When debating issues of nonviolence and principled pacifism, it is often framed in terms of State power. In essense, the debate is not as much about pacifism as it is about the morality or immorality of the State. Those arguing against pacifism from this perspective do so with the mind to maintain the State as it presently exists, to keep the status quo and increase the State's prosperity and security. They are enfranchized into the State and argue for its defense. This considerably weakens their argument as the majority of principled pacifists would not share this perspective. They would argue that if the State requires violence, then that delegitimizes the State.

Thus, Ward Chuchill's essay Pacifism as Pathology forms a far more potent and important critique. This text approaches the subject of nonviolence from a leftist radical revolutionary perspective, which shares the same fundamental assumption of leftist radical pacifism politics: that the State is an inherently oppressive institution which obstructs justice. The question Churchill poses is how we ought to orient our stuggle against the State. Shall it be a pacifist struggle, undermining the State with its dialectic opposite of grassroots nonviolent building of alternative models of community, or shall it be the violent overthrow of the State, meeting its violence with comprable violence?

In discussing Mike Ryan's epilogal essay "On Ward Churchill's 'Pacifism as Pathology'," defending his views, Churchill notes that "the 'other side' of the question not only never produced a publishable - or even coherent - text in response..." [26] This inevitably begs the challenge, which I am here taking up. This is not meant to be an exhaustive critique of the essay, but more of a cursory examination of Churchill's main points and evidences. This critique will be offered from a Christian pacifist perspective, which will indeed figure significantly later on.

If no one has been able to draft a coherent response to the core arguement that Churchill makes, I might suggest that it is because they orient themselves wrongly in relation to it. He also makes the claim "more than a dozen leading proponents of nonviolence comitted themselves at various times between 1986 and 1991 to producing point-by-point written rebuttals for publication. Not one delivered." [28] If this is so, then their inability to do so may be exacty because they tried to do so. Many of Churchill's arguments from history and Western activist misuse, misinterpretation or denial of it demonstrate adequately the ambiguity of the issues involved.

However, the core of the essay is a series of criticisms, not of principled pacifism in itself, but of a particular model of "pacifism" prevalent in the Western activist community. Feeling their conscience twinged by Churchill's admonitions, many pacifist thinkers may seek to defend themselves from his charges. A more useful approach may be to accept his argument and repent of it, allowing it to be an indictment and a caution against that model of "pacifism".

The bulk of the text is spent making the argument that "American activism has not been the truly pacifist formulation, 'How can we forge a revolutionary politics within which we can avoid inflicting violence on others?' On the contrary, a more accurate guiding question has been, 'What sort of politics might I engage in which will both allow me to posture as a progressive and allow me to avoid incurring harm to myself?'" [49, emphasis his] Churchill identifies this as the "politics of the comfort zone" [49] in which "Pacifists, no less than their unpacifist counterparts, are quite aware that violence already exists as an integral component in the execution of state policies and requires no provocation... What is at issue then cannot be a valid attempt to stave off or even minimize violence per se. Instead, it can only be a conscious effort not to refocus state violence in such a way that it would directly impact American pacifists themselves. This is true even when it can be shown that the tactics which could trigger such a refocusing might in themselves alleviate a real measure of the much more massive state-inflicted violence occuring elsewhere..." [61, emphasis his]

This may appear to be a pithy response to a 100-page essay, but really it is all that is required. Churchill criticizes that Western pacifist practice is dominated by an unwillingness to commit to direct action because it would refocus State violence against themselves. Therefore, Western pacifists should be willing to commit to direct action and refocus state violence upon themselves. Thank you, Mr. Churchill, for reminding us of this.

Hereafter, pacifism may not be regarded as pathological, but rather, tactical within the framework of pacifist principles. He makes the argument in favour of tactical discretion - when to use violent means and when to use nonviolent means - so this much is acknowledged. Now we may simply return to the admitedly genuine pacifist question "How can we forge a revolutionary politics within which we can avoid inflicting violence on others?" One's level and timing of involvement becomes a tactical gauging of usefulness, viability and opportunity.

Churchill does make the argument that pacifism, both real and this varity of Western pacifism, is a pathology however. This discussion of pacifism's pathological characteristics is perhaps the weakest and pettiest part of his argument, filled with assumptions that are philosophical or theological in nature, and often self-serving and self-congratulatory. He begins his discussion with a state of pacifism's inherent religiousity: "The 'blind faith' obstinacy inherent in this position is thus not immediately open to pragmatic, or even empirical, consideration. It might be more properly categorized within the sphere of theological inquiry... - and, indeed, many variants of pacifist dogma acknowledge strong links to an array of sects and denominations - were it not that pacifism asserts itself (generically) not only as a functional aspect of 'the real world,' but as a praxis capable of engendering revolutionary social transformation. Its basic irratonalities must therefore be taken, on their face, as seriously intended to supplant reality itself." [77-78]

This sort of argument is not unique to Churchill, for many have made it in regards to many different issues. Essentially what it is saying is that religion denies the "real world" and thus is false, delusional and dangerous. In the Christian context, the accusation would run "following whatever Jesus taught about pacifism is insanity since there is no God to become incarnate and people don't just stop being dead. That's not the real world."

This is itself a theological inquiry, however. The basic claim of any religion is that the "real world" is not in itself "real", but in some way or other a construct that alienates us from the "really real" world. That a person does not believe that this "Ultimate Reality" exists is itself part of the alienating construct, the assent to which and defense of amounts to a fundamental preference for the status quo, regardless of liberal intentions. It is, as Saint Paul says, to "conform oneself to the standards of the world." [Romans 12:1-2]

Churchill condemns this "fusion of spiritualist impetus with political articulation/practice" by its "central belief that objective conditions (i.e., reality) can be altered by an act of 'will' (individual or collective)." [78] In terms of scientific facts, this would indeed be a strong condemnation. But in regards to something as relatively pliable as human action and intent, one person's reality is another person's alienating construct: the "reality" of violence is itself maintained by an act of will on the part of those involved. Theologically speaking from a Christian perspective, it is this very human willfulness that keeps us from the objective reality of Creation's internal unity and its unity with the Creator. What Christianity, and Christian pacifism specifically, seeks is a universal change of human will.

The first of Churchill's criteria of pathology is that pacifism is delusional. In his words: "This symptom is marked by a range of indicators, for example, insistence that reform or adjustment of given state policies constitutes a 'revolutionary agenda', insistence that holding candelight vigils and walking down the street constitute 'acts of solidarity' with those engaged in armed sturggle, or - despite facts to the contrary - that such things as 'the nonviolent deconolonization of India'... actually occurred." [79]

I should like to take up this last point, as a matter of defense. The traditional interpretation is that India accheived independence by the nonviolent movement of Gandhi. Churchill refutes this, stating that the movement "exhibits characteristics of a calculated strategy of nonviolence salvaged only the existence of violent peripheral processes." [41] To clarify: "Prior to the decimation of British troop strength and the virtual bankruptcy of the Imperial treasury during World War II, Gandhi's movement showed little liklihood of forcing England's abandonment of India." [42] This strikes Churchill as reason enough to consider the narrative of India's nonviolent independence to be delusional.

But here, as later in the text, Churchill himself neglects sensitivity to the means of certain ends, or the ends of certain means. Specifically, he is forgetting the important distinction to be made between intentional and contextual forces... What the activists set out to accomplish and the incidental historical circumstances that allow them to accomplish it. It is true that, had the British been able to apply their full military and economic power against Gandhi, his movement may have failed. But the reason they could not was the decimation they received at the hands of the Nazis. If "violent peripheral processes" stand as a justification for violent revolution, does that in turn make Adolf Hitler a great humanitarian for his service to the Indian independence movement?

And now the snake starts eating its own tail. Let us look at another example that Churchill doesn't mention: the early Christian church in the Roman Empire. If we look at context, the violent peripheral processes, then we might suggest that Christianity succeeded as a nonviolent socially transformative movement exactly because the Rome was a violent military superpower, even as Rome applied this power against the Christians themselves. It is ofted cited that without the extended communications network created by the Empire as it conquered everything from northwestern Europe to northern Africa to the Middle East, Christianity would have found it difficult to spread its message. In fact, it was the Roman occupation of Palestine which precipitated the conditions under which Jesus was born and the Roman razing of the Temple in 70AD that proved indispensible to Jewish interest in the sect. Do these violent peripheral processes which allowed for the spread of Christianity then legitimize the very violence which the Christians eschewed?

Or to return to Hitler, the Holocaust and persistant European anti-semitism set up the conditions which allowed for the creation of Israel. Should Hitler then be lauded twice over as a great humanitarian, once for decimating the British and once for decimating Jews, given what should rise out of the ashes of his deeds? I should hope that Churchill is not arguing that point, though he certainly opens himself to such criticism when he makes such off-handed remarks about delusion.

He also accuses pacifism of being racist, which is an especially petty and weak argument. In essense, he says that since North American pacifists aren't "doing enough" for indiginous peoples, in manners that he deems appropriate, they are effectively racists. This is not very far from the accusations of conservatives that anyone opposed to the war on Iraq were racists because they didn't want to "save" arab people from Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.

Returning to the subject of delusion, Churchill's arguement "Toward a Liberatory Praxis" does not necessarily lend itself to the impression that he is of sound mind. In discussing the necessity of violence in Third World liberation movements, Churchill cites the Bolshevik, Chinese, Cuban, Algerian and Zimbabwean revolutions as examples. However, one, looking at the consequences of these actions, would be hard-pressed to say that they were truly liberatory. History has demonstrated that the Communist and Nationalist/Fascist dictatorships that rose out of these revolutions were often just as bad, if not significantly worse than the orders they supplanted.

Here, Churchill seems almost to care only for revolution for revolution's sake. Rather than a concern for what may rise after the revolution, he is primarily orineted towards ripping down the present state of affairs. Granted that the current system is hardly sufficient, but his examples of successful violent revolution only demosntrate that violent revolution in itself does not by necessity lead to justice, equality and opportunity. Oddly absent in his list of examples of liberatory violent revolutions is the American revolution, doubtless because it created the system to which he, individually, works to oppose. This may reveal Churchill not so much as a proponent of objective liberatory principles, but as a partisan fighting on behalf of a particular political system.

In which case, his argument for violent revolution is sound in a manner. It all depends on one's goals. In his conclusion, Churchill states "the desire for a nonviolent and cooperative world is the healthiest of all psychological manifestations. This is the overarching principle of liberation and revolution. Undoubtedly, it seems the highest order of contradiction that, in order to achieve nonviolence, we must first break with it in overcoming its root causes. Therein, however, lies our only hope." [103, emphasis his] But one might suggest that this is not truly his goal.

The pacifist ethos begins with the vision of a nonviolent and cooperative world and then works backwards, figuring out the consistent means by which this world may be forged. Churchill indulges the fault of expediency, beginning not with the goal, but with what he presumes to be the means. He is looking to overthrow, by any means necessary, the present system in the hopes that this ideal world will magically sprout up from the vacant lot. As his examples demonstrate, this simply does not happen. That the ends are preeminent in the means is not a matter of ideology: it is a historical fact. Such revolution begets oppressive and violent societies exactly because they are a violent and oppressive act. Violent revolution, as it overthrows one system, seeks to impose another on penalty of death.

Ironically, the best part of Churchill's paper is his perscription for treating the pathology of pacifism. His regimen of values clarification, reality therapy, demystification and evaluation are highly worthwhile processes for individuals to go through. Not only that, but intentionally or not, he is reconstructing the very state of early Church pacifism.

Values clarification came to the first or second century Christian by virtue of Christianity's place as a persecuted minority in the Roman Empire. If you wanted to be a Christian, you really had to be sure you wanted to be a Christian, since you would more likely than not suffer and die because of it. This state of oppression also acted as the "reality therapy". Demystification came incidentally as a consequence of conversion. When speaking of demystification, Churchill means aquainting individuals with the tools and techniques of violence so that they can make an informed choice not to use violence rather than an uninformed gut reaction based in fear (oddly comprable to Neitszche's insistance that the "slave morality" of Judeo-Christianity was a reaction to their inability to become masters). In the first few centuries, most Christians would have been converts, often from the military and political ranks of Rome, who would have been familiar enough with the ways of the world. Evaluation and articulation of the Christian's belief would be ongoing and constant.

Altogether, Churchill's critique may be useful in the particulars, but misses something in the broad scope. Certain practices, like the "treatment" of pacifism and the exhortations to more direct action by Western activists, are perfectly valid. But the overall criticism of pacifism ends up ringing too familiarily with every other violent revolution that ended in despotism, injustice, inequality and the unending persecution of the enemies of the revolution. Ultimately, he only demonstrates every maxim of dedicated pacifism in that the ends are preeminent in the means and that those who live by the sword die by it.

Churchill, Ward & Ryan, Mike. Pacifism As Pathology: Reflections On The Role Of Armed Struggle In North America. Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 1998.