Interior of the Toshbi Khana-Red Fort, Agra ………… ..................................Cover
 
 

                Figure 1: Madonna and Child ……………………………………………..…... p. 12
 
 

                Figure 2: Mihrab of Maydan Mosque …………….………………………...... p. 17
 
 

                Figure 3: Bihzad in the Garden ………………………....…………..............… p. 18
 
 

                Figure 4: The Temptation ………………….....…………………………….… p. 19
 

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                Figure 5: From Khamseh of Amir Khusrau ………………………..............… back

The purpose of this paper is not to judge certain views or social outlooks as immoral or iniquitous, but rather to explore the divergence between the Quranic explanation of shirk and the social usage and manifestations of this principle within traditional Muslim societies. In order to achieve this end, this paper will focus on two case studies within whose context shirk is applied.

Case Study I: Sufism:

Within the Islamic context, there exists a dichotomy between the roles of the Sufi Mystics and the jurists and proponents of kalam. The Sufis look at the inward, esoteric and possibly metaphorical meanings, while the jurists look at the outward meaning with an exoteric perspective. The Sufis being "spiritualizing and non-dogmatic mystics, while the jurists are literal minded and dogmatic legalists." The implications of this dichotomy within this paper are of great importance. The creation of this dichotomy can be traced back to the split between oneness and manyness; the diverging interpretations of tawhid and its applications and shirk. However, before one can interpret and elucidate this dichotomy, the question of what Sufism is must first be addressed. This question carries within it, its own complexities. Sufism is generally accepted as the name for Islamic mysticism as a whole. Although mysticism and its definitions are widely available, these definitions do not explain the whole of what it is. These aspects can only be explained through gnosis, the wisdom of the heart. "A spiritual experience is that depends upon neither sensual no rational methods is needed." Once on this spiritual experience, the seeker, having set forth on the ‘Path’, towards this Last Reality, will be lead by the inner light that becomes stronger and he frees himself from the worldly attachments and material culture. After a long period of purification, he will reach the maqam (station) of illumination where he will be endowed with gnosis and love. From this maqam he may be able to reach the last of the maqamat, the last goal of the mythical quest, the mystical union.

It is this contention that led to the execution of Mansur Al-Hallaj. Hallaj was executed for uttering the infamous words "Ana’l Haqq", traditionally meaning I am the Reality/Truth. He was pronounced a heretic and was said to have associated himself with the Absolute Reality, Allah. However, a cursory glance at the material is not sufficient. One must delve deeper into Hallaj’s own personality and his ideology behind this utterance. The concept of tawhid, a central concept in any sect of Islam seems to be neglected. However, it is quiet the contrary; Hallaj, and other Sufis alike, has merely internalized this concept. The oneness of God, found asserted within the Quran is coupled with other verses of the Quran that reveal God to be closer than even ones own heart.
 
 

Using these ayat together, the Sufi mind sees God even closer than ones own person. The heart, that is seen is the innermost seat of a man’s affections, secrets and desires, is no barrier for God. These ayat used with the Sufi ideology that God himself is everywhere and encompasses everything can be seen to hold that Hallaj’s words of "Ana’l Haqq" had much more of a sentiment behind them than they were attributed. He was seen by most as a pantheist for a large duration of time. However, recently, he has been regarded in light of his own work through Louis Masignon’s work that shows that the previous views were entirely erroneous and did not correspond with Hallaj’s own writings.

According to Hallaj, while discussing tawhid, "the first step is the annihilation of separation, (tafrid), so that in unity (wahdaniyyat) one affirms nothing other than God." Any thought other than of God becomes a veil and hence an imperfection, an impediment to unity. One is veiled by one’s thought, not by God. Hence, the path is concentration of thought on god alone—to the point of knowing only God and nothing of oneself. The principles of fana and baqa, "annihilation and extinction" and "everlasting life, duration" are fundamental to this concept of tawhid and Hallaj’s ideology surrounding his actions. Fana and baqa as a correlating principle itself is found to be problematic. Many jurists have found that the principle of fana and baqa allows for shirk as it in itself is a means to annihilate and connect to the divine being. However, here it seems that fana is being confused with ittihad, "union". This is a term that presupposes the "existence of two independent beings and has, therefore been regarded as heretic, as has hulul, "indwelling", which means the incarnation of the divine in man." The jurist see Hallaj and other Sufis as accepting this concept. However, fana is "the nullification of the mystic in the divine presence." It is imperative to note the distinction between these two principles. Hulul is the direct association of the divine and man; fana is merely losing oneself in the divine. As with most concepts within Sufism, this idea is best explained through metaphors.

Additionally, in regards to the argument of Halaj’s proclamation of Ana’l Haqq being blasphemous, one finds another point of contention within Hallaj’s own writings. Opponents argue that Al-Haqq is the Absolute, Allah. However in the "Tawasin", Hallaj defines his concept of Al-Haqq. "The Truth (Al-Haqq) itself is none other than the abode of Allah not essentially Allah." Here one finds the discrepancy that condemns Hallaj. He views Al-Haqq as not essentially Allah, where as the jurist view it as Allah. Using Hallaj’s own definition, one finds that by saying Ana’l Haqq, he was merely asserting that he was an abode of Allah; that Allah could be found with him, not that he was Allah. As cited before from the Quran, Allah is even closer than one’s jugular vein and all encompassing. Hence, saying that Allah encompassed him and thus, could be found within him, should pose no threat.

Hallaj’s proclamation of Ana’l Haqq, although seeming blasphemous, can be explained with a deeper look into his ideology. Similarly, the Sufi concept that evokes harsh feelings by the jurists can, under a different light, be seen as a different way to experience God. According to Sufi thought, one does not know God merely through reading and other people, but rather through a personal experience. The jurists feel that the religion is explained in the best manner possible through the words of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet. The Sufis do not doubt that the words are the best possible, but a personal experience for them is the best way of really knowing the religion and God. Each view is simply a different interpretation of the practice of religion.

Case Study II: Islamic Art

Islamic art is fundamentally derived from tawhid. More correctly, from "an assent to or contemplation of Divine Unity. The essence of tawhid is beyond words." But this essence is revealed in the Quran through sudden flashes. Just as with Sufi principles, within all of Islamic art, one finds the coupling of ideas, principles, light and shade, geometry, and symmetry; a constant balancing of the negative with the positive and vice versa. Possibly for this reason, one cannot talk about tawhid, without shirk even within the context of Islamic art.

The problem of shirk within art, is complex, even though there is much material present about the Islamic attitude towards the arts. However, encyclopedias and general works on art history "simply assert that, for a variety of reasons which are rarely explored, Islam was theologically opposed to the representation of living beings." It is this assertion that is the focus of this study. Many jurists have argued that the representation of any living being is against Islamic law, and that by depicting these beings, one supposes oneself to be the Creator. Following the argument on these lines, the presupposition leads the artist to associate himself with Allah, thereby condemning himself as a mushrik. However, the very citation within the Quranic text that supposedly prove that one should not replicate living beings, can be used against the jurists very own arguments.

Extending the meaning within these passages, opponents used them to reject the representation of living beings.

These ayat have been used to further the presupposition that representation (specifically statues or figures) is unlawful within Islamic doctrine. It is important to note that although the artist is criticized, the artwork itself is not. The artist is the one that is questioned and labeled a mushrik. As such, the artist that created the "Madonna and Child" (figure 1) within one lacquer paintings in a private house in Aleppo would be condemned by this view but the art would not be affected. The debate of these

Since it is fairly well known in academic circles, that the Quran itself "contains no prohibition of such representations, the undeniable denunciation of the artists
 
 

 Figure 1: This image is "Madonna and Child", a detail of one lacquer paintings on the wall of a reception room of a private house in Aleppo (Syria), dated 1600-1603.

and of representations found in many traditions about the life of the Prophet are taken as a genuine expressions of an original Muslim attitude." However, it is imperative to note that although these attitudes exist, they are not derived from the Quranic text itself. They are traditions that maybe derived from the culture within which Islam was introduced, the social conditions and circumstance surrounding the advent of this ideology. This prohibition was not a central or immediate concern of the Muslims at the advent of Islam. It developed later, and the presupposed prohibition actually seems to be aided by the contemporaneous rise of Islam and the Byzantine iconoclasm, that "also led to a consideration of the political aspects of a presumed Muslim prohibition." This fear of iconoclasm is also apparent in the view of the majority of Muslims on the Shi’i alum. These alum are intricate designed metal crafts that are viewed by some scholars as Shi’i art as well. However, the majority of Muslims, unfamiliar with the Shi’i ideology, view the alum to be an object of worship. However, they are, within the Shi’i context, not used as idols, but as a representation of the flag used in the time of the Prophet and his family. Regardless of the context, many Muslims view the ritual of the majalis and taziyana as shirk because they view the use of the alum as parallel to idolatry. Additionally, the argument has been made that since it is art and a representation of sorts, it too is impermissible by the very ayat that do not allow representation in any art. These ayat as translated show the use of the Arabic words of al-ansab and al-asnam; these two words, although in some translation represent the word statue, in fact are translated more correctly as representations, statues or paintings, used for worship. The principle of intention then comes into play, as within any context within which there may exists an ambiguity. The intention of the artist or the admirer is something that cannot be ascertained by the jurists or the admirers, either opponents or advocates of representation within art. The judgement is God’s alone.

From the onset of this paper, it has been made clear that the purpose is not to judge any view as immoral or iniquitous. Within the Islamic context, judgements are reserved for Allah alone, since he is the best judge, he is the all knowing, and only he knows what is in the hearts of man. Making judgements, such as saying someone has committed shirk and is thus destined to hell, is only God’s right. Quranic support for this claim can be found in Surah 2: Al-Baqarah.

These ayat reflect the notion that one is not supposed to judge the afterlife of others. One is not supposed to make any judgement on someone else’s afterlife, because by judging one not only circumvents this aya, but in the process also, associates oneself with God. He is the only one capable to judge anyone. By judging someone, one would in essence, give oneself the status of God. Precisely for this reason, one can not judge another without fearing worse a reprimand for oneself.

Although there is no precise Quranic explicit definition of shirk, there is the implied definition explaining it as association of anything with God. The social presuppositions and usage of this sentiment, however, do seem to differ from the Quranic nature of the concept. As we see within both case studies, although the rationalizing ideologies behind each study could be found to differ from those adopted by the main stream Muslim society, there still existed cultural and social mores that condemned an actor as a mushrik. The implications for the mushrik, however severe are ignored, for the allowance of social and traditional hypothesis’s to have precedence over religious ethics. The debate is abandoned in favor of maintaining the social values, and against renewing discussion or re-establishing Quranic ideals.

Figure 2: This image is the Mihrab, made entirely in luster faience, from the Maydan Mosque in Kashan, dated 1226 and signed Hasan ibn ‘Arabshah an-Naqqash. It is a classic example of indisputable Islamic art.

Figure 3: Junaid. Bihzad in the Garden. Miniture from a manuscript of Khwaju Kirmani dated 1396. This piece shows the debated depictions of living beings.
 
 

Figure 4: Miniture from Chronology of Ancient People of al-Biruni, showing the Temptation. Manuscript dated 1307. Tabriz. This piece serves as a further illustration of the debated concept of not only depicting living beings, but also depicting religious beings; both Adam and Eve are represented here showing the traditional scene of the temptation.

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