THE DIGNIFIED RANT

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS JANUARY 2004 ARCHIVES

Return to The Dignified Rant

Return to National Security Affairs

Return to National Security Affairs Archives

“Precision” (Posted January 31, 2004)

The Army in the Iraq War left behind its non-divisional artillery units. Organic guns and rockets plus airpower worked just fine to decimate enemy forces. Combined with the shortage of other “high demand, low density troops,” the Army is converting 2/3 of its non-divisional artillery battalions into other units:

The U.S. Army has decided that smart bombs and smart shells make a lot of its artillery units unnecessary. So two thirds of its non-divisional (those that that are not part of a combat division) artillery battalions will be converted to other uses (engineers, military police and civil affairs.) That's 36 artillery battalions containing nearly 10,000 troops. Most of these are National Guard units, who report to state governors until they are called up by the federal government. The governors won't mind having fewer artillery, and more engineer, military police and civil affairs battalions, as these units are more useful for the natural disasters the governors usually call upon National Guard units to help out with.

We really aren’t likely to need that amount of artillery in the next generation. We’ve come a long way since every combat brigade seemed to have an artillery brigade in support.

“More Evidence for a Horn Offensive?” (Posted January 31, 2004)

The Somalis (minus Somaliland) have agreed to a loose government.

Could this be an indication that we are going into the Horn of Africa to strike at al Qaeda? The thugs have been there in the past. We’ve been monitoring the area for quite some time with troops on the ground in Djibouti as a staging base. It would certainly make more political sense to be able to say we are going in to support a new government from the threat of destabilization. Indeed, it would be true too, not just a pretext. A working government would help cement whatever good our military effort would achieve.

Of course, it is always dangerous to interpret events in light of what you expect.

“Huh?” (Posted January 31, 2004)

This is one of those news items that just leaves me scratching my head:

North Korea has agreed to share missile technology with Nigeria, the Nigerian government said Wednesday — a deal that would take the secretive communist nation's missile business to sub-Saharan Africa.

Now, I pay attention to world events. I concede I’m no area specialist on West Africa, but why on earth would Nigeria need surface-to-surface missiles?

I mean, are the Nigerians worried that the feared Benin Hordes are poised to sweep in to Lagos? Are the dreaded Cameroonians undermining the youth of Nigeria? Could nefarious Chad be plotting the destruction of Nigeria? Is irredentist Niger just an “ia” away from annexing all of Nigeria?

The Nigerians cleared up the mystery. The article explained:

Nigeria, which is not at war or under any known threat from other countries, said any missile help would be used for "peacekeeping" and to protect its territory. It said it was not seeking nuclear technology or weapons of mass destruction.

I don’t know, I think the Nigerians are a little short-sighted. Nukes would really enhance their peacekeeping efforts.

“Screw the NGOs—Part Two” (Posted January 31, 2004)

A Nobel Peace prize winner said:

"One of the great curses of this world is the human rights industry," he told the Associated Press news agency at an international conference of terrorism victims in Madrid.

"They justify terrorist acts and end up being complicit in the murder of innocent victims."

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were angry in their reaction.

I dare say they worked up more genuine anger at this statement than they managed over Iraqis being run through plastic shredders under Saddam.

“Sleight of Hand?” (Posted January 31, 2004)

I don’t know, but this really just screams “look over here!” to me:

The U.S. military is "sure" it will catch Osama bin Laden this year, perhaps within months, a spokesman declared Thursday, but Pakistan said it would not allow American troops to cross the border in search of the al-Qaida leader.

Will we launch something in the spring, possibly into Pakistan? Yes. And maybe the publicity is designed to get Osama (if he is still alive) to move in a panic.

But I still think that it is designed to mask another offensive move. Nothing large-scale, but a Special Operations-dominated attack in the Horn of Africa region.

Just a hunch.

“Deep Strike” (Posted January 30, 2004)

During the Iraq War, the Army launched a deep strike ahead of 3^rd ID to attack Republican Guard elements guarding the approaches to Baghdad. The attack was repelled by intense ground fire and we lost an Apache. The crew survived and was freed late in the war.

Many said this showed that deep strike was flawed. And this seemed like a real lesson of the war since we really anticipated our attack helicopters would be used behind our front lines to strike advancing Soviet armor in the Fulda Gap. We changed that after the Cold War was won. This battle seemed to show that the concept is flawed.

Yet I was puzzled. Deep strike certainly worked in Desert Storm. The Iraq War answers this. According to the authors, the attack was smaller than first planned and delayed by hours; failed to attack from a better direction; lacked good intel on the target; and squandered an artillery strike mission that occurred hours earlier, when the helicopters were supposed to attack. Instead of suppressing the Iraqis as the helicopters attacked, the artillery mission just warned the Iraqis that we were up to something.

So I’ll suspend my judgment on deep strike by our helicopters.

“Screw Human Rights Watch” (Posted January 30, 2004)

I finished The March Up about I MEF in the Iraq War. I’m now reading The Iraq War: A Military History. One passage hammered me in particular, in light of the claim by Human Rights Watch that our invasion of Iraq cannot be justified on humanitarian grounds:

In May 2003 an Iraqi came up to [Major General James Mattis, USMC] and thanked him for the efforts the marines had made to free Iraq. It was too late for him, he said. During the time of the Baath, he had found the broken body of his twelve-year-old daughter on his doorstep, along with a videotape depicting her last two hours of life, as Saddam’s thugs raped, tortured, and eventually killed her. But the Americans had saved others from a similar fate, he said, his eyes welling with tears.

Screw HRW.

Screw the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Amnesty International, and all the other posing NGOs who pretend to care. Nobody doubted Saddam’s brutality nor was his desire for nuclear weapons questioned. These groups whined in their righteous goodness about human rights violations (and they complained equally about us and Saddam to prove their superiority) and further elevated their purity of heart by refusing to endorse any type of war to end the brutality of thug regimes. Gosh darn it, didn’t they just feel so good condemning torture and condemning anything more violent than a group hug to end the torture.

People who pretend to care join these groups. They care alright, about their own purported purity.

People willing to do something about human rights join the United States Armed Forces. And because of them, a lot of twelve-year-old girls will grow up healthy and whole. And a lot of fathers will not have to face the heart-numbing despair of facing a lifeless body who was once their pride and joy left on his doorstep. With a video chronicling what was done to her.

This was a good war.

“Why We Fight” (Posted January 30, 2004)

As we deal with despotic regimes that seek to kill us or acquire nuclear weapons, it would be well to remember how badly these regimes read America.

These rulers believe we are always on the verge of executing Plan X to invade and occupy them. The thugs think only nuclear weapons can save them from our secretly-hatched plots. As V. D. Hanson notes:

Take September 11 away and the United States would never — despite the conspiracists' theories of pre-9/11 mediation — have gone into either Afghanistan or Iraq. Both reactive military campaigns were waged humanely to minimize civilian casualties, often at risk to American military lives. The defeated were odious; their oppressed deserved to have been freed, and their nations returned from the graveyard to the family of nations.

Clearly, we would not have embarked on these wars and plans to overthrow other odious regimes absent the 9-11 attacks that showed the consequences of leaving fanatics in power with the means and will to kill us. Until then, we were willing to let horrible regimes remain in power rather than risk even low casualties to destroy them.

Yet thug regimes continue to think that nuclear weapons will deter us and preserve their cruel regimes.

In The American Way of War by Weigley, the author stated that he believed our way of war evolved toward total annihilation of our enemies. The nuclear balance of terror, however, made such wars impossible and even made limited wars too costly to contemplate for the gains to be made.

Unipolarity ended the restraints imposed by a heavily armed nuclear adversary. Yet we still obeyed the Cold War rules in 1991.

9-11 scrapped those rules.

Once again, when a threat to us arises, our instinct is to destroy the threat. The Taliban shelter and sponsor killers of 9-11? We crush them. Saddam refuses to verifiably end his nuclear and biological ambitions (and chemical too, though those were less worrisome)? We destroyed his regime.

Despots need to get a clue to the new reality. Going for nukes doesn’t deter us, it provokes us. We notice thug regimes. Libya’s Khaddafi figured this one out.

With our idealistic streak, we can’t help notice their brutality as well. And that motivates our very core. We gain moral reasons to crush threats.

New rules, people. New rules.

“New Offensive” (Posted January 28, 2004)

I’ve argued we need a new offensive in 2004. I think we will deal with Iran in early 2005 unless a crisis provides an opportunity before then. The delay will give us time to regroup our Army, redesign 3^rd ID and 101^st AB into the new smaller-brigade organization, and cover the troop buildup for an Iran operation (to support our side in a civil war—not to invade straight up) with a new troop rotation in Iraq. Until then, we don’t want a big operation to tire the troops.

On the other hand, I think it is a bad idea to have too long a pause in going after our enemies. Bad for morale at home where people forget we are at war for a reason. And bad for our enemies who think they have a reprieve or worse, that we are tiring and giving up.

According to Strategypage:

With the capture of Saddam Hussein and most of his key aides, more SOCOM people are being withdrawn from Iraq. Some will go to Afghanistan, where the search for Osama bin Laden and Taliban leaders continues. But expect to see SOCOM showing up in other parts of the world later this year. 

The latest rumor (via Instapundit) is that we will launch a spring offensive into Pakistan. The objective is to nail al Qaeda and possibly get bin Laden if he isn’t already rotting nicely by now in some Islamist “Weekend at Osama’s” ploy. Some have made this out to be “invading” an ally, but the troop strength looks small. CIA and Special Forces plus Rangers and some leg infantry for backup. And airpower of course. Oh, and real efforts by the Pakistani army. This could be the fruits of a conference back in September, as I noted here:

"Pakistani Cooperation" (Posted September 26, 2003)

Given the problems we are having with shutting down the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan, the topics of this meeting by the Pakistan Defense Consultative Group are interesting. I hope the upbeat assessment by the US in the statement will be felt on the ground real fast

So is this Pakistan spring offensive the operation to carry on the war on terror? The one I think we need to show we are still moving forward without stressing us out prior to the main effort against Iran?

Nah. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, though they are vitally important, are still “old” fronts. That’s cleanup. I still think the Horn of Africa is the likely front. We’ve had a task force in the area looking it over for quite some time now. Plus, the cover story of action in Afghanistan/Pakistan will mask the buildup for a Horn of Africa mission.

I still think we will do something in Pakistan too, but the carrier seems to give away the game. We have land-based airpower available for Afghanistan. But a carrier in the Arabian Sea is conveniently near Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

One thing I’ve learned from my mistaken predictions of when we’d invade Iraq is that we really can’t hide substantial forces except in plain sight. Since we can’t hide a Ranger regiment or a carrier moving overseas, convince people we have a real mission elsewhere.

Given that some commentators are slamming those publicizing the Pakistan spring offensive, am I guilty too? I thought long and hard about this issue before. And the answer is no. First of all, I’m just speculating and I probably am guessing wrong, anyway. Guilt in this case would be tightly linked to conceit. Nobody in the Pentagon is emailing me secret stuff. I just guess what I’d do if I could. Plus, since we can only hide what we are doing in noise rather than silence, my speculation just adds to the noise. Other than that, I’d require a bigger readership than I have before I start to seriously worry about spoiling US military plans!

So, a spring offensive. Possibly even an operation inside Pakistan bigger than our past operations if we think we can accomplish something big. But the real spring offensive will be in the Horn of Africa. That’s what I’d do, anyway.

“The Sound of Moral Credibility Leaking Out” (Posted January 27, 2004)

Aside from the WMD question, a “human rights” group says that if you kill hundreds of thousands and get away with it, you are cleared of facing justice:

The war in Iraq cannot be justified as an intervention in defense of human rights even though it ended a brutal regime, Human Rights Watch said Monday, dismissing one of the Bush administration's main arguments for the invasion.

While Saddam Hussein had an atrocious human rights record, his worst actions occurred long before the war and there was no ongoing or imminent mass killing in Iraq when the conflict began, the advocacy group said in its annual report.

I do want to know why intelligence organizations believed Iraq had chemical weapons on the eve of war. This is a problem. But to suggest that there was not a moral good to destroying Saddam’s regime?

So Human Rights Watch people believe they can chronicle abuses and feel all good and morally superior for watching evil.

But then they argue that nothing should be done about it. When we do more than watch, they get all upset.

No, we can’t undo all evil regimes and I don’t argue that. But when we do overthrow a brutal tyrant, how is it possible to argue that his overthrow is not an intervention in defense of human rights?

What mental gymnastics are required to argue this way?

“So What Did Happen to the Arab Street?” (Posted January 27, 2004)

Before the Afghan campaign and before the Iraq War, opponents of those military actions cried out that we would make things worse by inspiring uprisings of 'the street' against pro-Western governments. So what happened?

From Strategypage:

The quick fall of Saddam Hussein's government led other Arab nations to revise their attitude towards terrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular. Libya came completely clean, Syria became more cooperative, as did all Arab nations, and other Moslem nations as well. This was especially true of Iran, which had long been a supporter of anti-American terrorists.

The American efforts in the war on terror has caused much anger in the Moslem world, and many young Moslems have said they would go to war against America. But where are they? And what have they done? They are out there making noise and talking to BBC reporters. But they do nothing of substance. We tend to forget that the "disaffected Arab masses" have been "driven to violence" for decades and have repeatedly demonstrated a general inability to shoot straight, or even figure out who their enemy really is.

Meanwhile, there is momentous change going through the Arab world. In the wake of the Iraq war, many Arab journalists and opinion leaders noted, openly, that, once more, the Arab media had lied to itself and it's audience. Throughout the three week campaign in Iraq, until the very end, the Arab media was broadcasting lies. Some Arab journalists noted this openly, and the fact that this fantasy mentality was a large part of the reason the Arab world was so far behind the West. Perhaps, the message went, we are the authors of our own misfortune. The new thinking coalesced into organizations like the Arab Thought Foundation, which openly discuss these matters. Even the leadership in the Arab world, which is regularly criticized by al Qaeda and Arabs in general, agrees that something is wrong, and it's not what al Qaeda says it is.

Of course, our press still just reports on angry voices from the Arab world who vow to reporters to fight to the death. Yet this vocal and sought out group is one of three reactions to our campaign to free the Islamic world from the despotism that has impoverished and imprisoned hundreds of millions of people who deserve freedom and prosperity no less than we do.

In addition to the second group that is quietly moving our way to suppress Islamists is the third group that offers hope (this in the context of the SOTU):

The third and most significant reaction, however, was the one least seen in the West. It was the response from the underdogs, the dissidents, and the people who have simply had enough of Middle Eastern mayhem. Kuwait, for example, applauded the speech; so did the Governing Council in Iraq, as did other civilized societies. In a sense, they were glad to have their misery publicly acknowledged in Washington. Students and reformers in Iran cheered, and opposition movements in Syria and Lebanon breathed better. Southern Sudanese and Nubians were encouraged and reinvigorated; Berbers and liberal secularists in Algeria applauded. And from the deepest regions of underground activism, dissident websites — with writers around the Arab world, including women in Saudi Arabia — began counting the days. They had heard the voice of the most powerful man on Earth — the president of the United States — promise them a brighter future.

How ironic. Inside Byzantium (read: Washington's beltway), this never factored into the debate. There, people only want to know "Where are the WMDs?" and "What are we doing in Iraq?" But in the parts of the Middle East that you don't see on al Jazeera, Shiites, Kurds, liberal Sunnis, democratic Arabs, oppressed minorities, women, and students are reading President Bush's speech in disbelief: "Who among our own presidents-for-life and fundamentalist monarchs has ever mentioned the mass graves and our vanished human rights? Let it come from the American president, and even if he is not serious, it doesn't matter. What matters is that the Truth was said." This is the real response to the State of the Union — people who, after a long time, finally dare to hope.

We really are offering hope to a lot of people who have suffered for decades.

And fear, too, for those who caused the suffering.

“Like I Said” (Posted January 27, 2004)

The Saudi fear that fanatics will sneak into Saudi Arabia is fairly outrageous for the Saudis to peddle:

EVIDENCE continues to build that the terrorist "resistance" in the Sunni Triangle, far from being a spontaneous response to new frustrations, has a history and an ideology. The correct name for the main influence inciting Sunni Muslim Iraqis to attack coalition forces is Wahhabism, although its proponents seek to disguise it under the more acceptable name Salafism. It is financed and supported from inside Saudi Arabia, which shares a long border with southern Iraq.

I thought the Saudis were moving in the right direction, but if the Saudis are trying to divert Islamists to Iraq instead of fighting them, we can’t be satisfied with the Saudi government’s recent apparent decision to go after the Islamists. What is worrisome is that the Saudis seem to have decided just that:

Furthermore, Saudi guards on the Iraqi border told the website's writers, "Saudi fighters are still heading to Iraq, with little scrutiny by Saudi authorities." A guard commander in Rafha, a border outpost southwest of the Iraqi line, complained that he had asked for more equipment and personnel to monitor the area, but never received them. The guards merely fire warning shots when they observe people crossing the border illegally. Another guard, quoted by the same website, said "the infiltrators are highly skilled at crossing the borders."

In an earlier report on the website, a Saudi border guard noted, "We used to have problems with Iraqis fleeing into Saudi territories, but now the problem is with hundreds of Saudis crossing into Iraq."

And Saudi jihadists don't need to go to Afghanistan or Chechnya for training before they head to Iraq. On January 15 the Associated Press reported the Saudi government's recognition, as if it were a sudden discovery, that al Qaeda has desert training camps near Saudi cities.

We may yet have a lever to move the Saudi government if we can forge a real friendship with the Shias based on overthrowing Saddam and the Iranian mullahs. Saudi Shias live in the oil regions and are poor and left out of the ruling family.

Wahhabi influence would be a mere shadow of its current strength if the Saudi royal family was a poor tribe watching over the holiest places of Islam but without oil.

“Terrorists” (Posted January 27, 2004)

A good article (via NRO) on recruiting terrorists and who those recruits are.

Of note:

Given its long history, one must wonder whether terrorism accomplishes its goals. For some ideological terrorists, of course, there are scarcely any clear goals that can be accomplished. But for many assassins and religious terrorists, there are important goals, such as ending tyranny, spreading a religious doctrine, or defeating a national enemy.

By these standards, terrorism does not work. Franklin Ford concluded his long history of political murders by saying that, with one or two possible exceptions, assassinations have not produced results consonant with the aims of the doer. Walter Laqueur, in his shorter review of the matter, comes to the same conclusion: of the 50 prime ministers and heads of state killed between 1945 and 1985, it is hard to think of one whose death changed a state’s policies.

“Terrorism doe not work.” This is why, though we must fight terrorists tooth and nail (since nukes are possible), I always worry more about hostile states. The Axis of Evil and lesser states (or more powerful states, of course) that possess the organization and wealth to carry out sustained actions to harm us.

Wilson notes that arresting the leaders of isolated terrorist groups will work; but that this will not when dealing with terrorists who have the sympathy of large numbers of people and whole societies. Wilson writes:

But support for resistance is not the same as support for an endless war. An opinion survey done in November 2002 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research showed that over three-fourths of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank supported a mutual cessation of violence between Israel and Palestinians and backed reconciliation between Israelis and a newly created Palestinian state. A majority favored the Palestinian Authority taking measures to prevent armed attacks against Israeli civilians. Another poll found that about half of all Palestinians wanted both the intifada and negotiations with Israel to go forward simultaneously, while 15 percent favored negotiations alone.

These facts, rarely mentioned in the American press, suggest how empty are the statements of many Middle Eastern and European leaders, who incessantly tell us that ending terrorism generally requires “solving” the Palestinian question by dealing with Arafat. These claims, often made to satisfy internal political needs, fail to recognize how disliked Arafat is by his own people and how eager they are for a democratic government that respects the governed and avoids corruption.

Matters are worse when one state sponsors or accommodates terrorism in another state. In this case, the problem is to end that state support. To do that means making clear that the leaders of such a state will suffer serious pain as a consequence of that accommodation. Though many people take exception to it, I think President Bush was right to condemn certain nations as being part of an “axis of evil,” putting leaders on notice that they cannot fund or encourage Hamas, al-Qaida, or Hezbollah without paying a heavy price for it. Iraq has learned how high that price can be.

So it will take time to collapse the support network of the terrorists. Until then, we will need to fight the terrorist organizations. It is very common, when discussing terrorists, to claim that we have to be successful all the time but the terrorists only need to succeed once.

Hogwash.

What is supposed to happen when the terrorists “succeed once?” Will we collapse? Will we retreat?

As horrific as 9-11 was, we reacted with restrained strength, crushing two enemies (the Taliban’s Afghanistan and Saddam’s Iraq) and crippling al Qaeda and putting them on the run.

Indeed, after years of failing to go after these thugs or thug regimes, we are the ones who only needed to succeed once to win.

So let’s abandon this silly notion that our enemies only have to succeed once to win. They will succeed again. We can’t win every time on the defensive. But we will remain on the offensive and even when terrorists strike here again, we will keep attacking and we will be the ones who win.

“An Honorable Cause” (Posted January 27, 2004)

The current campaign should lead to reexamining the myths of the Vietnam War.

Our soldiers served with honor in a difficult war.

Kudos to M. T. Owens.

“Test of Friendship” (Posted January 24, 2004)

This better not be true:

The European Union (news - web sites) may end its ban on arms sales to China this spring, diplomatic sources said Friday, a move that could allow China's big-spending military to buy cutting-edge weapons ranging from French Mirage jets to stealthy German submarines.

Seriously, this could get Americans, Japanese, South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Australians killed if the Chinese ever try to capture Taiwan.

The EU needs to remember who its friends are.

Or are they choosing?

I’m telling you, it is not in our interests to promote European integration. Friendship toward us in individual countries will be submerged and crushed in the Euro culture that despises America.

“Chinese Intentions” (Posted January 24, 2004)

More evidence that North Korea is close to collapse. The Chinese have revived ancient land claims in Korea:

Chinese academics taking part in a government-run project recently shocked scholars from both South and North Korea by releasing documents that claim Goguryeo as an ethnic kingdom of ancient China.

The result has been a heated dispute. More is at stake than bragging rights to the extraordinary bronze and clay Buddhas and frescoed murals of a long-dead civilization. Goguryeo encompassed a vast area from central Manchuria to south of Seoul. Korean academics and politicians accuse China of attempting to lay claim to the kingdom out of fear that its 870-mile-long border with North Korea will rupture with a flood of refugees if the government in Pyongyang collapses.

The Chinese may be laying the groundwork to dispute the current border with North Korea and, if they find it to be in their interest, claim more territory, scholars say. They also argue that China is trying to head off any attempt by pockets of Korean speakers on the Chinese side of the border from eventually becoming part of a unified Korea.

"The Chinese are trying to use a novel claim on history as an insurance policy for the future of its border with Korea," said Yeo Ho Kyu, a historian at Seoul's Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. "This is not the first time the Chinese have tried to do this. They did the same thing before they claimed Tibet. Now, they are trying to use history as a weapon to wield influence in an area that is historically Korean."

Most interesting. The way the Chinese absolutely hate the idea of legitimizing foreign intervention in a domestic issue (lest their own oppression be the target), they are trying to lay the groundwork to argue that a Chinese intervention in North Korea is really a domestic issue.

One wonders whether the Chinese would try to expand their border with a relatively small buffer zone to keep refugees out or whether they’d try for something more dramatic by pushing south to the DMZ.

I can’t believe we’d accept that. Or the South Koreans.

But an unofficial buffer zone in case of a Pyongyang collapse seems likely.

“Shias” (Posted January 24, 2004)

Hoagland thinks we may be stiff-arming the Shias in Iraq too much:

Iraq's Shiite majority has begun to pry political control of the country from U.S. administrator Paul Bremer and his small, overwhelmed staff in Baghdad. The Bush administration should welcome and help shape this silent transition rather than fight to retain eroding power.

I still think our thinking of the Shias is warped by the Iranian hostage crisis. Shia march peacefully in Iraq demanding majority rule and we cringe at the sight. But this isn’t a death-to-America crisis. Remember that the Iraqi Shias feel we abandoned them in 1991. They are wary of what we might do or fail to do. Plus, the Shias fear the Sunni Baathists after suffering under their misrule for so long. Let’s cut them some slack. Support our friends and insist on rule of law and minority protection for sincere Sunnis who want to be part of the new Iraq, but we should not try to contain the Shias.

Iraq’s Shias like us.

Iran’s Shias like us.

And with our pressure forcing Saudi Arabia to loosen up, maybe Saudi Arabia’s Shias will come to like us.

As I wrote about before, we could well be seeing the realignment of the Shias to our friends as they see us aiding them against oppressors.

Could be pretty amazing.

And the Sunnis need to come in from the cold and end their Baathist resistance before the newly empowered Shias gain the seat of power with elections. While we are still there to work for rule of law and minority rights. I thought the Sunnis would begin to see the summer deadline as a real threat to them if they are still fighting us by then. Apparently, this is so:

Coalition officials, however, detect a shift in the attitude of some Sunnis leaders and maintain that the Dec. 13 capture of Saddam may have had something to do with it.

Mike Gfoeller, the coalition's regional coordinator for six Iraqi provinces, said Sunnis now want to ensure their rights are respected in any new government.

"What I have seen is greater and greater seriousness of purpose on their part ... to really engage in building the new Iraq and make sure they get their piece of the pie," Gfoeller said.

The Sunnis don’t have to like being in the minority and no longer able to rule as they see fit. They just have to accept that they will work within the rule of law. They may find that we are their only friends in Iraq.

“More Good News from Australia” (Posted January 22, 2004)

Australia will continue to stand with us as we prepare to fight in the future:

Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Richard Myers announced that the US was likely to use the joint military training facility it is seeking to establish in northern Australia to preposition equipment and materiel. The joint-use facility could also ensure that US and Australian forces get the opportunity to train together prior to any future crisis. However, there was no proposal to station US troops permanently in Australia.

In a global reassessment of its force deployment the US has developed a "places, not bases" doctrine, under which it stores large amounts of equipment (tanks, aircraft, fuel and ammunition). This allows for the rapid deployment of troops around the world, no matter where the next theater of war develops.

Prepositioning has to be the way to go to speed deployment of real ground killing power to distant theaters. I don’t trust the idea of featherweight Army units jetting about and overwhelming hordes of dumb ass enemies too incompetent to fight us effectively.

I did mention in Military Review in 2002 the need to preposition heavy forces (like main battle tanks) rather than rely on the revolutionary future combat system to speed deployment:

It may be unwise to rely solely on a light FCS if the Army needs a survivable system. If it can find a way around deploying from CONUS, future heavy systems would not need to conform to the tradeoffs necessary for the FCS to get to the theater quickly, and they might exhibit the same dominance as today’s MBTs. Pre-positioned future heavy systems, perhaps afloat, should not be overlooked. Where pre-positioning is impractical, sealift from CONUS must be faster. We may even need to explore deploying more forces overseas to get ground troops closer to potential trouble spots for the initial rapid response.

I’m glad the Aussies are with us on this.

“This Has to be Good” (Posted January 22, 2004)

Unrest in Iran over the heavy handed tactics of the mullahs seems to be broadening to the actual government:

Iran's worst political crisis in years deepened Wednesday, with the government saying most of its ministers and vice presidents have submitted resignations to protest the barring of thousands of would-be candidates from upcoming elections.

But the Iranian people have a lot to do:

"This is the final battle for survival," he said. "Hard-liners don't want reformers in power and are determined to take control of parliament at any cost. Reformers need to boycott polls or stand up firmly if they want to have any future."

I think we will deal with Iran in 2005 if the Iranian people don’t take care of the problem themselves. But I sure hope we are prepared to intervene to help the democratic dissidents should the system blow before then.

And we need to deal with Iran. If you have doubt, read this on Iran’s continuing drive to get nukes despite so-called promise to halt nuclear activities.

“Nice to Hear” (Posted January 22, 2004)

A nice article defending the US war on terror (via Instapundit). From Caroline Overington in Australia:

Any student of history knows that this is true. America saved the Western world from communism. America saved Australia and, for that matter, France from a system that would stop you from reading this newspaper.

Americans support the war in Iraq and, by extension, Bush because they see it as part of a bigger picture. Like everybody, they now know that Saddam was not the threat they thought he was (at least, not to them) but they still think it was a good idea to deal with him, before he became one.

The price of freedom is high. You might think you would not sacrifice your life for it, but maybe you don't have to. After all, 20-year-old Americans are doing it for you, every day.

Thank you. It’s good to hear that not everyone overseas thinks we are the main threat to world peace.

“Momentum” (Posted January 22, 2004)

I’ve written that I think Iran is the target for 2005 after a relatively quiet 2004 spent mopping up and an election. While this is understandable, I also think we need to do something forward leaning in 2004 so that we do not lose momentum and allow our enemies to think they weathered the storm. Just as important, our people can’t forget we are at war. So I thought we should go after Islamists in the Horn of Africa.

From Jane’s Intelligence Digest:

According to JID's intelligence sources, US secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld is considering plans to expand the global war on terrorism with multi-pronged attacks against suspected militant bases in countries such as Lebanon and Somalia. In a week in which Israel launched airstrikes against Hizbullah positions, our regional correspondent reports from Beirut.

I think it would be better to subcontract the Hezbollah strikes to the Israelis. We can go after the Somalia thugs.

“North Korea Doing Fine?” (Posted January 22, 2004)

Pritchard is at it again in the New York Times. He thinks the North Koreans have graciously warned him that we had better hurry up and negotiate or we might not get as good a deal:

"Time is not on the American side," Kim Gye Gwan, vice foreign minister of North Korea, told me a few weeks ago. "As time passes, our nuclear deterrent continues to grow in quantity and quality." Those words are an indictment of United States intelligence as well as a potential epitaph on the Bush administration's failed policy in North Korea.

And this is what Pritchard is worried we might be doing:

American policy in North Korea is hardly better than American intelligence. At best it can be described only as amateurish. At worst, it is a failed attempt to lure American allies down a path that is not designed to resolve the crisis diplomatically but to lead to the failure and ultimate isolation of North Korea in hopes that its government will collapse.

Having a discussion with North Korea does not mean abandoning the multilateral framework agreed to in 1994. Nor does direct communications mean capitulating to North Korean demands. It simply means serious exploration of what is possible and acceptable to all parties.

Having staked his reputation on the value of negotiations and resigned over our refusal to play the same game again, Pritchard fails to see that regime change would be better than perpetuating the repulsive pudgy sadist who holds sway in Pyongyang.

This article then repeats the “time is on North Korea’s side” argument by noting a think tank’s position:

"As time elapses, however, a diplomatic solution could become more difficult, as Pyongyang acquires additional strategic bargaining chips" and greater uncertainty make verification more complicated, he said.

So why, I wonder, are the North Koreans essentially arguing that if they get a dozen nukes, they won’t negotiate to give them up? Don’t people like Pritchard think Pyongyang wants “security” with a pact with us? Why would North Korea’s possession of one or twenty bombs affect their negotiating if all they want is non-nuclear threat-free nirvana?

And what of this guy’s assessment and his description of the North Koreans’ reaction to his skepticism:

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hecker [a former director of the Los Alamos, N.M., nuclear research laboratory] said the North Koreans apparently wanted to show the delegation their main nuclear site "to verify that they had taken significant actions since December 2002 and to impress us with their nuclear capabilities."

Hecker said his hosts seemed disappointed when he reported to them that he had not seen enough to draw definitive conclusions about the facility.

When far, appear near. When weak, appear strong. That’s Sun Tsu, I believe (I’d have to walk twenty feet to grab the volume and I don’t get paid enough for blogging to take that kind of effort).

I think the North Koreans are desperate and worried about collapsing.

As Strategypage notes, ordinary North Koreans are starting to just not give a damn about consequences. They are not happy, shopping, confident good little communists:

The food and fuel situation up north is pretty grim, and it's making the security forces up there nervous. Lots more North Koreans are openly expressing a "I don't give a damn" attitude. Just like Eastern Europe in 1989. The current food crises is a result of foreign donors refusing to contribute food for North Korea because the government has not allowed foreigners to observe where the donated food goes. Other witnesses have consistently reported that the donated food goes to the armed forces and is not sent to areas where there has been unrest, or where the government suspects there might be unrest (because a number of locals have fled to China or Russia.) Currently, some twelve percent of North Korea's population, that was getting food aid, has been cut off. New supplies will not arrive for several months. But after that, the food aid could dry up again if the North Korean government does not become more cooperative. The government is showing signs of easing up on building nuclear weapons and controlling foreign aid. But signs are not the same as a done deal, so the people still starve.

Dictators hate that attitude. And rightly so.

“Nuclear Disarmament” (Posted January 20, 2004)

US, British, and UN experts are working to see that Libya follows through on its decision to end WMD programs:

The announcement that the destruction of Libya's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs was underway comes after Tripoli volunteered on December 19 to abandon its WMD ambitions in a bid to shed its status as a pariah state.

Fear of US power: 1. EU diplomacy: 0.

“Nuclear Semantics” (Posted January 20, 2004)

Iran agreed to the EU initiative to halt its nuclear programs. I was skeptical that people who boast they will use nukes would actually give them up.

Now the Europeans are worrying too:

Now, diplomats told The Associated Press on condition of anonymity, even key European nations who negotiated the deal with Tehran have started to question Iran's commitment because it appears to be using semantics — the meaning of the word suspend — to keep some of its nuclear enrichment program operational.

I guess it all depends on what the meaning of “we’ll nuke you infidel bastards until you glow” is.

Some over here in the State Department still think it is just a quaint Farsi way of saying “let’s talk.”

Target: Iran. 2005.

“Sympathy for the French” (Posted January 19, 2004)

No, really. I may have “issues” with how the French government behaves. And I may think a lot of this is a problem of their own making. But since they are trying to do something about the problem, I have great sympathy for their plight:

France's drive to better integrate its five million Muslims looked shaken Monday after a weekend of protests against a looming ban on Islamic veils and a bomb attack on the car of a senior public official of Muslim origin.

A bomb attack in protest.

Gee, ya think the French have something to worry about? American Moslems seem like they are on the road to being Americans just like others who have come to our shores. I see veiled Moslem women driving mini-vans here. One day, in our country, the end of the Moslem Ramadan fasting period will signal a three-day blowout furniture sale. Perhaps I’m too optimistic on this, but that’s how I see it.

The French can’t allow their Moslem minority to remain unassimilated. It really would be better to have French Moslems thinking like Parisians rather than Islamists.

Really.

“Immovable Object?” (Posted January 18, 2004)

Iranian hard-line mullahs are sticking to their guns to deny anyone unacceptable to them from running for the powerless offices at stake in the elections:

The Guardian Council, an unelected body controlled by hard-liners, has disqualified more than a third of the 8,200 people who applied to run in the Feb. 20 elections.

The only question is whether the long-frustrated opposition will prove to be the unstoppable force that challenges the Guardian Council.

This could be interesting”

Iran's 27 provincial governors have vowed to resign by Monday unless the disqualifications are reversed.

And it occurred to me that we are still holding the Iranian opposition forces known as MEK. I noted and forgot from a Coalition briefing that thousands are still being held. Are we vetting them to make sure only good guys are still there when the civil war breaks out in Iran? Could these guys be the Iranians we go in with to make up for the error of not having properly trained friendly Iraqis with out forces when we went in?

This editorial makes the common mistake of believing that as long as the people see their rulers as awful they’ll turn out just fine. Any effort on our part to help the people will turn them into raving Islamists:

Since the clerics' vessel is sinking of its own accord, Bush should avoid any interventionist measures that the hard-liners might be able to use to legitimate their rule, rallying Iranians to them under the banner of nationalism. The longer the misrule of the mullahs goes on, the more Iran's youth are alienated from both the hard-line clerics and those figures such as the ineffectual President Mohammad Khatami who want to preserve the current system by making it only marginally less repressive.

Never mind the ruthless killers that the government wields, Never mind the torture chambers. Never mind the sheer power of terror to over-awe the dissatisfied but atomized citizenry. Never mind that sinking on their own accord could take decades more. Sometimes victims need help.

I still think we plan on taking action in spring 2005, but targets of opportunity will always be possible.

Remember, Iran is on the Axis of Evil for a reason.

That fact is not forgotten. Not by us anyway.

“Good Multilateralism” (Posted January 18, 2004)

Nations are banding together to stop trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. US and Spanish forces practiced boarding and seizing a ship.

Of course, we’ve already seen one example of seizing a ship (though far less dramatic) that some say might have been more important to getting Libya to agree to end its nuclear program than years of talking (thanks to Instapundit):

The capture by the United States of thousands of centrifuges on board a German-owned vessel, the BBC China, en route to Libya has raised suspicions in Washington and London that Col Gaddafi offered to abandon his weapons programme after threats from America, rather than the lengthy British and American diplomacy vaunted by Tony Blair.

And imagine, seizing Khaddafi’s WMD equipment didn’t “humiliate” him so much that Khaddafi refused to talk. It didn’t just make him take a hard line.

Nope. Scared the living daylights out of him.

“If Only We Were Less Unilateralist” (Posted January 17, 2004)

We will transfer power to Iraqis by July. I worry this could be too soon, but keep an open mind. I just don’t think we should be pushed by a few protests that probably don’t represent more than, oh, the protesters themselves. Articles and broadcasts that claim that Iraq’s Shias want fast elections seem overblown to me. For some, the power of those committed enough to march and chant trumps the actual majority. Let’s not accept that thinking.

Anyway, for all those who claim we should have more international help (read that “France”):

France has offered to share expertise with Iraqi police after the U.S.-led coalition hands power to an Iraqi transitional government on July 1. But [de Villepin] said the question of sending in French troops is "not a current topic."

As long as I’m ranting, this article says of our efforts to get the UN to help in the transition:

Seeking the help of the United Nations is an ironic shift for the administration, which sought to keep U.N. participation at a minimum before and during the U.S.-led war last year that deposed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and ended his dictatorial rule.

Just what were we doing in the fall of ’02 and spring of ’03?

In addition, 3 American soldiers and two Iraqi civil defense people were killed by a blast. I think the first US KIA since Monday.

And the Japanese are arriving in the area. Too bad they don’t count as much as the French.

“Needed Clarity” (Posted January 17, 2004)

Two good thing that clarify the Taiwan issue. One clarifies our caution on Taiwanese actions by reminding the Chinese that we will fight if necessary:

Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded two days of talks with senior Chinese military leaders Thursday and said they understand "very clearly" that the United States "will resist any attempt to use coercion" to resolve the status of Taiwan.

On the other hand, after the Taiwanese heeded our concerns and toned down their proposed referendum, the Chinese clarify to us that they see democracy on Taiwan as unacceptable:

“Potemkin Country” (Posted January 17, 2004)

This guy really is an idiot and doesn’t understand that the North Koreans will set up elaborate deceptions to show fake shoppers and drivers for a few hours in order to fool gullible Westerners:

An unofficial U.S. delegation to North Korea last week saw a vibrant and thriving capital, with the main market in Pyongyang selling clothes, vegetables, meat and electronics, according to a former State Department official who was part of the delegation.

"I was stunned by the activity," Charles L. Pritchard said at a briefing organized by the Brookings Institution. He said there were many vehicles on the street, compared with almost none a few years ago.

Pritchard said the visit indicated that change is occurring in one of the world's most closed societies, even during a crisis over its nuclear ambitions, and that North Korea is far from economic collapse.

Pritchard resigned as senior North Korea specialist from the State Department in August after failing to persuade Washington to engage in direct talks with Pyongyang.

He said yesterday North Korean officials warned that delay in resolving the crisis will only give Pyongyang more time to build a nuclear arsenal.

"Time is not on the U.S. side," Pritchard quoted Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan as saying during nine hours of talks. "Lapses of time will result in quantitative and qualitative increases in our nuclear deterrent."

But at least the article shows his pedigree.

But what really makes me wonder is Prichard’s emphasis that time is not on America’s side so we better start shoveling money at the North Koreans (Ok, he didn’t day that but I think the official State Department dictionary shows “engage” to mean “shovel money.”)

If time is on our side, why on Earth would the North Korean’s warn us of that? One would think that if time was on their side they’d just let time pass to get a better deal.

No, North Korea is teetering and they want some dupe to think that everything is just fine in North Korea and improving, and America is foolish not to take Pyongyang up on its generous offer to agree to halt nuclear programs (as opposed to actually halting them) in exchange for money and treaties.

Screw them. Time is on our side.

“A Way to Fail” (Posted January 17, 2004)

We are not powerless in the battle to shape Iraq. I don’t know if we will just give in to whoever has the loudest protesters. but this is a worry:

We are now making the Afghans and the Iraqis pay a terrible price for American political correctness, and the price is being exacted by our diplomats and misnamed "strategists." The fundamental error — enshrined, as the splendid Diane Ravitch has recently explained in her stellar work on American history textbooks — is the belief that American political and civic culture is just one among many, no better and quite likely considerably worse, than most. Hence we have no right to tell anyone, here or elsewhere, how they should behave.

We really can and should insist that the laws follow our ideas of freedom and democracy. We really should help our friends in Iraq who share these views and work against those who oppose it.

We’ve come a long sad way from the days when we had the confidence of our superiority to write the Japanese constitution and secretly funnel money to the Italian Christian Democrats to keep the communists from winning elections.

“Memo to State Department” (Posted January 17, 2004)

To State Department employees, if you can’t carry out the President’s foreign policy you do have an alternative to undermining it. Said South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon on his resignation over subordinates’ failure to carry out government policies:

“Diplomats are people who implement the president's philosophy on state affairs by serving as his hands and feet," Yoon said. "In that sense, I feel deeply sorry."

I’m just saying.

“We’re Still At War” (Posted January 17, 2004)

It is too soon to declare victory and get back to normal domestic politics. Are terrorists actively trying to execute a large-scale attack in Baghdad? Possibly with chemical weapons? According to this article, yes.

“No Gas” (Posted January 17, 2004)

I already noted that even if real, the mortar shells wouldn’t be the “smoking gun” of WMD since they were likely of Iran-Iraq War vintage. Tests show they did not contain Mustard gas:

The U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group conducted tests on five of 36 shells found Friday and all came up negative, the Danish army said Wednesday in a statement from Copenhagen. Those results contradicted Danish and British field tests that were positive for a blister agent.

"Based on the tests, the experts conclude that none of the shells contain chemical warfare agents," the Danish army statement said, adding that more studies are needed for final confirmation.

The earliest results may have been positive because tests by troops in the field are designed to favor a positive reading, erring on the side of caution to protect soldiers.

The important thing to remember is that all these months after the fall of Baghdad we are still finding weapons. We’ll find what we are looking for.

“The Value of Boots on the Ground” (Posted January 13, 2004)

Excellent lengthy post from Strategypage.com (site down at this moment). One part (which I emailed to myself, luckily, to remind me to post on it) is all I’ll quote. The Air Force thinks it can win our wars by itself. This frustrates me. Our air guys are awesome and indispensable, but they have a serious attitude problem:

The air force won't give up. Ever since becoming a separate service in 1947, the air generals have sought ways to avoid being seen as just a supporting service for the army. But unless there are some dramatic changes in the way wars are fought, the army will remain the key service.

Even the U.S. Navy recognizes this, which is why the navy tolerated the growth of it's tiny Marine Corps a century ago until it became one of the most formidable ground combat forces on the planet. The navy understands that there are limits to what ships and aircraft can accomplish. Often, you have to "send in the marines" to settle a situation once and for all. For larger operations, you need an army. While death from above can be deadly and intimidating, there's nothing more compelling than a guy standing right in front of you, pointing a rifle at your head.

Works every time

Personally, I think we need to upgrade the Marines for mobile high-intensity warfare. When was the last time somebody other than the Marine Corps was the major ground help for the United States Army?

“Iranian Nuclear Ambitions Not Suspended” (Posted January 13, 2004)

Not too surprising, Iran has not actually suspended its nuclear activities:

Tehran, under fire over U.S. allegations it is secretly developing atomic weapons, agreed last November to suspend all "enrichment-related activities" and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the suspension.

But Western diplomats told Reuters Iran has made it clear that it was only suspending activities that fell under its limited definition of the term "enrichment-related" and has therefore continued acquiring enrichment centrifuge machinery.

They say Iran maintains it would only breach the accord if it actually enriched uranium, not just acquired materials.

I say we promise to suspend all “invasion-related activities” per Tehran’s definitional framework and see how that goes.

But all in all, way to go EU diplomacy!

“If We Weren’t So Distracted …” (Posted January 12, 2004)

… We’d pay attention to obscure countries where al Qaeda might pop up and send experts to help them keep the bad guys out.

Oh my, that is exactly what we are doing:

The small team will be followed in coming months by U.S. Army experts and defense contractors, under a $100 million Bush administration anti-terror initiative for the Saharan nations of Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger.

The U.S. Pan-Sahel Initiative will provide 60 days of training to military units within the four nations, coaching them in everything from desert navigation to small-unit infantry tactical skills, said Lt. Col. M.J. Jadick, spokeswoman for the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

The initiative also will provide Toyota Land Cruisers, radios, and uniforms for the border efforts in the largely poor countries, a West Africa-based U.S. diplomatic official involved in the program said on condition of anonymity.

Another plastic turkey issue.

“Bad Trend?” (Posted January 12, 2004)

If the Shias as a whole are losing faith, as this story suggests, this would be bad. But numerous polls still show patience and support as I’ve read recently.

And, more important, these are critics who denied the Shias supported our overthrow of Saddam at all until a few protests allowed them to report that Shia support is waning.

Critical to watch this but don’t surrender yet.

Steady, lads. We’re winning this.

“Same Old Story” (Posted January 12, 2004)

Interesting story that illustrates an old lesson. US soldiers hired Iraqis to fashion add-on armor for our Humvees:

"I went to these guys with the design to fit our vehicles with some kind of reinforced steel and asked if they could build a prototype," Watson, a combat engineer with the Tikrit-based 4th Infantry Division, said recently. "They said they could, and after making a bid for the project, they won the tender."

The winning company, which belongs to Kirkuk businessman Delshat Peerot Aziz, has built and installed 8mm thick steel casings in the rear compartments of 100 Humvees and other vehicles where gun-toting soldiers sit. It also fitted new doors made of the same material onto each of the vehicles.

In peacetime, people forget that enemies shoot at you and try to lighten vehicles to make them “more mobile.” In war, people remember that a burned out 10-ton hulk is less mobile than an armored behemoth that shrugs off damage.

I hope the military takes this lesson to heart as it designs our future armored vehicles.

“The Price of Unilatralism” (Posted January 12, 2004)

The US is so unilateral and uninterested in allies that we’ve convinced the Japanese to set aside 50 years of pacifism to support us in Iraq with their military:

Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the impending Japanese deployment historic.

"It says to international terrorists that ... we, Japan, understand these risks, and we're willing to be there to do our part to make the world a safer place," Myers told reporters Monday during a visit to Tokyo.

One wonders what we might accomplish if we were less unilateralist, eh?

“Actual Suppression of Dissent” (Posted January 12, 2004)

As opposed to the faux chic oppression that anti-war types vocally and frequently assert they experience (yet none seek refuge in France), real oppression exists in—fancy this—one of the Axis of Evil countries:

Iran's reformist-run interior ministry -- charged with organising the February 20 ballot -- said the Council had rejected 44.2 percent of candidates, or 3,605 out of 8,157 who registered.

The interesting part:

The government was also risking collapse, with up to eight cabinet ministers reportedly preparing to resign and all of Iran's 27 provincial governors saying they will also quit unless the crisis is resolved within a week.

It would be really nice if this boils over and we get another Axis member off the pedestal this year.

“Another Plastic Turkey Story” (Posted January 12, 2004)

I can’t believe that the radio and TV shows are making a big deal of the revelation that Bush wanted Saddam gone in January 2001. I do believe he said during the campaign we’d be better off with him gone. I’m sure Congress passed and President Clinton signed an act to declare regime change in Iraq as our official policy. And I’m darned sure that our military had plans to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam since 1991—unless someone wants to argue that the prior administration ignored the 1998 law.

Now that just couldn’t be true.

“Government Plans” (Posted January 11, 2004)

The Iraqis will purge the country’s government offices of Baathists. Some will whine about this. But it will only target the top 56,000 or so. Instead of complaining about how the Shias and Kurds should just get over it and reconcile, remember this:

"How can you reconcile those laying dead in mass graves with those who killed them?"

How indeed?

And note they aren’t being killed, or jailed, or expelled. Just denied government jobs. The Baathists are getting better than they gave when they were stomping on people’s necks.

“War Plans” (Posted January 11, 2004)

A fired secretary unique in his failings, tries to cause a stir with a book that says:

"From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go," O'Neill told CBS's "60 Minutes" in an interview to be aired Sunday night.

I know it must be a shock to critics of the administration that Saddam was bad, needed to go, and the administration planned how to depose Saddam, possibly with an invasion.

I don’t know why anybody is seizing on the first two since except for the most extreme ANSWER types, everybody agreed Saddam was bad and had to go. The main disagreement was that the critics said we shouldn’t do anything and it was up to the Iraqi people to quit whining while they were being killed in industrial plastic shredders and rise up and do it themselves. (The critics complain we didn’t have strip malls in Iraq by June but on the issue of overthrowing Saddam they had the patience of a corpse)

We’ve planned for one of our two notional major theater conflicts to be Iraq since 1991 and somehow this is a shock. Perhaps most shocking to the critics is that our president followed the 1998 act that declared overthrowing Saddam is our national policy.

Following the law. How amazing, eh?

“Who Is Wrong?” (Posted January 11, 2004)

The New York Times argues that we were misled and wrong about Saddam’s WMD:

The article first mentions a Washington Post article that said we have found nothing and will find nothing because there was nothing. We’ll see. I think it is too early to say that. Sure, one scientist thinks there was nothing but how open was Iraq for discussing all of this amongst the people involved? The article also reported that Iraq’s missile programs were just CDs of information. What about the SA-2-based surface-to-surface missiles that Iraq was working on? What about the LA Times report that Iraq tried to import SA-2 engines from Poland? (that article failed to note this aspect of the engines)

The editorial also cites Pollard’s article in The Atlantic that asks where our intelligence went wrong. Pollard had argued for action against Saddam on the assumption that Saddam had WMD. The intelligence went back into the 1990s so we can’t blame the Bush administration. The one-year estimate of getting nuclear weapons always seemed to be to be a worst case estimate if Saddam could buy or steal enough nuclear weapons grade material. If not, they’d need years to process weapons grade material. Given our under-estimation of Saddam’s nuclear program in 1990, this was prudent.

The major part is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report. The authors are well-known leftists who argued stridently against the war in the months before we invaded. This is what the editorial said of the report:

Analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also found that three intelligence services that are arguably the best in the world — those of the United States, Britain and Israel — were tragically unable to provide accurate information on Iraq. But the Carnegie experts are even harsher in condemning the administration for deliberate exaggerations. They argue that the intelligence community gave reasonably cautious assessments up until mid-2002, when official statements and estimates suddenly became increasingly alarmist. The Carnegie analysts accuse the Bush administration of putting intense pressure on intelligence experts to conform, of minimizing the existence of dissenting views, and of routinely dropping caveats and uncertainties in painting a worst-case picture.

The Carnegie people are not terribly credible to me.

So, three of the best intel agencies concluded Saddam had WMD. Carnegie’s conclusion? The agencies were wrong. What if the agencies were right? Could we not yet find out what happened to the WMD? We did give Saddam and those who supplied the components plenty of time to scrub the country as we pursued the UN route.

As for the intelligence summaries that had not been too alarmist before summer 2002 (although they were alarmist enough to lead President Clinton to launch an air assault in 1998), the Carnegie troika says that the assessments became alarmist because of pressure to conform to administration views. Hmm. Since the administration allegedly wanted to nail Saddam from day one, why didn’t the assessments change in January 2001? And wasn’t there a little thing that happened in September 11, 2001 that might have led analysts to think about threats a little differently? And couldn’t the pressure to conform have been from the previous administration that didn’t want to do anything serious about the Iraqi threat? Couldn’t the caveats have been designed to give the Clinton administration an excuse not to do anything? (Although any caveats weren’t enough to argue against action in 1998 as I noted, or, for that matter, enough to lift sanctions from 1999 to December 2000.)

I too want to know about why our intel people did not know what Saddam had at the moment we invaded. But it is too early to tell if we were wrong all along or if we were right up to a certain point and then failed to discover the changes in the situation.

I think we will find what we are looking for. Prime Minister Blair agrees:

Blair said he believed the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group would find evidence of the weapons' existence, saying inspectors have found extensive evidence of concealment operations.

Blair the British Broadcasting Corp. that it would have been "irresponsible not to have acted upon" prewar intelligence that Saddam's regime had weapons of mass destruction.

"You can only imagine what would have happened if I'd ignored the intelligence and then something terrible had happened," he said,

And of course, the editorial’s statement that we’ve come up with nothing after 9 months is humorously wrong given the report on Mustard gas-filled mortar shells dug up in Iraq. Yes, they are old. But they have remained hidden since we captured the area in March of 2003. Surely, we would have found them within days of controlling the ground, shouldn’t we have?

“American Soldiers” (Posted January 10, 2004)

A good piece on the fine young soldiers who defend us:

The average army trooper is, compared to the general population, younger, more male, healthier and more physically fit, better educated, more law abiding and more conservative.

Read if you think the poor and minorities are compelled by economic necessity to defend those of us in comfy civilian lives.

“Korean Options” (Posted January 10, 2004)

I don’t like Kristoff much. Not really sure why. In this piece he is unhappy with our policy toward North Korea:

An administration that was panicked about Iraq's virtually nonexistent nuclear programs is blasé as North Korea reprocesses plutonium, enriches uranium and gets set to produce up to 200 atomic weapons by 2010. North Korea balances its budget by counterfeiting American $100 bills, so counting on its scruples not to sell a nuclear warhead to terrorists seems a dangerous bet.

First of all, Kristoff compares a worst case estimate of North Korean nuclear advances with the apparent best case of Iraq—nothing much. Gee, isn’t he also complaining that we did assume worst case for Iraq? After all, aren’t we assuming our intelligence reports on North Korea are correct? And I still think we will find more in Iraq or find what happened to them. The Dutch discovery may not pan out but one day one of them will.

He says he is “appalled” that we have let the situation get worse. Let’s see, North Korea was quietly working on nuclear weapons and now we have exposed them and gained support from allies and neighbors to confront them. This is worse? It isn’t good yet, but that’s why we are trying to do something.

What would Kristoff have us do? Go back to paying North Korea for not developing nukes (or whatever specific nuke programs they agree to halt) and then wait to see what loophole or interpretation they are exploiting to work on something just as bad? Maybe we invade? Maybe we bomb for a couple weeks? Kristoff at least has the courtesy to admit our options are bad.

So Kristoff offers no solutions. He at least says that rewarding bad behavior is bad. So the Clinton policy is apparently off the table despite his complaint that we have let the situation get worse. In the end, Kristoff is upset that he haven’t solved the problem last week.

Sorry, dude, this is a tough one. And we have a policy. Squeeze North Korea and gather allies to pressure them to halt and reverse their nuclear programs. Would it be nice if North Korea collapsed? Yeah (though South Korea would disagree). Are we counting on it as Kristoff alleges? I don’t think so. If we and our allies can get North Korea to disarm, we’ll do it. It isn’t a pleasant option to leave the North Korean people in that gulag, but the price of liberation is too high unless Pyongyang chooses war.

Plus, the Islamist threat is worse and I worried more about Iraq supplying WMD to terrorists than I worry about North Korea doing it. We have enough to do in the Moslem world without exhausting ourselves on coping with a problem that is really isolated and should be more of a worry to South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia.

And, as I’ve said often enough before, stopping the nutjob from getting his first nuke trumps stopping the nutjob from getting his third.

So basically Kristoff is voicing unhappiness at the situation.

Welcome to the club.

“Strategic Victory” (Posted January 10, 2004)

Pakistan and India seem serious about talking peace:

The United States is claiming no credit for the recent moves by Indian and Pakistani leaders toward resumed peace talks, but it wants to encourage them, an American diplomat said Saturday.

If we can get India and Pakistan to resolve their differences so we can befriend both, it will be a tremendous victory for us. We’d end the threat of a nuclear was that would likely shake the world into an economic spiral and destroy millions of lives. We’d likely get a Pakistan better able to focus its economy on its people and not its military and so gain breathing space to combat Islamists and help us more in Afghanistan. We’d gain an ally with India better able to face off with China. Face it, China would not be too sad to see India go toe to toe in a nuclear war with Pakistan. With peace, China has more problems to its west—an India allied with the US and a US free to expand in central Asia with Pakistan’s help.

We may not be claiming credit, but who cares? Like so many other successes that we have witnessed in the last two years, critics will say we had nothing to do with it. All just coincidences, right? Success despite our administration, huh? At worst, the administration hasn’t been so awful that it halted lots of good developments.

At best some credit is due.

“Chemical Shells” (Posted January 10, 2004)

This would be nice if it pans out:

A Danish official in the city of Basra said troops had uncovered 36 120mm mortars on Friday and had asked British specialists to analyze them.

"The first inspections have shown that the mortars contain some liquid," he said. "We don't now what sort of liquid or the age of the mortars."

In Baghdad, the U.S. military said the mortar rounds had been found buried 45 miles south of Al-Amara, north of Basra.

"Most were wrapped in plastic bags, and some were leaking," Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt told a news conference, adding that it was likely the weapons were left over from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.

I’ve seen false alarms before so this could be another. Yeah, they may be old, but the important thing to remember if this pans out is that they were hidden under our noses since we captured the region in the war. What else is out there? Of more recent vintage?

In time, we will find what we are looking for.

“Exactly!” (Posted January 8, 2004)

As I’ve said before, why are the anti-American folks still called “anti-war” protesters when the war is over and the Baathists are persisting in attacking? Mark Steyn puts it well:

The real story of this past year is not Saddam, but something deeper, symbolised by the bizarre persistence of the "anti-war" movement even after the war was over. For a significant chunk of the British establishment and for most of the governing class on the Continent, if it's a choice between an America-led West or no West at all they'll take the latter. That's the trend to watch in the year ahead.

I really am curious to see how long the media goes along with the bizarre fantasy that people urging on the Baathists to detonate bombs and kill Iraqis and Americans can be called “anti-war.”

“Pakistan in the Balance” (Posted January 8, 2004)

Pakistan is turning out to be an important proliferator of nuclear know how. It already has nuclear weapons and we also need Pakistan to hunt down al Qaeda operatives in the border areas. There’s also that small matter of trying to keep India and Pakistan from engaging in the first nuclear war.

On the nuclear issue:

The burning question is whether Pakistan has morphed into a rogue nuclear state, or is the unwitting victim of a handful of deranged army generals, intelligence officers, and mad nuclear scientists run amok.

I think Musharraf wants to work with us. But without our pressure, he wouldn’t move since he has enough to worry about. But we are pushing now.

His forces are working on the Afghan border.

He is working to defuse the India-Pakistan Kashmir issue. If this front can be defused, Pakistan could possibly step back from nuclear advances and work harder with us to secure the nuclear weapons they have.

“American Atrocity?” (Posted January 8, 2004)

Instapundit noted that there is an accusation that American soldiers committed murder. As I emailed to the Instapundit (which he posted):

Brian Dunn is also skeptical:

Certainly, if true, the guilty should be punished. It is unacceptable both from a mission standpoint and a moral standpoint.

But this part makes no sense: "Zaydun's cousin said that the soldiers were drunk and looked tired, and that during their ride they even chatted and joked with one of the soldiers who spoke a little Arabic. After he managed to get out of the water he remained hidden because he could see that the unit was searching for them using flashlights and he was scared to death."

That's pretty terrible light discipline. Would they really be on a mission without night vision apparatus? Would they really give away their position if potential snipers were in the area? This is a dangerous area of Iraq after all.

I'm just saying it doesn't make much sense. And there is always a ready audience for tales of American atrocities out there (and here, too, for that matter).

Really, that flashlight thing just leapt out at me. Other commentators have mentioned other problems but this one really seemed bad. I was but a reservist who never saw any action and even I remembered the lessons from basic training about not giving away your position at night. Soldiers who own the night don’t rent it out to any yahoo with Mark I eyeballs, an AK, and a desire to kill Americans.

Yes, there are some bad guys in the American military. I’ve even seen them. But we have darned fewer than most armies. And this accusation just rings false. Just as the ridiculous Tailwind accusations seemed absurd and indeed were shown to be false.

Oh, and I violated a rule of mine—never email without linking to my site. So all I got was a personal credit and nothing about The Dignified Rant. Oh well.

“Iraq WMD” (Posted January 7, 2004)

The Washington Post article shouts “Iraq’s Arsenal Was Only on Paper.” Perhaps now, after giving the Iraqis plenty of time to hide and destroy what they had, but I don’t buy the argument that Iraq had less than zero as one scientist put it. Even if the war in 1991, the embargo, and the 1998 air campaign crippled the Iraqi infrastructure, they still had the scientists and technicians. The brainpower and know-how were key.

But another article, from Strategypage, that will get much less press disputes the “paper” assertion. The Russians may have helped zero out the physical evidence. Bottom line:

It is most likely that some weapons remain in Iraq, and the search should go on. For example, one search team found Mig-25s warplanes hidden in the desert. But pressure must be put on Syria. It appears that the most high-level personnel are aware of these facts, as David Kay has confirmed that he had reports of WMD components going to Syria and that Saddam sent convoys full of unidentified Iraqi equipment to Syria just prior to war. A large chunk of the WMD expertise and workers have fled to Syria and elsewhere, and no one knows what they took with them. The head of the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency has also confirmed the increase in traffic to Syria before the war, and recently there have been reports that Coalition forces are focusing in on Syria’s northern al-Jazirah province, specifically the desert portion in between the Iraqi and Turkish borders. It is now believed some banned weapons are buried there.

Now, some say that questionable sources such as Debkafile are the only source for this information. That is simply not true, in fact, a Syrian journalist, famous for his awards in journalistic integrity, has defected and given exact locations of the weapons in Syria. Other sources reporting the general theme, with different details without contradiction, include Jane’s Foreign Report, Middle East Newsline, Geostrategy-Direct.com, WorldTribune.com, and the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. The New York Post and New York Times have also reported on the testimony of former Iraqi scientists indicating some banned weapons went to Syria. From hours of research, I have concluded that at least the general theme of the story is indeed correct.

We have much to learn. I still think we will find the smoking gun. If the Kay report wasn’t damning enough, we’ll get the goods yet. We gave Saddam time. I think he used it.

“Balancing Act Continues” (Posted January 7, 2004)

It is getting quiet in Tikrit:

Following months of multiple attacks, the number and strength of daily hits has decreased in the face of a heavy U.S. military presence and the humiliating circumstances of Saddam's capture.

We erred in hoping that Sunni Iraqis would cooperate after the resistance seemed to die down at the end of July. We were wrong and we ramped up the offensive after the spike in Iraqi Baathist attacks in the fall. As one American battalion commander in Tikrit said:

We have never taken the approach of handing out lollipops in the hope that they would like us," he said of residents of the town 100 miles north of Baghdad. "That doesn't work in this city. Different populations need different treatment."

It is too early to tell if this is a real trend or just a false dawn, but our people over there think it could be moving in our direction.

As we continue to hammer resisters, we are also offering hope to those who are neutral:

U.S. authorities in Iraq will release 506 low-level Iraqi prisoners while increasing the bounties for fugitives suspected of major roles in attacks against coalition forces, the top American civilian official in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, said Wednesday.

It is a balancing act between carrots and sticks.

“Target: Iran” (Posted January 7, 2004)

On top of Iran’s nuclear programs we have this news:

Iran said Tuesday that it will launch a satellite with its own rocket within 18 months. "We will be the first Islamic country with the technology to launch a satellite into space," Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani told state-run television.

If anybody thinks that Iran really needs satellites… no—I can’t believe anybody does. The ability to loft satellites into orbit means you have the ability to launch warheads across the globe.

We have to do something about Iran and the EU initiatives to negotiate with the mullahs are doomed to failure.

Iranians themselves are unhappy with their mullah government and tired of the impotent reformers. This writer, an Iranian career diplomat, believes the reformers need to turn out for the parliamentary elections next month and win. I disagree. I think the fascist Islamists need to win. The Iranian people need to see that there is no hope for reforming the thugs in power and their bully boy allies that increasingly are foreign mercenaries.

Our people going in to help with the Bam earthquake were swamped with good will.

I read that the mullahs arrested some Iranian military people passing secrets to us. The situation in Iran could be ripe for exploitation:

The government says it arrested several Iranians, apparently soldiers, and accused them of working for the CIA and sending secret information over the Internet. While the Islamic conservatives control the police and an armed Islamic militia, the armed forces are not under their control and have been a source of opposition to the Islamic conservatives. There were several cases of Iranian navy ships exchanging salutes with American naval ships during, and since, the recent Iraq war. Iranian army troops on the border have cooperated with American troops operating on the Iraqi side. The defeat of Saddam's government, and the capture of Saddam himself, was very popular inside Iran, and particularly inside the Iranian armed forces. The Islamic conservatives who control the justice system and police, see the armed forces as a source of support in a future civil war remove the veto powers the Islamic conservative minority has over the rest of the country.

The Iranian military is fairly friendly to us and I hope we can turn it when the leadership is presented with a hopelessly corrupt and vicious regime entrenched in power, people pro-American in orientation, and an America that will unilaterally destroy the nuclear facilities of Iran if we have to.

I think we will go after Iran in the spring of 2005. Our elections will be safely over. Our military will be refurbished, with 3^rd ID and 101^st Airborne possibly reconfigured by then into the smaller brigade format.

Plus, we will be getting ready for another force rotation in Iraq. In the spring of 2004, we will be rotating a lot of troops into and out of Iraq, nearly doubling our forces for a few months. A year later, in 2005, this will look routine and if we send in 3^rd ID and 101^st AB and maybe an armored cavalry regiment, they could use the cover of replacing garrison forces in Iraq to get in place to attack into Iran in support of the Iranian military in a coup against the mullahs.

In this light, Powell’s soft talk is to buy time while we get ready. There is no point in talking tough as long as we are far from acting. Why provoke them into speeding up?

All speculation of course. Just hunches. And my hunches on the big Jordan front didn’t pan out so I should be cautious. But I don’t think we are going to let Iran go. We are at war and I think our President is deadly serious about winning. And this requires us to take down the mullahs. A pure invasion would be too tough and expensive. Air attacks too dicey. Supporting a coup too likely to fail in the face of tough mullahs. But intervening in a civil war? That could work.

What the Hell: Iran in the spring of 2005.

“More Evidence of Good Trends” (Posted January 6, 2004)

From Strategypage:

Ambushes, including roadside bombs, have become smaller and less frequent. There were 250 of them in November, 200 in December and the trend continues. The amount of explosives (often several artillery and mortar shells rigged to explode) has declined to the point were many of the bombs do little damage unless a vehicle is right next to it. Raids have seized a lot of bomb making material over the last few months. Better scouting and surveillance by American troops has caused the bombers to place their explosives among civilians, but this usually just hurts more Iraqis than Americans. The supply convoys are only attacked once or twice a day, and usually without much effect. Most of the ambushes are of combat patrols or civil affairs troops going about their business (visiting local Iraqi leaders and aid projects.)

Fewer and poorer quality attacks. The apparent trend is very good.

NPR displayed its bias today. When attacks increased, the reporters spoke of quagmire and growing resistance. When attacks are decreasing noticeably in quantity and quality, the NPR reporter says that we “claim” that we are making progress. Can’t be too careful with objectivity. We might be lying about that progress, right?

Most reporters know so little about military matters that it is frightening that they have the responsibility of reporting on such matters. Embedding was their high point and damn few are up to the job now.

“Writing New Rules” (Posted January 6, 2004)

Our decision to offer help to the poor souls of Bam who died in the tens of thousands was right for humanitarian reasons and right for the long-term benefit of Iranians (and us). Iranians have seen the corruption of the mullahs and now they have seen the bloody results of that corruption. An invisible Imam would protect Bam, they were told.

Instead, 30,000 or more died.

And the Great Satan that the mullahs have railed against came in planes to offer help. In contrast to the hatred and anger that greeted Iranian rulers who visited Bam and pretended to give a damn, Iranians were ecstatic at the symbol of our presence on Iranian soil:

Though the European aid workers are treated with respect, they also receive a great deal of aloofness. The arrival of a U.S. colonel and his aides in Hercules C130 military transport planes, however, proved to be a raging success. Iranians had gathered in the Kerman airport to greet them with arms full of flowers, shouting, "AMRIKAAYEE...KHOSH AMADEE" (American, you're welcome). Iranians hugged them and hung on to them as if their "saviors" had come. Departing Americans were met with pleas from the crowd, begging them to stay. One of the American aid workers involved said that she was shocked and deeply moved to receive such a reception.

Yet so many in the West think we can work with the Iranian mullah/killers. Many think that the Iranian people should fight the guns, torture chambers, jails, and courts of the mullahs unaided.

The day of reckoning is coming. The mullahs pretend to cooperate with Europe over prohibited nuclear programs but the mullahs will show their true colors. We will gain the support for regime change or, if we fail to do that, massive aerial attacks to destroy the nuclear infrastructure of the mullahs. We have time. We may talk to the mullahs for now, but we are playing by our rules that seek results—not the European rules that seek talks for the sake of talk.

Target: Iran in 2005.

“Learning the New Rules” (Posted January 6, 2004)

Some progress on North Korea that did not require our immediate surrender to their ranting demands:

North Korea's explicit offer to suspend its nuclear power program as well as to refrain from testing or making nuclear weapons went further than a Dec. 9 statement in which Pyongyang generally offered to freeze its "nuclear activities."

I’m sure the Pyongyang Certifiables are shocked that their threats and refusal to talk haven’t been met by new offers of money and help, with a good apology thrown in for good measure, from Washington.

Instead, the noose is tightening with Iraq down, Iran feeling the heat, Libya turning state’s evidence, and Western nations willing to help squeezing North Korea with naval forces interdicting their criminal and nuclear enterprises.

I’ve got to believe that being an extortionist psychopathic dictator has to really suck nowadays. The new rules make it hard for them to win.

"United States Army Europe" (Posted January 6, 2004)

Military Review published an article of mine on reconfiguring US Army Europe, entitled "Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption."

And to my surprise, the Army promoted me. Although my resume and bio only mentioned a BA and MA, I am listed incorrectly as having a PhD. Remember, Doctor Dunn has a master's degree—in history. And I was an E-4 in the Army National Guard. And to make it really clear, I was more familiar with a coffee pot than anything even remotely associated with Delta Force (although I assume they drink coffee too).

To further burst this bubble, I wrote the first draft of the article in August 2001 in a pub in downtown Ann Arbor.

An editor stated the online version will be corrected and a correction will go in the paper issue next time. So by the time you read this, the online resume fluff may be gone. Whew.

This article is several revisions (and rejections) later. It is amazing really, to think about all the events since I penned the first draft. 9-11. The Taliban War. The Iraq War. The clear intention of achieving regime change when we go to war. The proclamation of a strategy of preemption to defeat threats before they can become real. The basic thrust remained constant throughout these events and decisions.

Mostly the article reflects my concern that "mere" soldiers (and Marines to a lesser degree) are replaceable by air power and missiles enhanced with GPS. This thinking made the heavy corps in Germany too vulnerable to budget cutters.

Anyway, I'm happy to have something published on paper. It's been awhile. This inspires me to be more diligent on that side of the ledger and less focused on the blog side of writing.

We'll see.

“People Confused—Part II" (Posted January 5, 2004)

US and Iraqi forces raid a mosque and find that the good holy men have stockpiled weapons and explosives. Some might say that they wished to use those weapons to kill American soldiers or our Iraqi friends. Those same holy men then claim that our soldiers ripped up a Koran.

One would think the good holy men would have a bit of a credibility problem.

But no, some think that the accusation could be true.

So we show film showing the fine behavior of our troops in the raid.

So what does one bright reporter focus on?

[BG] Kimmitt was asked whether he was concerned that images of U.S. soldiers raiding a mosque might provoke anger, rather than refute accusations of misconduct. He said he was struck not by "the fact that we had soldiers in a mosque, but the fact that a holy site, a holy mosque ... is being used as an arms cache."

What does it take for the US to get the benefit of the doubt in some circles?

Seriously.

“People Confused—Part I” (Posted January 5, 2004)

The North Koreans are a tad upset with us:

North Korea on Monday blamed Washington's stance for the delay in scheduling a new round of talks and rejected as unfair U.S. demands that it first irreversibly and verifiably disarm.

Unfair?

Let’s read on:

The North Korean nuclear crisis flared in October 2002 when U.S. officials accused North Korea of running a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of a 1994 deal in which North Korea is obliged to freeze its nuclear facilities. Washington and its allies cut off free oil shipments, also part of the 1994 accord.

So we are being unfair to insist that North Korea at least go back to the 1994 freeze that they violated? We’re supposed to just say, oh well, you got away with 9 years of cheating. Oopsy! My bad. Should have been watching you closer.

Screw ‘em.

More specifically, isolate them and squeeze them until the SOBs crack and fall.

“Predictions” (Posted January 5, 2003)

This is what Diehl writes:

Yet, looking back at what Washington's foreign policy community expected from an intervention in Iraq, it's striking how much of the trouble the U.S. mission now faces was accurately and publicly predicted.

On my desk is a pile of more than a dozen studies and pieces of congressional testimony on the likely conditions of postwar Iraq, prepared before the invasion by think tanks of the left, center and right, by task forces of veteran diplomats and area experts, and by freelancing academics.

What a crock. Oh, sure, I bet Diehl does have more than a dozen studies that predict what we are facing.

But what of all the predictions that did not come true? The refugees? Starvation? Disease? Nationalist resistance? Chemical use on our troops? A nuclear war? Last ditch defense of Baghdad? A long war lasting 6 months before we could take Baghdad? The Arab or Moslem “street” rising up?

Didn’t happen, you say? Funny how those studies aren’t on Diehl’s desk.

Just remember the chaos of post-war Germany and Japan after all those years of studying the problems.

We’re doing just fine, thank you. Errors and all, we’re doing just fine.

Oh, and I swear to God I’ll blow a gasket if one more idiot claims we disbanded a functioning Iraqi army back in May. Repeat after me: it wasn’t there. Gone. Self-disbanded.

“Misplaced Humanitarianism” (Posted January 4, 2004)

The UN guy says”

The humanitarian community continues to press for more access and more freedom to monitor the effectiveness of multilateral assistance. Until its demands for the sort of working environment that prevails in other beneficiary countries are met, doubts will persist in the minds of donors. But we have clearly demonstrated that the vulnerable are better off for having us in North Korea.

He thinks politics should not prevent the saving of lives.

I don’t know, but I think saving lives requires more analysis than he provides.

What if we provide enough aid that the North Koreans don’t collapse, and so build nukes and then sell or use them?

What if the food we send is keeping the army loyal? And they invade the South?

What if we instead send aid to other starving countries that aren’t threatening us? And Countries that we don’t have to hope will gain access and the ability to monitor what we send? Wouldn’t we be more sure that those vulnerable people were getting food?

Do I think we should cut off North Korea from humanitarian aid? No. But it is not for short-term humanitarian reasons. I want to string the North Koreans along until they collapse without firing a shot. A long slow decline may demoralize them and sap them of the will to lash out in defeat. Just like the Soviets went down.

Are North Koreans better off with what little may be getting through to them? Perhaps. Would those people be even better off with Kim Jong Il’s regime gone? You bet.

I’d also like to see the UN admit that Iraqis are better off for having us in Iraq.

“Another Future Begins” (Posted January 4, 2004)

Iraqis will soon be on the road to self-government:

The United States begins the complicated political, economic and security transfer with a general framework and a June 30 deadline for completion. But critical details are still being negotiated between the Iraqis and U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer, some of which could determine whether the new Iraqi government is ultimately embraced by the majority of Iraq's 22 million people.

As I’ve argued before, getting Iraqis responsible for their future binds them to us. This is true whether it is security, governing, or trying Baathists for crimes.

We don’t need to turn over a perfectly peaceful Iraq to the Iraqis. It is way better now than before and once authority for all these things are transferred, we can scale back our military presence and transform our units remaining into garrisons that watch foreign enemies and act as a reserve in case government forces get in trouble.

Remember, lots of countries struggle against rebels or terrorists of one sort or another without bothering us at all.

“Afghanistan” (Posted January 4, 2004)

When I read recently that the constitutional discussions in Afghanistan were halted despite the fact that the majority Pashtuns liked it because northern factions walked out, I wasn’t too worried. I figured, if our allies from the Afghanistan Campaign are unhappy, we can work it out.

Success has been achieved:

Observers said it was vital for the constitution to command broad support, and analysts have voiced concern that Karzai's reliance on the support of his fellow Pashtuns could make him a partisan figure in the eyes of the country's myriad minorities.

Now we can move forward rebuilding in earnest.

“Homecoming” (Posted January 4, 2004)

A company of Army Reserve Military Police has come home from Iraq.

They lost nobody in Iraq but now must become civilians again. And go back to weekend drills, too, a little reminder that their duty isn’t even over.

I am so thankful for what they have done and still do.

Like much of my military career (all of 8 years in the reserves), I have experienced but shadows of what they are feeling to give me an idea of what they have been through. I knew what it was like to worry about going to war.

I know what it is like to come home from Basic Training and back into civilian life without decompressing in a military school. I was Army-hardened though not war-hardened. It was weird to be Hooah one day and then sit in a Law Quad lounge the next.

Summer training, which seemed like an eternity for two weeks, was such a relief to get done with that it made the next weekend drill seem unjust. Going to drills after basic training one summer and signal school the next summer was even more troubling. Wasn’t I done?

I know what it was like to leave a new wife for several months and to worry about how she was handling the bills, and getting by on a PFC’s salary, and taking care of a cat that wasn’t really hers.

I just have shadows, like I said, that just hint to me what they are going through. But I don’t know at all, of course. And I’m glad I don’t know. But the shadows make my thanks all the more heartfelt.

Welcome home 443^rd.

“Global Warming” (Posted January 3, 2004)

Again, global warming is not a topic I really discuss. And I am interested primarily because, one, I don’t see the issue as anywhere near settled despite the cries of “fascist” if you wonder about the claims. Two, even if true the “cures” seem worse than the disease. Some tiny islands in the Pacific will be inundated? Why yes, let’s spend several multiple trillions of dollars and impoverish all of us to try and hold seas levels down. Or spend a million to airlift them to the mainland when (and if) their island dies. I may be off a bit on the exact figures but you get the idea on the ratio. Third, and this is why this is in National Security Affairs (although it might better be an annoying thing), we get beaten about the head and shoulders by foreign and domestic elites for refusing to “do something” about global warming and be a good global citizen. Fourth, I remember thirty years ago when the problem was supposed to be a new ice age caused by human activity. Oh well.

So Crichton’s speech on the lack of science in this supposedly scientific debate highlights a science community disgrace. Thanks to Instapundit for this one. Someone should explain the parable of the boy who cried wolf to the so-called scientists who peddle crud like this.

“Momentum?” (Posted January 2, 2004)

From a CPA press briefing, evidence of the tipping point being passed?

In the north, a former senior Ba'ath party member turned in 31 AK-47s to the Talifar police station.  This individual has turned in weapons before to include 79 AK-47s.  Additionally, other former high-ranking members of the Ba'ath party plan to publicly denounce violence and turn in weapons during a ceremony this Monday.  A media advisory for the event will be forthcoming.

Nobody in the press asked about this but it sure seems significant to me.

“More Evidence of Our Cowboy Mentality” (Posted January 2, 2004)

A success that has not earned a “Georgia in Crisis” logo on CNN:

One bright spot this new year is the former Soviet republic of Georgia, where careful diplomacy appears to have defused a potentially dangerous flashpoint between the United States and Russia.

The only question, really, is whether administration critics will ignore this success or deride it as a success “despite” the administration’s cowboy tendencies.

“Recognize Somaliland” (Posted January 2, 2004)

Periodically, America as the standard bearer of the West, is condemned for the “artificial” borders that divide Africa. These borders, drawn by Europeans, are said to be a major reason for the poverty in Africa.

Nonetheless, it is official policy of the Africans that the borders are sacrosanct.

It is time to end this situation where we are blamed for what we did not do. Somaliland seems like it is behaving like a well-ordered state:

At least a small part of the future of Africa is being played out in Somaliland, the northwest portion of Somalia that declared its independence in 1991. In its bustling but impoverished capital of Hargeysa, the most striking contrast with most African cities is the sense of order.

And not just order. There is democracy, too, with respect for elections:

In 2001, 98 percent of voters opted in a free and fair election for a new constitution that boldly proclaimed the case for independence. Somaliland then had successful, internationally monitored, local council elections in 2002 and a free and fair presidential election in April 2003. The presidential election was most notable because the ruling UDUB party, led by President Dahir Rayale Kahin, won by only 217 votes out of almost 500,000 cast. The opposition party KULMIYE challenged the tally but, in a moment of extraordinary responsibility given Somalia's history of having weapons resolve almost every conflict, eventually accepted the results. Somaliland is planning parliamentary elections this year (the legislature is currently appointed). At that point, it will have a far more impressive democracy than most African countries.

Recognize Somaliland. We have a task force looking for terrorists in the region. I bet a little bit of aid from us could do wonders for the people of Somaliland and for our foreign policy. Is Somaliland perfect? No, as the article concedes. But it’s a damn sight better than other places in Africa where we commit our resources.

“Our Friends (Like These)” (Posted January 2, 2004)

Max Boot thinks we need to deal harshly with our duplicitous friends in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia:

The superficially reassuring thing about Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is that the leaders of both countries, Crown Prince Abdullah and President Pervez Musharraf, have disassociated themselves from such extremist rhetoric. Both claim to be allies in the war on terror--and to some extent they have delivered by detaining some suspects and closing some bank accounts. But neither one has done nearly enough to crack down on the extremists who have penetrated their own governments.

Yes, we need to do something about these countries but when making an error with one could cause an economic tailspin and making an error with the other could spark the first nuclear war, I think some caution is in order. If things are going just ok rather than great, I am willing to accept that for now.

I think the best way to deal with scared or ambivalent friends in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is to constantly praise them—in their home countries and in their language so the locals hear it—for their thorough cooperation with us in the war on Islamism and terrorism. Laugh. Beam at them. Make no demands in public that indicate they need to do more. The more we appear to be happy with them publicly, the better.

Keep praising them and the Islamist terrorists will work harder to kill our shaky friends. I dare say our shaky friends will work harder to destroy our mutual enemies all the harder.

As a last point, I just don’t buy the idea that we lack moral clarity for failing to consider the consequences of acting against Pakistan or Saudi Arabia right now.

We have plenty to do so no need to do everything at once or do it publicly.

“Fourth ID in Iraq” (Posted January 2, 2004)

Way back in the run up to the Iraq War, I was skeptical that we really wanted 4^th ID to run through northern Iraq. We did as it turns out, apparently. I still have doubts about the wisdom although one issue that concerned me—the possibility that we’d have to destroy Iraqi regular army units that might be called on to defect—did not work out due to massive and complete desertions by the Iraqi army everywhere. Plus, I worried about putting the division into high intensity combat in its first real world test of its advanced electronics. Anyway, no link to this old post because this is “The permalinkless Dignified Rant.” Anyway, from Strategypage comes one benefit of having 4^th ID in occupation duty that I predicted:

On a more practical level, U.S. troops are getting lots of training with the new electronic gear that has just been introduced during the last few years. The 4th Infantry division is actually the "test division" for a lot of this stuff and what this unit is doing in Iraq is something of a large scale field test, with real ammo. The troops have rapidly come up with new ways to use the equipment to protect themselves (by spotting ambushes and roadside bombs) and, of course, carrying out raids quickly and with few, if any, injuries to either side. This kind of "shock and awe" works. Iraqis tend to freeze during these rapid raids, and just let the Americans get it over with and leave.

Apparently, this is all pretty awe inspiring to Iraqis who witness the operations and to those who weren’t there who hear embellished versions of what happened.

“Higher Authority” (Posted January 2, 2004)

There has been considerable talk about whether we can go to war without higher authority. Talk of rights of first refusal and all that. Notwithstanding all the prior resolutions on the subject of the Persian Gulf War and the failure of Iraq to obey the original 1991 ceasefire terms, opponents of the Iraq War wanted one more resolution for “authorization.” Proponents of the international community’s moral authority insist this is the only way to go to war.

Never mind our war in Kosovo. Or Desert Fox. Or any of the other scores of wars that have been fought since 1945 without international authorization.

But I’m sort of digressing. No, what I have in mind is based on the Persian Gulf War of 1991. We obtained explicit international authorization in the form of UN Security Council votes for expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait. We got the Holy Grail of moral authority. The authority that so many said we did not get in 2003. I disagree with the legitimacy of that authority and value of such “permission,” but that was the subject of many posts long ago. I won’t bounce the rubble on that question.

My question today is why was the Congressional vote in 1991 so close? I mean, if you don’t think that Congress is the ultimate authority for war under our Constitution, shouldn’t the UN’s official approval have been all that we needed? Why was the vote even close? Why did opponents of the war bother to debate the question when the higher moral authority of the UNSC looked at the issue? Indeed, why was there even any vote in the first place?

Just wondering.

“Headline-Statistics Mismatch” (Posted January 1, 2004)

This is the AP headline: “Most U.S. Iraq Deaths Are Reservists”

To be fair, the article doesn’t say that. The first paragraph states simply:

As they prepare to increase their role in Iraq, including more combat duty, soldiers with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve already are experiencing a bigger share of U.S. military deaths there.

But with the headline it is easy to miss the point that this is only saying that more reservists are dying and not most.

Later on, the article notes that a quarter of the deaths in December were reservists. This is up from the overall rate of 14% in Iraq since the invasion. Not quite since this figure is restricted to Army casualties, but you could probably only add a few points to this if you figured in all reservists. There definitely is an increase over the long-term rate.

Is this alarming? Well, the article notes that reservists are about a quarter of the total American force in Iraq. So this sounds like the casualties are proportional.

I think we can make a safe prediction. After the force rotation in the spring when the percentage of reservists in the Iraq force goes up to 40%, we may see 40% of the casualties being reservists.

Really, the crisis is only in the abilities of the AP headline writers.

“The Taiwan Showdown—Part II (Invasion Without a Navy)” (Posted January 1, 2004)

See “The Taiwan Showdown—Part I (Intentions)” (Posted November 27, 2003)

Sources used include this 1997 Air Command and Staff College research paper by Major Brian T. Baxley; and Norway 1940 website.

Invasion Problem
This is the basic problem. You are a major land power with plenty of troops and aircraft and you wish to conquer a far smaller country. While the status quo is acceptable, a change for the worse is not. The problem is you have to cross quite a bit of sea to get to the target and you have little amphibious warfare capability. To add to your misery, a major power with a powerful navy that includes aircraft carriers, possibly supported by another major power, may intervene to stop you.

This is China's problem today. They may need to invade Taiwan but the United States and maybe Japan stand in the way. But it was also Germany's problem in the spring of 1940. As long as Norway was neutral, Germany could import critical iron ore and remain free from attack from enemy bases in Norway. Germany had to contemplate British and French resistance to their plans or even pre-emptive action. Yet Germany pulled off the invasion and Norway remained under German control for the remainder of the war.

So how did Germany do it?

Norwegian defenders
The Norwegians had 12,000 troops on active duty in 6 infantry brigades, three cavalry regiments, and separate units. Reserves were 120,000 strong. The brigades were poorly equipped and lacked mobility. The Norwegians had little artillery or anti-aircraft weapons. They had an old and small navy, dispersed across Norway’s long coast. The Norwegians had only about 40 old combat aircraft. In addition, neutral Denmark was in the way.

German invasion force
The Germans had six infantry division and a parachute battalion allocated to conquer Norway. The German navy was modern and of good quality, but had few ships. Thirty warships were available but Germany had no amphibious ships to carry troops.

The Germans had 500 transport aircraft each capable of carrying 28 troops. They also had 100 fighters and 330 bombers for the invasion.

Allied expectations
The British only expected a small German effort if they went after Norway. The British based their plans on the Germans being able to invade with no more than eight battalions. The British had a large navy with aircraft carriers, although the carrier aircraft were not equal to the German aircraft nor could the British carriers hold many planes. Still, German bases were far to the south of Norway. The Norwegians expected the British to help them.

German invasion plan
For ground forces, Germany was able to deploy 50 battalions of troops. The British wrongly assumed only 6-8 battalions could be landed. The Germans exceeded the worst-case British estimate by a factor of six. How did the Germans do this?

The Germans sent ships to sea six days before the invasion date in order to attack widely separated targets simultaneously. The Germans deployed a parachute battalion and about 9,000 infantry carried aboard warships in six groups for the initial landings at different points in Norway (Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand & Arendal, Oslo, and Egersand). Another 1,400 were dedicated to an assault on Denmark, which would provide convenient stepping stones to Norway. Two battlecruisers were the primary heavy naval force to escort the invasion elements in the northernmost thrust.

The Germans disguised transport ships as civilian cargo ships to carry the second wave. These ships made repeated trips.A half dozen submarines were outfitted to carry supplies. German bombers were held in reserve to attack any British navy forces found by recon aircraft over the North Sea.

The invasion
On April 9, 1940, German forces began their invasion of Norway. The Norwegian navy just watched the Germans go by, unwilling to initiate hostilities. The British lacked enough recon aircraft to track the German fleet.

Two airborne landings were made at Stavenger and Oslo, supported by German airpower. German air transports then airlifted 6 battalions into Oslo and 2 more into Stavenger to reinforce. At Bergen, 3 seaplanes brought in troops. Air power helped the German warships enter the harbors for the first wave. Initial objectives were captured quickly and they began to fan out to the rest of the country. The Norwegian navy did interfere with water lines of supply but Germans relied on air transports for resupply. The Germans quickly put captured airfields into use for their own aircraft to support the troops and fight off any British naval intervention.

In the middle of April, small British and French forces landed in Norway to resist the German invasion. Four British brigades, 3 French demi-brigades, and a Polish brigade (plus supporting units) were sent to Norway to oppose the Germans. The British deployed a few dozen fighters to Norway but were unable to prevent the Germans from gaining air superiority. German air power kept British navy in northern Norwegian waters. The Germans were successful in pushing back the allies everywhere but at Narvik in the north, which the allies captured after fatal hesitation on May 28. Ten German destroyers in Narvik harbor were sunk by two British forays into the harbor.

With the Germans crushing French and British resistance in France, the allies withdrew from their isolated Narvik toehold by June 9. The Germans managed to sink one of the British carriers in the final phase, 260 miles west of Norway.

End state
The Germans overwhelmed the Norwegian and Allied forces that tried to hold Norway. In the short run, the German surface fleet was crippled. Both battlecruisers were damaged and out of action for six months. But the occupation of Norway allowed the Germans to secure their iron ore imports from Sweden, protect their northern flank and prevent Allied attacks from that direction, and provided bases to send out ships, submarines, and planes to strike British naval forces. When Allied convoys passed by Norwegian waters to supply the Soviet Union later in the war, German bases here allowed the Germans to savage the vital supply lines.

As one author of the campaign stated (quoted in Baxley’s paper):

The occupation of Norway was a great military success for Germany. In the face of British naval superiority, the landing operation could only succeed if the intention remained concealed long enough to make allied counter-measures late and therefore ineffective. This was achieved. The Allies’ delay, and their failure to act immediately on receipt of the first news of the German invasion, were contributory causes to the German success.

It was an impressive performance for a country with a small navy and a non-existent amphibious warfare force.

Next time: Part 3 (Chinese Possibilities).

Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAJAN2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA01JAN04A