John Stuart Mill, Poverty and International Political Economy

Examining international causes and solutions to poverty in a utilitarian framework

Bryan Goodrich
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Most people cannot imagine what it is like to live on one or two dollars a day. This kind of living condition, however, ranges in the billions of men, women and children worldwide. To combat this distressing global issue, international organizations, such as the World Bank Group or International Monetary Fund (IMF), have thrown billions upon billions of dollars at it. In some cases they are met with failure. In other cases they even make matters worse.[1] To approach poverty effectively requires knowing its causes. It will not be resolved as a monetary problem because it is not merely a problem of incomes, as the IMF and World Bank's actions might suppose. Therefore, a more encompassing theory of political economy is needed. John Stuart Mill is a prized social philosopher of the 19th century who dealt with domestic issues of poverty in his day. Though not facing the international effects of globalization that modern societies know all too well, Mill's utilitarian philosophy provides a consistent and accurate standard for analyzing poverty, its causes and how to effectively resolve them. The purpose of this paper is to provide that analysis of international relations from the framework of Mill's utilitarianism. To achieve this goal we will first examine the principle of utility, its derivatives and the relationship of the international system to the individual. Secondly, we will analyze poverty with a more accurate and appropriate definition. With that foundation in place, we can address the causes, and possible solutions, of poverty.

The principle of utility, in the most rudimentary assessment, establishes the relationship between the culturing of one's character, choices and one's intended future lifestyle as determined by one's preferences, and how all that will result in their improved happiness or flourishing. To decipher this philosophy within the scope of this paper it will suffice to understand two key elements: ethology and liberty.

The development of one's character is essential for an individual, or any body of people, to establish their happiness. What Mill called ethology was the study of how the formation of character transpired.[2] Vital to a study of ethics, ethology constitutes the science of human choice. The ethological processes, in terms of a social philosophy, comprise the set of choices producing the tendency toward some desired character. Utilitarianism provides the normative basis to direct that tendency. Therefore, ethology under the utilitarian dictate directs the intended character toward improved happiness.

The best source of knowledge, in terms of knowing what is best for one's self, is the individual. The individual gains information about the best course of actions, the best choices and the best means to achieve their desired end, i.e., their character, which will make them happy.[3] They can be wrong in that goal, but they are still the best person to know. Even if they fail, that failure is a part of life, and success is rarely discovered without being built upon the enumeration of failures. Therefore, the allowance of this process is crucial to human development, as will be espoused later. What is important, in Mill's analysis, is that the individual's development of this goal, the plan to achieve it and the process of development to get there, signifies the most critical steps in the ethological process. It is the individual's ability to express their creative intentions, and make the future they want for themselves, that establishes the basis for the individual's flourishing.

For someone to be the best they can be, i.e., to achieve that goal of flourishing, it requires individuality. Moreover, it is critical that each person is afforded the freedom to express that individuality. Mill recognized this in the ethological processes, as alluded to above; he also recognized the importance of individuality in the moral sentiments. Particularly, human's have the capability to experience both feelings and sympathies to varying degrees of *quality*.[4]

Therefore, the individual's flourishing is expressed in their well-being modeled after their own interests, or as Mill states:

> Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.[5]

Thus, the individuality of the person determines what is in their best interests. Furthermore, this also is sanctioned as a primary liberty on the basis that it is not only good for the individual, but good for society's welfare as a whole.[6] Thus, ethology and flourishing become encapsulated in the concept of liberty. Through liberty we can discern the moral implications of social relations.

Having the opportunity to act provides a channel through which our choices can produce their intended effects. Liberty is more than the mere freedom to choose, however. Liberty envelops the freedom to think, discuss, act and associate with everyone else. In short, liberty is the crux of the ethological processes. For human interests to be realized they need the liberty to make their life plan a reality. In this view, liberty becomes the result of structuring society, and individual behavior, for the benefit of removing social tyrannies, whether that impediment to individual flourishing would come from other people in society or some government of the people; thus, it instills responsibility in our actions, because the extent to which we are free to act stops short of when we begin to harm other's well-being.[7] Consequently, liberty requires some criterion for when the freedoms of the individual can be suspended for the security of others.

The harm principle negatively establishes liberty by providing the utilitarian framework through which people determine harms against them. When someone's freedom to act infringes on the liberty of another, such that it impedes their ability to flourish, we can consider that harming them. It is in this light that the harm principle, derived from the utilitarian doctrine, determines the boundaries by which individual liberty is exercised.[8] Harm is decided, in part, by

those whom the choice or action effects; particularly, it is qualified on the basis of whether it results in disutility, i.e., impedes the flourishing of others. This relative nature of determining harm allows its flexibility to fit the situation in both time and space. Therefore, the decision of harm is left to those under what can be considered a jurisdiction; the jurisdiction is the scope on whom harm is inflicted upon.[9] Therefore, in the domain of social relations, if people feel the actions of their fellow citizens prove to be a disutility to their flourishing, individually or collectively, then they have legitimate right to demand compensation or retribution to resolve the harm or its effects. This has obvious implications in the realm of social relations, and will provide the framework for which international relations, in this utilitarian context, will be investigated.

Before addressing the causes of poverty from international affairs, it will be pertinent to understand the structural relations between the individual and the state. The structure of this relationship derives from the power relations involved. The state draws its power from the people in some manner. This can obviously be despotic or democratic.[10] As established by the liberty principle, the tyrannical rule of a despot will, in general, be harmful and require particular reasons for it to be permissible. Thus, we can suppose that democratically run nations will exhibit the interests of the individuals more accurately.[11] This representation of the people's interests, however, is not an ideal presentation of their character. Nevertheless, we can estimate the relationship that establishes the citizen's flourishing will be a democratic state. Moving to the international level convolutes these power relationships. Therefore, globalization has its costs and benefits in terms of human flourishing; Recognizing the importance of the individual, their flourishing and how it relates to the international stage must be analyzed.[12]

The international stage is comprised of numerous actors all of whom can have direct impact on the individual's flourishing. Like the individual-to-state relation, the relation of the individual to the international actors is demonstrated by power. The difference is the international actor's often proxy through the state. Thus, the relation of the individual to the international stage is marked by transitivity. If the individual-to-state relation is democratic but the relation, ultimately, to the international actors is not, and the international actors impede the flourishing of the individuals, then the individual-to-state relation becomes illusory because it no longer expresses the interests of its constituents. Thus, evaluating the nature of the international-to-individual relation needs to be one that is marked by the flourishing of the individual irrespective of the relation of the state; given that the individual-to-state relation is at least one expressive of the individual's interests. Connecting the utilitarian doctrine to these power relations will provide a clear picture of poverty and its causes as understood in terms of flourishing.

Poverty is often addressed as a monetary issue, and it is this definition that fails to characterize the reality of poverty and its effects. If poverty were merely a monetary issue, then the billions of foreign aid provided to impoverished states would resolve the issue. Clearly, it has not. What is needed is an evaluation of poverty in terms of what income provides. Income opens the doors to market opportunities so individuals can improve their lives, i.e., flourish. The availability of opportunities acts as the medium through which liberty can be established in these power relations. Therefore, poverty is more accurately characterized by "opportunity deprivation."[13] It is through the lack of opportunities that people are deprived of their ability to flourish. When people do not have the income to sustain themselves well enough to do the things they value, and thus develop their character, we identify them as being impoverished. Therefore, it is not money itself that is the issue but whether they have the opportunities it provides, and if

they have it, that it translates into real opportunities. With this holistic view of poverty as effecting all aspects of a person's livelihood through deprivation of their opportunities, and thusly their liberties, we can see it provides a clearer picture of where the problem of poverty arises.

The utilitarian doctrine identifies, through the harm principle, the fundamental concept of poverty as an extension of the impediment to liberty. It is through this perspective that the power relations of the individual and international actors can be assessed for the causes of poverty. There are two fundamental ways international relations can impede individual flourishing. These two ways can be considered a direct (i.e., international-individual) or indirect (i.e., international-state-individual) form of impediment.

The first way an international actor can impede individual flourishing is through directly prohibiting their ability to associate with other individuals, and through affecting the culture. These impediments can happen through barriers to all the things globalization promised, but where mismanaged in organization.[14] If communications, for instance, are censored or prohibited in some way, e.g., Iran's censoring public access to the internet, then people are not able to get access to information, new ideas or discuss with other individuals that they may have reason to value; at least it will not happen as freely as other countries provide it; thus, this censorship to information restricts resources they may value in planning, living and improving their lives, i.e., in flourishing. This censorship is a direct violation of individual liberties; plus, it ensures that individuals have fewer resources to raise awareness, or become cognizant, of their possible destitution, i.e., they are less capable of questioning official doctrine or policy leading to dogma or social stagnation.[15] A cultural case exists if a multinational business is outsourcing, then they are effecting the culture of the place the have moved their business operations. In addition, if a

nation promotes the migration of labor, or in some historical cases actually steals labor,[16] into their domestic business market, then they are affecting the culture at home by artificially instigating immigration. This is not to suppose any of these are inherently harms, but, in the scope of social and political liberties, these activities can result in an impediment to the flourishing of a state or, consequently, the individuals. Thusly, this direct impediment channels either positively (i.e., through a direct barrier) or negatively (i.e., through intentionally changing the social makeup from what individuals might desire). These can lead to poverty in terms of opportunity deprivation, for individuals and for society as a whole. It may not necessarily result in a monetary view of poverty, but with our more appropriate definition it can be construed as resulting in a deprivation of things they have reason to want, and furthermore, may have a right to want.[17]

The second way in which international relations impedes individual liberties is through an indirect route of state interference. As stated previously, the state regulated liberties and democratic functioning becomes diminished when the state becomes powerless to international actors. When a state loses the sovereignty to manage its economic affairs, for instance, and the IMF or some multinational business intercedes to manage things the way they paternalistically determine is in their best interest, this impedes the state's ability to manage itself on terms of the democratic will of its citizens. In short, international actors take the interests of a few and supersede the interests of the many. These types of indirect impediments can be considered economical, generally. These are more in line with the strict monetary view of poverty, but such a view is still limited since income does not necessarily translate into well-being; e.g., America is rich, yet certain minorities in America may have life expectancies far lower than those in developing countries.[18] Therefore, the economic impediments stem beyond the valuation of the

income into how those economic factors actually translate into impediments of the opportunities to flourish and satisfy desires.

These two routes of international impediments are not necessarily disjoint; since both social and economic factors can manifest through institutions and policies, i.e., both kinds of impediment can stem from one source. Nevertheless, these two avenues through which the individual relates to the international stage can be corrupted by actions of the international actors. These directly and indirectly translate into opportunity deprivations that may not be measurable by mere monetary values. Examining the spectrum of effects in terms of liberty, development of character and flourishing is central to resolving poverty. Therefore, analyzing the solutions of direct and indirect impediments will fill the remainder of this paper.

The indirect approach focuses on economic resolutions through increases in liberty, or removing barriers to liberty, i.e., harms; these can be approached in a variety of ways, e.g., institutions and policies can separately, or together, produce results. Also, increasing the market availability of certain goods can produce results. The underlying measure in terms of economic freedom is through an evaluation of welfare in terms of the market opportunities and in how those translate into flourishing. Since the welfare of the individual is directly aligned with the principle of utility, any welfare policy or institution to improve conditions must satisfy an alleviation of any harm or increase in individual flourishing. There are three perspectives on how to address these economic factors: the management of institutions, the economic interests in policies and the strengthening of state sovereignty. These will be addressed separately.[19]

Globalization has been economically driven, but it has been shaped by its political structures.[20] With this in mind, we have to consider what restructuring the management of international actors requires. This entails knowing how they are mismanaged. The most

prominent economic actors on the world stage, i.e., the World Bank Group, the IMF and World Trade Organization (WTO), have a democratic deficiency.[21] This stems from there being no internal or external (i.e., social) assignment of responsibility. There is also a lack of transparency in their meetings and decisions, indicating there is no one inside or outside of the organization with direct regulation over their choice of actions. They lack accountability to the individual's they effect. The very nature behind their political appointment, and elected officers, is biased in favor of more-developed countries (MDCs) and the MDC's interests. This shows direct conflict in the international-to-individual relation when the MDCs are determining what is best for their interests using the less-developed countries (LDCs) as the means to get there. The LDCs lack any democratic representation or say in how things are managed. Through this kind of mismanagement we end up with IMF policies that increase inflation in impoverished nations and make global trade imbalances worse, such as in the 1990s financial crises.[22] Thus, what is needed is a reform of the power relations between these actors and the individuals through modified institutions that will ameliorate the individual's well-being.

To restructure the economic actors on the world stage, in view of the utilitarian doctrine discussed so far, it is clear they need democratizing. To improve accountability, transparency and appointment, as mentioned above, there needs to be an international-to-individual power relation that enforces or regulates the harms put upon the individuals because of this mismanagement. This will tend to produce an international system in favor of the individual's interests and character. In essence, what is needed is a utilitarian international ethological process that ties together the individual well-being with national or international well-being. Therefore, not only are the individual relations important for well-being but international relations become critical. The individual way of achieving this utilitarian reform will be discussed in the direct

reformation. The indirect route, however, can go either through the state or through alternative proxies. The former results when the state is lacking the sovereignty to challenge the dictate of these international actors. In the alternative route, individuals have begun to develop alternative proxies that coordinate through other international actors to put pressure on two sources: states and other international organizations (IOs). These can be found in the numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that express the interests of citizens who do not have a state-voice. These watchdog groups, e.g., Human Rights Watch, put pressure on other international organizations, such as the United Nations, to address problems that other IOs, such as the IMF, have done in their countries with their dictates and policies. They also put pressure on other states; most importantly, they put pressure on the more-developed countries who have a direct involvement with the IOs in question. These NGOs and their press releases increase transparency to the MDCs, changing the citizen's opinion or culture. This, in turn, puts pressure on reform of the non-democratic IOs that reflect the MDCs interests. While not ideal, this form of resolution is a start. Luckily, it does not stand alone.

The strengthening of state sovereignty aids the direct proxy of international-to-individual relations by improving the democratic functioning of international actors. The IMF and World Bank Group have supported certain policies and actions that LDCs, under these IOs jurisdiction, had to submit.[23] These sometimes led to crises, or made crises worse. In some cases, the changes brought improvements, but not sustainable improvements that later went awry, e.g., Argentina. Argentina provides an example of where outside involvement exacerbated the problem, and state-sovereignty, going its own route, resolved it.[24] It was through their own sovereign operation and refusal of IMF policy that they recovered their debt and stabilized their economy. The "East Asian Miracle" is also an example of non-IMF policy that resulted in such high growth rates that

they considered it a miracle to have happened.[25] Therefore, it is obvious that increasing the sovereignty is a more utilitarian way of improving the power relations between the world stage, the state and the individual, by removing the impediment that the international system was putting on individual flourishing. Granted, this form does not correct any domestic issues of state-to-individual relations, but that is not in question at this point.

Lastly, the indirect approach of improving the international-to-individual relation is through the institutional and policy mandates that are available or could be available. As already explained, democratizing the international system is a must to remove undemocratic impediments that inherently exist due to lack of transparency, accountability, etc. New avenues such as NGOs or using other IOs in a democratic fashion help this resolution; improving the problem that the IOs had over state sovereignty helps as well. New policies that reflect the interests of individuals are also required, however. These can be expressed through the state if there is a democratic state-to-individual relation. This might be absent, for example, if the people of the USA approved environmental protection policy like the Kyoto treaty, but the USA government does not sign it. That would be an obvious policy, or lack there of, counter to the interests of the individuals. Therefore, improving the state-to-individual relation through policies is a requirement for increasing individual opportunities. Alternatively, if there is a policy such as the Washington Consensus that is not enacted as designed, to alleviate poverty, then there is an obvious policy-to-action impediment that doesn't reflect the interests of the individual since it doesn't translate into the intended outcome. The policy as reflecting individual interests needs to be effective by actually translating into the intended outcomes. Furthermore, bad institutions can be removed entirely; leaving room for more direct liberal associations that can resolve or manage the issues. Institutions can be said to embody certain rules.[26] If these are rules of conduct

determined by the individuals, then the institution will embody their interests and can be a possible improvement to the international stage. Two issues arise from that, however. Firstly, they take a long time and such reform of the international system cannot be expected, as some development policies today presume, in a few years.[27] Secondly, they require democratic operation, due to the fact people's interests change over time, to avoid stagnation. Only through democratic operation can they dynamically adjust to meet the demands of their time and avoid the risk of evolving into a later international form of impediment to flourishing.

The indirect way of resolving poverty from the international system revolves around its mismanagement and lack of democracy. The economic factors are the primary issue in that route; resolving the economic issues of accountability and transparency remove the impediments to the individual's flourishing by giving them more democratic representation and control. Nevertheless, political and social factors need to be considered. The changing of customs, personal attitudes and political strength of the individual more directly, more liberally, resolves the impediments of the international-to-individual relation by strengthening the power of the individual themselves. There will be two ways of achieving this strengthening. The first is removing any barriers to individual interacting that they desire by giving them the right of free association. The second area reflects the democratic representation of the individual by giving them direct political power.

Free associations of people are a requirement for any society to get along. We live in a global community when concerning international relations. The right to free association has long been instilled in American culture. It is not so free in other parts of the world. Despotic governments certainly do not allow it. Even democratic societies may have cultural barriers that prevent them from associating with certain other groups. The utilitarian perspective of increasing liberties that

are desired would not necessarily suggest forcing cultural mixing. Nevertheless, globalization forces cultural blending upon many. Respecting these diverse changes requires letting people be as ethnocentric as they want, as long as it does not violate the harm principle. It also requires a government or society to allow its people to associate outside of narrow-cultural confines; people should be allowed to be different.[28] The most powerful of these free associations, however, are the allowance of organizations and foundations to be created and to express their ideas. The freedom of discourse and thought are central to the flourishing of any society.[29] Organizations like the Clinton Foundation or the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation represent individuals, with lots of money, pooling resources, peoples and ideas to improve the welfare of others. The freedom to associate also directs resources to individual organizations like Architecture for Humanity who strive to spread ideas and innovation to where it can best be utilized to enhance opportunities.[30] Thus, associations of individuals are a direct way of getting good things done by people with the means to get them done. It also puts direct relations between individuals so when bad things are done the individuals involved are on a more equal footing to resolve them. If harm is inflicted by such associations the state would have a right to put up a barrier against such harms. In either case, the analysis falls directly in the scope of the utilitarian doctrine consistently. In terms of removing poverty, it also directs people to be more aware and more involved in the welfare of their fellow human beings, enhancing our social responsibilities. It also represents a global identity when our actions and inactions can result in, or act as, an improvement to poverty as caused by international relations.

The last area of interest revolves around the international strength of the individual. As alluded to above, the freedom to associate inherently has the effect of strengthening the relations between individuals. This also initiates that cultural blending mentioned previously. The view

that international relations can be affected by culture and customs is called constructivism. This constructivism, then, is inherently compatible with utilitarianism, as Mill might see it. In the view of such international relations it also ties it to the indirect routes of alleviating poverty. International organizations, NGOs, institutions and policies are affected by culture. Therefore, strengthening the free association of individuals opens the door for exchanges in thought, ideas and political strength. It improves a missing factor of economic progress for the LDCs by opening the means, of technological and intellectual know-how, and it accomplishes, or extends, the effects that NGOs have on political and social culture, as was mentioned before. Thus, free association is a direct route of alleviating poverty by opening the opportunities of individuals through strengthening their ties with the rest of humanity. It removes barriers so the benefits of some are more equitably distributed. It provides the equal opportunities the utilitarian doctrine suggests.

The alleviation of poverty can be resolved in many ways. Largely, this is sought out in removing the impediments the international system has inherently adopted by its mismanagement of globalization. There is a divergence in political and economic advancement today. Economic means bring wealth and prosperity to some, but does not distribute it to others. This is found in the power relations of the individual to the international actors. The utilitarian philosophy identifies the individual, and their liberties, as the crux of resolving poverty, as being caused by the impeding of rights and opportunities of individuals by international relations. Primarily, international actors that weaken or destroy opportunities and interests of the individual are inflicting harm upon them. This can be resolved by exactly the opposite. Strengthening the individual in their international relations directly through free associations is essential. It can also translate into cultural constructivist changes in the international actors. Indirectly, changes in the

management, relations and institutions on the world stage can be considered too. Ultimately, the goal of resolving poverty is to improve individual flourishing. Mill clearly understood this when he said "[poverty] may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society combined with the good sense and providence of individuals."[31] The reformations laid out in this analysis derive directly from John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism. In short, the result of these reformations generates a global community of "self-governing people whose protection lay in their own initiative, supported by good laws."[32]

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Notes

[1] On this see Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), particularly chapters 4 and 5.

[2] See John Stuart Mill, "Book 6" in *A System of Logic (1843)*, (computer printout, California State University Sacramento, 2007), chapter 5. See also J. K. Whitaker "Review: John Stuart Mill's Methodology," *Journal of Political Economy* 83 no. 5 (1975):1030-1050. Whitaker deeply goes into the political economic implications of Mill's methodology, especially concerning the relation to character formation (p. 1038).

[3] One can substitute interests here since it is conceptually linked to these ends, as Mill, "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy" in *The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill*, edited by J. Troyer, 256-269 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003b), states "*Interest* surely conveys ... the idea of an end, to which the conduct is designed as the means."

[4] For more on this concept see Michael S. McPherson, "Mill's Moral Theory and the Problem of Preference Change," *Ethics* 92 no. 2 (1982):252-273. See Lanny Ebenstein, "Mill's Theory of Utility" *Philosophy* 60 no. 234 (1985):539-543, for a treatment on the quality of pleasure as being most sought in sympathetic affection (p. 540).

[5] John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in *The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill*, edited by J. Troyer, 150-247 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003a), p. 196.

[6] Mill, "On Liberty," p. 199. He states, "In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them."

[7] For more on this see Paula Struhl, "Mill's Notion of Social Responsibility," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37 no. 1 (1976):155-162.

[8] In regard to liberty, see Mill, "On Liberty," p. 158. Particularly, Mill states the harm principle as "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection." Symbolically we can identify the harm principle as "*b* can interfere with *a*'s liberty whenever *a* harms *b*."

$$HP: Hab \rightarrow Iba$$

The harm principle only provides an abstracted meta-ethical basis, to be determined through the ethological processes aligned with the liberty to discuss, etc., for what an actual harm entails. As argued above, when one's well-being, or flourishing, is illegitimately suspended by some other agent, then it is a direct violation of liberty and, thus, unethical; consequently, this provides a direct connection to HP: "if *b* is not flourishing because of *a*, then *a* harms *b*."

$$\sim Fba \rightarrow Hab$$

This constitutes the fundamental structure of the argument for this paper, and the ethical basis for those who are impoverished to change the international system to alleviate that problem.

[9] From the notation in footnote 8, *b* has the jurisdiction to interfere, possibly with the aid of others, or society in general, with *a*'s liberty since a has taken action, made choices or had interests in prohibiting the well-being of *b*, i.e., since Hab.

[10] This is not intended to be a false dichotomy, but the spectrum is between liberal and non-liberal operations of the government which despotism and democracy characterize the polemic differences well enough.

[11] I use the term interests synonymously with preferences or what one desires through the relevant ethological processes. For more see C. L. Ten "Mill on Self-Regarding Actions," *Philosophy* 43 no. 163 (1968):29-37. This notion is also espoused (p. 30). Recall, also, from footnote 3, that interests convey the ethological aims of the individual(s), and the conduct to achieve it.

[12] See John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 9th ed. (Connecticut: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 2003). Rourke relates international relations to a play where the international agents or entities are actors upon this international or world stage. For convenience, this terminology will be used as well.

[13] See Amartya Sen, "Chapter 4: Poverty as Capability Deprivation" in *Development as Freedom*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), pp. 87-110. In that chapter, Sen details the relative nature of income as only representing possible market opportunities, but many non-economic factors weigh into the equation to

determine how those opportunities translate into actual well-being, or welfare, for the individual or state. See also Robert B. Ekelund jr. "The New Political Economy of J. S. Mill: The Means to Social Justice," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 9, no. 2 (1976):213-231. This same notion is well known in Mill's view (p. 216). Ekelund provides a robust economical analysis of Mill's political economic theory under similar concepts espoused here.

[14] See Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2006), p. 9. Stiglitz identifies, extending from his previous book (Stiglitz, 2003), that the mismanagement of globalization has led to many problems we have today in the developing countries. The book's focus is on how that correction must transpire.

[15] Thanks to professor Bellon for illuminating this important fact.

[16] See Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002) pp. 54-68. Chang indicates the importance "poaching" had as a protectionist activity of historically developing countries. Today those kinds of things go tandem with copyright and property laws, which may or may not exist in some nations; not to mention the question of effectively enforcing them arises.

[17] The right to want extends from the harm principle morally guaranteeing that they ought to be provided the opportunities they otherwise would have if these opportunities have become deprived by some other agent. Right, in this manner comes directly from Mill's translation of it: "When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by force of law or by that of education and opinion." (2003c, p. 137)

[18] See Sen, "Development as Freedom," pp. 21-4.

[19] This is not to say these avenues are disjoint. In fact, it will be shown that they are all interrelated.

[20] Stiglitz, "Making Globalization Work," p. 4.

[21] Ibid, p. 21

[22] See Stiglitz, "Globalization and its Discontents," particularly chapters 4 and 5 address the issue of the 1990s financial crisis.

[23] These are often required if they want to get the IMF's stamp of approval for stability so direct foreign investment and loans will increase capital flows into the country and support growth. These often require Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which may require liberalizing markets they may not have reason or the desire to do, and, in fact, have been shown to make things worse in some cases. In other cases, countries rejected these proposals and, through their own savings and investments, came out with higher growth than could have possibly been done or projected by the IMF. For more on that see the "East Asian Miracle" discussed later and in footnote 25.

[24] See Stiglitz, "Making Globalization Work," p. 220-25.

[25] See Stiglitz, "Globalization and its Discontents," p. 91. This does not indicate everything was a success; merely, economic growth happened at such great rates under conditions not expected to be conducive to that growth; it was a "miracle" for being outside of what could have been forecasted or analyzed. Corruption still exists in these changing nations, partly because of political issues. As well, there is a problem of inequitable distribution of the wealth in this growth; whereby, the fruits often go toward select groups such as previous dictatorships or mafia leaders -- an example of "crony capitalism." See, also, Stiglitz, "Globalization and its Discontents," chapter 5 for another example of how structural and political problems lead to economic changes not bearing on the individual's interests.

[26] Chang, "Kicking Away the Ladder," p. 126.

[27] Ibid.

[28] This eccentricity is justified, essentially, along the same grounds discussed in footnote 6. See Mill, "On Liberty," p. 199.

[29] See Mill, "On Liberty," Chapter 2, pp. 162-93.

[30] I first discovered this organization at a video presentation on http://www.ted.com as co-founder Cameron Sinclair won a Ted Prize for his talk on "open-source architecture." For more, see http://www.architectureforhumanity.org/

[31] Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 106.

[32] Elynor G. Davis, "Mill, Socialism and the English Romantics: An Interpretation," *Economica* n.s. 52 no. 207 (1985):352.