January 12, 2001

Hi Jason,

For some blasted reason which I cannot figure out, AOL in all its glory has not permitted me to send my response to your recent e-mail. I'm not certain whether it is the size or if it's because it was copy-pasted from another file. But I've tried a number of times to send it, and I'm not able to. So I've put together this mock webpage (complete with links) in my Temp folder. This page is not accessible by any hyperlinks from my main pages, so this is a private page (just don't lose the URL address).

Anyway….

I hope you're having a pleasant new year so far. Mine's as busy as ever, but I'm quite hopeful for the next year.

In your e-mail you wrote:

I have not done any extensive writing on the traditional arguments, since most of them have been rung out to dry by so many critics in the past. The so-called "ontological argument" is, in my opinion and as you suspect, a fully primacy of consciousness form of "reasoning" (if you could call it that). From what I've been able to gather from the various versions I've examined (which range from Anselm's original model, to Plantinga's latest models), the essential common to them all appears to be the presumption that the existence of X follows from our being able to conceive of X. Naturally, defenders of this argument will object to this characterization, and certainly they do not phrase it in such terms. But upon scrutiny of all the models I've checked out, this seems very much to be the case.

A number of other things seem common to most modern models include:

1. Reliance on the analytic-synthetic and 'necessary-contingent' dichotomy (e.g., "For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x");
2. Reliance on "possible worlds" formulations (e.g., "For any x, there is a possible world in which x is necessary...");
3. What I call 'vague values-system references' (e.g., "x is the Greatest Possible Being");
4. Indeterminacy of results (i.e., does the existence of the Christian God specifically follow from the premises of the Ont. arg.? Who says that the Christian God is the "Greatest Possible Being" and not Blarko? etc.);
5. Ontological arguments are open to parody.

I examine these in some detail below.

Each of these points are open to enduring criticism. For one, Objectivism rejects the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, and the resulting idea that existents can be placed into the categories "necessary" vs. "contingent" simply because we can imagine their non-existence or not. This is an area which I've been elaborating to some degree in a paper I'm working on at the moment. The motivation is clear: If one can divide the concept 'existence' into two opposing categories ('necessary' vs. 'contingent'), then one can promote a metaphysical hierarchy of sorts: "some things exist *necessarily* while other things do not..." But existence exists, and this fact is primary, regardless of how one wants to categorize entities. It seems quite hasty to categorize entities *before* one has determined that they exist; such identifications are dependent on epistemological hierarchy (i.e., discover *that* something exists, then discover *what* that something is...), but our epistemological hierarchy is necessary for man because he is [a] non-omniscient, [b] fallible, and (therefore) [c] he requires a *means* of knowledge (i.e., reason). The fact that *knowledge* is hierarchical is demonstrable by the fact that neither you nor I can presume to solve differential calculus equations *before* we've grasped the principles which govern the fact that 2+2=4 (assuming equal units). But simply because our knowledge is hierarchical does not mean that reality (the realm of existence) is also "metaphysically hierarchical." If something exists, it exists. One cannot say that something is "more existent" than something else as if there were degrees or gradations to existence. I have a book in my hand, a shoe sits on the floor and an apple is on my piano. Each of these items (book, hand, shoe, floor, apple, piano, etc.) are distinct from one another by nature, but share the same fact that they exist. What would justify my saying, simply because the book will probably last generations, my shoe will wear out and I'll eat the apple in the morning, that their existence is somehow hierarchically pedigreed because of these potentials? I hope this is clear what I'm trying to say... I think the best treatment of the analytic-synthetic and the 'necessary vs. contingent' dichotomies is Peikoff's essay ("The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy") in Rand's _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_.

The idea of "possible worlds" is also quite suspicious. I think this kind of formulation (which is so popular in academia today, just as the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and its fallout are) is consequence of the idea that what is *possible* is determined by our being able to *conceive* of it. In other words, if I can *conceive* that tomorrow I will go out to lunch at my favorite lunch (as I am planning), it follows that it is possible. This kind of thinking, I'm sure you can see, seems innocuous at first blush, but can lead to traumatic results in cognition. For instance, suppose a surgeon granted the possibility that his patient, whose blood type is B negative, could survive a transfusion of O positive blood simply because he could conceive of this possibility. Sure, in a cartoon-world (or "possible world"?) I could conceive of this, and I'm sure anyone else could. But does it legitimately follow from our being able to conceive this that it is genuinely possible? Well, I hope I'm not the one going under the knife if today's thinkers think so! I could conceive of a cow jumping over the moon (hey, it doesn't contradict any "a priori" facts, does it???), but does reality follow this whim? No, it does not.

"Merely the *possibility*? Well, if that is all that's needed, then I think we can meet that burden. Since I see no reason to believe that it is *impossible* that existence ultimately is grounded in some form of mind, it follows that it is possible. If he want to counter this, then he has to give us a demonstration that necessarily, all existence is physical."

In my examination of this statement (and you'll note that NOWHERE does Choi actually attempt to *demonstrate* this supposed possibility, even though he's confident that he can "meet that burden"), I consider the concept 'possibility' and some of the objective requirements in determining legitimate possibilities in reality (such as some evidence... a novel concept I suppose?). I cite Peikoff as support.

Well, some months after I posted this set of essays to my website, I got an e-mail from one presuppositionalist rushing to Choi's defense. He was quite indignant needless to say at my approach to assessing what is possible in reality, and exclaimed (I quote): "you don't need evidence for possibilities, only for probabilities..." To assess possibilities in reality, he says, "All I need is to conceive their existence."

Thus, what is *possible* in reality, according to this view, is dictated by one's imagination (i.e., by the content of one's consciousness). Thus, if I can conceive of men learning to breathe water and live under the ocean; or horses sprouting wings and flying to Neptune; or cows jumping over the moon; or me getting a month's paid vacation from work and spending it on an excavation in the Urals where I unearth the mummified head of Napolean's personal upholsterer (what's it doing there?)... etc., these things, according to this view, are legitimate possibilities, we are told. Sure, I can conceive of these things all I like (I just did, in fact!), but do you accept these as legitimate possibilities? I certainly don't. Why? Because the facts of reality are not dictated by consciousness, nor are the identities of those things which exist amenable to my imagination.

This of course is a necessary position for those who want to posit the idea of "creation ex nihilo." For if one challenges the notion that such a thing is *possible*, all the apologist need do is cite some academic hacks who agree on the idea that we can determine what is possible in reality by imagination ("conceivability" as they call it) unrestricted by evidence (i.e., without reference to reality, regardless of the identity of the entities in question). And if the identity of the entities in question is *contingent*, then one has all the more license to assume one's conscious content holds primacy over existence.

Such definitions can also come back to bite the apologist in the backside, too. Consider the consequences of applying this view of determining what is possible to god-belief in general, and the ontological argument in particular. If we are to accept that something is legitimately *possible* by virtue of the fact that one can *conceive* of it, then the apologist must accept as legitimately possible that God does *not* exist, because I can certainly *conceive* that all god-belief finds its source in primitive mythology and the errant philosophy which arises from taking that mythology seriously. Here the razor is double-bladed, and there goes the ontological argument. For I can *conceive* (the operative factor, right?) that it is *possible* that the ontological argument is fallacious and inconsistent with reality, and that the theist's *conceived* GPB can be eaten for breakfast by my *conceived* GPB. At this point, philosophy, which should be an endeavor to identify a comprehensive view of reality fit for men who want to live their lives here on earth (God forbid!), becomes idle wordplay and highfalutin nonsense. We've had enough of this by now, I think.

If the apologist then challenges me to *prove* the possibility that God does not exist, I will tell him I'm still trying to prove the possibility that Mother Goose does not exist. Perhaps I could enlist his help here? If he challenges me to prove that cows canNOT jump over the moon, I will tell him that I'm still trying to prove the possibility that one day I'll fit back into my size 28 pants. If he wants wordplay, he can have it, I've got my *conceivability* to provide this for him. If he wants me to prove that his God does *not* exist, he needs to prove to me that his god-belief is *not* an invention of primitive men.

Also, consider whether or not the "conceivability=possibility" model is supported by the Bible. I don't think it is, at least consistently so. While we do find Jesus saying, "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth" (Mark 9:23, KJV; cf. et al.), we find Paul saying, "Where is then the blessedness ye spake of? for I bear you record, that, if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them to me" (Galatians 4:15; KJV). Now, it is obvious that Paul could conceive of the members of his reading audience plucking out their eyes and giving them to him, for he describes just this. If he's able to describe it, what resistance do we have in inferring that he was able to conceive of it? But, Paul seems unconvinced that this was a legitimate possibility, for his remark takes it as a foregone conclusion that this was not likely to happen.

What else does the Bible say? Hebrews 10:4 states, "For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins." Well, why is that? Indeed, if I am asked to believe it possible that the universe was zapped into existence by the whim of a reality-creating consciousness, why should I not accept the possibility that "the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins"? This latter seems far less of a stretch than the former! Clearly, the criteria of Christians to assess what is legitimately possible in reality is a shifting matter of theological convenience and arbitrary expedience.

These, and many more reasons, are why I find the whole "possible worlds" premise of modern ontological arguments to be suspicious.

This is a minor point, but it exposes something that I think is taken very much for granted in criticisms of the ontological arguments that I've examined. Many versions of the ontological argument assert that something "great" or that "maximal greatness" is identified with the deity preferred in its conclusion. By "great" and "greatness" suggest a values hierarchy, either in scale, dimension or in terms of moral value. This is usually expressed in very cursory statements forming the premises of ontological arguments. A few examples:

"If God, a being greater than which cannot be conceived, does not exist, then He _cannot_ come into existence."

[From Norman Malcom's version, cited in Michael Martin's _Atheism: A Philosophical Justification_, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), p. 85.]

"There is a possible world where maximal greatness is exemplified."

[From Alvin Plantinga's version, cited in Martin's _Atheism_, p. 93.]

"(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is not "imperfect," deficient in any way, or dependent (definition). An "imperfection" is that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater" in some way than it is. [Example – in a monarchical system, although a baron is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be a duke, or even king.]"

Each of these premises invokes the concept 'great' or 'greatness', but these terms are usually undefined and undefended. In fact, I think they are interjected with the hope that the evaluation assumed is taken for granted by both defenders and critics of the argument without question. But why should one accept this? "God, a being greater than which...," in what context are we talking here? "Greater" in what way? "...a possible world where maximal greatness is exemplified"? What does this mean? In what way is a "Greatest Possible Being" great? This is one area where I think the ontological argument shows some weakness, though it is probably easily overcome by theological confabulation (i.e., by indulging into more of the arbitrary). Certainly, none of this is ever testable by critics, for theists will never allow it.

This seems to be a frequent point of criticism of the ontological argument, just as it is with respect to other classical arguments (e.g., the cosmological/"first cause" arguments). If we agree that the ontological argument invests its conclusion with the legitimate validity its defenders claim, what is the identity of this "Greatest Possible Being"? Naturally, Christian defenders of the ontological argument will claim that it is the Christian God. But why is this? Why can it not be Zeus? Or Allah? Zarathustra? Blarko? Brahman? The Antarctic WonderLord? Etc... ad nauseum. Who says the GPB must even be conscious? Of course, defenders of the argument will build the answers to these questions into the definitions assumed in the argument proper. "By definition, the Greatest Possible Being would be omniscient! Everyone knows that! It's an intuitive deductive certainty!" (Yes, I've heard such statements before!)

But supposing we allow that the Christian, for instance, settles for us that his argument concludes with the certainty that the Christian God exists. Well, he's not out of the woods yet, for there are literally hundreds of Christian denominations out there, many of which claim to be *exclusively* true and that other versions are not only false, but also evil perversions of "the Word of God." Ultimately, such religious rivalry amounts to "my god is better than your god," even under the umbrella of Christianity proper. Many Christians take John 1:14 ("And the Word was made flesh...") to mean that the Bible itself is God. As one critic of my ideas recently wrote to me in an e-mail in December (and I quote): "I have studied God's word. The word IS God." If it is true that "The word IS God," and that the Bible is "The word," then which version of the Bible is the right God? Is it the KJV, or the NASB? The LIV? How about the NIV or the NIN? Perhaps it's the CIA or the USDA? The FDA? The RAD or the MADD? Or perhaps it's the... etc.

This is Michael Martin's parody of Alvin Plantinga's argument (_Atheism_, p. 94). Martin devotes pages 79-95 to his criticism of the ontological argument, and in his examination he reviews four primary versions of it, each claimed (progressively through history) to be more comprehensive (and therefore more convincing and conclusive?) than earlier versions, beginning with Anselm's version and ending with Plantinga's (or "Plant Man" according to one atheologist I've corresponded with...). I think Martin's overall critique is quite sufficient so far as a refutation is concerned, though it does not attack the argument from an Objectivist point of view, which I think would only strengthen Martin's points all the more.

Naturally, I think there are many more angles to critique this argument, but in general I consider it a blatant fantasy and consequently quite unimportant in the scheme of modern apologetic arsenal. Its definitions are vague, its premises are suspicious, the consequence of its reasoning (from "conceivability" to certifying existence) is untenable, its conclusion is indefinite (which GPB?) and it's vulnerable to indulgent parody. An argument? No, not if our goal is to identify reality.

Perhaps you have some thoughts on this that you'd like to share, Jason, or questions on what I've written. But what I've offered above has not be edited, and there are probably some sources that could be cited to bolster my arguments. But this should get the ball rolling for you?

In the past, I was on an e-mail debate list with Mark Bernier, and in Nov. '99, he challenged the non-believers on the list to critique the ontological argument (he seemed to prefer Plantinga's version a lot). While I did not participate in that particular round of debate to any significant degree (due to time constraints and, to be honest, lack of interest in this flimsy argument), several atheists did submit some pretty eloquent (short, sweet and to the point) criticisms of Bernier's posts. I include those exchanges below. I have not edited them, so please excuse the typos and irrelevant server debris littering the posts.

(This is where my original e-mail stopped. I had originally intended to make the following material available upon your request. But since I've been forced to put this onto a webpage for you I've included these exchanges, as I think there are some interesting points to consider. In the future, I might add this page to my main page proper - either fortified and cleaned up, or as is - with your consent. So do let me know your thoughts on this please.)

Anton

Subj: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/5/99 7:01:44 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: No Magic 1, JB 2 DA, BSmith5044, BluefishCE

To: Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish, Dirquedong

To: Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, FreeMind76

To: Ms Atheist, Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com

To: Osareya, Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel

To: Hafas1, Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com

To: KippyBunny, petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello everyone,

I hope all is well, and that everyone has been using their time studiuosly. This will be a philosophically oriented email, since I have been working on the ontological argument lately, which I think I had been doing when last I communicated with the group. In any case, I have three versions of Anselm's argument (the ontological argument) I have been formulating, which I would like to present for critique. These versions no doubt still have their difficulties, and most who read this will probably hardly even see them as convincing, or even as arguments to begin with. Maybe all of you will feel this way:-) As it may be, I still would like to present them, and await any comments, good or bad...

Three Variations on Anselm's Insight

First Variation:

(I) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(II) God is understood to be the uncreated, self-existent (aseity) foundation of reality.

(III) That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it must either exist always, or not at all. Thus both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for God (I, II).

(IV) If God's existence is logically possible God cannot fail to exist (III).

(V) God's existence is logically possible (proposition).

(VI) God cannot fail to exist (from IV, V).

Second Variation:

(i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater" in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be a duke, or even king.]

(iii) To exist contingently is an "imperfection," for it is conceivably greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of nonexistence (proposition).

(iv) God is conceived of as the GPB.

(v) To categorize God's existence as contingent is to ascribe a deficiency to the GPB, and contingency by definition cannot be ascribed to GPB. (i, ii, iii, iv).

(vi) Existence and nonexistence cannot both be logical possibilities for God (from v).

(vii) If God is logically possible, then God cannot fail to exist (from vi).

(viii) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

(ix) God can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(x) God cannot fail to exist (from vii, viii, ix).

The true issue at stake here is not whether to accept this understanding of God or not, but whether this conception of God, as the Greatest Possible Being, is coherent. For if the above conception of God is coherent, then the argument is triumphant (I think). If God is coherent, then God is possible. If God is possible, then God cannot fail to exist. The entire argument can be condensed into the following syllogism:

(A) Either God exists or God is impossible

(B) God is not impossible

(C) Therefore, God exists

Third Variation:

(1) For any x, x is the property "being god-like" if and only if x implies having all possible knowledge (omniscient), all possible power (omnipotent), moral perfection, and aseity. (definition).

(2) Having all the knowledge and power that is logically possible entails knowledge about every possibility (every possible world) and the power to accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world.

(3) If the property "being god-like" is logically possible then it is exemplified in all possible worlds (from 1, 2).

(4) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

(5) "Being god-like" can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(6) "Being god-like" is exemplified in all possible worlds, which would include the actual world (from 3, 5).

If "being god-like" is coherent, then, as with the previous variations, this argument may be victorious. I realize, however, that among the difficulties inherent with these variations (and there are probably more than some, loathe as I am to admit it) the most difficult proposition is probably "God is coherent and/or logically possible." If the whole matter comes down to this single difficulty, then I am happy. I feel that most of the other difficulties can be overcome, (most notably the critique "existence is not a predicate," which I feel ultimately begs the question against the ontological argument) and this particular matter of demonstrating the logical cohesion of "God" is where the argument gets stuck, as it were. As Hartshorne believes, the entire enterprise rests on the coherence of our understanding of God, and if we can get this right, we will come to see that God must exist.

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm response

Date: 11/5/99 11:28:18 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: eztoamuse@email.msn.com (David)

To: TheRepublc@aol.com, NoMagic1@aol.com, JB2DA@aol.com, BSmith5044@aol.com, BluefishCE@aol.com, Heretic7@aol.com, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu, bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish@aol.com, Dirquedong@aol.com, Duncan96@aol.com, FreeMind76@aol.com, MsAtheist@aol.com, Necropsy69@aol.com, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya@aol.com, Pet564@aol.com, SlackerInc@aol.com, Tindrbox@aol.com, Sfinfidel@aol.com, Hafas1@aol.com, Haggai16@aol.com, drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny@aol.com, petecurtis69@hotmail.com

.Three Variations on Anselm's Insight

First Variation:

(I) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence

are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(II) God is understood to be the uncreated, self-existent (aseity) foundation

of reality.

(III) That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it

must either exist always, or not at all. Thus both existence and nonexistence

cannot be logical possibilities for God (I, II).

(IV) If God's existence is logically possible God cannot fail to exist (III).

(V) God's existence is logically possible (proposition).

(VI) God cannot fail to exist (from IV, V).

>>>>>Between #2 & #3, you assume your conclusion. You, like Anselm, try to define god into existence. i.e, you say god is uncreated, and define uncreated as that which must exist. The argument is circular.

Second Variation:

(i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence

are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is

not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is

that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater"

in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron

is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be

a duke, or even king.]

(iii) To exist contingently is an "imperfection," for it is conceivably

greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of

nonexistence (proposition).

(iv) God is conceived of as the GPB.

(v) To categorize God's existence as contingent is to ascribe a deficiency to

the GPB, and contingency by definition cannot be ascribed to GPB. (i, ii,

iii, iv).

(vi) Existence and nonexistence cannot both be logical possibilities for God

(from v).

(vii) If God is logically possible, then God cannot fail to exist (from vi).

(viii) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently

conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or

"square circle"). (axiom)

(ix) God can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(x) God cannot fail to exist (from vii, viii, ix).

>>>>>>>>>(IV) "god is conceived of as the GPB" means, god is conceived of as something which exists. Your argument goes from (as does Anselm), "God is conceived of that which exists, therefore god is that which exists."

.(vii) you mean, if the concept of god is logically possible, then the concept of God must include existence. To say, "if god is logically possible, it must exist" is to assume your conclusion.

(A) Either God exists or God is impossible where does this come from? does everything possible exist?

(B) God is not impossible you mean, God is "conceived of" as possible. You are assuming your conclusion here.

(C) Therefore, God exists

Third Variation:

(1) For any x, x is the property "being god-like" if and only if x implies

having all possible knowledge (omniscient), all possible power (omnipotent),

moral perfection, and aseity. (definition).

(2) Having all the knowledge and power that is logically possible entails

knowledge about every possibility (every possible world) and the power to

accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world.

(3) If the property "being god-like" is logically possible then it is

exemplified in all possible worlds (from 1, 2). here, you assume your conclusion: If something is possible, therefore it exists.

(4) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently

conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or

"square circle"). (axiom) Anything coherent is possible, and therefore exists? I can conceive of ufo's, therefore they are possible and must exist?

(5) "Being god-like" can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(6) "Being god-like" is exemplified in all possible worlds, which would

include the actual world (from 3, 5).

."God is

coherent and/or logically possible." If the whole matter comes down to this

single difficulty, then I am happy. .You never established that "god" is possible. Only that the idea of a god includes the necessity of its existence. The idea of UFO's includes the logical possibility of their existence, too. Does the concept of UFO's prove their existence?

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/6/99 2:58:56 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: FreeMind76

To: No Magic 1, JB 2 DA, BSmith5044, BluefishCE

To: Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish, Dirquedong

To: Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, Ms Atheist

To: Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya

To: Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel, Hafas1

To: Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny

To: petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello folks.

Thank you, TheRepublc, for the thought-provoking post. I have talked to several Christians recently who take the St. Anselm route ("Greatest Possible Being") in defense of their beliefs. Given that, and my own access to St. Anselm's actual argument (English translation, of course), I hope to work on a fully fleshed-out response soon and post it to the Philosophy section of my website (www.geocities.com/Athens/4688).

At this minute I only have time to address one aspect of TheRepublc's post. I will have more, hopefully Sunday.

In a message dated 11/5/99 9:01:44 PM Central Standard Time, TheRepublc writes:

<< Second Variation:

(i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater" in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be a duke, or even king.] >>

I could not resist pointing out that this immediately rules out the Christian god. Why? Consider the idea of the Trinity. In Christianity, God is often said to be "three persons in one essence," or "three persons in one triune Godhead." By TheRepublc's own definition, an imperfection is "that which possibly could have been...'greater' in some way than it is." Well, it is "conceivable" that God could have been four persons in one, or five persons in one, or 10, or 20, or 5,000. No? Would this not automatically rule out the Christian God as the "greatest possible being"?

Incidentally, any number of persons you could give in the above example could always be conceivably more. There is no such thing as a "number than which none greater can be conceived." Why, then, should one buy any argument that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived? That will be a key theme of my full response to this and to St. Anselm's argument as a whole.

Ponder that idea. And stay tuned for further information.

Really,

Nick

Hmm - TheRepublc's own box is full....

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm response

Date: 11/7/99 6:57:58 AM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: eztoamuse@email.msn.com, No Magic 1, JB 2 DA

To: BSmith5044, BluefishCE, Heretic7

To: aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu, bitemegod@hotmail.com

To: DarwinFish, Dirquedong, Duncan96, FreeMind76

To: Ms Atheist, Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com

To: Osareya, Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel

To: Hafas1, Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com

To: KippyBunny, petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello everyone,

Hello Ez (David) and thanks for the response. It is commonly understood today that Anselm actually presented two different forms of the ontological argument. He didn't present them as two separate forms, for apparently to Anselm's mind they were the same argument. But to quite a few present day philosophers (Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, to name two) who have analyzed his writings, they have gleaned two distinct types. The second type was found in his response to the criticism of the monk Gaunilon, who said that he coud conceive of a perfect island, so a perfect island must exist, therefore, Gaunilon argued, Anselm's demonstration of God failed. Anselm's response was that it is conceivable to think of a being that cannot fail to exist, and therefore the Greatest Conceivable Being cannot fail to exist. As far as I understand it, Anselm's first argument does not succeed, but his second form, in his response to Gaunilon, has spurred a great many variations in modern philosophy. The three variations which I provided are all inspired by Anselm's second form. Your criticism at times seems to be a cross between Guuanilon's rebuttal and Kant's critique of "existence is not a predicate." But I think your main argument is of circularity. You write the following:

<

> define god into existence. i.e, you say god is uncreated, and define

> uncreated as that which must exist. The argument is circular.>>

I plead "not guilty" to the charge of circularity. How I defined "uncreated" in the first variation is -- That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it

must either exist always, or not at all. -- and this is not a circular definition. I have not stated that the "uncreated is that which must exist" as you have suggested is the case. In fact, I think what I provided is a quite reasonable understanding of what is meant by uncreated and self-existent.

You write the following:

> >>>>>>>>>(IV) "god is conceived of as the GPB" means, god is conceived of

> as something which exists. Your argument goes from (as does Anselm), "God is

> conceived of that which exists, therefore god is that which exists.">>>

This is a distortion of the argument, I feel, for I have not stated these things. If you feel I have smuggled these ideas implicitly into the argument, then you will have to show how and where I have hidden them, because I do not see it. This is also, in my opinion, a distortion of Anselm's (second) argument.

You write:

> .(vii) you mean, if the concept of god is logically possible, then the

> concept of God must include existence. To say, "if god is logically possible,

> it must exist" is to assume your conclusion. >>>

I fail to see how I have assumed my conclusion, I think I have *argued* for the conclusion (or I hope I have:-)).

You write:

>

> (A) Either God exists or God is impossible where does this come from? does

> everything possible exist?>>>

Good questions. The first question: "either God exists or God is impossible" is an abbreviation from the preceding arguments. To sum up: Contingency is that which can either exist or not, both being logical possibilities. If X is not contingent, then both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for X. It is one or the other. Since (it is argued) God is not contingent, then "either God exists or God is impossible."

Second question: If something is "possible" (logically possible) does not mean that it is actual. Unicorns are apparently possible, and unicorns apparently are not actual. Unicorns are contingent, for existence and nonexistence are both logical possibilities for them. God, however, is not understood to be contingent.

You write:

> (B) God is not impossible you mean, God is "conceived of" as possible. You

> are assuming your conclusion here.

> (C) Therefore, God exists

>

Again, I plead "not guilty" to any circularity. If I am being circular, it is at least not obvious in a way that I can detect.

You write:

> Anything coherent is possible, and therefore

> exists? I can conceive of ufo's, therefore they are possible and must exist?

Not anything that is possible exists. UFO's would be contingent entities, and therefore they might, or might not, exist, both outcomes being logically possible.

>. .You never established that "god" is

> possible. Only that the idea of a god includes the necessity of its existence.

> The idea of UFO's includes the logical possibility of their existence, too.

> Does the concept of UFO's prove their existence?

Correct, I did not establish that the concept of God is coherent (which I have argued will mean that God is possible). I feel that the strongest line of criticism against these argument will probably head in this direction. But there is a difference between (as you wrote above) "necessity of existence" and "possibility of existence." You have actually highlighted a very important differece between UFO's and, for example God. I agree, that the idea of UFO's DO contain the logical possibility of their existence, which means that they might exist, or they might not. But if the idea of God includes "necessity of existence," then we have something a bit different than the case of the UFO. Necessity of existence is that which cannot fail to exist. So if the idea of God is coherent, then God exists (so have I argued).

respectfully

Mark

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/7/99 7:45:05 AM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: FreeMind76, No Magic 1, JB 2 DA, BSmith5044

To: BluefishCE, Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish, Dirquedong

To: Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, Ms Atheist

To: Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya

To: Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel, Hafas1

To: Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny

To: petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello everyone,

and Hello Nick,

>

> Hello folks.

>

> Thank you, TheRepublc, for the thought-provoking post. I have talked to

> several Christians recently who take the St. Anselm route ("Greatest Possible

> Being") in defense of their beliefs.

I am a bit surprised (pleasantly:-)) you have talked to several other people who were supporting Anselm's argument. I have found few who were familiar enough with it to have an opinion, and most in this category rejected it. I am curious, were their arguments similar to the three which I provided? Tell me more:-)

> Given that, and my own access to St.

> Anselm's actual argument (English translation, of course), I hope to work on

> a fully fleshed-out response soon and post it to the Philosophy section of my

> website (www.geocities.com/Athens/4688).

In my opinion, since there has been a lot of contemporary work done on the ontological argument, to provide a refutation of it will require more than a familiarity with Anselm's text -- though I am actually overjoyed that you are willing to take the time and read Anselm! By the way, I stopped by your website the other day, and thought it was very well put together.

> At this minute I only have time to address one aspect of TheRepublc's post.

> I will have more, hopefully Sunday.

>

> In a message dated 11/5/99 9:01:44 PM Central Standard Time, TheRepublc

> writes:

>

> << Second Variation:

>

> (i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and

> nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

> (ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is

> not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is

> that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater"

> in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron

> is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be

> a duke, or even king.] >>

>

> I could not resist pointing out that this immediately rules out the

> Christian god. Why? Consider the idea of the Trinity. In Christianity, God

> is often said to be "three persons in one essence," or "three persons in one

> triune Godhead." By TheRepublc's own definition, an imperfection is "that

> which possibly could have been...'greater' in some way than it is." Well, it

> is "conceivable" that God could have been four persons in one, or five

> persons in one, or 10, or 20, or 5,000. No? Would this not automatically

> rule out the Christian God as the "greatest possible being"?

>

> Incidentally, any number of persons you could give in the above example

> could always be conceivably more. There is no such thing as a "number than

> which none greater can be conceived." Why, then, should one buy any

> argument that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived?

> That will be a key theme of my full response to this and to St. Anselm's

> argument as a whole.

>

> Ponder that idea. And stay tuned for further information.

I would like to point out, that this general line of argument, dealing with the coherence of the conception of God (GPB), is probably the most fruitful. In any case, the idea of GPB is only used in one of the variations I provided, and thus, this criticism may not be applicable to the other two variations. With the critique drawn against the Christian God, and the Trinity, we could also argue that it is better to have two arms rather than one arm; it is better to have 10, 20, or 5,000 arms, etc. Therefore the Greatest Possible Being must have X amount of arms, and since there is no such thing as a greatest possible number this is incoherent.....we could argue the same for fingers or toes, or how many friends, or anything that can be quanitified.

Now, having said that, I feel your criticism thus far (and I know this is merely the beginning) is a fair criticism of the Trinity in relation to this argument. However, this argument is not meant to establish the Christian God in all of its conception, so it doesn't realy bother me on this point. Is the Trinity an idea that is incompatible with the GPB? I think it may be compatible, but I also feel this point is a very minor one in the scope of these arguments, since the Trinity is something which perplexes me, and something that I would never try to establish by way of an argument.

> Hmm - TheRepublc's own box is full....

Sorry, my mail is that than which none greater can be conceived. It therefore must exist:-)

respectfully,

Mark

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm response

Date: 11/7/99 5:03:44 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: TheRepublc, eztoamuse@email.msn.com, No Magic 1

To: JB 2 DA, BSmith5044, BluefishCE, Heretic7

To: aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu, bitemegod@hotmail.com

To: DarwinFish, Dirquedong, Duncan96, FreeMind76

To: Ms Atheist, Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com

To: Osareya, Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel

To: Hafas1, Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com

To: KippyBunny, petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello all,

Just a minor correction on my post to eztoamuse. "Gaunilon" is incorrectly spelled, it is supposed to be "Gaunilo." I was dillusional not once, but at least four times when I added the "n." Please turn a blind eye to the extra letter. Thank you.

respectfully,

Markn

Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/8/99 7:03:35 AM Pacific Standard Time

From: Haggai 1 6

To: BluefishCE, Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, BSmith5044, DarwinFish

To: Dirquedong, Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com

To: FreeMind76, JB 2 DA, Ms Atheist, Necropsy69

To: No Magic 1, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya

To: Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Sfinfidel, Hafas1

To: Haggai 1 6, drwnwllce@hotmail.com, TheRepublc

To: KippyBunny, petecurtis69@hotmail.com, SpamBoylll

I have several comments about the Ontological argument.

1) I think that Plantinga gives the most compelling ontological argument

2) I see several problems with the ontological argument. In order to make the ontological argument valid (if possible) is to assume or affirm that something exists. And once you argue something exists therefore God does you have argued cosmologically.

3) The ontological argument has been used to try and prove a pantheistic god, panetheist god, polytheistic god. The ontological argument alone does not designate which kind of god or gods is found in the conclusion.

4. Strictly a priori arguments about God are invalid. The problem is that the rational is not the real nor is the rationally inescapable the real. Even if it is logically necessary to conceive of a necessary Being as necessarily existing, it does not follow that it necessarily does exist. It might be necessary to think that it exists but this does not prove that it really does exist. It is necessary to think of triangles with three sides on them. However it is possible that no triangles exist. It is logically possible that nothing ever existed including a necessary being. For the nonexistence of everything is a logically conceivable state of affairs.

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/8/99 10:07:37 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: Haggai 1 6, BluefishCE, Heretic7

To: aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu, bitemegod@hotmail.com

To: BSmith5044, DarwinFish, Dirquedong, Duncan96

To: Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, FreeMind76, JB 2 DA

To: Ms Atheist, Necropsy69, No Magic 1

To: oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya, Pet564

To: SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Hafas1

To: drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny

To: petecurtis69@hotmail.com, SpamBoylll

Hello everyone,

thank you Haggai, for your comments and careful suggestions. You write:

> I have several comments about the Ontological argument.

> 1) I think that Plantinga gives the most compelling ontological argument

I might agree with you. I think Plantinga does a wonderful job of defending his modal version. But I also feel that Hartshorne has a pretty damn good argument as well. Hartshorne was the bloke who truly revived the argument this century. These two are my main influences on this matter, and both have very interesting points.

> 2) I see several problems with the ontological argument. In order to make

> the ontological argument valid (if possible) is to assume or affirm that

> something exists. And once you argue something exists therefore God does you

> have argued cosmologically.

I agree with your last sentence, but only in general terms. I don't see that the ontological argument has to affirm the existence of something, at least, not in any way that would render it an a posteriori argument instead of an a priori argument. You will have to explain this a bit more.

> 3) The ontological argument has been used to try and prove a pantheistic god,

> panetheist god, polytheistic god. The ontological argument alone does not

> designate which kind of god or gods is found in the conclusion.

True, the basic argument can be used in many different ways. Findlay actually tried to use the basic argument to prove that God does NOT exist. There are also cosmological arguments and teleological arguments that attempt the same thing -- namely to demonstrate that God does not exist. So I do not necessarily agree with this objection. But you are right, that the basic argument does NOT establish all characteristics of the proposed god; Hartshorne argues for a panentheistic version and Plantinga for the more classic theistic understanding. There are, however, some very important overlaps between these two arguments. And none of the arguments I have read attempt to establish the Trinity:-)

> 4) Strictly a priori arguments about God are invalid. The problem is that

> the rational is not the real nor is the rationally inescapable the real.

> Even if it is logically necessary to conceive of a necessary Being as

> necessarily existing, it does not follow that it necessarily does exist. It

> might be necessary to think that it exists but this does not prove that it

> really does exist. It is necessary to think of triangles with three sides on

> them. However it is possible that no triangles exist. It is logically

> possible that nothing ever existed including a necessary being. For the

> nonexistence of everything is a logically conceivable state of affairs.

This reminds me of Norman Geisler's objection to the ontological argument. As it now stands, these points you have in (4) are mere assertions about "what exactly we can and cannot do" and there is no real argument for most of it in the passage. You will have to be more specific, and demonstrative, to show that the ontological argument is not valid. With the example of the triangle, you are completely accurate. It is logically possible for no triangles to exist, for both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for triangles -- they are contingent. This, however, does not even touch the ontological argument, for God is not understood to be contingent. Next, you write: "It is logically possible that nothing ever existed including a necessary being." Thus, you are seemingly denying that anything can have logically necessary existence because "...the nonexistence of everything is a logically conceivable state of affairs."

First, I am not convinced that this exact criticism applies to ALL variations of the ontological argument. For example, it may not touch Plantinga's argument (my third variation is similar to Plantinga's), but I am quite willing to grant that it might. Second, I do not see how "the nonexistence of everything" is a conceivable state of affairs. Absolute nonexistence does not make sense to me as a "conceivable state of affairs." For a possible world that was "empty," at the very least the laws of logic would need to be applicable somehow, or it could not even be labeled as a "possible world." Further, the assertion (that you seem to be making in this passage) that God's necessity does not entail actual existence, does not seem correct to me. It is argued by many who are opposed to the OA (ontological argument) that IF God exists, THEN God exists necessarily, but this almost makes a mockery out of God's granted necessity. What could this possibly mean other than contingent existence? I believe it IS a statement of contingency, so the issue has merely been sidestepped, and "God's necessity" has been reinterpreted to mean nothing but "God's contingent existence." To say IF God exists then God exists necessarily, is to affirm that the state of affairs could be otherwise, and God might not have existed. But again, I think this type of criticism avoids the issue, for it is a flat denial of logical necessity.

Now, if I am right, your position is similar to that of Norman Geisler's, who advocates a "factually necessary" God, but not a logically necessary one. I don't agree with Geisler's position on this matter, and I feel that a factually necessary deity does not truly capture the "essence" of divinity. In contrast, I believe that a logically necessary deity is a more coherent viewpoint.

But you DID seem to argue that nothing can have logically necessary existence, because absolute nonexistence is a conceivable state of affairs, therefore everything which exists merely exists contingently, or at most there is a variety of "factual necessity," which is not much different from saying "contingent." At least, this seems to be the outcome of the criticism as I understand it. Is this what you meant earllier when you wrote that, in order to make the argument valid it must be asserted that something exists, for the only way in which to refute the possiblity of nonexistence is by establishing that something exists, thereby giving a cosmological argument instead of an ontological one?

In any case, you mentioned that nonexistence is a logically conceivable state of affairs. Now, there are at least two different understandings for what we mean when we say something is "conceivable." The first type is based roughly on intuition. For example, it might be conceivable to me that X +Y -Z = 7, but since I do not know what X, Y or Z stand for I could very well be mistaken on this, though the answer is still conceivably 7, based upon my "intuition" of this problem. The second understanding of "conceivable" is that which has no contradictions, and this seems to be the understanding you imply, since you wrote "logically conceivable state of affairs." Now, I am not convinced that such a state of affairs is logically possible. Just because we can use our imagination does not automatically entail its status is logically possible. I think a point against it is that, practically by definition, we have something that just be beyond logical analysis. And also, by very definition it is something that does not exist. We might be able to roughly and intuitively imagine that such a state of affairs is possible, but there may be inherent contradictions in this (maybe not, however).

I'll stop here and let it stew. I am willing to change my mind on any of these points, if sufficient reason is given:-)

Respectfully,

Mark

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Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/14/99 11:11:26 AM Pacific Standard Time

From: FreeMind76

To: TheRepublc, No Magic 1, JB 2 DA, BSmith5044

To: BluefishCE, Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish, Dirquedong

To: Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, Ms Atheist

To: Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya

To: Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Hafas1, Haggai 1 6

To: drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny

To: petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello folks...

Well, after some delay, I am ready to tackle TheRepublc's "Variations on Anselm's Insight." Without further ado, let us begin.

In a message dated 11/5/99 9:01:44 PM Central Standard Time, TheRepublc writes:

First Variation:

(I) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

This definition raises a major question.

Q1. What does it mean that "both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x"? If x exists, then it is not logically possible that x doesn't exist in the same time and in the same respect. If you mean that at different times, x may either exist or not-exist, then that is different. Is that what you mean?

(II) God is understood to be the uncreated, self-existent (aseity) foundation of reality.

Q2. What do you mean by "foundation of reality"? Reality is the realm of existence. How can the whole of existence have a foundation? This smacks very loudly of the primacy-of-consciousness metaphysics, by which a form of consciousness is posited as the source of existence -- and, as I've noted countless times in the past, such a view commits the stolen-concept fallacy by asserting "consciousness" while denying its genetic root, "existence."

(III) That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it must either exist always, or not at all. Thus both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for God (I, II).

(IV) If God's existence is logically possible God cannot fail to exist (III).

(V) God's existence is logically possible (proposition).

(VI) God cannot fail to exist (from IV, V).

If you look carefully, you will see that the notion of God being the "foundation of reality" is jettisoned in the rest of the argument, steps III through VI. What is left? An existent which is "uncreated and self-existent." What observable phenomenon fits this bill? Existence -- i.e., reality, the whole of existence, the sum of all that which exists. To use the words of TheRepublc's argument:

Existence must either exist always, or not at all. Both existence and nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for existence.

But we know that existence exists, and so existence cannot fail to exist. The whole of existence is "self-existent"; it cannot not-exist. The whole of existence is uncreated; there is nothing else to create it, and no means by which to create it.

Thus, if one were to accept the above argument, the only conclusion one could draw is that by "God," the author of the argument means "existence"; and as there is already a concept called "existence," and as the whole of existence is not conscious, the use of the term "God" is superfluous and without merit.

The First Variation therefore unwittingly vindicates the Objectivist position: that existence exists absolutely, and has metaphysical primacy.

Second Variation:

(i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

(ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater" in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be a duke, or even king.]

This premise has two major problems.

Q3. What do you mean by "possible" here? Later in your argument you use the term "conceivably greater." Are you equating the possible with the conceivable? If so, aren't you really referring to a "Greatest Conceivable Being" (GCB)? And if so, how could such a thing exist?

You see, if we are talking about a "Greatest Conceivable Being," you run into a problem. That problem is that for any being the mind can logically conceive, it can always conceive of something greater. Remember, "greatness" presupposes the concept of measurement -- the measurement of an attribute against a standard of measurement. It therefore also presupposes the concept of quantity, because that concept allows us to relate that which is measured to the standard by which it is measured. This leads to the other major problem:

Q4. How can there be a "greatest conceivable quantity" of anything? If I can conceive of a 'being' that is 1,000,000,000,000,000 feet tall, I can always conceive of a being that is 1,000,000,000,000,001 feet tall, and so on for attributes of weight, radiation intensity, wavelength of light, etc. One can always conceive of something more. The notion of a "greatest conceivable being" implies the notion of a "greatest conceivable quantity," which is equally as illogical as the notion of a "greatest conceivable number." What would that number be? There is none such. For any conceivable number, you can always add one to it.

The other possibility is the idea of a "greatest possible being" in the objective sense, not the sense of "greatest conceivable being." This leads us to premise (iii) of the Second Variation:

(iii) To exist contingently is an "imperfection," for it is conceivably greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of nonexistence (proposition).

As I noted on the First Variation, that which has "no possibility of nonexistence" is the whole of existence itself. And when you think about it, the whole of existence -- reality -- is the "greatest possible being." What could possibly be greater than the whole of existence? Because the whole of existence comprises everything that exists, there can't be anything more, or anything greater.

(iv) God is conceived of as the GPB.

(v) To categorize God's existence as contingent is to ascribe a deficiency to the GPB, and contingency by definition cannot be ascribed to GPB. (i, ii, iii, iv).

(vi) Existence and nonexistence cannot both be logical possibilities for God (from v).

(vii) If God is logically possible, then God cannot fail to exist (from vi).

(viii) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

(ix) God can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(x) God cannot fail to exist (from vii, viii, ix).

The rest of this argument can be assessed analogously to the First Variation. Where "God" appears in this argument, what actually belongs is the term "existence" (i.e., the whole of existence, a.k.a. "reality").

We therefore find that once again, this argument vindicates the Objectivist position that existence exists, and has metaphysical primacy.

The true issue at stake here is not whether to accept this understanding of God or not, but whether this conception of God, as the Greatest Possible Being, is coherent. For if the above conception of God is coherent, then the argument is triumphant (I think). If God is coherent, then God is possible. If God is possible, then God cannot fail to exist. The entire argument can be condensed into the following syllogism:

(A) Either God exists or God is impossible

(B) God is not impossible

(C) Therefore, God exists

In light of my above analysis, this argument either fails, or vindicates Objectivist metaphysics. The GCB version of God is impossible by virtue of internal contradiction. The GPB version of "God" actually turns out to be reality itself, i.e., the whole of existence, which isn't conscious, and thereby vindicates Objectivism.

Third Variation:

(1) For any x, x is the property "being god-like" if and only if x implies having all possible knowledge (omniscient), all possible power (omnipotent), moral perfection, and aseity. (definition).

Q5. If there is a self-existent being ("aseity"), what need would it have of morals? How can one objectively define a moral standard for a being whose nonexistence is impossible? For humans, objective morality is determined by reference to the fact that existence qua living human is subject to termination, and nonexistence qua living human is possible. The fundamental alternative of life ("existence") vs. death ("nonexistence") is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) precondition of an objective moral system. (The other precondition is volition.) Therefore, in order for this Third Variation to even have a chance to succeed, either "aseity" or moral perfection must be thrown out, as they are not mutually compatible.

Q6. What do you mean by "all possible power"? Is it not true that I have all possible power? After all, whatever I have the power to do is possible for me to do, and whatever I don't have the power to do is impossible for me to do (at any given moment) -- and so by that definition of "omnipotent," I have all possible power, and so in fact does everyone else. Of what good is the notion of "omnipotence" then?

(2) Having all the knowledge and power that is logically possible entails knowledge about every possibility (every possible world) and the power to accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world.

Q7. What is a "possible world"? Assuming that by "world" you mean "reality," there is only one possible reality, and that's the actual one. So what exactly are you referring to here?

(3) If the property "being god-like" is logically possible then it is exemplified in all possible worlds (from 1, 2).

Q8. What do you mean by "exemplified"? Already your definition in (1) renders "being god-like" logically impossible. But even if you were to clean up your definition, what does "exemplified" mean here?

(4) For any x, x is logically possible if and only if x can be coherently conceived of and is not definitionally nonexistent ( i.e., "nonbeing" or "square circle"). (axiom)

(5) "Being god-like" can be coherently conceived (proposition).

(6) "Being god-like" is exemplified in all possible worlds, which would include the actual world (from 3, 5).

If "being god-like" is coherent, then, as with the previous variations, this argument may be victorious.

Obviously, as I demonstrated, it isn't coherent. The argument, in its present form, fails to prove anything. Even if the internal contradictions were weeded out, though, what would it prove? What is the significance of 'exemplifying "being god-like" in all possible worlds including the actual world'? All that that proves is that actual people can conceive of it without contradiction. Does that prove anything about what exists apart from man's mind? No.

I look forward to your responses to my observations.

Really,

Nick

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Subj: Re: Three variations of Anselm

Date: 11/20/99 10:31:01 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: TheRepublc

To: FreeMind76, No Magic 1, JB 2 DA, BSmith5044

To: BluefishCE, Heretic7, aburhan1@bigred.unl.edu

To: bitemegod@hotmail.com, DarwinFish, Dirquedong

To: Duncan96, Eztoamuse@email.msn.com, Ms Atheist

To: Necropsy69, oinkjointroad@hotmail.com, Osareya

To: Pet564, SlackerInc, Tindrbox, Hafas1, Haggai 1 6

To: drwnwllce@hotmail.com, KippyBunny

To: petecurtis69@hotmail.com

Hello everyone,

And Hello Nick, and thanks for the response.

> First Variation:

>

> (I) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and

> nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

>

> This definition raises a major question.

>

> Q1. What does it mean that "both existence and nonexistence are logical

> possibilities for x"? If x exists, then it is not logically possible that x

> doesn't exist in the same time and in the same respect. If you mean that at different

> times, x may either exist or not-exist, then that is different. Is that

> what you mean?

I agree with your statement, "if x exists, then it is not logically possible that x doesn't exist in the same time and in the same respect." Strict deduction from the law of noncontradiction. But this is not what I am saying. If we say that "x exists," then we have already made the existential judgment on what is the FACT of the matter. And we cannot say that, factually speaking, x does, and does not exist, for CLEARLY it indeed does exist (if we grant that "x exists" is a true statement). But when we talk of logical possibility, we are no longer talking of strict factual matters. If "x exists" is a true statement, that is, it is factually accurate, we may still say, that logically speaking, it is possible that x might not have existed at all. What I mean is that there is no logical necessity involved in the existence of x. Another way of understanding this is the following: If there is no logical contradiction generated by the denial of the existence of x, then logically speaking, x can either exist or not. The FACT may very well be that x exists, but a mere existential fact does not imply logical necessity, for the facts might have been different, and x might not have existed. This is true even if determinism is true. For determinism merely states that granted M state of affairs, then this set of circumstances will necessarily follow. But with a different state of affairs, then there will follow a different set of circumstances.

> (II) God is understood to be the uncreated, self-existent (aseity)

> foundation of reality.

>

> Q2. What do you mean by "foundation of reality"? Reality is the realm

> of existence. How can the whole of existence have a foundation? This smacks

> very loudly of the primacy-of-consciousness metaphysics, by which a form of

> consciousness is posited as the source of existence -- and, as I've noted

> countless times in the past, such a view commits the stolen-concept fallacy

> by asserting "consciousness" while denying its genetic root, "existence."

I am aware that you have noted this view many times, and I have yet to be convinced that this is not a mere semantic game on the part of Objectivists. If you want this to have any holding on theistic discussions, I feel you ought to either meet the theist with their understanding of the issue, or convince them that your interpretation is the correct one (or both). As it now stands, it seems more of an arbitrary observation, because the theist is not saying anything like this.

Now, what I meant by "reality" is the material universe and any universals that may exist (if nominalism is not true). This also may include anything else that finds its "ontological footing" in the creative sustaining powers of God. God, of course, will be understood to be existing, but not in the mundane sense of the term "existing" that we are most familiar with. We may obviously include God in the tentative set of "that which exists," but God has a special ontological niche, being in the unique role of grounding all other existence, which is understood to be dependent upon him. So when theists refer to God as the foundation of "reality" or "existence," the meaning being conveyed is of a relationship. The relationship of God to all other existence.

Again, there is no denying of any "genetic roots" in this. Nobody is denying that "existence" "exists." Why would anyone deny such a straightforward tautology? But we cannot say that "existence" is the foundation for "existence" and have any information come out of this. This is an empty statement, void of any explanatory powers.

> (III) That which is uncreated and self-existent is not contingent, for it

> must either exist always, or not at all. Thus both existence and nonexistence

> cannot be logical possibilities for God (I, II).

> (IV) If God's existence is logically possible God cannot fail to exist (III)

> .

> (V) God's existence is logically possible (proposition).

> (VI) God cannot fail to exist (from IV, V).

>

> If you look carefully, you will see that the notion of God being the "

> foundation of reality" is jettisoned in the rest of the argument, steps III

> through VI. What is left? An existent which is "uncreated and self-existent.

> " What observable phenomenon fits this bill? Existence -- i.e., reality,

> the whole of existence, the sum of all that which exists. To use the words

> of TheRepublc's argument:

>

> Existence must either exist always, or not at all. Both existence and

> nonexistence cannot be logical possibilities for existence.

This statement has the appearance of being completely tautaological, and thus, empty of any information.

> But we know that existence exists, and so existence cannot fail to exist.

> The whole of existence is "self-existent"; it cannot not-exist. The whole of

> existence is uncreated; there is nothing else to create it, and no means by

> which to create it.

You seem to be using the term "existence" in equivocal ways, changing the meaning of what you are saying, and thus it is difficult to understand the content of this passage. In any case, when you say that "existence cannot fail to exist" and that existence is "self-existent," this is, as above, tautological and empty. Unless you are implying differement meanings for the word "existence," in which case you are being equivocal, as I implied.

Further, and more importantly, you are making the unsubstantiated assertion that the whole of existence cannot fail to exist. Why must the WHOLE be self-existent? Why not SOME of existence? It is the most universal and abstract FACT that something exists. This FACT is a "factual necessity," but this does not mean that this fact is "logically necessary." There is a difference, and thus far there does not seem to be a reason why the fact of existence must be logically necessary.

Also, you write, "existence cannot fail to exist." I take your meaning here as something like the law of identity, A is A, therefore what you are really saying is that "existence cannot fail to be identical with itself." In other words, existence is NOT identical with nonexistence, or nonbeing, or nothingness, etc. And thus, "existence" CANNOT FAIL to be identical with itself, and it must simply "exist." Now, what does this mean? What does it mean "to exist?"? What *exactly* does this imply? Do you have a notion of what it means, or a definition for it? If not, then it is empty. Even after defining it, it still may only turn out to be a tautology.

> Thus, if one were to accept the above argument, the only conclusion one

> could draw is that by "God," the author of the argument means "existence";

> and as there is already a concept called "existence," and as the whole of

> existence is not conscious, the use of the term "God" is superfluous and

> without merit.

I feel these are ungrounded conclusions. There is no logical necessity within the understanding of "existence," and even if there is, you have not argued for it yet, but have only argued for factual necessity. Thus, there is as of yet no reason to hold to your claims on this point.

But in all fairness, there may be something to the phrase "existence exists," used in conjunction with the law of identity, and even with my above arguments, I am not ready to altogether discount it.

>

> Second Variation:

>

> (i) For any x, x is contingent if and only if both existence and

> nonexistence are logical possibilities for x (definition).

> (ii) For any x, x is the Greatest Possible Being (GPB) if and only if x is

> not "imperfect" or deficient in any way (definition). An "imperfection" is

> that which possibly could have been more complete, independent, or "greater"

> in some way than it is. [Example - in a monarchical system, although a baron

> is royalty, it is deficient in some way, for it is conceivably greater to be

> a duke, or even king.]

>

> This premise has two major problems.

>

> Q3. What do you mean by "possible" here?

Generally, logical possibility.

Later in your argument you use

> the term "conceivably greater." Are you equating the possible with the

> conceivable?

No, but there is overlap.

If so, aren't you really referring to a "Greatest Conceivable

> Being" (GCB)? And if so, how could such a thing exist?

>

> You see, if we are talking about a "Greatest Conceivable Being," you run

> into a problem. That problem is that for any being the mind can logically

> conceive, it can always conceive of something greater. Remember, "greatness"

> presupposes the concept of measurement -- the measurement of an attribute

> against a standard of measurement. It therefore also presupposes the concept

> of quantity, because that concept allows us to relate that which is measured

> to the standard by which it is measured. This leads to the other major

> problem:

>

> Q4. How can there be a "greatest conceivable quantity" of anything? If I

> can conceive of a 'being' that is 1,000,000,000,000,000 feet tall, I can

> always conceive of a being that is 1,000,000,000,000,001 feet tall, and so on

> for attributes of weight, radiation intensity, wavelength of light, etc. One

> can always conceive of something more. The notion of a "greatest conceivable

> being" implies the notion of a "greatest conceivable quantity," which is

> equally as illogical as the notion of a "greatest conceivable number." What

> would that number be? There is none such. For any conceivable number, you

> can always add one to it.

This type of objection, I feel, is much more important than your other comments thus far. For I feel this is ultimately where the arguments leads us -- to a pondering and wrestling over the idea of divinity, and what such a thing would be. This is the real heart of the matter. The other points usually brought up against the ontological argument (that I am aware of) are mainly a matter of clarifying the argument, and eventually coming to this point of the dilemma: if there is any meaning to the idea of a Greatest Possible Being, then such a being must exist. Consequently, if such a being is shown to be meaningless and/or contradictory, then it is absolutely impossible for it to exist. Having said that, I feel that there is some answer that can be given to the particular problem you call attention to. This is in fact the same type of objection that Leibniz had to Descartes' ontological argument, and Leibniz went on to support what he considered an "improved" version of it.

Now, God is considered, per the Anselmian insight, to be the Greatest Possible Being. On the face of it, this must be generally true, for God is considered the creator of all things (besides himself) and is sovereign ovr all creation. Thus, whatever can possibly exist is actually understood to be "that which God can do, or cause to transpire, etc." And possibility would be identical with God's abilities. And God would obviously be the GPB. We may also consider it from another viewpoint.

Consider for a moment what would make a being "greater" than another being. If x is dependent upon y for w, then y is "greater" than x, for x is relying upon y for something that it does not have. Now, if we take w to stand for "existence," then we have the case that x depends upon y for existence. And for something to rely upon something else for existence seems to be an important thing indeed (at least to me). And thus, I think it can be rationally implied that in the case of the GPB, all else that exists would be depende upon GPB, for this would mean GPB would be the "greatest" or "most important" being in all of existence. I do not see how "all" can be quantified in this matter, for in the case of the GPB whatever exists will be dependent upon GPB. It is not that there are a million things dependent on GPB, and we can conceive of "a million plus one things." There is no "everything plus one." There is only "everything." Just as there is no "existence plus one," there is only "existence."

Now, the same may be said for other qualities, which would follow from the GPB. If GPB is sovereign, then GPB must have all knowledge that it is logically possible to have. And there is no such thing as "all the knowledge plus one." But I would agree, that for any quality that CAN be obviously quantified, then your critique would stand in relation to that quality. For example, all physical attributes (height, weight, width, length, i.e., "extension") could not apply.

> The other possibility is the idea of a "greatest possible being" in the

> objective sense, not the sense of "greatest conceivable being." This leads

> us to premise (iii) of the Second Variation:

>

> (iii) To exist contingently is an "imperfection," for it is conceivably

> greater to exist noncontingently, that is, with no the possibility of

> nonexistence (proposition).

>

> As I noted on the First Variation, that which has "no possibility of

> nonexistence" is the whole of existence itself.

So far you have mainly talked about this in the factual sense, and not the logically necessary sense. And thus I do not see the groundwork for it yet.

> And when you think about it,

> the whole of existence -- reality -- is the "greatest possible being."

> What could possibly be greater than the whole of existence? Because the

> whole of existence comprises everything that exists, there can't be anything

> more, or anything greater.

Indeed, and there can be nothing greater than that being which is responsible for "everything that exists" outside of itself. There can be nothing more, or greater, than such a being. If you are willing to grant that the whole of existence could be GPB, then I do not see what your objection could possibly be to God as such a being, in this context. I was under the impression that you just finished (in the above passages) dismissing the notion of GPB as "impossible." If you then turn around and affirm it, even with qualifications, then you destroy your own argument.

> Third Variation:

>

> (1) For any x, x is the property "being god-like" if and only if x implies

> having all possible knowledge (omniscient), all possible power (omnipotent),

> moral perfection, and aseity. (definition).

>

> Q5. If there is a self-existent being ("aseity"), what need would it

> have of morals? How can one objectively define a moral standard for a

> being whose nonexistence is impossible? For humans, objective morality is

> determined by reference to the fact that existence qua living human is

> subject to termination, and nonexistence qua living human is possible. The

> fundamental alternative of life ("existence") vs. death ("nonexistence") is a

> necessary (albeit not sufficient) precondition of an objective moral system.

> (The other precondition is volition.) Therefore, in order for this Third

> Variation to even have a chance to succeed, either "aseity" or moral

> perfection must be thrown out, as they are not mutually compatible.

Why would an objective moral standard need to be defined at all for such a being? The standard is thought of as inherent in the GPB, and not as a standard that GPB adheres to. Being morally perfect is conceived of as being part of the nature of GPB. For humans, morality is influenced by our finitude (our limited span of life), but I do not see the need of saying this same situation applies to GPB. Why would it? Now, I could have easily not included "moral perfection" as part of the definition of "being god-like." I almost didn't, for I felt the focus would be taken off the other qualities. But I decided to present it to, if nothing else, offer an argument with a much more complete picture of the God of theism than the other two arguments offered. The exact understanding of "morally perfect" is of course up for debate, however, and I am content to leave it at that for the moment (unless you want to pursue this line of thought more fully).

> Q6. What do you mean by "all possible power"? Is it not true that I have

> all possible power? After all, whatever I have the power to do is possible

> for me to do, and whatever I don't have the power to do is impossible for me

> to do (at any given moment) -- and so by that definition of "omnipotent," I

> have all possible power, and so in fact does everyone else. Of what good is

> the notion of "omnipotence" then?

You do not have "all possible power." This phrase simply means something like "the ability (power) to acomplish anything that is logically possible." You do not have such ability, for there are many things that you cannot accomplish which are in fact logically possible. It would be a matter of your factual limitations. For example, I doubt very much that you can flap your arms and fly to Mars. This is a factual limitation, based upon the actual state of affairs. If things were different (i.e., if humans had wings and did not need to breathe or eat, and could store enough energy for such a trip, etc) then flying to Mars on your own power may be logically possible.

> (2) Having all the knowledge and power that is logically possible entails

> knowledge about every possibility (every possible world) and the power to

> accomplish anything that can be accomplished in any possible world.

>

> Q7. What is a "possible world"? Assuming that by "world" you mean "

> reality," there is only one possible reality, and that's the actual one. So

> what exactly are you referring to here?

Possible World semantics refers to, generally, what is logically possible. And granted a different state of affairs, x may or may not be logically possible. If x is possible given y state of affairs, then x "exists" in a possible world in which y state of affairs obtain. Possible worlds are not thought of as truly being real, as if they were parallel universes or other dimensions, but as a semantic way of making sense of logical possibility and variuous states of affairs. Discussion of possible worlds is a pretty involved thing in modern philosophy, and the soundness of it has been proven by Saul Kripke.

> (3) If the property "being god-like" is logically possible then it is

> exemplified in all possible worlds (from 1, 2).

>

> Q8. What do you mean by "exemplified"? Already your definition in (1)

> renders "being god-like" logically impossible. But even if you were to clean

> up your definition, what does "exemplified" mean here?

In this context exemplified means "existing." In other words, to say that x property is logically possible is to assert that x is exemplified in at least one possible world.

> Obviously, as I demonstrated, it isn't coherent. The argument, in its

> present form, fails to prove anything. Even if the internal contradictions

> were weeded out, though, what would it prove? What is the significance of '

> exemplifying "being god-like" in all possible worlds including the actual

> world'? All that that proves is that actual people can conceive of it

> without contradiction. Does that prove anything about what exists apart from

> man's mind? No.

Sorry, but if "being god-like" is exemplified in all possible worlds, then indeed this does mean that there is such a being in actuality.

respectfully

Mark