Copyright 1996 by OKAMOTO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: Preferred Citation:Maj.Dan K. Carpenter, "U.S. Marines a Force for good on Okinawa," Special Column on the Okinawa's U.S.Bases : First of the Series (May-June, 1997)




U.S. Marines a Force for good on Okinawa

-- Yes! The U.S. Marines have good reasons
for their forward-basing there.--


Maj. Dan K. Carpenter


As a regular reader of The Japan Times, I have come to view the intermittent articles by Chalmers Johnson as mere recasting of the same opinions in slightly different packaging -- like last year's car engine with a new body over it. As a result, I thought it appropriate to offer readers the viewpoint of a U.S. Marine who has served in Okinawa and watched events evolve through the years.

First, I would fully agree that Okinawans have borne a disproportionate share of the burden of housing U.S. forces in Japan. Unlike Johnson, who uses words like "empty promise" and "cosmetic," we feel that the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, agreed to by the governments of Japan and the United States, is movement in the correct direction. The marines who are involved in the definition of requirements for Futenma Air Station's replacement take their assignment seriously. The time and money we are spending in this effort are indicators of our sincerity. Additionally, we are working hard to implement the other findings of the final report.

That said, the U.S. Marines on Okinawa remain a target for those who say our presence has outlived the Cold War. Let me explain why we, and many of our Pacific neighbors, think we need to be here.

(1) The possible major regional contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Marines forward-based in Okinawa have several missions to perform in support of war plans/contingencies involving the peninsula, and we would respond via a variety of transportation modes within hours.

(2)Crisis response and crisis management. We maintain a force capable of rapid response to lesser regional conflicts, noncombatant evacuation operations and military operations other than war. The ability to respond results not only from location, but also from situational and strategic awareness. These two things are easier to obtain when you live near the crisis.

(3)As the command element of a joint task force for humanitarian assistance or disaster relief contingency for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.Due to our strategic location, we stand ready to respond rapidly anywhere in the region in case of natural disaster or emergency to lend medical aid, equipment, food, shelter and security assistance to a nation in need. We have previously responded to disasters in Bangladesh, the Philippines and Kobe, and earlier this year we provided humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees housed temporarily in Guam.

(4)Peacetime engagement with our Pacific neighbors and allies.By actively participating with them we have created a network of cooperative existence that will help ensure peace and stability in the region for years to come. Our forward presence enables us to participate in some 70 exercises each year in order to exchange military training, and conduct humanitarian and medical assistance.

This presence in the region is made timely by our forward positioning in Okinawa and affordable through our partnership with Japan. With the U.S. providing the forces and the costs to train and maintain them, and Japan providing marines the training area and support infrastructure (at an estimated cost of at $11.5 billion), the partnership has served each party's interests well.

Active participation in the region has positioned us to be at trusted neighbor and honest broker for many countries who do not have relationships that would allow them to deal with each other outside of conflict. In the Pacific, the U.S. has become, as Cameron Barr wrote in the Christian Science Monitor, "the hub at the center of the wheel," a reference to the fact that many nations, the spokes of the wheel, have bilateral relationships with the U.S., the hub. Unlike Europe and its multilateral security arrangement, Pacific nations are prevented by the historical animosity that persists among them from forming such a collective military alliance.

Historically, Northeast Asia has been an area where great power interests have sharply clashed -- unfortunately, the evolving present and an uncertain future promise no escape from the historical backdrop. Until a regional dialogue is established that will address long-term security challenges in Northeast Asia, the U.S. Marines in Okinawa remain poised to respond to global security contingencies in the Pacific, the Middle East and elsewhere. Our presence here helps provide deterrence to military options any nation in the region might consider to resolve a dispute and has substantially contributed to stability.

Asia, remains an area of uncertainty, tension and immense concentrations of military power. Many of the largest armies in the world are in Asia and the Pacific, including those of nuclear power states. Three major Pacific powers -- the U.S., Russia and China -- are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Prudent powers will consider this history before making significant changes in regional security arrangements.

There will be inevitable adjustments between our two countries as situations evolve and requirements change. The first step toward reforming the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty, as outlined by Johnson, proposes an approach that ignores the wisdom of long-term, strategic planning. His is a knee-jerk solution to a situation that runs deeper than local issues; issues that we are already discussing with national and local authorities as we work to implement the decisions of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa.

Johnson often writes on the issues of discipline and behavior. Although the vast majority of marines show a positive image of Americans when they go off base, Marine Corps leadership has focused command attention on reducing further the already small number of occurrences of unacceptable behavior outside the gates. Incidents in the local community have been on the decline for many years. Forty thousand marines have rotated through Okinawa since the reprehensible event that occurred in September of 1995. In that period, there have been only two serious incidents: a tragic auto accident that caused the death of three Okinawans and a convenience store robbery.

We are quite aware that, although we are invited guests of the government of Japan, a continuing dialogue that seeks to understand Okinawan desires and needs is very important to our continued presence on Okinawa. Wisdom will be needed as our two countries discuss ways to maintain the advantages of forward-basing marines while actively considering the legitimate concerns of the Okinawan people. We are an active part of that dialogue.


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