The Truth is Out There!

Because it Certainly Isn’t in Here

The last decade of the twentieth century is commonly referred to as “the age of confusion.”  Naturally, certain people have a direct interest in maintaining confusion; confusion bolsters the status quo.  On the other hand, the oppressed peoples of the world require clarity; clarity is a revolutionary force. 

In this paper I will be arguing in favour of a materialist epistemology.  Considering the breadth and depth of the subject (the subject spans the length of European twentieth century thought from Hegel and Marx to Foucoult and Habermas), this paper can only be a very modest attempt, or merely a starting point to untangle the epistemological debate in the modern world.  

What is Epistemology?

Although starting with a dictionary definition of a concept is not only a cliché but can also be problematic, in so far as it excludes other ways of understanding a process, nonetheless, for lack of a better place to begin and in order to find some common ground from where to begin, I choose to start from the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of epistemology as “the theory or science of the methods or grounds of knowledge” (Pg. 338).  Therefore, epistemology is a theory of knowledge and poses the question “what is the basis of knowledge?” or more simply “how do we know, what we think we know?”

Epistemology is distinct from methodology.  Methodology is simply the manner in which the study of a question is arranged.  That is, what questions are asked first, what evidences are compiled in order to solve the question, and so on.   Every study, therefore, already presupposes both an epistemology and a methodology.  However, the distinction is important to underscore the possibility of two diametrically opposed methodologies and theories, agreeing on a common epistemology (for example, Marxism and Neo-liberalism).  Similarly, two diametrically opposed theories and conclusions, may agree on the same methodology and epistemology (for example, Smith’s economic model and Marx’s economic model). 

Post-Modernism and Epistemology

The debate regarding epistemology has found renewed interest owing to the popularity at the end of the cold war of the post-modernist / post-structuralist critique of modernity.  Therefore, perhaps it is better to start with the end and reconstruct the beginning.

Post-modernism is mainly inspired by the writings of figures such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty.  Although it is difficult to “pin down” post-modernism, one can certainly discern certain themes that are repeated and associated with post-modernism.

Firstly, post-modernism is a rejection of the notion that a “Grand Narrative” can explain history.  It argues that the very idea of a “Grand Narrative” is itself a product of notions from the European Enlightenment, and therefore, an idea that is culturally and historically specific.  Post-modernists argue that the entire project of the Enlightenment (including Liberalism, Marxism, and Science) has failed, and therefore, proves the impossibility of constructing a grand narrative.

Secondly, and this naturally follows from the first, post-modernism is a rejection of notions of “Progress”, “Science”, “Objectivity”, and “Rationality”.  These notions are merely social constructs and paradigms. The result is a deep epistemological doubt about any claims to science, rationality, objectivity, or value free theory.

Third, as opposed to a scientific untangling of the objective world, post-modernism seeks to deconstruct the role of discourse, culture, and language as a realm of oppression, struggle, and emancipation.  This methodology of deconstructing language and concepts is referred to as post-structuralism.  Culture and language studies, therefore, is deeply influenced by post-structuralism.

The original thinkers of post-modernism, such as Foucault, mean for this new paradigm to be used as a tool for emancipation.  For example, Foucoult claims that “power is implicated in all knowledge systems”, and therefore, “knowledge is a tool for resisting power”.  The conclusion is that those who are interested in resisting power must create their own “knowledge system” in order to resist power.  Thus, the mushrooming of post-Marxism and post-feminism, feminist science owes itself, in no small measure, to the influence of post-modernism.

Is there a Truth? Is there an objective world?

To refute post-modernism in a comprehensive manner would require substantial research; nonetheless, one can show logically that the epistemological basis of post-modernism is self-contradictory.  Let us start with the axiom “There is no universal truth.”  In this axiom the “truth” is synonymous with “objective science” because objective science claims to be “the truth”[1].

On closer examination it becomes apparent that the axiom that “there is no universal truth” is itself a universal axiom.  In other words, the above axiom can be rewritten as “the universal truth is, that there is no universal truth.” This does not change the original axiom; it merely elaborates what was hidden within the original axiom.  Now if the former axiom is true than the latter cannot be true; the latter can only exist as an expression of the former.  In other words, the paradigm is hopelessly fraught with self-contradiction and is a philosophical and logical absurdity.  In a word, implicit in the original axiom is claim about a universal truth and explicit in the axiom is a claim that there is no such thing as a universal truth.  From the aforementioned analysis one can only reach the conclusion that all theories that seek to challenge the possibility of an objective epistemology have a self-contradictory foundation.

Lets see how this understanding works with respect to Thomas Kuhn’s critique of science in the book The Structure of Scientific Revolution.  Kuhn argues, much like the post-modernists, that humans understand the world in the context of a paradigm.  For a period of time, the paradigm helps to solve certain problems at a particular period in history.  During this period, challenges to the paradigm are considered mistakes made in the application of the paradigm and not as a fundamental flaw in the basis of the paradigm itself.  After an indeterminate period, anomalies build up and lead to a crisis in thought because the paradigm can no longer explain these irregularities.  At this point in time, a new revolutionary paradigm arises until eventually it also becomes the norm.  This process is repeated in a cycle through the history of science.  Kuhn further asserts that this entire process of the creation and death of paradigms (scientific or otherwise) has no objective basis. Paradigms are “are incommensurable” he says and there is no objective basis to distinguish the correctness or the incorrectness of one paradigm with respect to another; that there is no entity in common between two paradigms; that there is no basis for comparison; or, for that matter, even of comprehension.

If the above argument is correct, especially if the latter part is held to be true, then one ends up with the same aforementioned logical absurdity.  It follows from Kuhn’s own argument that that there is no basis for determining whether Kuhn’s paradigm of “incommensurable paradigms” is correct or incorrect.  How would we know?  Since, as Kuhn asserts, there is no “objective basis” or “commensurability” between paradigms, there is then also no basis to judge this alleged “incommensurability” itself.  At the most Kuhn can assert he himself has built yet another incommensurable paradigm.  Naturally, at this point one lapses into self-contradiction.  Kuhn’s particular paradigm, which by definition has to be incommensurable like all paradigms, is not incommensurable.  This is because Kuhn asserts that his particular paradigm is “the paradigm” that explains the very creation and death of other paradigms.  Given the fact that all paradigms are incommensurable, can one build a universal paradigm to explain other paradigms?  To put it more simply, to assert as a universal paradigm that all paradigms are incommensurable is a self-contradiction and a logical absurdity.  It is no different from the logical error made in the first instant. 

Can Science Be Objective and Non-Ideological?

The answers to the above questions can be derived from the above stated argument.  It follows logically from the above argument that science is objective in the sense that there is an objective world that a scientist attempts to study.  Scientists attempt to discern the objective laws of development of the natural and social world. The subjectivity of the scientist may distort the practice science.  However, this distortion, in and of itself, would not change the objective existence of the world or even the possibility of studying it scientifically and objectively.  In other words, this subjectivity would constitute an example of the poor application of the principles of science.  In conclusion, the world exists objectively irrespective of our degree of comprehension of it and science is the attempt to study that objective world.

However, a note of caution is necessary while asserting that science is objective.  While there is no doubt that science is objective, this does not imply that science is neutral to questions of power.  For example, a scientific analysis of capitalist conditions reveals relations of exploitation.  Therefore, the scientific discovery of surplus-value favoured the development of the working class movement.  In conclusion, while science is objective, it is never neutral or value-neutral in relation to questions of power.

If one defines ideology as the “systematic distortion of the truth in order to legitimise the power of one group of people over other people”, then science is the opposite of ideology and is non-ideological.  Science is the opposite of ideology.

However, if one defines non-ideological in terms of neutrality to questions of power, in other words that science does not favour a particular group in society, then science cannot be non-ideological.  In conclusion, science is objective and non-ideological but not value neutral.

Conclusion

From the above argument we can conclude that any theory that seeks to limit the possibility of an all-embracing theory, is itself an all-embracing theory and therefore self-contradictory.  In other words, it is itself what it professes to reject.

The inevitable result of accepting a non-scientific epistemology in relation to the study of society is that one lapses into complete relativism and subjectivism.  The methodology of post-structuralism is the inevitable outcome of a non-scientific epistemology.  Post-structuralism allows one the “intellectual freedom”, in other words subjectivity, in which one can freely interpret and reinterpret discourse without any reference to objective reality, to the structure of society, to the economic base, or to class.  The fact that a few post-structuralists refer to class in their critique does not disprove my point.  It merely illustrates it with more force because these references to class are not the foundation and do not act as a unit of analysis of post-structuralism.  These references are peripheral or supplementary references and do not follow as a logical necessity.

Post-structuralism is the flip side of bourgeois hypocrisy.  There is no doubt that bourgeois politicians and academics distort science by defining terms in order to bolster their policies.  The post-structuralists redefine them in a subjective manner to favour themselves.  Neither group is interested in a disinterested analysis of their own objective position with respect to the rest of society.  The post-structuralist epistemological and methodological approach predisposes them to grave subjective errors.  Mostly this error assumes the inability to distinguish between form and content.  The form of two things might be exactly the same but they may be different in content or essence.  Since post-structuralists concentrate on the super-structure in terms of form (e.g. language) they are unable to see what objective position the subject acquires in a system of power relationships.  For example, the discourse of a socialist trade-union leader, and a fascist leader might be the same in form (for example, both may talk in militaristic terms).  However, they play diametrically opposite roles in relation to the class struggle.  Concentrating on the form predisposes one to the error of subjective interpretation (which may also become a thin shiny veneer to conceal bourgeois prejudice).  They attribute fundamental qualities to the form (the subjective) and do not see that form is a vehicle for the transmission of content (the objective).

Post-modernism and post-sructuralism are modern forms of idealism.  It is not a coincidence that they share the hatred for science that was a hallmark of pre-capitalist idealism.  Post-modernism and post-structuralism is the “theoretical machine breaking” of the modern world.  In the early decades of the industrial revolution workers thought that their oppression was the product of machines and not of the social relations of production.  They therefore, broke machines in an attempt to roll back history.  But of course this was a primitive form of rebellion and did not work.

Similarly, post-modernism and post-structuralism is machine breaking by the intellectual (without the consequences that workers faced for their rebellion).  But curiously, the attack by post-modernists and post-structuralists on science, which is lauded as the greatest things since the Enlightenment, is to the particular taste of the decaying bourgeoisie of metropolitan countries.  The decaying and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie of the metropolitan centres supports both reaction and idealism in third world countries in the form of “religious intolerance”, and idealism in its modern post-modernist and post-structuralist form in first world countries.  Both these form, in their particular context, help to obscure the clarity so necessary for a emancipation.  The post-modernists, centred in European society, are themselves the product of a failed and despondent generation of sixties “radicals” seeking to reintegrate themselves into the bourgeois world.  In this context, their modern form of idealism is extremely useful to the bourgeoisie for it obscures the objective basis of exploitation and the necessary steps (especially organisational and political) to solve the problems of the world today.  It is not a coincidence that the post-modernists and post-structuralists are firmly rooted in the social studies department of the educational institutes of the West.  The post-structuralists perform a great service to the capitalist world by substituting the “word” itself as a revolutionary “act”.  The familiar expression of “theory itself as action” in this context (and only in this particular context), translates in terms of praxis into a rather benign and harmless preoccupation on the part of certain academics to interpret and reinterpret discourse.

In conclusion, social science must begin with and can only begin with the premise that the world exists as an objective and understandable entity.  An analysis is scientific in the measure that it accords with reality and, in doing so, informs practice.  Furthermore, the post-modern critique of materialist epistemology (“science” is a construct) is self-contradictory subjectivism.  Post-modernism and post-structuralism are supported by the reactionary bourgeoisie of Europe to befuddle and confuse the revolutionary potential of students and prevent the emergence of a revolutionary socialist intelligentsia.  These ideas play a retrogressive role in the development of class struggle and history.

Bibliography

Kuhn, Thomas Samuel (1996), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press.

Marx, Karl (1970). A Contribution to the critique of political economy. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

McLellan, G. (1989). Marxism, pluralism and beyond. Oxford: Polity.

Oxford English Dictionary, (1989), Oxford Clarendon P.