Every day new evidence reveals that there is no "Okinawa Problem," only a Tokyo and a Washington problem. Japanese and American political leaders could solve the so-called "Okinawa Problem" overnight if they had the will or courage to do so. Yukio Okamoto, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's kagemusha for dealing with the Okinawa problem, would then not have to keep pretending that he is "searching for solutions"; and Vice President Al Gore would no longer have to embarrass himself and his country by saying to the press in Tokyo that the U.S. is "sensitive" to the problems arising from the massive U.S. military presence in Okinawa.

All that is required for the Japanese government would be to start to move Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Kinser, Camp Butler, Camp Foster, Camp Lester, Camp Shields, camp McTureous, Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab (i.e., the main U.S. Marine bases on Okinawa) to somewhere in Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku or Hokkaido. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty only requires that the Japanese government allocate land for U.S. military bases in Japan, not just or particularly in Okinawa.

Moreover, by moving these bases to, say, Prime Minister Hashimoto's constituency in Okayama, Japan would greatly strengthen the alliance. The U.S. might start to believe that the Japanese are sincere allies. As it is, they distrust the Japanese because they know that the Japanese government has concentrated the bases in a place that for over a century Japan has looked down on and exploited -- an area that is as far from Tokyo as possible and still in Japan and where the bases do not disturb the lives of mainstream LDP voters.

On the other hand, the U.S. government could just as easily end the Okinawa problem by moving some of its marines back to its own country. They are not needed in Okinawa, which is unlikely ever again to be a scene of conflict, and they are irrelevant to China, which is simply not susceptible to a military challenge by ground forces. The marines on Okinawa could make no difference in Korea, where much larger and better equipped U.S. forces are already based, even if the means to get them there existed. Actually, the U.S. does not have the sealift capacity to move the Okinawa-based marines to any actual combat area. In any case, according to U.S. intelligence, North Korea no longer has either the food or the fuel to launch a military campaign that would last longer than a day.

The gore-Hashimoto meeting displayed the real, underlying problem. Gore said that Washington would not even consider cutting the numbers of the marines in Okinawa, and Prime Minister hashimoto replied that he welcomed that decision and would try to enact a law that perpetuated the status quo in Okinawa indefinitely. Gore and hashimoto thus declared to the Okinawan people that they should not look for relief to the governments that make decisions about their fate without consulting them in any way.

Under these circumstances, there is nothing the Japanese and the U.S. people can do except wait for the inevitable incident that will inflame the situation and compel their political leaders to act somewhat more responsibly. It may be an airplane crash into a school or hospital, revelation that the U.S. espionage units in Okinawa are directed primarily against japan itself, more vicious sexual attacks by U.S. servicemen on Okinawan women, an environmental catastrophe, an uprising by exasperated Okinawans against the foreigners in their midst or something else we cannot imagine. But we know such an incident will occur.

In just the past few weeks, the U.S. accidentally dropped a bomb into Naha's main shipping channel, leaked a large quantity of PCB pollutants at Camp Zukeran and fired over 1,500 depleted-uranium bullets into an Okinawan firing range in violation of their own regulations. It is only a matter of time until the next big incident discredits the Japanese and U.S. governments and forces remedial action under crisis circumstances.

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