More Discussion of the Ontological Arguments

Sunday, January 14, 2001

This discussion continues the discussion which began on the page accessed by the following link:

Thanks again for your quick response. You really can be a godsend. :) I had a few comments/questions about what you wrote (and yes, everything worked just fine -- a private website just for me made me feel quite special). It's going to be a lot... Sorry.

A godsend? Do you really think so? (I take that in the 'spirit' which it is intended, of course.) I've gotten a lot of e-mail over the last year or so from readers of my website expressing the same positive sentiment. I'm glad people are enjoying it!

As for the private website, I think it's a convenient way to exchange ideas, don't you? And since I still have oodles of free space from geocities.com (I've barely made a dent in my allotment with what I have posted up already), it's no bother.

First I wanted to respond to what you wrote about the notion of "possible worlds." I'm not entirely sure, because I haven't read a lot of literature on such things, but I think your analysis is based somewhat on a confusion. For instance, you wrote, "I could conceive of a cow jumping over the moon (hey, it doesn't contradict any "a priori" facts, does it???), but does reality follow this whim? No, it does not." You seem to equate all "possible worlds" theories with "possible worlds" realism. In other words, you seem to attack the idea that such possible worlds actually exist. However, from what I can tell many thinkers who use the "possible worlds" way of speaking do not adopt a realist view of such things -- they are more or less semantic devices. I gleaned this from a discussion of "possible worlds" from J. L. Mackie's "The Miracle of Theism" (which was very helpful during this crisis with Ontological Arguments -- they initially seemed very convincing, to the point where I was almost a theist). He mentions that not all who speak of "possible worlds" believe that such worlds actually exist. I am not sure if this has any bearing on what you said in respect to possible worlds or not -- as I said, I am not very familiar with such things. Perhaps (and I don't think this is farfetched) you could hold that even the possibility of such worlds (whether they really exist or not) is implausible. This is basically just a clarification, and I doubt that it has any significance for your views.

I certainly do not profess to be an expert on "possible worlds" locution, that much should be apparent from my comments. But I'm not really certain what the distinction between "possible worlds" theories and "possible worlds" realism is. Can we chew on that?

Also, if I am attacking the idea that such possible worlds *actually exist*, that's most likely because I've seen versions of the Ont. Arg. which make use of premises suggesting that they do. For example, one fellow sent me the following back in October, 2000:

[snip]

[unsnip]

Premise 2 here ("There is a possible world in which G exists"), at least from my reading, suggests the "actuality" of the "possible world" in question. It does not say "There might be a possible world in which G exists," or "I imagine that there's a possible world in which G exists." This premise confidently asserts the existence of this "possible world" as if it were a foregone conclusion. Premise 2 references premise 1 as its substantiation. But what justifies going from the statement "X is possible" to the statement "there is a possible world in which X exists"? If this is valid reasoning (and yes, there are probably many arguments out there whose intention is to confirm that this is valid reasoning that I have not examined), can I then say:

[a] "It is possible that G does not exist"

and that the statement

[b] "There is a possible world in which G does not exist"

is a valid consequence of reasoning?

Am I still confused here? Well, it seems appropriate to be confused by arguments which seem designed to confuse! ;)

I am not certain what all employers of the "possible worlds" locution have in mind when they speak of "possible worlds." I'm not convinced that they are sure themselves of what they have in mind when they use it. I have to go by what the context of their statements infers as well as how consistent their use of definitions is.

My main concern with the "possible worlds" locution has to do with the definitions such idea assume (and whether they are employed consistently or not), and the validity of determining what is possible. It seems entirely suspicious to me to go from the assessment "X is possible" (which may or may not be valid to begin with) to the claim that "there is a possible world in which X" (where "X" is some truth statement about reality or relationships between existents).

If by "possible" one simply means that he can "conceive" of it being the case, what are the criteria considered to make this kind of judgment? (You see how complicate this can get!) Is our identification of what is "possible" in reality based on perceptually available facts or on reasoning which reduces to perceptually available facts? Or, is one's idea of what is possible in reality limited only by what one can imagine (e.g., cows jumping over the moon, cartoon-worlds, etc.), as suggested by some defenders' statements about the "conceivability=possibility" model of reasoning I mentioned earlier?

Also, what is the rôle of the law of identity in our assessment of what is possible? Remember that our reasoning is no more valid than our loyalty to the law of identity on which reason and logic depend. If we dispense with the law of identity, or compromise it in any way, then what validity can we claim for our reasoning? Our desire that it is valid in spite of our disregard for the law of identity? Does the law of identity hold primacy over our ability to conceive of "possible worlds" scenarios? If so, then what reign of impact can we give to "possible world" scenarios which posit ideas which ultimately conflict with the law of identity (e.g., notions which affirm the primacy of consciousness)? If the reasoning which connects statements like [a] and [b] above is valid and rationally tenable, can we then make statements like:

[a'] "It is possible that some beings can violate the law of identity (from the definition of 'supernatural being')"

[b'] "There is a possible world in which some beings can violate the law of identity (from [a'])"

and consider them rationally viable?

Yes, I'm rambling at this point, but hopefully I've made my concerns clear (I suppose you were clear on these concerns already, but now they've been expressed with more application). Am I confused on the matter of "possible worlds" locution? Well, I could certainly well be confused, I'll admit that right off. I suppose my concern is how "possible worlds" locution can integrate with a valid metaphysics and rational epistemology. In essence, that's what my railings attempt to emphasize.

Am I making sense? Or should I have another cup of brown rice tea and start to read Mr. Kripke? (that's supposed to rhyme ;)

Also, I'd love to hear your thoughts on Mackie. I've not read much of him either (just brief passages quoted by others

Here are a couple of articles I found on "possible worlds" (though I do not vouch for their content!!! - just food for thought and perhaps unthought?):

"Possible Worlds: A Critical Analysis" by Jaroslav Peregrin:

"Do Modal Claims Imply the Existence of Possible Worlds?"

(This article was written by Michael Huemer, who has written some material contra Objectivism; see "Why I am Not an Objectivist"

"An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds" from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

(This article states that it draws from "Plantinga's account" for its examples.)

Have you read much literature on "possible worlds"? Is there an official Objectivist position on this line of thinking, and -- better yet -- are there any papers you know of addressing the topic? I'm interested in exploring such notions further.

I've only read a few things here and there over the course of a long period of time. I have not read any comprehensive treatments of the subject; nor do I know of an 'official' Objectivist position on this matter, or its reasoning. Most of my exposure to arguments which appeal to "possible worlds" has been the result of encountering such ideas as incorporated in theistic arguments that I have examined; thus the context in which I've seen it presented has been associated with ideas that I find suspect to begin with. On that note, I admit my bias against mysticism just as I admit my bias towards objective reality.

My main questions regarding "possible world" locution would include:

Are there any principles and/or criteria assumed by "possible worlds" reasoning which encourage or ensure objectivity? If so, what are they, and how is their assumption integrated in that reasoning?

In other words, what reference to reality does "possible worlds" reasoning provide? And can claims about reality which assume "possible worlds" scenarios in their premises be validated by reduction to perceptually available facts?

And chiefly some of the points I mentioned above.

TheRepublc wrote in the piece you attached to your message, "Discussion of possible worlds is a pretty involved thing in modern philosophy, and the soundness of it has been proven by Saul Kripke." Do you know what Kripke has said? Is it really accepted everywhere (this seems to almost never be the case with philosophy)?

No, I have not read Kripke's arguments. What do you suppose constitutes Kripke's starting points? (That's a rhetorical question; I don't expect you to answer it.)

Also, in the attachments to your message, TheRepublc got the final response. Did Nick Wiltgen -- who I was delighted to discover was part of that list -- have a response to the response that you know of? He mentions that he will probably be addressing the Ontological Argument on his website, but there is nothing there about it that I can find. I may write him about the issue as well, but I was wondering first if you knew more.

I don't recall if Nick offered any more responses to Mark's defenses against Nick's points of criticism. I don't think he did, and I don't think he's drafted up anything more for his website. I think Nick was satisfied that his primary points of contention sustained Mark's defenses and thereafter lost interest. But then again, I can't speak for him. But one of these days I'll ask him. I will probably give him the links to these temp pages to refresh his memory and to get him up to speed on our conversation; though I very much doubt he has much time to pursue these things. Then again, this might be the diversion he'd like to pursue at this time. That's his decision.

And now, I wanted to give some analysis of TheRepublc's argument and see if you have anything further to add. On to that!

Okay! Let's do some atheology! ;)

The First Variation

(I) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

-To this premise there is the question of whether or not the analytic/synthetic and necessary/contingent dichotomies are accepted. It seems the Objectivist point of view is that they are not valid. Are the analytic/synthetic dichotomies and necessary/contingent dichotomies the same thing? I unfortunately don't have my copy of ITOE right now (I gave it to a friend who has forgotten to return it), so I can't read the essay. Nonetheless, if contingency/necessity is rejected it seems we have little room to move, do we not?

The analytic-synthetic dichotomy and the necessary-contingent dichotomy are not exactly the same thing, even though they are closely related and those who endorse one usually endorse both. On this Peikoff writes:

"The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological error, as I have discussed, is an incorrect view of the nature of concepts. The metaphysical error is: the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts." (106)

So, from this, we see that, according to Peikoff, not only are the two dichotomies not the same thing, the one dichotomy ("necessary vs. contingent" truths) is more fundamental than the other ("analytic vs. synthetic" truths). Peikoff is also right to point to the assumption of an erroneous view of concepts as fundamental to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. So there is a hierarchical relationship here.

I'm not sure what you mean by your question, "if contingency/necessity is rejected it seems we have little room to move, do we not?" Can you restate? If what you mean is that, should we initially and justifiably reject the necessary-contingent dichotomy as invalid, we have clear grounds for rejecting any argument which makes use of this dichotomy in its premises, then yes, I agree, we are justified in rejecting such arguments.

You can read more about the Objectivist view of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy online with David Ross' article "IOE: The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy":

Furthermore, since the argument begins by discussing "logical possibilities," I would point out to those who defend such arguments that the concept 'possible' cannot apply outside the context of existence (since the concept 'possible' genetically presupposes the fact of existence). Therefore, whatever we're talking about when we say "X is possible," we must be speaking of something within the universe (since 'universe' is defined as "the sum total of existence"). Theists will probably try to contend that this beginning reservation involves an equivocation, for it is unlikely that theists hoping to establish the existence of the supernatural will agree to our definition of 'universe'. Indeed, my Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary agrees with this definition of 'universe' in its first entry for this word: "all existing space and matter as a whole." Theists objecting to this definition in order to make room for "existence beyond the universe" (which is summarily self-contradictory on this definition) will have to argue for their preferred alternative definition of this word, and this of course would probably draw the discussion off into areas of concept-formation and concept-adequacy. Elaborate objections against the definition of 'universe' will likely involve some appeal to the "necessary-contingent" dichotomy and its conceptual fallout. There is no reason why one should relent on this point, however, especially a knowledgeable Objectivist.

(II) God is understood to be the uncreated, self-existent (aseity) foundation of reality.

-I'm not sure if I can even understand the idea of being self-existent. Is God conscious? If so, he depends on existence. Does God have identity? If so, isn't he a part of existence as such? If there is nothing else other than God at some point, where does he exist? And additionally, the idea of God being the foundation of reality faces strong (in my view, unanswerable) criticism from the AFE.

The idea of "self-existence" is a somewhat murky issue, from what I've been able to gather from the articles I've read and the apologetic uses of this term I've encountered. To me, the term seems redundant. What "self-existence" is supposed to refer to is something that doesn't need anything else, either existent or causal in nature, for it to exist. Somewhat like "necessary" as used in the necessary/contingent dichotomy. A "self-existent" thing exists independently of other things; not as a dependent. The universe, of course, in the hands of the theists, does not possess this trait; but God does, they claim.

Of course, if we ask the theist to offer proof that God is "self-existent," what will he offer us by way of proof? A bunch of assumed definitions, most likely. God, they will claim, is by definition "self-existent"; this is not a property they discover about God after learning of His existence. It's a property that is assigned to God by their characterization of God, which of course, we know, is given to them by revelation. In other words, we get wordplay, not proof.

If something is "self-existent," why can't it be the universe? "Because," says the theist, "the universe is a creation." I.e., he begs he question.

If God exists, he must have identity. And if God exists and has identity, then he belongs to the realm of existence. But theists will resist employing the concept 'existence' without subdividing it somehow to reflect the dichotomies of their thinking. Thus we are offered the dichotomy "necessary existence" vs. "contingent existence." (Don't laugh, I've seen it before!) So what concept will envelop it all? If we must subdivide the concept 'existence' (which Objectivism holds to be the widest of all abstractions), so that God cannot be included in the same term of reference used for those things which are allegedly "created" by God, then what precisely are we subdividing? We are never allowed the use of the concept 'existence' without this duplicitous division of meaning. We are not allowed to use this concept conceptually intact. Instead, we must say:

God exists

and

the universe exists'

where exists and exists' constitute the two uses in question. But to be consistent, we could never use [exists] to include both of these senses, since exists refers to necessary existence and exists' refers to contingent existence. Thus, in effect, we've chopped an otherwise legitimate, objective concept into two opposing (or mutually exclusive) ideas. What justifies this? For those who endorse such division of concepts, the necessary-contingent dichotomy in metaphysics is the justification we are given. Thus, to answer the question "isn't [God] a part of existence as such?" the answer would be (assuming this dichotomy): No. God is separate both metaphysically as well as epistemologically, and the theist's formation and use of concepts must, to be consistent, reflect this.

As for your aside that the notion of God providing or "being the foundation of reality faces strong criticism from the AFE," I agree wholeheartedly, but only so long as we preserve the unity (it occurred to me to say "sanctity") of our concepts. Once we allow our concepts to be arbitrarily divided, we immediately lose sight of our starting point, which is: the fact of existence.

-Furthermore, wouldn't this amount in one way or another to saying that the laws of logic (which I believe are assumed to be necessary) are really contingent and dependent on God? I think Michael Martin touched on this in his critique of the TAG. Perhaps, however, this is avoided because God is supposedly necessary based on the conclusion of this argument.

If we are to say that the laws of logic, of which the law of identity is fundamental, are "grounded" in anything, it is in the fact of existence in which this can be said. You're already familiar with the Objectivist axioms: existence exists, to exist is to be something (i.e., to have identity), etc. If A should exist, it must be A, etc.

Modern theists, particularly presuppositionalists, have every intention to kidnap the laws of logic and retrofit their theology with the cunning proposition (and casuistry supporting such subterfuge) that one cannot assume their validity without also assuming the validity of their theology. This is nothing but grand theft logic. They claim that the laws of nature (i.e., the laws of this world) are grounded in a realm which contradicts this world, a realm where consciousness can create and alter the identity of the objects it perceives; a realm where the good, the moral, the righteous, the just and the proper follow from the dictates of a "personal" whim unbounded by natural law; a realm where consciousness requires no means of consciousness, whose content is spontaneous, a consciousness said to be both omniscient and infallible (thus not in need of reason or any means of acquiring and validating its content); a realm where identity is "infinite" and causality is pure desire without the need of action; a realm where existence is non-physical, where knowledge is nonsense.

Martin says that the laws of logic become "contingent" if they are based on God's "character" (which smacks of the necessary-contingent dichotomy above).

Martin writes:

By contrast, I argue that the laws of logic, specifically the law of identity, becomes meaningless (or at the very least unreliable) if we should base them on the "character" of a being capable of performing miracles (i.e., capable of creating and altering the identity of objects at whim). Not only would the laws of logic be a product of whim if they were "dependent upon God", but they would be provisional at best at any time, since God (or possibly angels and devils) could override the laws of logic at any time. Martin argues essentially the same thing, though he neglects to clarify the meaning (i.e., the reference) of the laws of logic. The meaning or reference to the laws of logic are the facts of reality. Objectivism does not treat the laws of logic or of nature as "a priori deductive certainties" that we're born with or have "automatically" or "somehow." According to Objectivism, they are perceptually available to us implicitly, and explicitly available through axiomatic concepts which depend hierarchically on our perception of objects.

Much more can - and should - be said on these matters to make this clearer. Sadly, however, I am pressed for time and must move on.

(III) That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it must either exist always, or not at all. Thus both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for God (I, II).

-I'm not sure I see that God must either always exist or not exist at all if he is uncreated and self-existent. Is there something I'm missing here? Apparently being uncreated and self-existent makes God "necessary" in some way, but I don't fully understand how. And why could God not still end his own existence at some point? He could still have all of the properties ascribed to him and end his own existence. There seems to be a false dichotomy involved, unless I am missing something. Even if that is not the case, since III follows from I and II it is possible that it rests on contradictions and other false dichotomies.

I suppose the assumption entailed by the characteristic "self-existent" is the idea that, if X is self-existent, it has the power and/or means by which it can perpetuate its existence indefinitely. But if this is part of the definition assumed by "self-existent," it should be clarified explicitly in order to eliminate the risk of the fallacy you mention (if indeed this risk can be eliminated).

But note my present observations on the progress of the argument thus far:

As the Ont. Argument proceeds, new attributes are added with each premise. In Premise II, we have the claim, "God is understood to be uncreated, self-existent" as well as the "foundation of reality." These are hefty characterizations to be sure. The question is: Who understands this, and upon what reference to reality is such alleged understanding based? Again, the wagon train proceeds with carts before the horses. The objective of the argument is to conclude with the establishment that X exists. But if in the course of arguing to this end we continually make additions to the identity of what allegedly exists, aren't we begging the question? Aren't we already assuming the identity of something, and thereby implying necessarily the very conclusion we hope to achieve in the premises we offer in support of that conclusion?

And now, with Premise III, we have yet another addition to our growing list of identity assumptions: that the "uncreated and self-existent X" the existence of which we hope to establish in our forthcoming conclusion must be eternal ("exist always"). We are given precious little by way of justifying the assumption that any X could possess all these characteristics, at least within the confines of the argument itself.

So far as the characteristics which have been stated explicitly are concerned (those characteristics being "uncreated," "self-existent," "eternal"), we already have something which satisfies these: the universe itself. What the theist hesitates to name among his growing list of characteristics is the idea that this "uncreated, self-existent and eternal X" is conscious (indeed, a form of consciousness without material existence and, consequently, without a means of consciousness). Just as Premise III says that " both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for God," we can say quite justifiably that " both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for" the universe proper. The very concept 'possible' cannot make sense apart from the fact of existence. And if we recognize that 'universe' is the "sum total of existence," then we realize that the concept 'possible' and its cognates cannot be posited outside the universe. Consequently, it is literally and genetically incoherent to speak of the "possibility that the universe does not exist."

It's the assumption which the ontological arguer resists naming - i.e., that "X is conscious" - which he hopes to be accepted without his naming it (for nowhere in his premises does he specifically stipulate that the entity whose existence he hopes to establish in his conclusion is a conscious being - why is that do you suppose?).

So what is missing is, why should we be assuming at any point that X is conscious? How do any of these premises necessitate this assumption? I don't think they do, anywhere, anyhow. Besides, we do not need an argument to establish the fact that the universe exists; this is a perceptually self-evident fact, a fact which requires no validation. The ontological argument hesitates to lay bare its assumptions, and is an entirely moot exercise.

An advocate of the Ont. Arg. could say that "self-existent," if this idea assumes the power and/or means by which it can perpetuate its existence indefinitely as I mentioned above, implies consciousness. But is this necessarily the case? The fact of consciousness does not ensure eternality. If that were the case, then I, being conscious, could live forever, and I wouldn't even have to worry about my sodium intake! Again, this is an attempt to hoodwink the law of identity. Objectivism holds that existence as such is uncreated, just as the Ont. Arg. attributes to X. Objectivism also holds that existence is indestructible, just as the advocates of the Ont. Arg. surely hope the idea "self-existent" should conceptually assume. So at every angle thus far, we have no reason - yea, no justification - to assume that X is a conscious being, yet this is the most important assumption behind X. Even if he can show that his argument is sound (which would be a stretch), he would still have to argue for the assumption that the X whose existence this argument allegedly establishes is a conscious being. Without such an argument, we have no reason not to assume that X is little better than a clod of dirt.

(IV) If God's existence is logically possible God cannot fail to exist (III).

-This is claimed to follow from III, but I don't see how it does. My response to III, if it is correct, makes this premise even less plausible.

Well, again, look at the attributes thus far granted to X: "uncreated," "self-existent," both of which are claimed to be "not contingent," and therefore X "must either always exist" (i.e., X must be eternal), or "not at all." This case is made, however, before numerous other questionable attributes have been examined, such as, "X is conscious," "X is omniscient," "X is omnipotent," "X is moral," "X is good," "X is ever-present," "X is immaterial," etc., etc., etc. However, even though these attributes have not been identified in this argument (and they never are), we already find its premises passing the assessment that the existence of X is "logically possible." This is a hasty bit of non-homework, and thus we have little alternative than to recognize that the Ontological Argument, thus crafted, is attempting to foist upon us an enormous package deal. If we go by what is stated explicitly in the argument, we have no reason not to assume that X is nothing but an eternal, indestructible particle of dust. Pay attention to what is stated, and note the assumptions that are not identified.

Thus, Premise IV asks us to accept the assumption that X is "logically possible" before we are given all the attributes of X which we need to integrate such an assessment. We are given what seem to be plausibly acceptable attributes ("uncreated," "self-existent," "eternal,"), while the implausible and questionable attributes of X are withheld from our review until after we've accepted the assumption that the existence of X is "logically possible."

Can advocates of god-belief not find a more honest route to defending their claims?

(V) God's existence is logically possible (proposition).

-This is questionable in and of itself, and TheRepublc acknowledges this. I think this fact is devastating to the argument.

And what's especially devastating is the fact that, when we attempt to integrate all the characteristics attributed to God which are not expressed in the argument's premises with those which are identified, Premise V does not stand a snowball's chance in hell to achieve validity. It is questionable to say the least.

(VI) God cannot fail to exist (from IV, V).

-All premises of the argument are either questionable or involve contradictions.

Yes, I think you're right. But at least the theist refuses to believe their god is a failure!

-------

The Second Variation

(i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

-We can raise a similar question about the analytic/synthetic and necessary/contingent dichotomy here as well.

Yes. We've already covered the potential problems with this premise in our review above. If our objections against the analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent dichotomy succeed in challenging Premise I of the First Variation above, then Premise I of the Second Variation suffers the same fate.

(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater" in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be a duke, or even king.]

-This conception of the GPB seems to be incoherent. If GPB is perfectly good and perfectly evil at the same time, there is a contradiction. If not, then the GPB is deficient in one way or another.

Yes, I think you're right insofar as the point you raise here underscores the inadequacy of the terminological reference of Premise II. In other words, how broadly can the notion "imperfection" as defined in Premise II be applied? Does it apply to mutually exclusive attributes and properties? For example, can the GPB not be perfectly self-absorbed and not perfectly self-absorbed at the same time and still be free of imperfections? How can the theist prefer the one over the other if both are measures of some kind of perfection or guards against imperfection?

Also, is the "any x" which is identical to the "Greatest Possible Being (GPB)" a conscious entity? Will the advocates of this argument argue that the GPB is by definition a conscious being? Does the vague notion "Greatest Possible Being" assume consciousness necessarily? If this is at all assumed anywhere in the premises of the Ontological Argument, should it not

1. be explicitly identified, and
2. justified as a proper assumption

in order for this assumption to be legitimately entailed by the idea of a "Greatest Possible Being"? If not, why not? And if so, where is it stated explicitly, and where is the argument to the end that consciousness is properly assumed by GPB? I don't see it anywhere here.

Is the "Greatest Possible Being," like the X argued for in the First Variation, an uncreated, self-existent and eternal being? If the GPB is eternal by definition, what could justify the assumption that it is also conscious?

Theists will of course argue that their GPB must be self-conscious, and necessarily so. But why is that? It seems that equipping the GPB with self-consciousness would only open it up to psychological conflict. We have already defined the GPB as uncreated, eternal, indestructible, invincible, etc. Consciousness is certainly not required for it would serve no purpose. In the case of animate beings like man, which do possess consciousness, we see that consciousness serves a literally vital purpose: to survive (i.e., find food, water, erect shelter, procreate, etc.). Animals require conscious functions because they are not immortal, because they face the fundamental alternative: to live or to die, to exist or not to exist. But a being which is by definition is eternal would have no need for consciousness, because it does not face this fundamental alternative. And were such a being conscious, all it would need to do is ask a simple question like, "Why do I exist?" and unrelenting psychological torment would eventually follow, for it would never be able to answer this question for all eternity. It would have no purpose to serve, including the needs of its own existence, since its existence has no needs. Attribute consciousness to the GPB, and you condemn it to solipsistic misery. And the Christian calls this love for his God!

(iii) To exist contingently is an "imperfection," for it is conceivably greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of nonexistence (proposition).

-Whether or not existence is a perfection, as far as I know, is still a matter of debate. Couldn't this also vary from person to person? For instance, God's not existing may be a value to some people, and thus he would be greater (in their respect) if he did not exist. Is this a legitimate thing to say?

Well, of course, the theist is not going to say that existence proper is a perfection, for he has already divided this concept; there is no 'existence' in his vocabulary, only "necessary existence" and "contingent existence." What distinguishes these two is only valid in the theist's mind. But from the assumption of this unnecessary division of an axiomatic concept, he would say that self-existence is a perfection, since "to exist contingently is an 'imperfection'."

We know that this is definitely incoherent. Either something exists, or it does not. There is no valid reason to subdivide the concept 'existence' before we can use it properly. Such is arbitrary, and if the theist doesn't watch out, such careless use of concepts will turn round and be used against himself.

Of course, any rigorous discussion of the idea of perfection in reference to religious dogma would not be complete without examining the question of whether or not imperfection can follow from perfection. If God is perfect, then why are his creations not perfect? If something is "contingent" by virtue of the fact that it is created (cf. Premise I of the First Variation), and it is the case that "to exist contingently is an imperfection," then it follows that God cannot even create perfection! This is just integrating the theist's own premises to see where they go. Theists are often so encumbered with their own assumptions of what God is supposed to be, and so preoccupied with attacking that which opposes their dogmatic commitments, that they often do not see the binding on their own feet!

Let's pursue this a bit:

Premise I from the First Variation (PIFV) was:

Now Premise III from the Second Variation (PIIISV) states:

Consider what is entailed by the definition of "contingent" in PIFV. "Contingent" according to this definition refers to anything whose "existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities." Certainly, the theist will not admit that any contingent X is identical with his preferred deity.

Now look at Premise III of the First Variation (PIIIFV):

From PIIIFV above, we see that whatever is "uncreated and self-existent is not contingent." From this, we can safely assume that the opposite of "uncreated and self-existent" is the opposite of "not contingent." Which means:

That which is created and not self-existent is contingent.

Now when we incorporate PIIISV, which states that "to exist contingently is an 'imperfection'," we are wise to recognize that anything which is "created" and therefore which "exists contingently" is an imperfection. This follows definitionally from the theist's own premises!!!

What does this mean: Anything created is by definition imperfect.

Which means: Everything created is imperfect.

And from this we must infer: God cannot create perfection.

Thus, if the premises of the two versions ontological arguments offered here are absolutely true, then the theist must be willing to apply them consistently no matter what conclusion follows. He cannot offer these premises as absolute and exception-free when arguing to his preferred conclusions, and then say, "Woe, hold on! Wait a doggone minute!" and proceed to stipulate a few exceptions once those very same premises are offered to support conclusions which he does not prefer.

If the universe "exists contingently," by his own premises, he must accept that it is imperfect by virtue of it being the product of a creative act of God (and not because of Adam's fall!). This means that God created imperfection. If the premises which are offered in the Ontological Argument are valid, then he must accept this uncomfortable conclusion.

There is no way out of this conundrum for the theist if he endorses the claim that " it is conceivably greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of nonexistence."

The theist has two alternatives: admit that his premises also conclude that his God cannot create perfection, or admit that the universe is "self-existent," which defeats the purpose of positing a God in the first place. His own premises come back round to bite him in the backside!

So much for God's alleged omnipotence.

(iv) God is conceived of as the GPB.

Is this a "necessary" or a "contingent" truth? If man is contingent (CITE), and consequently that which man conceives is contingent, then does it not follow that that which man identifies through his conceiving is consequently contingent also? If so, isn't the statement, "God is conceived of as the GPB," since ostensively it is some man who is conceiving thus, a contingent truth?

(v) To categorize God's existence as contingent is to ascribe a deficiency to the GPB, and contingency by definition cannot be ascribed to GPB. (i, ii, iii, iv).

-This is questionable for all the reasons that the premises it follows from are questionable.

Agreed.

(vi) Existence and nonexistence cannot both be logical possibilities for God (from v).

-It seems that this may be true if we are speaking about the same possible world, but couldn't God exist in one possible world and not in the other? One could say no because God is necessarily existent, but isn't this presupposing the conclusion of the argument and therefore begging the question? Perhaps the arguer could base the claim of necessity on the premises about contingency being an imperfection, but the description of perfection provided there is incoherent.

In response to Premise VI as stated, since I see the notion 'god' to be internally incoherent, defensible only upon the assumption of arbitrary premises, and unsupportable by appealing to objective reality, I'm happy to affirm that the existence of God is not a logical possibility. So, given the two alternatives of Premise VI, I can only side with the negation of god-belief here, and that basically settles the matter for me personally.

In response to your statement, I'd say your point should be granted serious attention by the theist if he ascribes any validity to "possible worlds" locution to begin with. Does what applies to one "possible world" necessarily apply to all "possible worlds"? If so, then "possible worlds" locution seems rather superfluous. If not, then your question above merits consideration.

And yes, if the response is that God is necessarily existent in all "possible worlds," then the argument does beg the question, which is one of the most common criticisms against the Ontological Argument. And if defenders of the Ontological Argument "base the claim of necessity on the premises about contingency being an imperfection," it seems they're deliberately stacking the deck with a series of hastily conceived definitions, definitions which arbitrarily smuggle the argument's conclusion into its premises. And if that's the case, it cannot escape this criticism.

(vii) If God is logically possible, then God cannot fail to exist (from vi).

-This is questionable because the previous premise (from which this follows) is questionable.

Agreed.

(viii) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

-In addition to the question of whether or not this idea of God can be conceived of and is not the same as a "square circle" (in that it is a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself, which is a contradiction), one can question this premise for the additional reason that the very notion of logical possibility presupposes that reality is malleable.

Agreed. The entire validity of the Ontological Argument explicitly rests upon (among other things) the assumption that one can legitimately conceive of such a thing. This is a whole box of problems, though, as you rightly acknowledge.

(ix) God can be coherently conceived (proposition).

-Obviously questionable.

The theist should check his premises. He does not argue for this premise anywhere. In terms of the present argument, it must be assumed.

(x) God cannot fail to exist (from vii, viii, ix).

Guess again.

Condensed Version:

(A) Either God exists or God is impossible.

-This seems to be a false dichotomy hingeing on the conclusion of the argument -- that God is a necessarily existant being. Is this question-begging?

Personally, I see no way out of the latter horn of this premise's dichotomy. A well-formed and comprehensive AFE will show this beyond all doubt. And even more fundamentally, I think the Objectivist metaphysics demonstrates this.

(B) God is not impossible.

-Assumes quite a bit.

I won't argue with you on that!

(C) Therefore, God exists.

If you say so, Anselm!

-------

The Third Variation

(1) For any x, x is the property "being god-like" if and only if x implies having all possible knowledge (omniscient), all possible power (omnipotent), moral perfection, and aseity. (definition).

-"Being god-like" seems incoherent. Omniscience doesn't make sense. To be god-like x must know what it is like to know the laws of logic and not know the laws of logic at the same time. Both are possible pieces of knowledge. Omnipotence implies that x must be able to be totally evil and totally good, or totally strong and totally weak. Nick Wiltgen questioned additionally how moral perfection could be attributed to an immortal being who could not have values. Aseity (being self-existent) is also questionable.

"Being god-like" as defined in Premise 1 here is definitely problematic. 'Omniscience' is usually defined as "exhaustive knowledge" or (as in this premise) "having all possible knowledge." But "having all knowledge" suggests the results of a long labor of gathering and validating knowledge when of course this is not what theists have in mind when the claim that God is omniscient. God, they will claim, is not only omniscient, but infallible as well, which means: God did not have to work for his knowledge; he did not have to check his premises and validate his conclusions by referring to standards independent of his consciousness. Instead, this is the claim to automatic knowledge or "knowledge without means" which means: knowledge no how, which is non-knowledge. It is not valid. This alone is sufficient to reject Premise 1 here. (Indeed, questions like "Can God be amazed?" or "Can God know the joy of discovering new knowledge?" will only underscore the incoherence of this notion. It is not an attribute which God would need; it is an attribute which the priests need in order to invoke fear on their flocks.)

Premise 1 suggest "having… all possible power" as equivalent to being omnipotent. But this is also problematic. If we assume an objective understanding of the concepts 'possible' and 'power', then already the theist will be in retreat. Anything we assess to be objectively possible must conform to the laws of nature, even when it comes to the idea of power. But God as an omnipotent being is portrayed as being able to create and alter the identity of objects at will, without any natural causation. In one review and critique which I've been working on over the past few months, I examine the idea of omnipotence in some detail, and define omnipotence as "the power to perform miracles," or, more specifically, "the power to contradict the law of identity." Assuming this definition, arguing for omnipotence amounts to arguing for the ability to contradict reality. Not a pretty picture.

As for the supposed 'moral perfection' of God, this is also unworkable. Morality is a code of values which guides man's choices and actions. And a code of values, as Rand shows so eloquently in "The Objectivist Ethics" (The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 13-35), presupposes the fundamental alternative: to exist or not to exist ("to be or not to be" for the Shakespeareans out there) (see particularly pages 15-18 of VOS for the relevant argument here). But an eternal and immortal being (like God) does not face this fundamental alternative. Nothing can harm it, and since God is also said to be perfect (i.e., lacking nothing it needs, lacking any and all defect, and complete in every way as such), he cannot be said to need anything. The concept 'value' and the notion 'god' cannot be integrated. Consequently, the idea of a "perfectly moral God" is inescapably incoherent.

As for the supposed attribute 'aseity', we've covered this notion to some extent above. If the attribute 'aseity' can legitimately apply to anything in reality, why can it not apply to the universe as a whole? If 'universe' is the "sum total of existence," then it 'aseity' must apply to something within the universe if it can legitimately apply to anything. But theists want to reserve this term for their god-beliefs, and will likely run to the necessary-contingent dichotomy in order to secure exclusive rights to it.

Premise 1 has its share of problems.

(2) Having all the knowledge and power that is logically possible entails knowledge about every possibility (every possible world) and the power to accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world.

-Which would seemingly result in contradictions.

Or in absurdities. If by "power to accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world" includes the violation of natural law, why should we accept this as a legitimate possibility? Will the theist say that the laws of nature are contingent? Arguing to this end would ultimately be self-defeating for the theist, for he would be assuming the validity natural laws (i.e., the law of identity) in order to argue. If he wants to compromise the law of identity, then he compromises the force of his argument.

(3) If the property "being god-like" is logically possible then it is exemplified in all possible worlds (from 1, 2).

-Whether or not it is logically possible is the issue at question.

Yes, another "possible worlds" premise. Completely problematic.

(4) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

-In addition to the question of whether or not this idea of God can be conceived of and is not the same as a "square circle" (in that it is a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself, which is a contradiction), one can question this premise for the additional reason that the very notion of logical possibility presupposes that reality is malleable.

In the hands of the "possible worlds" folx, yes, their treatment of "logical possibility" does seem to presuppose an almost infinitely promiscuous view of reality. I'd like to know what in principle distinguishes a "possible world" from someone's imagination.

(5) "Being god-like" can be coherently conceived (proposition).

-Once again, this is the issue at question.

Right. See responses to Premise 1.

(6) "Being god-like" is exemplified in all possible worlds, which would include the actual world (from 3, 5).

These are my questions and comments in response to the arguments offered by TheRepublc. Do you have any to offer yourself? Or perhaps answers to some of my questions? Thanks for all of your help. I'm slowly gaining confidence in dealing with this argument.

Keep at it. Consider every possible angle (and if we accept that an angle of valid criticism is logically possible, then it must be valid in all possible worlds ;). Also, focus on what is being said at the exclusion of what is not being said, and then focus on what is not be said that may actually be assumed down the road (such as the GPB being a conscious being, even though no premise stipulates this explicitly). Also, try to see if all the claims put forth as premises in such arguments can be integrated without causing further complications for theism down the road (such as when we can infer from their premises that God cannot create anything perfect since anything created must be seen as 'contingent' and "to exist contingently is an imperfection").

I am currently reviewing George H. Smith's examination of historical responses to the Ontological Argument in his latest book, Why Atheism? (chap. 9, pp. 149-172) which was published in late 2000. Smith's analysis covers a review of Anselm's original argument and reactions to it by Aquinas, Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes and finally Kant. He does not examine modern versions of the argument (e.g., Hartshorne's or Plantinga's). I'll let you know once I'm finished reading it whether Smith has anything significant to offer by way of fresh criticism not already suggested here or covered elsewhere.

Best regards,

Anton