx

Wage Labour and Capital

 

 

Contents

Introduction. 3

Section 1 : Flexible Work Relations. 5

What is a Mode of Regulation or a Regime of Accumulation?. 5

What was Fordism?. 6

The Rise and Fall of Fordism/Keynesianism. 7

Post-Fordist Labour -- Flexible Accumulation. 10

Section 2 : Globalisation. 12

Concentration of World Trade, Production, and Finance. 12

The Nation-State & the Power of International Capital 14

Conclusion. 16

Introduction

The last century witnessed an unprecedented growth in the forces of production.  In absolute and relative terms, the economic transformation of the world has been swifter this century than any other period of human history.  Entire new branches of industry have been set up, ranging from semiconductors, petrochemicals, consumer electronics, automobiles, construction, pharmaceuticals, chemical and genetic engineering, to soft drinks, tobacco, fast food chains, luxury hotels, airlines, telecommunications, financial consultancies, banking and insurance, and so on.  If we accept the view that “Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life, including the polity” (Cox, 1987), this rapid transformation in the productive forces conditions the nature and direction of social and political relations. 

The development of new scientific discoveries, their application to production, the effects of this technology on the relations between individuals and class configurations, the resultant forms and development of state-power and inter-state rivalry -- in a word, all the dynamic and static pieces of the puzzle -- must be continually investigated, examined, and analysed to reveal the nexus between the productive forces and the relations of production.

This paper will critically analyse some aspects of the debate surrounding the transformation of the world economy and the process called ‘globalisation’.  This paper is composed of two separate yet inter-related parts.  The first part of the paper will discuss the new labour relations that have been introduced in the last two decades known as flexible work relations and the second party of the paper will discuss the impact of globalisation.

The literature on post-Fordist flexible work relations is dominated by the language of the ‘regulation school’.  Therefore, in order to ground our understanding of flexible work relations in the appropriate theoretical background, this paper will begin with a discussion of the premises of the ‘regulation school’.  Next it will proceed to lay down the essential features of Fordism.  The rise and fall of Fordism cannot be fully appreciated or understood without some historical knowledge of the world conditions.  Therefore, the following part will elaborate the historical background and salient theoretical features in the rise and fall of Fordism.  This part of the paper will end with a discussion about flexible work relations and attempt to persuade the reader that these work relations have resulted in the deterioration of the social and individual position of the worker.

The proceeding section will discuss the impact of globalisation.  This part of the paper will challenge the view of the ‘extreme globalisers’.  The paper will produce statistical evidence that indicates that world trade, production, and finance is increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer multinational companies.  It will be argued that in light of the growing concentration of capital, the sovereignty of third world nation-states is increasingly disappearing.

In the concluding section, this paper will look at the profile of human development in the world today and argue that flexible work relations and globalisation have increased the social control of corporations over other political and economic actors and increased the inequality between social classes.

Section 1 : Flexible Work Relations

What is a Mode of Regulation or a Regime of Accumulation?

The original argument of the ‘regulation school’ was advanced by Michel Aglietta in his famous book, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (1979).  Aglietta argued that both neo-classical economics and Marxian economics had reduced complex social relations to a postulate of homogeneity that were fundamentally untenable.  Neo-classical economics reduced all human behaviour to the axiom of rationality and Marxian economics reduced them to general laws that led to the overthrow of capitalism.  This form of methodological individualism ignored the asymmetry of information and the role played by externalities.  Aglietta argued that the assumption of a general equilibrium under perfect competition or general laws of history was simply incorrect owing to asymmetric information and the role of externalities.  In fact, he argued that there was every reason to believe that the process of unhindered capital accumulation could only lead to the disintegration of the fabric of society.  In order, therefore, to keep society functioning as a society, a regime of accumulation or a mode of regulation was necessary.  According to ­­­­Aglietta,

A mode of regulation is a set of mediations which ensure that the distortions created by the accumulation of capital are kept within limits which are compatible with social cohesion within each nation. (Aglieta, p. 44)

Labour-processes, consumer habits, geographical and geopolitical configurations, state-powers and practices, and so on, all constitute the mode of regulation.  This argument was further developed by Lipietz (1986) who coined the term regime of accumulation to describe the same concept.  Similarly, Boyer and David Harvey (1990) used these concepts to analyse the condition of post-modernity.  According to David Harvey,

A regime of accumulation describes the stabilisation over a long period of the allocation of the net product between consumption and accumulation; it implies some correspondence between the transformation of both the conditions of production and the conditions of reproduction of wage earners. (Harvey, p. 121)

A brief look at the salient features of Fordism can help to elaborate the central arguments of the ‘regulation school’.

What was Fordism?

According to the ‘regulation school’, Fordism was a mode of capital accumulation that originated in 1914 when Henry Ford introduced a five-dollar, eight-hour workday for the assembly line production of automobiles.  Lipietz (1982) argues that Fordism incorporated two theoretically linked concepts.  First, Fordism incorporated the workers know-how into the form of machinery.  This incorporation, however, presupposes scientific management of work in accordance with F.W. Taylor’s ideas on management captured in his famous book, The Principles of Scientific Management.  Taylor introduced a separation between conception and execution in the production process.  This separation increased the division of labour in the factory and resulted in greater productivity.  However, the new division of labour required a higher degree of labour-discipline and subservience to a central directing authority.  Second, Fordism incorporated the continual adjustment of mass consumption in accordance with increases in productivity resulting from new technology.  This was accomplished by linking nominal wage to the cost-of-living and productivity.  The policy of linking of nominal-wages to increases in productivity helped to ameliorate the crisis of over-production.  Therefore, Keynesian demand management, in a certain sense, represented the application of Fordism at the level of the state. 

Fordism/Keynesianism constituted the mode of regulation in Western capitalist society after the Second World War.  However, in order to understand the process through which this particular mode of regulation became dominant and was later replaced by flexible accumulation, it is necessary to understand the historic conditions that led to the rise and fall of Fordism/Keynesianism.

The Rise and Fall of Fordism/Keynesianism

Fordism/Keynesianism became the principle mode of regulation of Western capitalist societies after the Second World War.  At the time, Europe was devastated by the Second World War and to many people Soviet Communism seemed an attractive alternative to capitalism.  Thus, the atmosphere of the Cold War and the need to stabilise Western European capitalism was instrumental in the institutionalisation of Fordism/Keynesianism.

The United States was the only capitalist power with the financial and military might necessary to save capitalism.  Before the war, world trade was more or less equally dominated by four nations--USA, Britain, France and Germany.  After the war, however, the devastation of Europe owing to the Second World War created the conditions for the economic, political, and military hegemony of the United States.  The hegemony of Britain was declining as evidenced by the falling proportion of British goods in the world trade.  The world shifted from a Pax Britannica to a Pax Americana (Gills, 2000). 

The United States used its newly acquired hegemonic position with foresight and intelligence.  Capitalist states felt that another economic depression such as the 1930s would lead to a social revolution.  Therefore, there was consensus that the financial system of the West should be rebuilt on a solid foundation.  The Bretton Woods conference laid this foundation.  The Marshall Plan, the International Bank for Research and Development (that later became the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs (that later became the World Trade Organisation), ensured the capitalist recovery of Europe and Japan and laid the foundation for a sustained post-war economic boom.  The United States also guaranteed a market for its capitalist allies and through the rounds of GATT, tarriffs were reduced from 60 per cent in 1934 to 4.3 per cent in 1987.  Similarly, Japan’s tarriffs were reduced to 2.9 per cent and the European Union’s were reduced to 4.7 per cent.  From 1948 to 1966, world trade grew by 6.6 per cent per annum.  Between 1966 and 1973, it further increased at a rate of 9.2 per cent per annum (Waters, 69).  This post-war boom represented the high point of Fordism/Keynesianism. 

Most analysts, especially those writing at the time, argued that these policies were instrumental in saving capitalism from Soviet Communism.  However, despite these significant achievements, Fordism/Keynesianism began to come under increasing criticism from both intellectual and political circles.  These critiques can broadly be categorised into two schools of thought.  On the one hand, Fordism was criticised from a post-modern cultural perspective, and on the other, Keynesianism was criticised from a neoliberal economics perspective. 

Analysts within the first category, that is Post-modernists, argued that Fordism created rigidity that was simply untenable.  This rigidity had to give way to a regime of flexible work relations.  David Harvey (1990) outlines five areas of criticism of Fordism/Keynesianism.  First, Fordism benefited certain unionised male white workers over others.  Women, African American, or Latin American workers did not enter into the Fordist scheme of collective bargaining and trade-unionism.  Second, Fordism created rigidity in the transfer of labour from one branch to another.  The reasons for the rigidity rested in too much union power and a cultural attitude of malaise.  Third, Fordism’s failure to provide social services via the state came under increasing criticism.  Fourth, consumers were fed up with Fordist standardised mass consumption.  In city planning and architecture, the shift to post-modernism was highly pronounced.  Fifth, discontent in the Third world rose with the failure of Fordist Modernisation Project. 

Analysts within the second category, that is neoliberals, argued that Keynesianism resulted in declining US position in the world market.  Neoliberals outlined six main reasons for the decline of US hegemony (Hirst, 5).  First, the 1973 and 1979 oil price hikes owing to the formation of OPEC combined with the international impact of US involvement in the Vietnam rendered the Bretton Woods system economically unsustainable.  This led to the second result that the fixed exchange rate controls proved to be unsustainable in the face of turbulence in the world market and they were abandoned in the early 1980s in favour of a flexible exchange rate system. Third, widespread bank lending to the third world combined with the growth of the Eurodollar market and the increasing ratio of foreign trade to Gross Domestic Product in the advanced countries resulted in a decline in US economic power.    Fourth, long-term unemployment and de-industrialisation in Britain and the US were said to be the result of increasing competition from Japan.  Fifth, the New International Economic Order established in 1974 under the sponsorship of UNCTAD gave preference to manufactured goods from Less Developed Countries (LDCs).  Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) emerged to capture a quarter of the share of world trade and penetrated into first world markets.  Sixth, the introduction of new technology (computers, fibre-optics, genetics, satellite telecommunications and so on) was transforming productive and social relations.  Flexible work relations, pioneered in Japan, proved to be more competitive in the terms of economic strength.  Thus, the older patterns of Fordist collective bargaining came under criticism.

By the 1960s three trading blocks had emerged--NAFTA, EU, and ASEAN.  Since the 1960s NAFTA’s share of world trade was declining in relation to the other blocks.  At the same time, domestic budget deficits and stagflation prompted a rethinking and reorganisation of government policy along neoliberal lines.  Neoliberal economists were able to persuade key policy makers and to some extent the general public that the Fordist/Keynesian outlook was responsible for the economic ills of society during the late 1970s.  They argued for a leaner and more competitive capitalism (Albert, 1993).  The ideological foundation for neoliberal was laid out by specialised institutions, such as, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Britain.  Intellectuals such as Milton Friedman, F.A. von Hayek, and Karl Popper were the think-tanks behind the Regan-Thatcher neoliberal assault on the Fordist/Keynesian model (Desai, 1994).

Post-Fordist Labour -- Flexible Accumulation

If rigidity in the labour market, owing to trade-unions or cultural impediments, was the main feature of Fordism, extreme flexibility became the central concept in the post-Fordist era (Harvey, 1990).  Flexible accumulation is based on seven fundamental principles (Waters, p.82).

1

Strategic Management

The aims of management are to forecast and capture raw material and product markets.

2

Just in time production

The aims are to minimise inventory at every stage of production since unused inventory represents unrealised capital.

3

Total quality management

The introduction of quality control circles to check quality of supplies of components inside and outside the factory

4

Teamwork

The creation of autonomous task oriented work groups

5

Managerial decentralisation

The replacement of centrally controlled hierarchies with flowing matrices of a federation of organisational styles and practices.

6

Flexible labour force

The possibility of laying off workers during a lean periods and hiring them back during prosperous periods.

7

Functionally flexible workers

Task integration and rotation, multiskilled labour force, and localised responsibility.

Most post-modernists agree that on the whole the post-Fordist set up resulted in a loss of power for workers, nonetheless, some argue that flexible work relations ‘can be mutually beneficial’ to the worker and employer (Harvey, p.151).  The central argument in this regard is that flexible work relations allows for greater scope to exercise ‘individual choice’, and therefore, leads to higher ‘job-enrichment’.  On this basis they argue that flexible work relations engender less worker dissatisfaction. 

In the authors view, this argument is incorrect for two reasons.  First, there is ample statistical evidence that points to the conclusion that flexible accumulation resulted in the deterioration of the general position of workers in society—that is, insurance coverage, pension rights, standard of living wage levels, job security and so on (Arrighi, 1991; Harvey, p.152).  Second, at the individual level, flexible accumulation did not result in greater scope to exercise individual choice.  On the contrary, it can be argued that flexibility is not the discontinuation of Fordism/Taylorism, but rather the application of those very principles to new productive forces and new conditions of production.  Arguing along these lines, Christian Palloix (1976) shows that workers in flexible work relations, regardless of the formal appearance of independence, must work to produce increasing surplus-product and the discipline of increasing surplus-production continues to be the central commanding authority.  The worker under flexible work relations, therefore, merely internalises the logic of this discipline.  Ironically flexible accumulation presupposes, not an undisciplined work force, but a work force socialised to accept discipline to such a high degree that individual workers have internalised the overall goals of factory production.  In conclusion, Palloix argues flexible accumulation greatly increases the social power of capital over labour (Palloix, 1976).

However, these labour relations offer us a microcosmic and therefore limited understanding of the transformation of the world economy in the last two decades.  In order to situate these new work relations in a broader context, it is necessary to analyse the ownership patters of trade, production, and finance in the context of the debate surrounding globalisation.

Section 2: Globalisation

Hirst and Thompson introduce a bit of healthy scepticism in the debate surrounding globalisation.  They challenge the view of ‘extreme globalisers’ who argue that the new global economy is characterised by increasing interdependence.  The author will try and argue that such a position is, in fact, misleading.  There is no doubt that the world is witnessing an unprecedented growth in productive forces.  The last twenty years have brought about an ‘information revolution’.  However, the benefits of this growth are far from equally shared.  In fact, the process is so heavily skewed in favour of certain social actors that it is, perhaps, better to refer to the changes in the last twenty years, not as globalisation, but as inter-nationalisation.  This term implies that we are witnessing a transformation in which the principle agents have not changed (that is, nation-states), but their respective balance of power has certainly undergone a dramatic transformation.  This transformation has consolidated the social power of a handful of corporations based in the industrialised world over the nation-states in the third world.

Concentration of World Trade, Production, and Finance

The ‘extreme globalisers’ argue that the ratio of growth rates of world trade to growth rates of production has always been positive (barring the period in and around the great depression) (Hirst, 62-65).  They conclude from this information that the world is becoming interdependent.  The author feels that such an approach obscures the question of control and ownership of trade.  In fact, there is growing evidence that world trade is increasingly dominated by large multinational companies.  For example, according to the World Investment Report of 1995 the top 1 per cent of all multinational companies account for 70 per cent of all global trade.  The top 15 multinational companies control the world market in 20 key commodities: 90 per cent of the world’s trade in iron ore, wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, pineapples; 80 per cent of the world’s trade in copper, tea, and coffee; 70 per cent of the world’s trade in rice; and 60 per cent of the world’s trade in oil.  The top 5 multinational companies account for 70 per cent of consumer durables, 58 per cent of cars, trucks, and airlines, 55 per cent of aerospace, 53 per cent of electronic components, and 50 per cent of oil, steel, personal computers and media industries[1].  Nearly 30 to 40 per cent of the world trade is simply intra-firm trade between multinational companies and their foreign affiliates (Brar, 1997).

Moreover, more than two-thirds of all trade is between three trading blocks--NAFTA, EU, and ASEAN (Hirst, 118).  Approximately, 90 per cent of all multinational companies are based in industrialised countries (ibid., ch. 4).  In that sense, Hirst and Thompson argue these firms cannot be described as ‘trans’ national firms.  They are firms based in the industrialised world that operate internationally.  The proportion of trade between industrialised countries is increasing year by year.  For example, the proportion of manufactured exports exchanged from industrialised countries to other industrialised countries increased from about 30 per cent in 1935 to 64 per cent in 1983 (Waters, p.69). 

The picture that emerges in the realm of production and manufacture is not too different from that of world trade.  A mere 1 per cent of all multinational companies own half the total stock of foreign direct investment (FDI)[2], 80 per cent of all international investment, and account for 30 per cent of the world’s output.[3]  The top 200 multinational companies employ less than 0.05 per cent of the world’s population but control over a quarter of the world’s Gross Domestic Product[4] (Brar, 1997).

In the realm of finance and banking, the combined assets of the world’s 50 largest banks and diversified financial companies account for 60 per cent of the $20 trillion global stock of productive capital in 1993.[5]  In the year 2001, the top 10 banks had combined assets of over $ 7.5 trillion (ibid., 1997).

In conclusion, it is incorrect to assume that growing international trade, production, or finance, in and of themselves, are indicative of ‘interdependence’.  Arrighi shows that under capitalist relations internationalisation is not just entirely compatible with inequality and exploitation, but is in fact premised upon increasingly unequal social relations (Arrighi, 1991). 

The Nation-State & the Power of International Capital

Globalisers argue that the role of the nation-state as the primary political actor in international relations is declining owing to the transformation of the world economy.  Furthermore, the currency crises in East Asia, followed by similar crises in Brazil, Russia, and Argentina point towards evidence that the economic fate of states are interlinked (Gills, 2000).  However, such a view obscures certain crucial elements of the debate.  Primarily, such a view obscures the fact that it is third world states, not all states, that are losing the ability to act as political agents.  The economic clout of third world nation-states is declining in relation to the interests of multinational companies based predominantly in the industrialised world.

Thus, in 1991 the combined sales of the world’s 10 largest corporations were greater than the combined GNP of the world’s 100 smallest countries.  General Motors’ 1992 sales ($133 billion) were equal to the aggregate GNP of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia – countries that together are host to 500 million people representing nearly a tenth of the global population.  Furthermore, out of the 100 largest economies in the world, only 49 were countries and 51 were corporations.  US retailer Wal-Mart – the twelfth largest corporation in the world – is larger than 161 countries including Israel, Greece, and Poland.  Mitsubishi, the largest corporation in the world, is bigger than Indonesia which is the fourth most populous country on Earth.  Toyota is bigger than Norway, Ford is bigger than South Africa, and Philip Morris is bigger than New Zealand.  The combined sales of the world’s top 200 corporations in 1996 were far greater than a quarter of the world’s economic activity.  In other words, these combined sales of multinational companies exceed the combined economies of 182 countries out of 191 countries.[6] 

A major reason for the decline in the role of third world nation states is linked to the third world debt.  In 1971 the third world debt was $70 billion.  In 2001 the combined debt of third world countries was $ 2,095 billion.  This represents a 30 fold increase.  Each year the third world receives approximately 55 billion dollars in development aid but pays back approximately  233 billion dollars for old loans.  In order to stay afloat in the international economy, third world countries are subject to increasing debt repayment.  If they cannot meet these repayments they are subjected to restructuring such as the Structural Adjustment Program.   

These factors have resulted in an increasing income gap between the industrialised countries and the poor countries.  Table 1 shows the growth in the ratio of wealth of rich to poor countries.

Table 1: Ratio of Income of Rich to Poor Countries

1820

1913

1950

1973

1997

3:1

11:1

35:1

44:1

72:1

Source: Harpal Brar ch. 1, 1997. 

Therefore, the picture that emerges with respect to nation-states is one where the sovereignty of third world states is increasingly challenged owing to the dominance of multinational corporations based in the industrialised world.  These multinational companies control 60 per cent of foreign direct investment, 66 per cent of trade, 75 per cent of world gross national product, but 90 per cent of these companies are located, operated, and owned by agents in the industrialised world.  On this basis it is perhaps more accurate to argue that the world economy is not developing towards a globalised society, but an inter-nationalised society.

Conclusion

The impact of post-Fordist flexible accumulation and globalisation cannot be judged by the criterion of economic growth alone.  Economic growth is not an end, but a means to an end.  The real end of an economic system must be the human development of society at large.  However, the profile of human development after the introduction of this latest form of capitalism is not encouraging despite the fantastic growth in productive forces in the last century.  Naturally, the standard of living of individuals has improved considerably.  However, human development must be judged, not solely on the basis of historical trends, but also on the basis of the possibilities for enhancing human life through different strategies and policies.  In other words, it must be judged in terms of the potentialities for human development given the growth of productive forces and technology.

The report of the World Health Organisation for the year 2000 shows that as much as one-fifth of the world’s population continues to live in ‘extreme poverty’.   As much as a third of the world’s children are malnourished and approximately 100 million children live or work on the streets.  More than 30,000 children die every day from easily preventable diseases and half the world’s population lacks regular access to the most essential drugs.  The trends noted by many feminists regarding the feminisation of poverty continue to be true.  Approximately 70 per cent of the worlds poor and two-thirds of the world’s illiterate population are women. 

Inequality and the polarisation of wealth and poverty has reached gregarious proportions.  We live in a world where, according to the United Nations Development Program, 85 per cent of world gross domestic product is controlled by the richest one-fifth of humanity and only 15 per cent is controlled by the poorest four-fifth.  The combined wealth of the world’s 200 richest people reached 1 trillion dollars in 1999; the combined income of 582 million people living in 43 least developed countries was 146 billion dollars.  In 1997 one-fifth of the world’s population generated 86 per cent of the world product and the bottom fifth produced 1 per cent.  The poorest 4.5 billion people in the world account for only $3.9 trillion of economic activity, which is only just over half of the combined revenues of $7.1 trillion of the top 200.  In other words, the top 200 posses an economic clout almost double that of the poorest four-fifths of humanity (Brar, 1997).  Today the richest 3 individuals have more money than 600,000,000 people. 

In conclusion, this paper has analysed post-Fordist flexible work relations and argued that these new labour relations have resulted in a deterioration of the social and individual position of the worker.  Second, this paper has shown the growing monopoly of world trade, production, and finance.  This tendency towards concentration and monopoly is aided by neoliberal policies.  In relation to the sovereignty of nations, this paper has tried to show that third world nations are increasingly being dominated by multinational companies based predominantly in industrialised countries.  In conclusion, flexible work relations and neoliberal globalisation have increased the social control of corporations over other political and economic actors. 

John F. Kennedy once remarked, “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  Clever political satirists at the time replied “except the ones that are already submerged.”  However, the evidence suggests that it is entirely arguable that “neoliberalism and post-Fordism has submerged a good many boats that were afloat.”


Bibliography

Aglietta, M. (1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation London.

Aglietta, M. ‘Capitalism at the turn of the century: regulation theory and the challenge of social change’, New Left Review 232, 1998

Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism Against Capitalism New York

Arrighi, G. ‘World Income Inequality and the Future for Socialism’, New Left Review 189, 1991

Brar, Harpal (1997) Imperialism – decadent, parasitic, moribund capitalism Harpal Brar Publications

Cox, Robert W. (1987) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York, Columbia University Press

Desai, Radhika ‘Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony’, New Left Review 203, 1994.

Gills, Barry ‘The Crises of postwar East Asian capitalism: American power, democracy and the vicissitudes of globalization’, Review of International Studies, 2000, Vol. 26, No. 3.

Harvey, David (1990) The Condition of Post modernity Blackwell.

Hirst, Paul; Thompson, Grahame (1996) Globalization in Question Polity Press.

Hoogvelt, Ankie; Yuasa Masae ‘Going lean or going native? The social regulation of “lean” production systems’ Review of International Political Economy 1 (2) 1994.

Lipietz, A. ‘Towards Global Fordism?’, New Left Review 132, 1982.

Marx, Karl Wage Labour and Capital Progress Publishers 1967.

Palloix, C. ‘The Labour Process: From Fordism to Neo-Fordism’ [transl. By J. Mepham and M. Soneuscher], in R. Panzeiri et al., The Labour Process and Class Strategies London, CSE 1976.

Waters, Malcom (1995) Globalization London and New York.

World Health Organisation, United Nations, World Bank, Jubilee 2000.

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[1] The Economist, 27 March 1993, quoted in Brar (1997)

[2] United Nations World Investment Report, 1993 in Brar (1997).

[3] Hawken, Paul, ‘The Power of Transnationals’, The Ecologist, July/Aug 1992 in Brar (1997).

[4] Anderson, Sarah; Cavanagh, John The Top 200 – the Rise of Global Corporate Power, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 25 September 1996 in Brar (1997).  ‘A Survey of Multinationals: Everybody’s Favourite Monsters’, the Economist, 27 March 1993, Special Supplement in Brar (1997).

[5] Hoover’s Handbook of World Business, 1993 in Brar (1997).

[6] Anderson, Sarah; Cavanagh, John The Top 200 – the Rise of Global Corporate Power, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 25 September 1996 in Brar (1997).

 

 
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Last modified: March 27, 2004
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