


Abstraction Refinement

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Formal Verification of Safety Properties

- Problem:
 - A gate-level design with an initial state and an output signal fail
 - Prove that fail is always 0
- Answer:
 - True
 - False, input sequence (error trace) that asserts fail
 - Inconclusive




Challenge

- Design may have 10M gates (~1M registers)
- Formal proof engines cannot handle
 - BDD: ~200 registers
 - Clause [McMillan02]: ~10K gates
 - Interpolant [McMillan03]: ~100K gates
- How?
 - Abstraction

Subset Abstraction


- Prove the property on a subset
 - True on subset \rightarrow True
 - False on subset \rightarrow inconclusive
 - Which subset?

10M gates




Abstraction Refinement

- Incrementally expand the abstract model (subset) by analyzing the error traces



Abstraction Refinement Algorithm



History (As Far As I Know)

- Kurshan introduced abstraction refinement
 - Localization reduction
 - R. Kurshan. *Computer-Aided Verification of Coordinating Processes: The Automata-Theoretic Approach*. Princeton University Press, 1994.
 - High level


History (cont.)

- Clarke, Grumberg, Jha, Lu, Veith, CAV00
 - Refinement based on investigation of deadend states
 - States in abstract error trace
 - Can be reached by concrete error trace
 - Cannot reach fail states by concrete error trace
 - Closest to fail states
 - Require building transition relation of the design in BDD
 - Not effective in real world

This Talk


- Mang, Ho, DAC04
- Wang, Ho, Kukula, Zhu, Ma, Damiano, DAC01
- Goal: Make the size of the design almost irrelevant; Only proof complexity matters
 - 10M gates
 - Algorithm avoids building or analyzing whole design
 - 3-value simulation
 - ATPG in limited fashion
 - ATPG model size is linear to the netlist, not depth*netlist
 - Use hybrid engines to model check abstract model
 - BDD-based symbolic reachability analysis
 - ATPG

Abstraction Refinement Algorithm



Step 1: Create Abstract Model

- Task
 - Create abstract model N
- Abstract model
 - A subset of registers and their combinational fanin cones
 - Initially → "fail" and its combinational fanin cone




The Abstract Model

Outputs of the registers of N


Primary inputs of N but register outputs of M

Primary inputs of N and M

Rest of registers and inputs of M



Inputs of the registers of N



M: concrete model
N: abstract model

Step 2: Model Check Abstract Model

- Task
 - Find an abstract error trace to assert fail
 - Or declare that fail is always 0 (proven)
- Find an error trace on the abstract model
 - BDD based image computation
 - Forward image computation
 - Number of input variables is often an issue for backward image computation
 - SAT/ATPG based search
 - Length of the error trace sometimes is an issue

Find Abstract Error Trace

- Hybrid BDD-ATPG Simulation algorithm for abstract error trace:
 - Forward image to reach the fail state
 - Backward image to find an abstract error trace
 - Computes a min-cut abstract model with less number of inputs
 - ... (next 2 slides)


Min-Cut and Original Abstract Models

M: concrete model
N: original abstract model
MC: min-cut abstract model

Outputs of the registers of N

Primary inputs of N but register outputs of M


Primary inputs of N and M



Hybrid Algorithm

M: concrete model
N: original abstract model
MC: min-cut abstract model

BDD-based backward image



Prove The Property

- If error trace cannot be found on the abstract model (after reaching resource limit)
 - Apply symbolic reachability analysis to prove the property on the abstract model
 - BDD-based forward fixpoint
 - Or SAT[McMillan02] or interpolant[McMillan03]


Step 3: Try to Concretize Abstract Error Trace

- Task
 - Check the validity of abstract error trace on concrete model
 - Discover concrete error trace
- Challenge
 - Must analyze the whole design
- Solution
 - Use 3-value simulation to quickly identify abstract error traces that cannot be concretized
 - Use guided ATPG to concretize the error trace

Check Abstract Error Trace Using 3-Value Simulation

- 3-valued simulation
 - Simulate the abstract error trace on concrete model to see if there are conflicts on excluded registers
 - Conflicts → candidates to be included in the refined abstract model
 - No conflicts → Try to concretize the abstract error trace using ATPG


Identify Conflicts Using 3-Value Simulation



Step 3: Try to Concretize the Abstract Error Trace

- Conflict
 - Yes \rightarrow conflict variables are good candidates to be included to refine the abstract model (in Step 4)
 - No \rightarrow guided ATPG to find concrete error trace
- Guided ATPG
 - Runs faster than unguided
 - Gradually impose more constraints
 - Increases the chance to find real error traces

Abstract Error Trace Guided ATPG




Step 4: Refinement

- Task
 - Add "important" registers to refine the abstract model
 - Intuition: add registers that invalidate the spurious error trace
- Key idea: 3-value simulation conflicts are good candidates
 - Assignments required by the spurious error trace
 - if the trace is minimal
 - true for BDD, not always true for ATPG
 - Concrete model does not permit the assignments (conflicts)


Rank Conflict Registers

- Conflict registers are ranked:
 - Frequencies of conflict (high)
 - Persistence (beg to be selected)
 - Sequential Distances (close)
 - Input Widths (small)
 - Number of primary inputs in the support of transition function
- Can we do better?
 - Game based register selection


K-Cooperativeness



Input trace
 $c^0, c^1 \dots c^k$
is a counterexample




Trace
 $c^0, c^1 \dots c^k$
not valid
(not producible
by the additional logic)



Blue inputs are called k-cooperative


K-controllability

Given an abstraction and a partition $\{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$ of the inputs of the abstraction, the abstraction is k-controllable by **Bob** if no matter what input **Alice** chooses, **Bob** is able to choose an input such that the fail signal is low for k cycles.




Controllable Predecessor


Alice/Bob



$$CPre(X) = \forall A \exists B . (T_{abs} \wedge next(X))$$




K-controllable by Bob if initial state is in X_k





Abstract Model
= (Shield, Core)


Loop invariant: Core is not controllable by Shield

Find a K-controlling input of the Core and give it to the Shield;
Move registers from the Shield to the Core one-by-one until the loop invariant holds again









Find and Rank the
k-cooperative
inputs




Search for the
k-controlling
inputs



Add the fanin of
the first k-
cooperative input



Add the fanin of
k-controlling
inputs



Find and Rank the
k-cooperative
inputs



Search for the
k-controlling
inputs



Add the fanin of
the first k-
cooperative input

Yes



Add the fanin of
k-controlling
inputs



Move some
fanins of the
shield inputs
into the core

Rank k-Cooperative Variables

- Conflict registers that are inputs of shield are removed from the list
- Remaining conflict registers are ranked
 - Frequencies of conflict (high)
 - Persistence (beg to be selected)
 - Sequential Distances (close)
 - Input Widths (small)
 - Number of primary inputs in the support of transition function
- Try to find k-controlling variable in the top 3 ranked registers
 - Found → Use it
 - Not found → Use the top register

Outline

- What is functional verification?
- What is formal property verification (FPV)?
- FPV techniques
- Abstraction refinement for FPV
- *Experimental results*

Comparisons

- Technologies
 - Old RFN [WHL+01]
 - GRAB [WLJ+03]
 - All the inputs are scored according to a game-theoretic formula
 - Highest scored does not imply k-controlling
 - k-controlling does not imply highest scored
 - Interpolant [McM03]
 - SAT-based
- Testcases
 - 7 properties for 6 industrial designs
 - 750 MHz SPARC, 4GB memory, Solaris 5.8

Results - Runtime

	#gates/#rgtrs	Game RFN	RFN	mGrab	INT
P1	481/60	2246.3s	3826.6s	3333.9s	>10hr
P2	8372/697	1091.9s	13555.6s	>10hr	65.1s
P3	61552/4986	737.0s	310.2s	>10hr	194.2s
P4	77545/2122	202.8s	1049.0s	>10hr	>10hr
P5	127229/4891	10004.9s	10027.2s	>10hr	>10hr
P6	127261/4895	8311.6s	10920.5s	>10hr	>10hr
P7	137365/4494	230.3s	340.7s	>10hr	>10hr

Number of Registers in Abstract Model

	Game RFN	RFN	K-cntrl & k-coop
P1	51	57	38
P2	62	75	28
P3	21	17	7
P4	10	34	10
P5	51	51	34
P6	54	60	32
p7	13	23	13

Conclusion

- Complexity is less correlated to design complexity
 - Only perform expensive computation on abstract model
 - More scalable than interpolant
 - Much more efficient than GRAB
- Can use interpolant or SAT as proof engine for abstract model
- Apply similar scheme to verify timed or hybrid systems?