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March 6, 1997
Dear President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, and Members of Congress:
We are writing out of profound concern that the continued stationing of the United States 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa poses serious risks to the interests and security of our nation. Our conclusion is the result of an intensive study of military, political, and economic issues, and an ongoing survey of public opinion in Japan and the United States. We have concluded that (1) this Marine division is not needed in Okinawa to maintain national security, to defend Japan, or to foster stability in the region; and (2) its continued deployment in Okinawa has negative effects on Japan's governing coalition-pro-American and supportive of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty-which endanger the Security Treaty and our overall relations with that country.
The recent series of ugly incidents involving Marines in Okinawa, including the 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl, the accidental dumping of a 1,000 pound bomb off the main port, and the mistaken firing of 1,520 uranium-cased shells in nearby waters, represent only the tip of an iceberg that threatens to chill our relations with a vital ally. Resentment in Japan is fueled by other crimes involving Marines in Okinawa, frequent vehicle and helicopter accidents, traffic tie-ups caused by convoys, constant noise from Marine aircraft that disturbs local residents and interrupts classes in public schools, live-fire artillery drills that cause fires on the outskirts of villages as well as other environmental damage, and the continued occupation of vast areas of land in this small island prefecture by 3rd Marine Division bases and exercise areas.
Below is a summary of responses, based on our research, to the three most commonly stated reasons for the continued deployment of the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa:
(1.) This lightly equipped and largely untransportable division cannot possibly function in a crisis as the "quick-reaction force" it is often advertised to be. The United States Navy does not have in-theater sealift capacity to move this division from Okinawa to "forward areas" such as South Korea or the Middle East. During an emergency in Korea or the Middle East, most of the Marines in Okinawa today would be left stranded there as troops in exile. A realistic compromise would be to retain the 31st MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit) of approximately 2,000 personnel in Okinawa and move the other Marine units to Hawaii or Guam.
(2.) With strong and healthy allies in East Asia, the 3rd Marine Division is not needed and does not function to deter potential adversaries from military adventures. Since Russia and China have opened diplomatic relations with South Korea, North Korea has become virtually isolated and is on the verge of economic collapse. South Korea's GNP is almost twenty times larger than the North's and its population is twice as large. Contrary to widespread perceptions in the United States, Chinese conventional military power is declining. The numbers of China's combat aircraft, submarines, surface ships, and army personnel have all decreased in recent years, and the obsolescence of its equipment is obvious. Some modernization of forces has been attempted, but the pace has been slower than that of Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan. For example, since the early 1990s China has imported only 48 Su-27 fighter aircraft from Russia, but it must soon retire some 4,500 old fighters, mostly MiG17s, MiG19s, and MiG21s. The two "Kilo class" submarines China purchased from Russia cannot possibly replace 60 obsolete submarines in their fleet. Increasing fiscal deficits and lack of central authority in China, even over local military commanders, are continuing obstacles to this modernization program.
(3.) The financial support provided by the Japanese government for maintaining the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa is increasingly resented by Japanese taxpayers, especially in Okinawa, and does not justify its continued deployment there. Public opinion surveys indicate that about two-thirds of the Japanese people want to maintain the U.S-Japan Security Treaty, but approximately the same proportion want the U.S. military presence reduced. A poll conducted by the newspaper Asahi Shimbun and published on May 15, 1996, indicated 70% favoring the alliance and 69% wanting U.S. bases reduced. The Governor of Hawaii and the Congressman from Guam have both expressed their desire to host the Marines in their localities. One regiment of the 3rd Marine Division is already stationed in Hawaii, though the divisional headquarters is in Okinawa. Moving the headquarters, the one infantry regiment, and one artillery battalion from Okinawa to Hawaii would improve the overall command and control structure of the 3rd Marine Division. The Governor of Okinawa has offered to help finance any redeployment to Hawaii or Guam.
Lacking a rationale for its continued deployment, the problems associated with the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa put the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at risk, threatening the maintenance of truly vital military facilities in Japan, such as the ports for American Naval vessels at Yokosuka and Sasebo.The situation is particularly urgent now as resentment of the continuing presence of Marines in Okinawa is complicating the Japanese government's efforts to extend the law which permits U.S. bases on Japanese soil. Some 3,000 leases concluded under the current law expire May 14 on land which includes military runways at Kadena Air Force Base, the largest and busiest U.S. air base in Asia, and portions of eleven other U.S. installations in Okinawa. With landowners refusing voluntarily to renew their leases in protest, a political crisis is looming that threatens maintenance of U.S. bases, and could bring a coalition to power in Tokyo less favorably disposed to the Security Treaty and less friendly to U.S. interests generally. Current leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties have indicated that a U.S. commitment to withdraw Marines from Okinawa would make it possible for them to support an extension of the lease law needed to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. We strongly urge you to support redeployment of the 3rd Marine Division from Okinawa.
Respectfully,
Dr. K. Amemiya, Del Mar, California
Japan Policy Research Institute
Dr. Hans Baerwald, Blue Oaks Ranch, California Professor Emeritus, Japanese
Politics, UCLA
Dr. Herbert P. Bix, Boston Massachusetts Lecturer, Japanese History,
Harvard University
Dr. Bruce Cumings, Evanston, Illinois
Director, Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern
University
Dr. Norma Field, Chicago, Illinois
Professor of East Asian Languages & Civilizations, University of Chicago
Dr. Andrew Gordon, Cambridge, Massachusetts Reischauer Institute of
Japanese Studies, Harvard University
Dr. Margaret McKeon, Durham, North Carolina Professor of Political Science,
Duke University
Dr. Michael Mochizuki, Washington D.C.
Brookings Institution
Dr. Michael Molasky, New London, Connecticut Professor of Japanese,
Connecticut College
Mr. Richard W. Ormsby, Chicago, Illinois President, Ormsby International,
Veteran, 3rd Marine Division (Okinawa)
Dr. Steve Rabson, Providence, Rhode Island Professor of Japanese, Brown
University
Mr. Patrick Smith, Norfolk, Connecticut
Author of Japan: A Reinterpretation (1997)
Dr. Koji Taira, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois Professor of Economics,
University of Illinois
Dr. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Evanston, Illinois Professor of Political
Science, Northwestern University
Chalmers Johnson
President, Japan Policy Research Institute E-mail: cjohnson@ucsd.edu
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