The Battle of Dai Do was a fierce and bloody struggle between an understrength Marine battalion landing team, 2nd. Battalion, 4th.Marines (BLT 2/4), and major elements of the 320th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division during three hot, humid spring days in 1968 (30 April - 3 May). I was privileged to command those magnificent Marines and Sailors who stopped the well-equipped 320th in its tracks on the north bank of the Bo Dieu River and drove it back toward the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). I believe that we conducted a successful spoiling attack that prevented the much larger NVA unit from launching a ground assault on the Marine combat/combat service support base at Dong Ha, headquarters of the 3rd Marine Division (Forward).
I would like to say that our success was part of a carefully orchestrated plan. It was not. We reacted first to hasty orders from higher headquarters, then to targets of opportunity, and finally to one desperate situation after another. That we succeeded was more a tribute to the extraordinary performance of individual Marines and Sailors and their small unit leaders than to brilliance or insight by higher echelons. Bravery, competence, initiative, toughness, and selflessness carried the day.
Oddly enough, except in the memories of those who took part, little is known and even less is written of this battle. To help rectify this shortfall. I offer the following account of the Battle of Dai Do as I remember it.
Dai Do, and the hamlets of An Loc, Dong Huan, Dinh To, and Thoung Do lie on the north bank of the Bo Dieu River, 2 1/2 kilometers northwest of Dong Ha, 13 kilometers south of the DMZ, and 13 kilometers west of the Golf of Tonkin. In 1968, most of the supplies for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in the northern most part of South Vietnam were ferried from cargo ships in the Gulf of Tonkin up the Cua Viet and Bo Dieu Rivers to Dong Ha by U.S. Navy landing craft. About 0400 on 30 April 1968, a U.S. Navy utility boat (LCU) was struck by rocket rounds and small arms fired from An Loc, a heavily wooded hamlet on the north bank of the Bo Dieu River. One sailor was killed and several wounded. The damaged LCU returned fire and limped to Dong Ha loading ramp. The 3D. Marine Division then closed the river to friendly traffic until the enemy ambush could be investigated and eliminated-a normally simple task that, this time, proved to be not so simple.
The problem area of Dai Do and the surrounding hamlets lay in the 1st Army of Vietnam (ARVN) Division's tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). On that morning, however, there were no ARVN units available to investigate and clear the ambush site. The task was given to BLT 2/4, which had been operating northeast of Dai Do, north of the Cua Viet River for the past two months. For two days prior to the Dai Do battle, enemy movement had been detected along Highway 1 north of Dong Ha, and ARVN units reported heavy enemy contact. To help the 2nd ARVN regiment, Echo Company, BLT 2/4, commanded by Capt James Livingston, was sent to defend a key bridge on Highway 1 about six kilometers north of Dong Ha. Echo Company operated directly under 3d Marine Division while at the bridge.
At BLT 2/4's command post (CP), we learned of the LCU ambush within minutes of the event. We monitored the Navy River Assault Force tactical net and heard the initial report. Almost simultaneously, we received a report from Hotel Company, BLT 2/4, which had a patrol not far from the incident. We relayed the report to Col Milton Hull, commanding officer (CO) of the 3d Marines, at his CP near the mouth of the Cua Viet River.
I felt uneasy. Something big was happening. Maj George F. "Fritz" Warren, BLT 2/4 operations officer, felt the same way. Things had been to quiet. So we told all subordinate units to be prepared for anything and assessed our situation.
Although under strength, BLT 2/4 was a tough, battle-tested unit. We had proved ourselves in heavy combat against NVA units in the DMZ area during the enemy 1968 Tet and post-tet offensives. In addition, we trained continuously in military basics appropriate to our area: assaults on fortified positions, small arms marksmanship, patrolling, stream crossing, crew served weapons, ambushes, calls for supporting arms, camouflage, etc. When not in actual combat, the reserve company followed a formal training schedule. In a less formal fashion, rifle companies in patrol bases also conducted prescribed training, one platoon or squad at a time. Whenever possible, we operated during darkness and became quite effective in night operations. During April 1968, our night patrols and ambushes were particularly productive. Most of our kills were at night with very few friendly casualties. We even conducted a successful battalion night attack. We literally took the night away from the enemy. I firmly believe the enemy began to avoid our area because he was consistently beaten and wouldn't bear the cost.
On 30 April 1968, when the Battle of Dai Do began, the four rifle companies of BLT 2/4 were widely dispersed: Echo was guarding the bridge on Highway 1; Golf occupied a patrol base to the north in Lam Xuan (west) and Nhi Ha; Foxtrot, designated as BLT 2/4 reserve, had two platoons at Mai Xa Chanh and one platoon at My Loc to the east; while Hotel had a patrol base in the south western sector. The BLT 2/4 CP, 81mm mortar platoon, 4.2 -inch mortar battery (W/2/12), and Headquarters and Service Company were located at Mai Xa Chanh ( Mai Xa Thi on some maps) in the south center of BLT 2/4 TAOR. Also at Mai Xa Chanh were the reconnaissance platoon, engineer platoon, the tank platoon (with only two tanks), the amphibian tractor platoon(-), and various headquarters elements. The BLT's normal 105mm howitzer battery (H/3/12) and Ontos platoon had been pulled away and were under operational control of other 3rd Marine Division units. Off the coast, aboard ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha were Maj Charles W. Knapp, BLT 2/4 executive officer (XO), and the remaining BLT attachments. The effective strength of the four rifle companies was about 125 Marines each, about 75 less than the prescribed table of organization strength.
I did not have authority to move Golf Company or Foxtrot Company without the approval of 3rd Marine Regiment since Echo Company was out of my area under control of 3rd Marine Division, the only maneuver unit immediately available when the Dai Do Battle began was Hotel Company, itself widely dispersed. Fortunately, Hotel Company was commanded by Capt James L. "Jim" Williams, a superb combat leader, who set the pace for an extraordinary three day display of small unit combat leadership.
About two hours after the LCU was struck by enemy rocket and small arms fire, BLT 2/4 was ordered to investigate and eliminate the enemy ambush site. Since An Loc was in the ARVN area, we requested that our boundary be shifted westward to include An Loc and its surrounding terrain. We wanted to be able to fire and maneuver with a free hand. The boundary shift was not approved for several hours. In the interim, we continued preparations. I ordered Capt Williams to assemble Hotel Company in Bac Vong, 1 1/2 kilometers north of An Lac, and prepare to eliminate any enemy still at the An Loc ambush site. Small enemy units and individuals often fired at the river boats and "disappeared" before we could react. This time I had a feeling that the enemy would not run.
Capt Williams and one platoon moved immediately toward Bac Vong. Upon reaching the southwestern corner of that hamlet, the platoon received heavy enemy fire from Dong Huan, about 200 meters south. Enemy machine guns in Dai Do, 800 meters southwest, also fired on Hotel Company. We obviously had to eliminate the enemy in Dong Huan before we could take An Loc. I modified Hotel Company's order: attack and seize Dong Huan.
I requested the return of Echo Company and permission to move Foxtrot and Golf Companies. Permission was granted to move two Foxtrot platoons and company headquarters moved out immediately from Mai Xa Chanh toward Bac Vong aboard amtracs (amphibian tractors). Golf Company would not return for 36 hours.
To be closer to the action, my forward CP group and I boarded an armored LCM-6 "Monitor" of the River Assault Group and moved along the Cua Viet River to the vicinity of Bac Vong. My group consisted of SgtMaj John M. "Big John" Malnar,* 1st Lt Judson D. "Judd" Hilton, Jr., the forward air controller (FAC), four radio operators, and a runner (messenger). The "Monitor" proved an ideal command post with good communications and significant firepower-a breechloaded 81mm mortar, two 20mm cannons, plus .50 and .30 caliber machine guns--to support our attacks and engage targets of opportunity. Marines of our group, including me, got a chance to fire these weapons-a little direct involvement in the early stages of the battle. We used a skimmer boat ( a 14-foot fiberglass boat with a 35 horsepower outboard motor) to move ashore when required. From the "Monitor" I had an excellent view of the early assaults as they occurred close to the river banks.
*SgtMaj John Malnar played and important role in the forward CP group. He was the "tactical commander," responsible for assigning individual positions on the march, during breaks, and whenever we halted. He could, and sometimes did, brief senior commanders on the situation when I was busy fighting the battle, He trained the CP radio operators and runners to a high state of proficiency and individual initiative. For example, Sgt Charles W. Bollinger, the battalion tactical radio net operator, a very capable Marine, was so well informed and competent that he kept our rear CP fully informed of what was happening during fast moving situations. He also answered many questions asked by the companies, without referring to me. He relayed messages clearly and in short order. Cpl Greg R. Kraus, our messenger, was another all-around, capable team member who could do almost anything. All of our group were good in a firefight. The contributions of Big John Malnar and our well trained forward CP group were critical to our success.
Before Hotel Company could attack Dong Huan, Capt Williams had to reconnoiter the creek that separated him from his objective, locate a ford, issue orders, and otherwise prepare his Marines for a daylight attack.
Everything about the situation favored the enemy defenders. The approaches to Dong Huan offered no cover and very little concealment. Surrounded by open rice paddies, and separated from Bac Vong by an unfordable stream, Dong Hun, itself, was hidden by dense hedgerow. (Vietnamese civilians had moved from the area some time earlier.) The heavy volume of fire received by the Hotel Company patrol-mortars, rockets, and automatic weapons-told us that the enemy occupied Dong Huan in strength and intended to stay there. I sensed that a major fight was brewing. I made my first urgent request for Ontos, "How Sixes" (105mm howitzers mounted on amphibian tractor chassis), and more tanks to support my meager force, but they never appeared.
Terrain and available resources dictated the plan for the assault on Dong Huan. The reconnaissance platoon, led by 1stLt C. William "Bill" Muter, an inspiring and fearless officer under fire, and two M48 tanks would remain in Bac Vong to support the attack by Hotel Company. Using the limited concealment afforded by the stream bank, Hotel Company would move north about 700 meters to a fording point, cross the stream and turn south to Dong Huan. Foxtrot Company, mounted on amtracs, would then cross the stream, move to the cemetery east of Dai Do, pour fire into Dai Do to silence enemy weapons there, create a diversion for Hotel Company as it moved into its assault. Foxtrot Company (reinforced by Golf when it arrived by helicopter) would also be prepared to assault Dai Do
As Hotel Company started its move north to the fording point, fixed-wing aircraft delivered bombs and napalm on Dong Huan. After the Company forded the stream and turned south, it had to negotiate 700 meters of open rice paddy in broad daylight to reach its assault position. To obscure this movement, Capt Williams used white phosphorous and smoke. Artillery, naval gunfire, tank, and machine gun fire helped keep enemy heads down, Hotel Company literally crawled the last 700 meters of open rice paddy. Other enemy positions were pounded with naval gunfire. Miraculously, Hotel Company sustained few casualties during this daring move. Foxtrot Company, mounted on amtracs, moved into the cemetery and opened fire on Dai Do as planned. The two tanks and the reconnaissance platoon in Bac Vong increased their rate of fire on Dong Huan. Then, within a few meters of the enemy forward positions, Capt Williams lifted supporting fires and Hotel Company assaulted Dong Huan. Considering the large number of bunkers, trenches, and spider holes, not to mention the doggedness of the enemy, Hotel Company moved quickly. Well-trained assault teams destroyed one fortified position after another. In about two hours, Dong Huan was secured. Unfortunately, Capt Williams was seriously wounded by an enemy hand grenade during the assault, but he lived to tell the tale. With his 45 caliber pistol, he killed the enemy soldier who wounded him. 1stLt Alexander "Scotty" Prescott assumed command, consolidated the position, and reorganized Hotel Company into a hasty defense.
Once I felt that the Hotel assault would carry through Dong Huan, I ordered Foxtrot Company to assault Dai Do. Attached to Foxtrot were two 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on top of amtracs, secured with sandbags (a field improvisation to provide mobility for these heavy weapons). One of the two Foxtrot platoons gained a toehold in the village, but the assault was stopped by heavy artillery and small arms fire. Two amtracs were disabled. Foxtrot Company needed assistance. I ordered it to hold, hoping to reinforce with Golf Company.
But Golf Company, under the able command of Capt Jay R. Vargas, was having problems of its own withdrawing from Lam Xuan (west) and Nhi Ha to the northwest. Intense enemy supporting arms fire and a ground attack forced cancellation of the helilift after the 81mm mortar section and some supplies were lifted out. Golf Company was forced to conduct a night retrograde movement by foot under heavy fire to Mai Xe Chanh. Capt Vargas and several others were wounded during the move. (This was Vargas' third wound in three month") But they all made it to Mai Xa Chanh to board LCM-8s the next day. At first glance, Golf Company's activities on 30 April do not seem extraordinary, considering everything else going on. But I think about it. After a full night of patrolling, Golf Company was alerted, prepared for a heliborne assault, underwent enemy supporting arms and ground attacks, canceled the helicopter lift, beat off the enemy attack, conducted a night retrograde under fire, and successfully moved on foot to a new assembly point for further movement-all without sleep for 36 hours, but very much full of fight as we shall see later.
Meanwhile, Hotel Company evacuated its casualties and consolidated its hard won positions in Dong Huan. Foxtrot was hanging by the skin of its teeth in the eastern edge of Dai Do, and we were pounding enemy positions with artillery, naval gunfire, and organic weapons.
About 1530, the CO of the 3d Marines, his operations officer, Maj Dennis J. Murphy (now Major General), and his sergeant major, Ted McClintock, arrived at my forward CP aboard the Navy "Monitor." They had traveled the 11 kilometers from their CP at the mouth of the Cua Viet River by unarmed "skimmer boat." This was done at considerable risk because the enemy had been firing at everything that moved on the water, including our armored LCM-6, all afternoon. Col Hull, a proven combat leader in World War II and Korea, holder of the Navy Cross and Silver Star, seemed unimpressed by his own daring dash up the river or by the artillery and mortar rounds exploding around us. He had already been ashore to visit Hotel Company. We discussed the situation, and Col Hull ordered me to continue attacking in our area and to keep the pressure on the enemy. He placed Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines and another platoon of amtracs under my operational control, so we could attack the enemy at An Lac.
We had worked with Bravo Company before, and I was happy to get that fine company under the able command of 1stLt Norris. Bravo Company had been operating south of the Bo Dieu River not far from the Dai Do area. 1stLt Norris reported in by radio. After a quick briefing, I ordered his company to mount the amtracs, cross the river, attack and seize An Loc, the hamlet from which the enemy had attacked the Navy utility boat,
Covered by a heavy bombardment of artillery and naval gunfire, Bravo Company, atop amtracs,* crossed the river in a classic amphibious assault wave. As the assault wave neared the northern river bank, the enemy opened up with heavy small arms, mortars, rockets, and artillery. The scene reminded me of films of the Iwo Jima assault in World War II. The direct fire weapons of the River Assault Group boats gave excellent support as Bravo Company dismounted and fought its way over the river banks and into the fortified positions. (See Figure 3,) The fighting was close and very heavy. Rockets destroyed two amtracs and damaged several others. Hotel Company spotted and cut down a group of enemy in the open moving south, apparently trying to reinforce An Loc. In An Loc, casualties were heavy on both sides. One of those killed early in the fight was 1st Lt Norris.
*We usually avoided riding inside the LVPP5 amtracs because of their highly volatile gasoline fuel tanks located beneath the troop compartment. We feared there would be little chance of escape if the amtrac struck a land mine. Land mines were plentiful in our area.
As the assault continued, it became obvious that the waning strength of Bravo Company was insufficient to sweep all the way through the hamlet. About an hour before darkness, I ordered the company (now confused, disorganized, and with only one officer left) to halt, reorganize, form a defensive perimeter in the western half of the hamlet, evacuate casualties, and carry out resupply.
I also ordered Foxtrot Company to withdraw from the southeastern edge of Dai Do under the cover of the darkness and join Hotel Company in Dong Huan. I did not want to have three separate perimeters that night. Foxtrot Company had difficulty in withdrawing from Dai Do and reorganizing. During the withdrawal, the company commander reported only 26 men left. (Actually, the figure was twice that number, as I learned later.) I was concerned about Foxtrot Company, but there were more pressing problems to deal with that night.
After digging in and being resupplied, both Bravo and Hotel Companies registered close-artillery and mortar concentrations, which proved fortuitous. They later received several probes, which were beaten back. As the night wore on, enemy, activity around the two companies perimeters quieted down. I ordered Bravo Company to send a reconnaissance patrol into the eastern half of An Loc. The patrol reported that the enemy had withdrawn. On order, the company quietly occupied the remainder of the hamlet under the cover of darkness.
Assessing the situation at the end of the first day, 30 April, I felt we had done well with what we had. But I was frustrated because we did not have enough power to continue the attack on Dai Do after Hotel Company successfully assaulted Dong Huan. Had the other two companies (Echo and Golf) been available, I was certain we could have seized and held Dai Do. We seemed to have caught a large enemy force off balance, but two Foxtrot company platoons were not nearly strong enough to take Dai Do.
I was also disappointed that we did not have our ONTOS platoon and more tanks with their potent 106mm and 90mm direct fire weapons, and we did not get enough air or heavy (8-inch) artillery support. The heavy artillery shells and bombs with delayed fuses might have cracked some of the enemy's fortifications. If the bombs and heavy artillery were followed by napalm, the destruction of the enemy positions would have been much greater. I especially wanted, but did not get, a radar controlled 2,000 pound bomb strike by Marine A-6 Intruder aircraft. Throughout 30 April, we received only one air strike and no 8 inch artillery support despite numerous emergency request,
At first light on 1 May, Hotel Company spotted a large group of enemy in open fields north and west of its positions and immediately took them under fire. Some of the same enemy were seen by Bravo Company, which joined in the turkey shoot. After the bitter fighting of the previous day and night, being able to see and shoot enemy in the open from covered positions proved quite a morale booster. We were not sure if they were stragglers who had withdrawn from An Loc during the night. This was not the last time. Large numbers of enemy troops would be spotted in the open in daylight during this battle.
Golf Company, meanwhile, had completed its night move to the BLT 2/4 CP at Mai Xa Chang. The company was resupplied and briefed on the current situation by Maj Warren. I originally hoped to move Golf Company to An Loc by Navy LCM-8 landing craft during darkness, to land at night behind Bravo Company, and launch a predawn attack on Dai Do. The two LCM-8s did not become available until much later, and it was 0900 before Golf Company and our two tanks were aboard and ready to move west. I boarded skimmer boat and met Capt Vargas in the lead LCM-8 about 0945. My orders were simple: land south of An Lac, pass around the right flank of Bravo Company, attack northwest, seize and hold the village of Dai Do. (See figure 4.) That's exactly what happened. We had been shelling Dai Do heavily with delayed fuse high explosive and white phosphorous shells for more than two hours before Golf began its attack. We had also intermittently run the amtrac engines and moved them short distances to disguise the sound of our tanks when they landed with Golf Company at about 1040. Two A-4 Skyhawks delivered bombs and napalm on Dai Do prior to the assault, then made dummy attacks as Golf Company moved forward. Hotel Company and several Navy patrol boats provided Golf Company with a base of fire.
Golf company crossed the rice paddies leaning into supporting fires with two platoons in the assault and one in reserve. The tanks were located between the assault platoons. Two hundred meters south of Dai Do heavy enemy fire slowed and then halted the left assault elements, but Capt Vargas personally led the remaining assault units forward, penetrating the first line of enemy bunkers. The fighting was close and furious. The assault lost and regained momentum several times. On one occasion Capt Vargas personally assaulted a bunker and killed seven enemy defenders. Finally, Golf Company Marines reached the northern edge of Dai Do. Fighting continued to eliminate the enemy in cleverly concealed, by passed positions, especially in the southwest portions of the village where the assault had bogged down. During these mopping-up operations, the enemy counterattacked Golf Company from the north and the west. Enemy also fired from bypassed positions in the rear (east). Golf Company was by now weakened by heavy casualties and desperately needed resupply. I ordered Vargas to fall back and establish a defensive perimeter in the eastern part of Dai Do. He did, receiving his fourth wound in the process.
Golf Company reorganized, evacuated casualties (which were heavy), set up a hasty defense, and called for supporting fires and resupply During reorganization, Golf Company reported large numbers of enemy in the open north of Dai Do moving south from the vicinity of Truc Kinh. They were taken under fire by machine-gun, artillery, and naval gunfire. An aerial observer also reported enemy movement in and around Truc Kinh and called in fixed-wing aircraft and armed helicopter strikes. On our air net we could hear the excited pilots as they strafed, bombed, and rocketed the enemy in the open daylight-a rare sight.
By now, the afternoon of the second day of our fight, our heavily engaged BLT was given priority for close air support (CAS). We were happy to get it, but wished it had arrived earlier. Even with the higher priority we didn't get all the CAS we requested, nor as quickly as we needed it. Our fixed wing support had not been responsive during the early months of 1968. Even preplanned strikes were usually late, and sometimes canceled without notice. During March and April, including the first day and a half of the Dai Do Battle, CAS was not adequate. We learned to operate without relying on CAS, the king of Marine Corps supporting arms.
Instead, we depended on our own mortars, artillery, and naval gunfire. Destroyers equipped with five-inch guns were usually on station and with in range in the Cau Viet area. Some times, powerful eight -inch gun cruisers provided support. Whenever a new Navy gunship came on line, our naval gunfire officer, Lt(jg) Joe Carroll, USNR was aware of it. He and his naval gunfire support team spent many hours registering the guns of each "new" ship and establishing and operating camaraderie with the shipboard gunners and operating personnel. There were always more targets than bullets in the Cua Viet area. We were happy to get the support, and the ships loved to shoot, especially when we reported the destruction of targets (which was often). We found naval gunfire support to be accurate, reliable, and, best of all, available when needed.
An area of concern was the way the BLT attachments were transferred to other units. For example, our attached ONTOS platoon never operated ashore with BLT 2/4. Too bad, because the Cua Viet area was ideal country for tracked vehicles and we sorely missed the firepower of the thirty 106mm recoilless rifles of those light, highly mobile vehicles to make up for this loss we again mounted our organic 106mm recoilless rifles on the tops of amphibian tractors. These jury-rigged contraptions helped considerably, but they were poor substitutes for ONTOS with well-trained crews. The BLT's 105mm howitzer battery had been transferred to the 12th Marines. The 4.2-inch mortar battery remained with the BLT, but fire missions had to be submitted through the standard artillery request net, reducing the responsiveness of this highly lethal and accurate weapon. For two months our tank platoon operated under another BLT. The assignment of BLT attachments to other organizations may have seemed a more efficient use of assets to somebody, but it was clearly a mistake. Any greater efficiency gained came at the cost of reduced BLT effectiveness, and lives were lost because of inadequate or unresponsive support in critical situations. Golf Company had barely reorganized on the eastern edge of Dai Do when the enemy attacked. The attack was beaten back, as was another an hour later. I was really worried about Golf Company, down to about 60 foxhole strength after several tough fights and without sleep for 48 hours. I ordered Foxtrot Company (still minus one platoon) to move northwest from Doug Huan to link up with and support Golf Company in Dai Do. But as soon as Foxtrot company moved into the rice paddies leading into Dai Do, it was pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Vargas boxed in his position with artillery, naval gunfire, and 4.2-inch and 81mm mortar fires. He also called in CAS. But something more was needed to take the pressure off Vargas and give the enemy something else to worry about.
My moral went up several notches when I learned that Echo Company had been released by 3rd Marine Division and was en route to my position, now located ashore in An Loc. But Echo Company would not arrive in time to help Golf Company that second night. I would have to use one of the companies already nearby. I had tried using Foxtrot Company, but it failed. Hotel Company was too weak for a major effort. I decided to use Bravo Company, which had received a new CO, XO, and several experienced staff noncommissioned officers from its parent battalion.
The plan to relieve Golf Company was simple. At 1700, from its location in An Loc, Bravo Company, mounted on amtracs, would move quickly north (about 500 meters) into the southern edge of Dai Do, dismount, and fight its way to link up with Golf. I hoped that Bravo Company would be able to slip into Dai Do while we kept the enemy pinned down with fire. But luck was not with us. Bravo Company was unable to penetrate Dai Do. It was stopped short by a withering hail of enemy fire, pinned down, and unable to move forward. As darkness fell, things looked grim indeed. Then Echo Company arrived and the picture brightened.
Echo's overland movement from the bridge on Highway 1 to An Loc was not exactly a romp in the sun. Small groups of enemy and forward observers occupied many points along the Echo route of march. Capt Jim Livingston knew that he was badly needed at Dai Do. A natural fighter, he overcame his inclination to stomp on the enemy positions that harassed him and tried to delay him. He returned fire only when absolutely necessary, skirted enemy strongpoints, and moved to An Loc as quickly as possible. His last obstacle was a "nearly unfordable," fairly swift stream about 51/2 feet deep. Capt Jim solved that problem in typical Livingston fashion. He had a half dozen of his tallest Marines strip down, plant themselves in the deepest part of the stream, and pass the shorter, heavily laden Marines hand-to-hand to the shallow water. Not very fancy and not found in any field manual. but "Livingston stream-crossing expedient" worked, ( I recommend it to anyone in a similar situation.) Incidentally, although soaked themselves, the Echo Marines kept their weapons and ammunition dry. That was Livingston's style: rarely fancy, but always effective, 2dLt Jack E. Deichman, Golf Company's XO, who was located in An Loc with the 60mm mortars, described Livingston on his arrival at An Lac: I was impressed at his anxiousness for combat, and he sort of had a smile on his face, like the combat he had been waiting for had at long last arrived, and he wasn't going to miss it for the world. He was itching for a fight and he got it.
My first concern was helping Bravo Company out of its predicament. (Its second company commander and most of its key personnel were wounded during the late afternoon attack to relieve pressure on Golf Company.) I looked to Capt Livingston and my ubiquitous reconnaissance officer, 1stLt Bill Muter. Those two combat leaders never let me or their fellow Marines down. Always on top of the situation, they personally led a number of small expeditions during darkness, across the fire-swept rice paddies, and helped Bravo Company successfully withdraw back to An Loc with all its wounded.
Capt Vargas of Golf Company also played an important role in Bravo Companies withdrawal. When Bravo's second company commander and key leaders were wounded, a young, inexperienced Marine assumed command. The young leader, overwhelmed by the chaos around him, was close to panic. Speaking to him over the radio, Vargas's calm confident voice settled the excited Marine down, enabling him to gain control of the situation.
Echo Company took over the defense of An Loc and set out security positions. Echo security positions made numerous contacts with NVA probing elements. Hotel and Foxtrot Companies also made contact near Dong Huan. Enemy prisoners taken that night told of a larger enemy force (12 companies) in Dai Do. No one slept that night as we prepared for out next action. Col Hull's orders to continue the attack and keep the pressure on the enemy meant that we had to retake the portion of Dai Do vacated by Golf and continue to attack north through the hamlets of Dinh To an Thoug Do.
My concern about Golf Company, isolated 500 meters from the rest of the BLT, increased greatly as it started to receive enemy probes. To take the pressure off Golf, I decided to launch Echo Company in a predawn attack on Dai Do. I ordered Hotel Company to be prepared to follow Echo Company. Echo's attack would be northwest from An Lac. We had to move Quickly because Golf Company's situation grew worse by the hour. Two large enemy night attacks and several small probes were beaten back. Capt Vargas ringed his position with supporting fires and exhausted his supply of small arms ammunition. A daring resupply was made by Capt Lorraine Forehand, BLT 2/4 logistics officer, and his people. Golf Company held, but just barely, thanks in no small part to some miraculous logistics support.
The thunder of Golf's defensive fires muffled the movement of Echo Company as it crossed the line of departure and moved into the rice paddies toward assault positions just south of Dai Do village. Before Echo Company reached its assault positions, the enemy opened up with heavy volumes of small arms and mortar fire. The two forward (assault) platoons received heavy casualties and lost forward momentum. But Capt Livingston immediately committed his reserve platoon, personally leading it forward to penetrate the forward enemy defenses and moved well into Dai Do. Livingston then widened the penetration by attacking to the right and left. He brought forward the two platoons previously pinned down in the rice paddies and continued to attack. The fighting was furious. Although twice wounded by grenade fragments Livingston continued to move wherever required to encourage his men and to maintain the momentum of the assault. Each enemy position had to be located, pinned down by accurate fire, blinded with white phosphorous, and destroyed by grenades, flame-throwers, satchel charges, and LAAW's (light assault antitank weapons).
Several times Echo Marines gained the flank of trench lines and placed killing, enfilade fire on large numbers of NVA soldiers who remained to die in their positions. One young machinegunner killed more than 30 enemy soldiers in this manner and later received the Silver Star.
Casualties were heavy as the assault continued for several hours. Golf Company broke out of its perimeter to assist Echo Company clear Dai Do. Finally, after several hours of heavy fighting and heavy casualties, Dai Do was secured.
Early on the second day, I put Capt Richard J. Murphy, our intelligence officer, in charge of the position at An Lac, now manned by survivors of Bravo Company, the 81mm mortar platoon, amtrac platoon, plus various supply, reconnaissance, medical, and communications personnel. Medical personnel performed initial triage at An Loc before evacuating wounded by skimmer boat to Mai Xa Chanh for further treatment and helilift to USS Iwo Jima or the hospital ship Repose. An Lac received too much enemy artillery fire to risk landing medivac helicopters, and we wanted to avoid lifting supporting fires while evacuation helicopters were in the battle area.
Our forward supply point was also located at An Lac. Capt Forehand again performed miracles with his Otter drivers and supply personnel, assisted by the reconnaissance platoon and other BLT units. These unsung heroes kept our assault units resupplied and evacuated the wounded, often exposing themselves to direct enemy fire and becoming casualties themselves.
About 1000 on 2 May, Col Hull arrived at An Lac. Echo and Golf Companies had just about completed the recapture of Dai Do. ( While we were talking, an enemy soldier carrying a machinegun popped up in the rice paddy about 50 yards north of our position. SgtMaj Malnar spotted him first. My radio operator, Sgt Charles W Bollinger, and runner, Cpl Greg R. Kraus, polished him off in short order.) Col Hull told me it was very important to keep the pressure on the enemy. I told him that we had just about run out of steam. I recommended that several battalions be landed about 10 kilometers north of Dai Do, attack south, and drive the enemy into our positions. I also recommended that the other two battalions of the 3d Marines, and 1st Amtrac Battalion would form the anvil against which the helilifted northern battalions would hammer the enemy. I believed that we could annihilate or capture most of the 320th NVA Division. We had taken prisoners from two of its four regiments. One of them told us there were 12 NVA companies in the village of Dai Do alone. From the amount of enemy bodies and weapons we uncovered, I believe the prisoner's story.
Col Hull didn't have the assets or authority to carry out such a plan. He could not even move his other two battalions from their positions without permission. Only the commanding general, 3rd Marine Division could act in the manner I suggested. Whether my recommendations ever reached the commanding general, I do not know. I do know that no aggressive plan to destroy the enemy was carried out and that we lost a rare, golden opportunity to annihilate the crack 320th NVA Division.*
The same recommendations were made by Maj Warren, our operations officer, on 1 May, the second day of the battle. In fairness, the CG. 3rd Marine Division may not have had the resources to carry out such a bold plan. In early 1968, the DOD-imposed "Dye Marker" plan of defending heavily fortified positions along the DMZ tied up a number of maneuver battalions. Later, when the Dye Marker concept was largely ignored, the 3rd Marine Division enjoyed great success in locating and defeating NVA forces.
Lost opportunities notwithstanding, I still had to carry out my orders: keep pressure on the enemy. I called upon Hotel Company, ordering Lt Prescott to pass through Dai Do and Echo Company, attack north, guide on the stream to the left, and seize Dinh To. Hotel crossed the line of departure on the northwest of Dai Do and entered Dinh To, receiving light enemy small arms in the process. As the advance continued, enemy fire increased, reinforced with mortars, rockets, and artillery, About one third through Dinh To, the enemy fire became so great that it halted Hotel's assault. Shortly thereafter, the enemy counterattacked. Hotel Company repulsed the counterattack, but was in desperate straits. Lt Prescott asked for help. He thought his company would be overrun by the next enemy counterattack, which he believed was coming very soon.
Four hundred meters to the south, Capt Jim Livingston had been listening to Hotel Company's reports. He quickly assembled what was left of Echo Company after the morning attack (about 30 Marines) and moved to the aid of Hotel Company. It's hard to describe the electrifying effect Capt Livingston's action had on Hotel Company, which was about to be overrun. Lt Prescott explained it this way:
We were really desperate. Than my radio operator told me, Capt Livingston is coming. I knew than that we would be okay. I yelled, "Echo is coming. The cry was repeated by others. Echo is coming... Echo is coming." Everyone felt like I did.
Such was Livingston's reputation. Even the riflemen in other companies knew him as a skilled, effective combat leader-a master craftsman at closing with and destroying the enemy.
Capt Livingston's arrival inspired Lt Prescott and Hotel Company to rally. Unfortunately, Lt Prescott suffered a serious wound and had to be evacuated. 2dLt Baynard V. "Vic" Taylor* assumed command of Hotel Company (the third company commander in three days). Capt Livingston and Lt Taylor resumed the attack north with remnants of Echo and Hotel Companies. After fighting through a series of defended trench lines, they were halted by a large volume of heavy (12.7mm) machinegun fire and a counterattack. The ferocity of the fighting by Echo and Hotel Companies is described by Lt Taylor in a letter to me years later:
The enemy counterattack dwarfed the fighting that had gone before in intensity and volume. I recall seeing banana trees and the masonry walls of a hooch cut down by (enemy) automatic weapons fire. The bushes to our front seemed to be alive with heavily camouflaged NVA soldiers. The Marines of Hotel and Echo held their ground and threw every available round back at them. PFC Scafiti, a lean, tough machinegunner from New York City, standing in the open, mowed down a column of charging NVA. Having run out of oil long before, his M60 was lubricated with the greasy juice of C-ration beans and franks.... Another Marine, armed only with a pistol and a sandbag full of hand grenades, was pitching them at groups of enemy as fast as he could pull the pins. They were all superb, they never gave the counterattack an inch-but it was apparent that the odds were not in our favor. We began to take fire from our left flank again, RPGs(shoulder launched rockets) and rifles. (A large group of) NVA were coming down the shallow stream (on the left) using the bank for cover... We (also) discovered enemy on our right flank and a few to our rear
*Taylor was aboard the USS Iwo Jima collecting money to pay Hotel Company troops when the battle began on 30 April, He had not fully recovered from a wound suffered several weeks earlier. He learned of the battle as wounded were being delivered to the Iwo by helicopters. He grabbed a rifle and jumped aboard a returning helicopter, rejoining Hotel Company at Dong Huan after the assault.
Echo Company's 2nd Platoon, led by Lt David R. Jones, intercepted the enemy company moving south along the streambank. In a brief, savage clash the enemy was thrown back. Lt Jones was badly wounded and Sgt James W. Rogers became 3rd Platoon commander. In a letter to me Sgt Rogers recalled the bitter fighting in Dinh To:....We began the assault into Dinh To and (at first) the resistance seemed to ease up. I could see NVA getting up and running away.... A Marine on my flank opened up with an M60 machinegun.... He tore them (NVA soldiers) up....Some NVA stated returning fire. I was hit in the cartridge belt and knocked to the ground. The round was deflected and went through my canteen.... It seemed like the NVA were regrouping and attacking.... NVA soldiers were all over.... as soon as you shot one, another would pop up in his place. We were receiving a lot of machinegun fire. Capt Livingston seemed to be everywhere at once. His coolness and calmness... kept us from panicking....
Realizing Echo and Hotel could not hold their position in Dinh To, I told both company commanders to pull back to Dai Do. At this point, Capt Livingston was hit in both legs by machinegun fire. Unable to move, he would not permit himself to be dragged to the rear until he was certain that all the other wounded were evacuated. He then ordered the able-bodied Marines in his immediate vicinity to pull back, fearing that they would be overrun protecting him. But the Marines refused to leave their leader and pulled him to safety.
During the Echo/Hotel withdrawal, LCpl James L. O'Neil, a sniper attached to Hotel Company, and his partner, PFC Robert Griese, had finished helping two wounded Marines back to a temporary aid station in the northern part of Dai Do. A corpsmen pointed out some enemy in the open about 700 meters to the northwest. Upon checking the area with his telescope, O'Neil saw three 12.7 mm machinegun positions cleverly concealed to look like graves. Whenever an aerial observer would appear, the guns and crews would remain hidden. When the plane left, the gun crews would remove the overhead cover and deliver murderous fire into Echo and Hotel Companies.
O'Neil and Griese zeroed in on the enemy machine-guns and fired at the gunners with deadly accuracy. As O'Neil described to me in an audio tape:
...I would...shoot the machine gunners and they would fall over their guns. The A (assistant) gunner would just pick up the gunner, move him off (to) the side, and the A gunner would keep shooting....somebody else would become the A gunner. Then I would shoot the gunner again....It was a turkey shoot....Pretty soon I counted 24 kills....
O'Neil's amazing feat was observed by a sergeant from the interrogator-translator team who couldn't believe his own eyes. O'Neil also observed and fired on large numbers of enemy moving along trails in the open northeast of Dai Do. He reported them to our FAC, Lt Hilton, who had already seen them and had ordered airstrikes.
Echo and Hotel Company brought all their wounded and withdrew to Dai Do where they formed a perimeter under the leadership of Maj Warren. Warren had earlier brought the main CP Group forward to the southern edge of Dai Do. Wounded were evacuated. Echo and Hotel Companies were resupplied and reorganized.
Maj Warren had been doing a tremendous job running things at the CP at Mai Xa Chanh, especially hounding regiment and division for more air and artillery support. He also stripped headquarters units of personnel to replace casualties in the rifle companies. A number of these Marines came from aboard ship; BLT 2/4 was the ground combat element of Special Lading Force Alpha, the equivalent of a present day Marine amphibious unit, which remained off the coast only 15 minutes away by helicopter from Dai Do. They were truck drivers, cooks, clerks, supply people, and others. They fit right in and did an admirable job.
I was ordered to conduct a combined attack with an ARVN mechanized battalion that reportedly had occupied Dong Lai, about 500 meters west of Dai Do. We worked out a tentative plan, which was simple. The ARVN mechanized battalion and BLT 2/4 would start out abreast at 1500, and attack northwest. The ARVN battalion was to seize Thuong Nghia. BLT 2/4 was to seize Dinh To and Thuong Do. The boundary line between the two units was a shallow stream that drained into the Bo Dieu River.
Coordination and communication with ARVN units was difficult at best. This day was no exception. Normally, we placed one or our own liaison officers and a radio operator with the ARVN commander and his U.S. Army advisor. This time, because of insufficient time and the shortage of officers, we didn't do it. Maj Warren and I both talked to the U.S. Army advisor by radio. He seemed to understand the plan and said that the ARVN commander agreed to it. I was disappointed about not coordinating face-to-face with the ARVN commander and not having my own liaison officer present in his command group. But that's the way it was-unfortunately..
By the afternoon on 2 May, BLT 2/4 was weakened by heavy casualties, loss of key leaders, and fatigue from more than two days of heavy fighting. Equipment casualties were also high. Our last two tanks had to be dragged off the battlefield, and less than half of our amtracs were operating, Many machine guns and mortars had to be replaced. Worst of all, most of the M16 rifles in the rifle companies had malfunctioned and were discarded in favor of captured AK-47 assault rifles.* In fact, when I visited Golf Company I saw only one M16 rifle. It was carried by Capt Vargas, the company commander. The only other functioning M16 I saw that afternoon was carried by me. Clearly Marines felt their rifles had let them down' Personnel and equipment problems notwithstanding, we had a job to do, and we did it.
*Problems with M16 rifles in Vietnam in 1967-68 were many. First, the M16. 5.56mm rifle was placed in the hands of troops who were not thoroughly trained in its use. Those troops had trained with the older, heavier, reliable M14, 7.62mm rifle. They were not familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the lighter, less rugged, rapid firing M16. Every new rifle takes time to get used to. The M16 was introduce to troops in a combat zone with inadequate familiarization. Second, cleaning materials were in short supply, and the M16 had to be kept clean to function properly. Third, several of the early lots of M16 ammunition experienced large numbers of ruptured cartridges and other malfunctions. Fourth, early versions of the M16 rifles did not have corrosive resistant bores, and the damp climate and salt air in RVN caused rapid bore deterioration. Fifth, the early M16 rifles would not function with dirt or grit in the receiver, unlike the highly reliable, "troop proof" AK-47 rifle carried by the enemy. In heavy, continuous combat, such as we experienced at Dai Do, keeping a rifle clean was nearly impossible for most troops. Sixth, the irresistible tendency by many Marines to use full automatic fire also contributed to jams and wasted ammunition. A related problem arose when Marines fired captured AK-47 and SKS rifles, which sounded distinctly different from M16's. Other Marines sometimes mistook friendly troops firing enemy rifles for the enemy, especially during darkness. On the night of 1-2 May, Bravo Company engaged in a Marine vs. Marine firefight with enemy weapons. Fortunately, no casualties occurred during this "rhubarb." For all these reason, the Marine rifleman in BLT 2/4 lost confidence in "The Marine's Best Friend,' his rifle.
I did not have much choice in selecting the companies for the afternoon attack of 2 May. Echo, Hotel, and Bravo Companies were decimated and unsuitable for offensive action. Golf Company, although down to about 40 effectives, including 4 officers, was still a viable, spirited fighting outfit, despite its 2-day ordeal. Capt Vargas knew his men well, and they knew and respected him for his outstanding competence as a combat leader and his compassion. I knew that I could depend on him and Golf Company.
The only other company was Foxtrot, the strongest with about 80 effectives, including 3 officers. (Foxtrot's 3rd Platoon had finally been relieved of duty at My Loc and returned to my control about noon on 2 May.) I had misgivings about Foxtrot's company commander, but the troops and small unit leaders were capable. I hoped to keep a close watch on the company commander during the forthcoming attack.
As I briefed Capt Vargas and Foxtrot's company commander on the northern edge of Dai Do, we saw another rare sight-large numbers of enemy troops in the open fields northwest of Dai Do. We called in air, artillery, and mortar fire. Pilots in the attacking aircraft were ecstatic at being able to strafe and bomb enemy troops in the open. We listened to there excited chatter on our air net. Some of the enemy were within small arms range. Marines had the morale boosting experience of squeezing off carefully aimed shots and watching the enemy drop. A Marine sniper, impatient with the slow rate of fire of his bolt action sniper rifle, borrowed an M14 semiautomatic rifle from our S-2 scout so that he could "kill em faster." I wondered if the enemy commander had gone berserk, allowing us another daylight turkey shoot. I bet the reenlistment rate in the 320th Division dropped after Dai Do.
I ordered Golf Company to lead the attack, followed closely in trace by Foxtrot. The principal direction of attack was northwest from Dai Do, through Dinh To and Thuong Di, guiding on the stream to our left and hopefully, maintaining contact with the ARVN battalion mounted in armored personnel carriers (APCs". Contact between the two battalions was from left to right. This meant that the ARVN Battalion was responsible for maintaining contact with BLT 2/4. Foxtrot Company, following closely behind Golf Company, was responsible for maintaining contact with Golf and providing rear security for both companies. Golf Company was to move forward until it ran into heavy enemy defense. Then the stronger Foxtrot Company would move forward, pass through Golf, and continue the attack. I placed myself and the forward CP group about 15 meters behind Capt Vargas and his command element, which was, in turn, about 20-30 meters behind Golf Company assault elements. I chose this spot because I wanted to be in position to decide exactly when to commit Foxtrot, and because I thought my presence up front seemed to boost the morale of my exhausted battalion.
The attack jumped off from Dai Do at 1500, as planned. Golf company moved into Dinh To. Except for occasional small arms fire, there was little enemy opposition. Enemy fighting holes and bunkers were checked out as assault elements moved cautiously forward. Crossing the open area northwest of Dinh To, Golf Company came under heavy enemy fire from the front and right flank as it entered Thoung Do. Enemy mortars, rockets, and artillery added to the tempo. I told Capt Vargas to hold up and ordered Foxtrot Company forward. But Foxtrot could not move. After some delay, I learned Foxtrot Company was pinned down in the rice paddies east of Dinh To and Thuong Do. It was the first I knew that Foxtrot had not followed directly behind Golf Company as ordered. Golf Company's rear was hanging in the air, unprotected'
About the same time, approximately 1700, we began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from the west (our left flank) where the ARVN battalion was supposed to be. Than we saw troops moving toward us from across the stream to our left. They were clearly North Vietnamese soldiers. We tried, unsuccessfully, to contact the ARVN battalion. Later we learned that the ARVN battalion had simply withdrawn without telling us. We began to receive light small arms fire from our rear and realized that some enemy had slipped in behind us. Things were not looking good at all. Then a large group of enemy assaulted from our front. Simultaneously, heavy automatic weapons fire hit us from our right (east) flank. Things were getting worse.
Desperate circumstances require desperate measures. Vargas called his two assault units back and attempted to draw his company into a tight perimeter. We called in artillery so close that shrapnel landed among us. We called for naval gunfire to plaster our front and asked for emergency air support. Several helicopter gunships responded. The fighting was close and violent. Everyone in the Golf Company and battalion command groups fired his weapon. There were plenty of targets, and we dropped enemy assault troops within a few yards of our positions. SgtMaj Malnar blasted away with his 12-gauge shotgun. Even the radio operators fought between transmissions. The enemy frontal attack finally stopped, but our losses were great. Big John Malnar was killed by a rocket round. Both my radio operators and I were wounded. All of Golf Company radio operators were either killed or wounded. Capt Vargas was painfully wounded (his third in three days and fifth in three months) but managed to stay on his feet and control things-in fact, he helped move me part of the way to the rear. I ordered Vargas to withdraw. He did, bringing all the wounded, and occasionally firing his rifle. His presence, inspirational leadership, personal actions, and total disregard for his own safety averted complete disaster and turned an impossible situation into an orderly withdrawal.
1stLt Hilton, our FAC, also played a key role in the successful withdrawal. He organized a pickup squad of eight Marines, which laid down a withering hail of fire to the flanks and front as we pulled back. He fired an M79 grenade launcher until he ran out of ammunition. Then he fired various enemy weapons picked up along the way. He also "talked in" several helicopter gunships that fired their rockets right into the midst of attacking enemy only 20 yards from his position. And he helped move wounded. Judd Hilton, our duty aviator, fought as well as any infantryman on the battlefield. Many Marines owe their lives to that courageous officer.
As we withdrew toward Dai Do we met stragglers and small groups from Foxtrot Company. Capt Vargas quickly organized them to support the withdrawal and move the wounded. Those wounded who were able to fired their weapons. We fell back behind a heavy curtain of supporting arms and our own small arms fire. Raw courage and the performance of individual Marines, inspired by leaders like Vargas and Hilton, made the withdrawal possible.
Maj Fritz Warren, leading a provisional platoon of Marines and several amtracs, moved northwest from Dai Do and met us in Dinh To. We were indeed happy to see him. The wounded were loaded aboard amtracs, moved to the banks of the Bo Dieu River, transferred to Mai Xa Chanh by skimmer boat, and then flown to medical facilities. I passed command to Maj Warren, who strengthened the perimeter of Dai Do and remained in command of BLT 2/4 until relieved by the battalion executive officer (Maj Charles W. Knapp) that evening. After evacuating the wounded and reorganizing the able-bodied survivors and replacements, BLT 2/4 had four rifle companies with 1 officer and 40 Marines each at the perimeter of Dai Do. (Bravo Company remnants were located at An Lac.)
The reorganized BLT 2/4 spent an active night on 2-3 May. The received some light probes and a few dozen enemy rounds. But heavy fighting was over. The next day, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines arrived and moved through BLT 2/4 into Dinh To and Thuong Do. The enemy had withdrawn. After policing up the battle area, BLT 2/4 moved back to Mai Xa Chanh. For BLT 2/4, the Battle of Dai Do was over.
Dai Do in Retrospect
Some officers, not aware of the ferocity of the fighting, have asked why BLT 2/4 suffered so many casualties. Here is my answer:
*First. we were attacking a well-trained, well-equipped, well-supported enemy in excellent fortified positions. Attacking such an enemy is always costly. Just think of the casualties suffered in World War II assaults on Tarawa, Peleiu, Iwo Jima, and Sugar Loaf Hill on Okinawa.
*Second, BLT 2/4 was piecemealed into the battle. When the battle began, the rifle companies were spread out over a wide area (one, Echo Company, was not even under my operational control). It took too long to gain the required authority to move even those units under my direct control (Golf Company and 3rd Platoon, Foxtrot Company). Higher authority than me had to give approval. Had I been able to assemble and deploy my entire battalion the first day, we could have exerted greater pressure on the enemy, when his positions in Dai Do were not fully occupied. With all four rifle companies readily available, we could have seized Dai Do immediately after Hotel Company seized Dong Huan. To take Dai Do, the enemy would have had to attack two or three well-dug-in rifle companies rather than by the pitifully understrength companies we had to use on 2 May.
*Third, BLT 2/4 was not reinforced during the battle, but the enemy continued to reinforce his units and to replace his casualties. Thus, the enemy became stronger while BLT 2/4 became weaker from casualties and exhaustion.
*Fourth, about half of our casualties occurred during the afternoon attack of 2 May. During that attack, the ARVN battalion on our left flank withdrew without notice allowing the enemy to move in on that flank. Also, during the same afternoon attack, Foxtrot Company failed to follow closely behind Golf company and was not available to reinforce Golf Company as I had planned. Some enemy, therefore, were able to move in behind Golf Company.
*Fifth, if we had more fixed-wing air support, especially during the first 36 hours, assaulting enemy fortified positions would have been less costly. Large bombs with delay fuses followed by napalm would have caused breaks in the enemy's mutually supporting fires. There would have been more dead spaces to crawl through and fewer enemy to shoot at our Marines.
*Sixth, we should have been reinforced with at least 10 tanks (we had only 2) and an equal number of ONTOS (we had none). The heavy firepower, greater mobility, and the shock of these weapons systems would have made our assaults more rapid and much more potent.
*Finally, the possibility exist that the 2nd ARVN Regiment, which had responsibility for the Dai Do complex, might have been collaborating with the enemy. LtCol Fritz Warren, now retired, believes this to be the case. In a recent letter to me, Warren discussed the following telltale signs:
a) (The day before the battle) the entire ARVN force (moved) from the area to be contested...to engage an enemy that was supposedly making an attack on a village along Route # 1. This movement required 3rd Marine Division to deplete BLT 2/4 assets by moving Company E to the ...bridge (north of Dong Ha).
b) The absolute lack of effective coordination and execution on the afternoon of 2 May and precarious position that BLT 2/4 was put in (by the)...silent withdrawal from the battlefield by the ARVN unit.
c) An Lac, (Dong Huan), Dai Do, Dinh To, (and Thoung Do) were clearly in the Area of Responsibility of the 2nd ARVN Regiment prior to the beginning of this engagement. It is inconceivable...that the 320th NVA (Division) troops could have been so well dug in-mutually supporting bunkers, communications (trench) lines, and infrastructure (etc.)-without having (worked on the positions) over a period of days and probably weeks. It would have been nigh impossible for the ARVN not to have gotten wind of this activity, as these areas were occupied by ARVN family members and... camp followers.
But despite numerous problems and possible treason, BLT 2/4 accomplished its mission. A superior enemy force was driven from the river banks, and the vital Cua Viet and Bo Dieu Rivers were open to traffic.
How badly was the 320th NVA Division hurt at Dai Do? I'm not sure, but much of its fighting effectiveness was destroyed. MajGen Raymond Davis, who became commanding general, 3rd Marine Division, after the battle of Dai Do, stated that the defeat of the 320th Division during August through September 1968 was hastened by the punishment it took during April and May. Other U.S. and ARVN units fought against the 320th prior to and after Dai Do, but I'm certain that BLT 2/4 played a major role in its defeat.
Brig General William Weise, USMC, Retired