1956. Suez Canal. The first large-scale helicopter Air Assault.

Details: www.britains-smallwars.com/suez/helo.html

45 Royal Marine Commando onboard Royal Navy Ships are to fly ashore to link up with British and French Paratroops already on the ground from an earlier fixed-wing aircraft parachute assault to regain control of the vital world waterway. The French Paras jumped on the east side of the canal to take Port Fouad, and south of Port Said on the west. The 3d British Parachute Battalion jumps in to take an airstrip and marches east to take Port Said on the west side of the canal. 45 Commando is to Air Assault directly afterwards into Port Said, where a bitter city fight erupts. It was the world's first amphibious combat helicopter "Air Assault". 41, 42, Commandos came ashore by conventional landing craft backed by 6th Royal Rank Regiment Centurion tanks and French AMX-13 light tanks. In a matter of hours the Suez Canal and a strip of land 25 miles south are in Anglo-French control before the cease-fire.

A few years later, farther west, in strife-torn Algeria, French 1st Regiment Estrangere' Parachutist under legendary leader Col. Michel Biegard were doing the same things using H-21 "Flying Bannana" helicopters to land troops to encircle guerrillas. The French even armed Piasecki H-21 and Sikorsky H-34 type helicopters with rockets and machine guns to sweep the landing zones for the H-21s. These battles are well described in Jean Larteguy's books, The Centurions and The Praetorians, the former made into a fine film called "Lost Command", starring Anthony Quinn and George Segal. Order the video:

A decade later, the U.S. Army was flying H-21s to ferry South Vietnamese (Army Republic of VietNam or "ARVN") troops into battle against the Viet Cong (VC).

Air Assault: the Germans were the first, then the U.S. Army NOT marines to use helicopters in combat...

However, let's set the record straight--the Germans had functional helicopters when WWII began--long before the vain, boastful marines began to revise history to fit their ego and bureaucratic goals. After some interruption from allied bombing, they had a twin-rotor, Air Assault capable of delivering a squad called the FA-223.

The existing Fa-223 helicopters carried on in demonstrating the usefulness of vertical flight aircraft. Two of the Fa-223s were used in maneuvers at the mountain Warfare school in the Alps near Innsbruck during September 1944. Ships V14 and V16 were utilized to supply the mountain troops. The aircraft flew 83 missions, flying on 29 of the 30 days. The one day of non-operation was due to fog so thick the pilot could not see the tips of the rotors. Seventeen landings were made on sites that were 4500 feet or more above sea level, including three on the Dresdener Hutte, at an elevation of 7600 feet.

The extensive maneuvers demonstrated the helicopter had a place in mountain warfare. The Fa-223 could lift 1100 pounds of provisions to a remote site at an elevation of 6500 feet in just seven minutes, a feat that would require twenty men, a day and half of strenuous climbing, to accomplish. in one fifteen minute round trip flight from the base at Mittenwald, a mountain howitzer and its ammunition were lifted on a cable below the helicopter, then flown to, and safely lowered to a position just below the Wornergrat peak. The gun had to be winch lowered, because there was not enough room to land.

The Fa-223 was used as a troop transport during maneuvers and carried as many as 12 troops in addition to the pilot. Four men were carried inside the cabin and eight were carried on tractor seats fastened to the outriggers.

When the mountain maneuvers ended on October 5,1944, the head of the Mountain Warfare School enthusiastically endorsed the Fa-223 and everyone expected that there would be a push for production of the Drache. instead, on October 11th, an order was received from the Air ministry to stop all work on the Fa-223 and transfer all Focke Achgelis personnel to Messerschmitt. The Me-262 jet fighter required all the skilled labor available for production and as the Allies closed in on Germany from east and west, factories were being set up in remote areas, away from the bombing devastating German industrial plants.

In December, the Air ministry did an about face and ordered Focke Achgelis to be reestablished at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin and to begin producing the Fa-223 at a preposterous rate of 400 per month! This lunatic order was issued despite the fact that all tooling had previously been destroyed in bomb raids and there were nowhere near enough aircraft workers left to perform such a task, even if the tooling did exist, but professor Focke once again went to work setting up a helicopter factory.

Five of the seven Fa-223s built at Laupheim were still flyable and three of these were turned over to the Luftwaffe for use by its recently activated helicopter squadron Transportstaffel 40. this unit was formed in early 1945 at Muhldorf, Bavaria, and operated a mix of Focke Achgelis Fa-223s and Flettner Fl-282s. The organization under the command of Hauptmann Josef Stangl moved to Ainring near the German-Austrian border and then to Styria in Austria to preform artillery observation, liaison, and transport task in support of the hastily improvised Luftwaffe division, north Alp. Once in Austria the unit began a retreat back to Ainring in the face of the advancing U.S. 80th infantry Division. Some of its helicopters were captured along the way, others were destroyed by their crews, after forced landings. The two Fa-223s and the few Fl-282s that made it back to Ainring, were captured by the onrushing U.S. forces.

Meanwhile, the Tempelhof produced Fa-233E was delivered to the Luftwaffe and by "Order of the Fuhrer' on February 25, 1945. ordered to fly to Danzig. it took off from Tempelhof the next morning to proceed on its mission. Due to dodging storms, Allied bombing attacks, advancing allied forces, and having to search for fuel, the helicopter's pilot did not arrive on the outskirts of Danzing until the evening of march 5th. There, because of advancing Soviet forces, it was now impossible to fly into the center of Danzing as ordered. While awaiting orders on where to proceed, the crew got word that a fighter pilot had gotten lost in a snowstorm and had made a crash landing. Lt. Gerstenhauer took off in the Fa-223 and proceeded to search the area. The helicopter crew spotted the downed Me-109 with the injured pilot still in the cockpit. They rescued him and flew him back to the base for medical attention. By this time, Danzing was falling to the Russians, and the Fa-223's crew took off to try to reach a safer haven. Fuel was still a problem and when they did find a fuel stockpile, they realized that the Allies push had captured or destroyed all the friendly airfields along their projected route. After topping the tanks off, they loaded a 55 gallon drum of gasoline and a hand pump on board, took off and overflew the Soviet forces. When they finally put down at the German base at Werder, they had flown a total of 1041 mile on this escape mission. After a rest the ship was flown to Ainring to join Transportstaffel 40, only to be captured by American troops.

Three Fa-223s were in final assembly at Tempelhof, along with 15 partially assembled ships, when the Soviet forces captured the Berlin airport.

Post-War

The Americans turned over Fa-223E V14 to the British for evaluation. At the time of its transfer, V14 had logged 170 flying hours, more than any other helicopter in the world. On July 25, 1945, ex-Luftwaffe Lt. Gerstenhauer (officially a POW), flew V14 with Sqn. Ldr. Cable, RAF and Lt. Buvide, USNR, from Germany, to the French coast and then on to England where they landed at RAF Beaulieu. This was the first crossing of the English Channel by helicopter, but while undergoing flight evaluations in England, V14 was destroyed, due to a mechanical failure in the drive system.

The Fa-223 that had made the Danzig trip was painted with U.S. markings and was scheduled to come to the United States for flight evaluation. it is not known if it ever actually made it to America, but there were other Fa-223 survivors.

In addition to the Tempelhof assembly line, a second Fa-223 production line was being set up in occupied Czechoslovakia. After the war, two of its partially completed airframes were assembled and flown at the Avia plant.

The French government took possession of two partially completed Fa-223 airframes, several BMW Bramo 323 engines, a partial set of Fa-223 blueprints, and key Focke Achgelis personnel, including Heinrich Focke, and transported this war booty from Germany to the SNCASE aircraft plant at Argenteuil. The two Fa-223s were then made flightworthy and flown under the French designation Se 3000.

Heinrich Focke and his engineering team also designed a small single rotor, single-seat helicopter for the French. in the early 1950s, Focke and his designers moved to Brazil where they constructed several helicopters. in 1956, Dr. Focke and most of his team returned home to Germany, to once again start up helicopter development.

U.S. Army takes the lead....

What began in WWII with Igor Sikorsky's R-4 being used by the U.S. Army to make the first combat rescue in Burma, grew to full-scale medical evacuations using Bell 47 OH-13s and some small-scale Sikorsky (S-55) UH-19 troop movements in Korea (see below). The U.S. Army was the first to ARM helicopters beginning with the H-13. The marines refused to arm their helicopters and opposed the HueyCobra being built, though they brag about it being "their idea" now (like the Russians claim baseball is "an old Russian game", though that too, was the creation of a U.S. Army Civil War General!). During Vietnam, marine UH-34s armed with only a door gun had to be escorted by U.S. Army Huey gunships to clear the landing zones of enemy after the marines begged the Army to bail them out. General Gavin was not happy that we had to fight the enemy in Korea for the most part in only 2-dimensions as he faced the closed-mindedness of those who do not want to employ good leadership and share power with junior ranking Soldiers/marines to execute 3-dimensional warfare:

---Lieutenant General James M. Gavin from his Harper's magazine article, "Cavalry and I don't mean horses"

Amidst all the reformer eagerness to Air Assault troops into battle to exploit "vertical envelopement" tactics, the enemy was not standing by idle. Helicopters need large, open areas to land on in formations, otherwise they land in ones or twos piecemeal, a slow build up of combat power. The open LZ as a large, danger area was exploited by the VC to defeat the ARVN at the epic battle of Ap Bac despite the best efforts of Army advisor LTC John Paul Vann to have our helicopters land at least effective small arms fire range (300 meters) away from the enemy held treeline.

The recently deceased (Dec. 8, age of 89) General Hamilton Hawkins Howze, is credited with developing U.S. Army helicopter warfare tactics used in the Vietnam War and beyond.

"The way the Army fights today" is due to Howze, said Bell Helicopter Textron spokesman Bob Leder. Howze was a vice president of the company after he retired from the Army in 1965.

In 1962, Howze presided over a military panel, the Howze Board, that issued a landmark report that called for aircraft, mainly helicopter, to carry Soldiers into battle, resupply them and remove the wounded.

"The Huey (helicopter) was to our riflemen roughly what the horse was to the old cavalryman, close by and ready," Howze said.

Howze was born at West Point on Dec. 21, 1908, while his father, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Howze, was commandant of cadets. His grandfather, Brig. Gen. Hamilton S. Hawkins, participated in the charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War, and his great-grandfather, Dr. Hamilton S. Hawkins, was an Army surgeon who died in the Mexican War. Howze won a Silver Star for service in North Africa during World War II and later commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

The U.S. Army response led by the Howze report was to create an "Air Cavalry"--an Air Assault flying combined-arms-team with "Aeroscouts" to recon ahead in Light Observation Helicopters or "LOACHES" (OH-13, OH-6 or OH-58s), AH-1 "Cobra" gunships with rockets, machine guns, cannon to clear away the LZ for the incoming "slicks"--UH-1 "Hueys" carrying light infantrymen a squad at a time.

The first force of this type, the 1st BN, 7th Air Cavalry debuted in battle at LZ X-Ray in the Ia Drang valley led by then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore to ambush the North Vietnamese hiding in the nearby mountains. Catching the NVA by surpise, the "Sky Soldiers" stood off several counter-attacks but then the main weakness of the Vietnam Air Assault paradigm was realized. Moving out on foot, laden with heavy equipment and weapons, the force was ambushed by the NVA which on the terrain of the battlefield were MORE MOBILE. Once on foot, Air Assault infantry fights the enemy even or if the enemy is better at managing the Soldier's load or has vehicles, at a disadvantage.

In fact, the need to have a large open area which to land helicopters causes the battalion to move out to nearby LZ Albany, where they are ambushed by the NVA hiding in trees. Read PFC Jack Smith's account of the battle here:

This graphic account explains why "foot-slogging" is not desirable and how we need something better than carrying an ax in your rucksack to cut down trees like PFC Jack Smith's comrades do to enable helicopters to land in dense vegetation. Its also clear why we need a gunshield that attaches to the end of Soldier weapons to deflect bullets away from their bodies so they do not become bleeding casualties. This includes the M9 Wire-Cutter Bayonet so you can fight even if you run out of ammunition. It also highlights the need for carrying enough field pressure dressings and having Combat LifeSaver trained Soldiers in each fireteam with all-purpose all-terrain carts (ATACs) to transport wounded out and ammunition with less personnel.

Then, the next year, the marines stumbled into the NVA the same way during Operation Hastings using crowded LZs:

"On July 15 at first light, a squadron of CH-46 helicopters. resembling mammoth grasshoppers, lifted off from Dong Ha with members of the 3d Battalion, 4th marines (3/4) of the 3d marine Division. Their operational zone was the Song Ngan Valley, within rifle range of the DMZ. The first wave of helicopters set down in the river valley without incident. Sniper fire ended hope for a quiet landing as the second wave swooped toward the LZ. The third wave met disaster. In the LZ, choked by jungle, two helicopters collided and crashed. A third, trying to avoid them, rammed into a tree, killing two marines and injuring seven. Snipers downed one more. Lieutenant Colonel Sumner Vale, the battalion commander, remembers the grisly sight of several panicked marines being slashed to death 'by the helicopter blades as they were getting out of the helicopter.' The Song Ngan Valley earned that day an infamous place in marine lore as 'Helicopter Valley.' It was an ominous beginning.

Then they began to foot slog........

"Vale's 3d Battalion initiated a sweep through the valley, while the 2d Battalion landed at the other end about three miles to the northeast. The 3d was to serve as a blocking force on a suspected infiltration route. The 2d commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arnold Bench, moved southwest to take Hill 208 overlooking the 3d's position The almost impassable jungle combined with oppressive heat slowed the 2d's progress to a crawl. By mid afternoon it had covered barely two miles. Captain J.W. Hilgers vividly recalls the difficulty of negotiating the terrain particularly the thick vegetation: 'Though we knew our location, we could not see where we were going, trusting only to our compasses. The heat with no breeze and unlimited humidity was devastating.'

Delays erased whatever tactical surprise General English had counted on. And the marine battalions, now isolated behind NVA advance positions, were quickly thrown on the defensive. At four in the afternoon, after unsuccessfully trying to cross the Song Ngan, Vale radioed that his men were 'under heavy fire' and were in trouble." By seven-thirty the 3d was surrounded, awaiting the inevitable NVA night attack. It did not have to wait long. Shortly after eight an NVA company tried to overrun Company K's position, igniting a wild three-hour fire fight. "It was so dark," said Captain Robert Modrzejewski, "we couldn't see our hands in front of our faces, so we threw out trip flares and called for a flare plane overhead. We could hear and smell and occasionally see the NVA after that. When the firing stopped, we heard them dragging the bodies of their dead away, but in the morning, at the first light, we found twenty five-bodies...... On the basis of the dragging we had heard... we figured we got another thirty of them, which we listed as probably killed."

The 3d's problems were not over. The next evening, still unable to ford the river, the marines dug in while the NVA picked up where they had left off, lobbing mortars at their perimeter. At this point the 2d Battalion changed the direction of its advance to assist the 3d. When it finally did reach Vale's unit, the 2d too was pinned down by the intense mortar attacks. The marines returned fire, directing ear-shattering air and artillery strikes to within a few hundred yards of their own positions, and killed a hundred of the enemy, some at close range with pistols and even bayonets. After two more days of incessant bombardment, the 2d and 3d got new orders: pull out.

In the early afternoon of July 18, Vale and Bench moved their units toward the eastern end of the valley. Captain Modrzejewski's battle-weary Company K stayed behind to destroy the crippled helicopters at the LZ. Instead of pursuing the main body, the NVA massed to attack Company K. Around two-thirty, several hundred NVA infantrymen charged the LZ, blowing bugles and whistles and waving flags. Company K stubbornly held its ground. The 1st Platoon, cut off in the confusion, bore the full brunt of the assault. First Platoon Sergeant John McGinty and his rifle squads threw everything they had at the NVA force but it was not enough: "We started getting mortar fire, followed by automatic weapons fire from all sides.... [Charlie] moved in with small arms right behind the mortars.... We just couldn't kill them fast enough." So close were the NVA to overrunning the company that Modrzejewski called air strikes virtually on top of the marines' position. One marine forward air controller, less than fifty feet from the enemy, had to plunge into a nearby stream to escape being burned by a napalm strike. The shower of bombs and napalm sent the enemy scurrying for cover. In three hours of close combat, the bloodiest of the entire operation, a beleaguered Company K suffered over fifty casualties, with some marines hit in five or six places. When reinforcements from Company L arrived to cover withdrawal, Modrzejewski 'men "formed a column of walking wounded ... and then proceeded upstream, where the wounded were evacuated that night." For their actions, Modrzejewski and McGinty each received the Medal of Honor.

The 2d and 3d Battalions had not seen their last of Helicopter Valley. General English, after evacuating the wounded, immediately sent these battalions back to the valley from the south to join the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines commanded by Colonel Van Bell, in blocking NVA infiltration. All the battalions saw action in a deadly game of cat and mouse. A marine summed up NVA tactics: "a probe followed by an attack with mortars, automatic weapons and small arms, then disengagement's and flight." What happened on Hill 362 is a classic example.

On July 17 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Bronars's 3d Battalion, 5th marines, began patrolling south of Helicopter Valley. A week into the patrol, Bronars ordered Captain Samuel Glaize's Company I to establish a radio relay station atop Hill 362, three miles below the DMZ. After hacking its way to the crest with two-foot-long machetes, Glaize's 2d Platoon descended the other side of the hill to scout defenses. It had not gone far when it met a hail of mortar and machine gun fire. "They had everything zeroed in on the trail," First Sergeant Bill Chapman recalled. Other platoons rushed to aid the 2d but were ambushed. Soon the entire company was trapped near the crest of the hill by a steady mortar barrage. "We could only dig small trenches," said Second Lieutenant Robert Williams. "We put a wounded man in with a man who could fight. Every third man was wounded, but they still tried to man the weapons.

It was a harrowing night for Company I as NVA Soldiers probed to within fifteen to twenty feet of the marines' perimeter. Corporal Mack Whieley remembered, 'The Commies were so close we could hear them breathing heavily and hear them talking.' For Private First Class Michael Bednar, it was hell. Struck by a bullet, he fell near another wounded marine just as some NVA Soldiers emerged from a clump of trees. Both marines played dead, but the NVA wanted to make sure. After the Soldiers plunged a bayonet into the marine beside Bednar and he groaned, they shot him through the head. Three times the Soldiers jabbed Bednar with bayonets but he refused to cry out. Leaving him for dead, the Soldiers snatched Bednar's cigarettes and watch and moved on to other wounded marines. According to another wounded survivor, Corporal Raymond Powell, 'it was damn near like a massacre'.

The next day, U.S. artillery struck at NVA emplacements. Helicopters whirred in to remove the wounded, including Private Bednar, who had managed to crawl back to his lines 'with his guts hanging out.' Glaize's unit suffered a casualty rate of 45 percent-eighteen dead and sixty-five wounded. As for the force of NVA, the New York Times reported that it 'vanished into the countryside.' ...In all 126 marines were killed and 448 wounded.

Operation Lam Son 719: the beginning of the end for Air Assault infantry/Artillery fire bases?

The need for Air Assault units to have the capability to use offset LZs and AFVs couldn't be more clear than what happened during the air/ground invasion of Laos in 1971, called "Lamson 719". It was the resultant loss of 107 helicopters and 600 damaged in the operation due to enemy anti-aircraft fires that has caused many to question the helicopter's survivability in combat. The goal was a cross-border attack to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail carrying war supplies to NVA units massing to attack South Vietnam. The 22 square mile target area as written by John Everett-Heath in Helicopters in Combat: the first fifty years pages 99-101:

"...was well-protected by nineteen anti-aircraft Battalions equipped with larger-caliber weapons than hitherto met: 23mm, 37mm and 57mm. Together with 12.7mm heavy machine guns, these weapons were deployed around potential LZs as well as to protect important storage sites, and vital ground. The defenders were further reinforced by sections of 10-12 men, armed with a couple machine guns, rocket launchers and an 82mm mortar, who changing their position daily, were able to dominate most of the LZs, pick-up points, fire bases and other ARVN positions. In addition to their air defenses, elements of five Divisions, twelve infantry Regiments, a tank Regiment with the amphibious PT-76 light tank and the T-34 Medium battle tank, and an artillery Regiment were present. Total NVA strength was estimated at 13,000 combat troops and 9,000 support troops...

Against this large conventional force, the battle effectiveness of helicopters was going to be put to a severe test..."

The Vietnam War Air Assault force structure was designed around the artillery fire base, a defended perimeter that could give indirect fire to infantry on foot delivered by helicopters and sometimes supported by tanks and M113 APCs. This was the American approach to defeating the more numerous VC and NVA. For Lam Son 719, 3-D South Vietnamese Air Assault troops would fly in by American-crewed helicopters ahead of the 2-D ground advance going west down highway 9 and establish artillery fire bases and defended landing zones. However, we knew from LZ X-Ray onwards, that once on foot after leaving our helicopters, we were loaded down with equipment and the enemy could fight us faster on foot "belt buckle" close since his supplies were cached nearby to negate our distant supporting arms, be that from the fire bases or aircraft flying Close Air Support (CAS). With "Vietnamization", President Nixon wanted the war fought more by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), and they inherited the Air Assault infantry/fire base style of warfare. However by 1971, the enemy had begun to come up with ways counter this system of warfare.

Everett-Heath writes:

.."worsening weather which often precluded fixed-wing fighter support and forced the helicopters to fly along valleys when the hills on either side were wreathed in cloud. Thus, the choice of roues to the fire bases and LZs became restricted and comparitively easy for the NVA and Viet Cong to predict. ARVN fire bases were a prime target for the enemy and on 25 February one was over-run by T-34 tanks, others had to be evacuated. By the end of the month it had become clear that the main supply route into laos could not be kept open on a secure and permanent basis while simultaneously maintaining the advance on Tchepone, one of the communications hubs of the NVA supply complex. The ARVN Commander, Lieutenant General Lam decided that he should use his aviation assets to attack Tchepone."

The ARVN troops made heliborne assaults into 3 LZs along the south side of Route 9, permitting a fire base to be set up in range of Tchepone. Cost was 12 helicopters shot down and 58 damaged. General Lam decided after the capture of Tchepone to withdraw before worsening weather hindered aviation operations.

"A concerted enemy effort was now made to hinder his withdrawal. Anti-aircraft weapons were concentrated on anticipated fly-in routes and around fire bases, and intense fire was directed at any helicopter that came within range".

1. Its clear the enemy was waiting for our light infantry to be Air Assaulted into predictable open-area LZs for airlanding helicopters and we suffered enormous losses.

2. Once on the ground, surviving Air Assault infantry lacked AFVs to help hold their positions (shielded mobility, carrying large quantities of ammunition/supplies as a "mother" vehicle) from massed enemy infantry assaults in some cases supported by enemy AFVs.

3. Air Assault infantry without a companion AFV was overloaded carrying all is supplies on their backs and couldn't out-maneuver the enemy on foot. Thus, the enemy could chose when/where to fight or refuse to fight at all, electing to "hit and run" causing casualties which would erode over time American public support for the war back in CONUS.

4. Air Assault infantry on foot, unshielded by enemy fire, mines and booby-traps because they had no AFVs to ride in, ride on or walk behind, took heavy casualties that had to be helicopter evacuated to safer "rear" areas, resulting in the momentum of attacks being stopped to set up impromptu LZs for "Dust off" medevac helicopters. To carry a casualty meant at least 2 shooters had to leave the fight to shuttle him back to a casualty collection point/aid station.

5. Air Assault infantry was critically dependant upon air/ground resupply due to the low amount of ammunition, food, water they could carry into battle with them; if these LOCs couldn't stay open due to weather, enemy actions etc., the Sky Troopers had to be pulled out

6. Since the Sky Troopers didn't have AFVs to fight their way out along the 2D axis, their extraction would have to be by aircraft using the same methods that had them get ambushed on the way in; the enemy could sense this, making matters even worse.

7. Since Air Assault troops lacked heavy weapons that an on-scene helicopter-deliverable AFV could provide, artillery fire bases had to be established to enhance their firepower using distant indirect means and these had to be defended and resupplied; draining combat power and providing predictable helicopter routes which the enemy could ambush helicopters.

Its very evident that the solution to these problems is an Air-Mech Airborne/Air Assault 3D maneuver/fighting capability that by having its own aircraft deliverable AFVs can once on the ground be self-sufficient, shielded and dominant in firepower moving along the 2D axis. Such a force can airland in LZs offset from the enemy and thus be less-defended due to their ability to close on the enemy along the 2D axis.

Everett-Heath concludes on pages 185-186:

"The Russians for example tried to solve this problem of secondary mobility by equipping some Air Assault units with the BMD tracked infantry fighting vehicle which carries both a gun and ATGMs and can accomodate a crew of 2 and 5 infantrymen....The Germans used the wheeled KRAKA and tracked Wiesel for infantry support weapons, particularly ATGMs...if vehicles and helicopters were made available for an operation they would widen the actical options and allow LZs to be chosen in safer areas clear of the objective..."

10 years after Ia Drang...

American civilians from the containership, SS Mayaguez are captured by armed Cambodians in fishing boats. The U.S. has just evacuated from Saigon as the NVA in the "final offensive" captured the South. It was thought they were taken to Koh Tang island, so Air Force SpecOps and CSAR CH- and HH-53D "Jolly Green Giants" loaded with marine infantry are flown by direction of marine corps planners into two beaches in broad daylight on the west and eastern end of the island without preparatory reconnaissance (PATHFINDING) or fires. Upon landing several helicopters are shot out of the sky and crash in flames at the water's edge. The enemy was camouflaged, dug-in and waiting. The mc Air Assault force, split into two pieces are surrounded and pinned down by enemy fire with casualties mounting. Unable to reinforce except piecemeal a helicopter at a time, the marines will be over-run if not pulled out immediately by the remaining USAF helicopters that can fly. A C-130 from Okinawa drops a 15,000 pound BLU-82 bomb which explodes a huge hole in the jungle which the helicopters could use to land. As darkness falls, the last helicopters take off, but 10 marines are left behind. 2 manning a M60 Medium Machine Gun to keep the Cambodians away. After all the years of helicopter Air Assaults, we apparently hadn't learned a thing.

Somalia: "The time for helicopters had passed"

12 February 2002

A Soldier's Eye-View of "Blackhawk Down", October 3, 1993

The author of the below E-mail, Gerry Izzo, is currently a Captain at Comair. He flew one of the UH-60s on the mission that is depicted in the movie "Blackhawk Down."

The key points you will see that by not having light tracked AFVs organic to the 75th Ranger Regiment or a Ground Cavalry Squadron with the 160th SOAR, helicopters were tasked to continuously fly overhead giving fire support, which made them sitting ducks for enemy RPGs. If the "time for helicopters had passed" as Captain Izzo concludes at a key point in the mission, then its high time we actually LEARN from "Blackhawk Down!" instead of sobbing over the men lost...AND DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE SO NEXT TIME WE WIN WITHOUT LOSSES.

All the 75th Rangers or 160th SOAR Commanders have to do is request some war-stock M113A3 Gavins be assigned to them, add gunshields and other refinements, and next time their helicopters will not have to loiter overhead to render fire support--they'd have their own heli-transportable "ground spectre"--a M113A3 with a Gatling min-gun and/or 25-30mm autocannon, 106mm recoilles rifles...

"During the last few days many pilots have come up to me and asked me if I had seen the movie 'Blackhawk Down'.

I don't mind talking about the movie, and I welcome the opportunity to talk about the heroism and valor of my friends. I just wanted to post some comments here about the movie and my impressions. Also I wanted to try to answer some frequently asked questions.

First of all, I and many of my friends that also flew on the mission thought that the movie was excellent! It is technically accurate and it is dramatically correct. In other words, the equipment, lingo and dialogue are all right on. By dramatically correct, I mean that it very effectively captured the emotions and tension that we all felt during the mission. It did this without being a cartoon, (like TOP GUN) or being over the top, (like FIREBIRDS). It's true that the screenwriters had to consolidate two or three people into one, but this was necessary because otherwise there would have been too many principle characters to keep track of. Also in the actual mission we had nearly 20 aircraft in the air that day. In the movie they had 4 Blackhawks and 4 "Little Birds". The unit could not afford to commit the actual number to the filming of the movie. However, through the magic of the cinema, they were able to give the impression of the real number. Our force mixture was as follows:

Super 61 - Lead Blackhawk
Star 41-44 Little Bird Assault
Super 62 - Trail Blackhawk

These aircraft made up the assault force. Their mission was to go into the buildings and capture the individuals who were the target of the day. Super 61 was shot down, killing both pilots. (They were CW4 Cliff Wolcott and CW3 Donovan Briley. The three of us shared a room at the airfield.) Star 41 landed at the crash site and the pilot CW4 Keith Jones ran over and dragged two survivors to his aircraft and took off for the hospital. Keith reenacted his actions in the movie.

Super 62 was the Blackhawk that put in the two Delta snipers, Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon. They were inserted at crash site #2. Shortly after Gary and Randy were put in Super 62 was struck in the fuselage by an antitank rocket. The whole right side of the aircraft was opened up and the sniper manning the right door gun had his leg blown off. The aircraft was able to make it out of the battle area to the port area where they made a controlled crash landing. (This is not depicted in the movie.)

Next was the Ranger Blocking Force.

This consisted of 4 x Blackhawks:

Super 64 (CW3 Mike Durant, CW4 Ray Frank)
Super 65 (Me, Capt. Richard Williams)
Super 66 (CW3 Stan Wood, CW4 Gary Fuller)
Super 67 (CW3 Jeff Niklaus, CW2 Sam Shamp)

The mission of the blocking force was to be inserted at the four corners of the objective building and to prevent any Somali reinforcements from getting through.

In the movie there is a brief overhead shot of the assault. My aircraft is depicted in the lower left hand corner of the screen. This is the only part of the film where I come close to being mentioned. As the assault is completed, you hear the Blackhawks calling out of the objective area. When you hear, "...Super 65 is out, going to holding..." that's my big movie moment. There is also a quick shot of an RPG being shot at a hovering Blackhawk. I did have one maybe two fired at me, but I did not see them or the gunner. I only heard the explosions. We were not able to return fire, although some of the other aircraft did. Make no mistake. I am fully aware of my role in this mission. My job was the same as the landing boat drivers in "Saving Private Ryan." Get the troops in the right place in one piece. I am very proud of the fact that my crew and I were able to do that. After having done this in Grenada, Panama and Somalia, I can identify with the bombardiers of World War Two. You have to ignore all of the chaos that is going on around and completely concentrate on the tasks at hand. That is holding the aircraft as steady as possible so the Rangers can slide down the ropes as quickly and safely as possible.

Okay, Okay, enough about me.

Super 64 was shot down also with an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade). They tried to make it back to the airfield, but their tail rotor gave way about a mile out of the objective area. They went down in the worst part of bad guy territory. The dialogue for the movie appears to have been taken from the mission tapes as it is exactly as I remember it. (This was the hardest part of the movie for me to watch.) The actions on the ground are as described by Mike Durant, as he was the only one from the crew to survive the crash and the gun battle. It was here the Gary and Randy won their Posthumous Medals of Honor.

Super 66 was called in at about 2000 hours to resupply the Rangers at the objective area. Some of the Rangers were completely out of ammunition and were fighting hand to hand with the Somali militia men. (Also not depicted in the movie). Stan and Gary brought their aircraft in so that they were hovering over the top of the Olympic Hotel with the cargo doors hanging out over the front door. In this way they were able to drop the ammo, water and medical supplies to the men inside. Stan's left gunner fired 1600 rounds of minigun ammo in 30 seconds. He probably killed between 8 to 12 Somali militia men. As Stan pulled out of the objective area, he headed to the airfield because his right gunner had been wounded, as had the two Rangers in the back who were throwing out the supplies. Once he landed, he discovered that he'd been hit by about 40-50 rounds and his transmission leaking oil like a sieve. Super 66 was done for the night.

The final group of aircraft were the 4 x MH-6 gunships, and the command and control Blackhawk and the Search and Rescue 'Hawk'. They were:

Barber 51-54 MH-6's
Super 63 C&C
Super 68 SAR

In the movie, the gunships are shown making only one attack. In fact, they were constantly engaged all night long. Each aircraft reloaded six times. It is estimated that they fired between 70 and 80,000 rounds of minigun ammo and fired a total 90 to 100 aerial rockets. They were the only thing that kept the Somalis from overrunning the objective area. All eight gunship pilots were awarded the Silver Star. Every one of them deserved it!

Next is Super 68.

The actions of this crew were very accurately portrayed. The only difference was that they were actually hit in the rotor blades by an RPG. This blew a semicircle out of the main rotor spar, but the blade held together long enough for them to finish putting in the medics and Rangers at the first crash site. It was then that they headed to the airfield. What they did not know, was that their main transmission and engine oil cooler had been destroyed by the blast. As they headed to the airfield all 7 gallons of oil from the main rotor gearbox, and all 7 quarts from each engine was pouring out. They got the aircraft on the ground just as all oil pressures went to zero. They then shutdown, ran to the spare aircraft and took off to rejoin the battle. They were in the air just in time to affect the MEDEVAC of Super 62, which had landed at the seaport. The pilots of this aircraft were CW3 Dan Jollota, and MAJ Herb Rodriguez. Both men were later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. Major Rodriguez is retired from the Army now and he teaches middle school with my wife in Clarksville, Tennessee.

Finally there is the Command and Control Blackhawk, Super 63.

In the back of this aircraft was my battalion commander, LTC Matthews, and the overall ground commander, LTC Harrell.

In the movie, there is a scene where the men on the ground were begging for MEDEVAC. By this point in the battle we had 5 Blackhawks out of action, either shot down or shot up so much they couldn't fly anymore. Of the two assault force and four blocking force 'hawks', only myself and Super 67 were left. I fully expected LTC Harrell to send us in to try to get those men out. I jacked a round into the chamber of my pistol and my M16. I knew that the only way to do was to hover with one wheel balanced on the roof of the building. Then the Rangers would be able to throw the wounded in. I knew that we were going to take a lot of fire and I was trying to mentally prepare myself to do this while the aircraft was getting hit. My friends had all gone in and taken their licks and now I figured it was our turn. (Peer pressure is such a powerful tool if used properly.) Quite frankly, I really thought that we were at best going to get shot down, at worst I figured we were going to be killed. The way I saw it we had already lost 5 aircraft, what was 2 more? I had accepted this because at least when this was all over General Garrison would be able to tell the families that we had tried everything to get their sons, fathers or husbands out.

We were even willing to send in our last two helicopters. Fortunately for me LTC Harrell realized that the time for helicopters had passed. The decision was made to get the tanks and armored personnel carriers to punch through to the objective area. Once again, the dialogue in the movie is verbatim. What you don't hear is me breathing a sigh of relief! I remembered thinking that maybe I was going to see the sunrise after all.

I guess I got a little carried away.

I really didn't mean to write this much. People ask me if this movie has given me 'flashbacks'. I don't think you can call them flashbacks if that day has never been out of my mind.

I hope that when you do see the movie it will fill you with pride and awe for the Rangers that fought their hearts out that day. Believe me, they are made of the same stuff as those kids at Normandy Beach. When 1LT Tom DiTomasso, the Ranger platoon leader on my aircraft, told me that we did a fantastic job, I couldn't imagine ever receiving higher praise than that. I love my wife and children, but the greatest thing I've ever done is to be a Nightstalker Pilot with Task Force Ranger on 3-4 October 1993.

Thank you for reading this. I look forward to answering any and all questions anyone may have about the movie or the actual battle. I just thought that this might fill in some of the blanks. Thank you again".

Capt. Gerry Izzo(Super 65)
"NSDQ" Nightstalkers Don't Quit

Another Air Assault debacle:

Robert's Ridge

This time we didn't even bring artillery to clear/suppress LZs to the fight!

In Vietnam, we knew enough to blow open LZs using fighter-bombers with delayed-action fuze bombs.

LTC Walter Bjorneby USAF (Retired) writes:

"F4s of the 4th TFS loaded up for God knows what with CBU24s and fuze-extended Mk 82s. We usually carried fuze extenders for making LZs by blowing down trees. I don't think unexploded bomblets (there were always some) would help an LZ any. Could be they were going to hit a truck park somewhere. That'd be a good load for it."

Why don't we do this today?

Where does Air Assault tactics stand today?

After reading Colonel Dan Bolger's book, The Battle for Hunger Hill, you get a good idea how the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) operates. I applaud then LTC Bolger's boldness at airlanding into LZs AWAY from the objective instead of right on top of it at JRTC. Building on that indirect vertical assault technique, "AIRmotorized" means lighter HMMWV soft-tops with gun mounts that TRANSPORT AN INFANTRY COMPANY at 10-40 mph simultaneously, not just some hard-top fire support HMMWVs running loose as the infantry foot-slogs at 1-4 mph. This force can even better speed to an objective from a distant LZ. Additionally, we need to employ fast roping/rappelling so we can avoid having to seize an open danger-area LZ to airland or maybe NONE of these vehicles are going to make it to the fight!

As stated in now Colonel Bolger's book, the 101st Air Assault Division removes the seats in the Blackhawk to cram 19 men inside, airland them into a 6-ship LZ (600 meters by 150 meters) determined by map recon without Pathfinding, then await the Chinooks coming in with 2 HMMWV sling-loads each and the HMMWV crews inside. An Air Assault version of the 82d Airborne Division dropping in its vehicles first from "Heavy Drop" aircraft into a equipment Drop Zone, followed by Paratroopers in "personnel birds" into a personnel DZ. But in both cases there are only a limited number of vehicles; the gun or ATGM trucks for "D" Company not transports for the other companies of Airborne/Air Assault infantry who must walk at best 1-4 mph.

You end up with a foot-mobile force that takes a long time to reconstitute. It is Landing Zone (LZ) and DZ dependant and thus predictable to an alert enemy, who with motor vehicles or armored fighting vehicles can speed to the LZ/DZ and repel the Airborne/Air Assault. To fight off the enemy's vehicular firepower, our own vehicular firepower is still in the sky awaiting the LZ/DZ to be cleared so it can airland. The parachute-deliverable M551 Sheridans of the 3/73d Armor Battalion were disbanded /retired so the only AFVs available to the 82d Airborne Division are the Immediate Ready Company's 4 x Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 4 x Abrams Main Battle Tanks which need a runway for the C-17 to airland them.

Both Air Assault and Airborne operations are dependant upon airlanding reinforcements that require open danger areas. The answer here is to improve our Airborne/Air Assault insertion means to avoid these areas. The quick answer to end the foot slogging for the 82d Airborne Division is to obtain air-droppable M113A3 tracked AFVs with Mk19 40mm GMGs and assign them to its "D" Company Anti-tank units to transport Javeling ATGM firers. The 101st Air Assault Division will need some different changes, first exploiting HMMWV 4x4 trucks for an AIRmotorized capability, then light AFVs like the German Airborne's tracked Wiesel for an AIRmechanized capability. A tracked AFV can break brush/vegetation for foot Soldiers and provides dominant firepower/protection.

THE ESSENCE OF AIRmotorized

In contrast, with AIRmotorized we propose that the infantry squad/fireteam fly in the same Blackhawk that carries their own Mk-19 GMG or L/MMG equipped HMMWV. Using the secondary ground mobility of the HMMWVs, we insert into a LZ unlikely to be held by the enemy. An infantry Battalion has enough unarmored cargo HMMWVs to move 2/3ds of itself if not parceled as staff cars so the older generation doesn't have to walk. A small Pathfinder/Infantry Security platoon inserts first to secure the LZ. If its secure they render the visual signal, and the Infantry AIRmotorized Company lands at the same time with its HMMWVs and moves out as soon as their vehicles are de-rigged. The analogy here is that of a "tail gate jump" where the vehicles and men are delivered close together by the same aircraft.

With Pathfinders on the ground, they can survey the LZ to assure its suitable for airlanding.

If Chinooks are available, 2 soft-skin HMMWVs can roll on/off FROM INSIDE THE CH-47D, with their men inside, eliminating the time spent de-rigging HMMWVs of sling legs etc. The CH-47D is free to fly a full speed flight profile to evade the enemy's detection.

The whole point is getting the force on wheels and out of the open LZ danger area long before enemy mortar/artillery fire can be called in on them from their noise, dust, heat signatures.

BUT WHO NEEDS LZs at all?

Taking things a step further, if we are going to sling load, lets maximize this otherwise airspeed/flight profile handicap. A helicopter with a sling load needs to hover to unhook...if the helicopter has Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction (FRIES) I-Bars installed, or even rappelling ropes set up (Why send Soldiers to Air Assault School if we are not going to use these skills?) after the HMMWV sling load is let go, ropes can be thrown out, and the men can slide down them directly to their HMMWV below. The Blackhawk doesn't land at all. No ground survey/Pathfinding required. ANY SPOT on the map with a small opening becomes a Hovering Insertion Point (HIP), thus open, danger area LZs are avoided completely. The AIRmotorized force mounts up in their HMMWVs and drives off to their objective.

Landing Away from predictable Landing Zones: hovering INSERTIONS

The problem many people are unaware of is that in Vietnam, the NVA began to place sentries on every open area that could be a LZ. At JRTC on the ficticious island of Cortina, 1st of the 509th OPFOR is doing the same thing as the VC/NVA did to Jack Smith's unit in the Ia Drang or the marines on Koh Tang island. It really "bit us in the butt" on Koh Tang island where we landed on beaches in broad daylight. This is where Rappel, FRIES, STABO, SPIES, parachuting come in, EVERYONE HAS TO BE ABLE TO DO IT, TOO. In Vietnam, STABilized Body Operations (STABO-- actually the last name initials of the system creators, 5 SF Soldiers) and Special Patrol Insertion Extraction (SPIE) systems were created to insert or extract men out of the jungle away from open, predictable LZs. A recon team could rappel in and STABO or SPIE rig out without ever needing to land in a large opening for a helicopter. Another less used option was to hang by STABO or SPIE and insert. The downside of STABO/SPIE is that the men cannot be pulled in from under the helicopter. Another technique used was lowering folding ladders which a physically-fit Soldier could climb up into the hover helicopter. Soldiers would have a snap link on their LBE to lock themselves in in event they tired on the way up. Ladder recovery into hovering helicopters is still done today by U.S. SOF units, but not "conventional" infantry.

Hovering above the midships deck of the Canberra (passenger cruise ship converted into troop ship), 40 Commando Royal Marines "rapid rope" from a 846 Squadron SeaKing helicopter en route to combat in the Falklands in 1982..

In the early eighties, the British again led the way by creating the "fast rope"---a very fat nylon rope which could be gripped like a fire pole and slid down without need of a rappeling rig to hold a snaplink and routed rope. First combat use was in the Falklands war in 1982 (see photo above). A team using fast rope can be down and clear of the helicopter in seconds compared to the lengthy delay rappelling requires--reducing helicopter noise/exposure time. Within a few short years, all U.S. elite units and some police departments had modified their helicopters and trained their men to use fast rope.

Columbian Rope Company
P.O. Box 270, 145 Towery Street
Guntown, Mississippi 38849
1(800)821-4391 Fax: 1(601)348-5749
WEB site: http://www.columbianrope.com

FAST-ROPE INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION SYSTEM

The FRIES comes in 50-, 60-, 90-, and 120-foot lengths and 3 inches in diameter. Before conducting a fast-rope operation, a thorough inspection of the fast rope is necessary.

a. Inspection of the Rope. The rope must be laid out to inspect the entire rope. The eyelet on the end should be checked for excessive wear. The rope must be checked along its entire length for fraying. Snags in the rope from normal use will not significantly weaken the rope. However, a rope with fraying of several strands in one particular spot must not be used. If the fast rope becomes wet, it must be S-folded or hung in a dry, warm area to dry before further use. If the fast rope is used in saltwater, it must be washed in fresh water before drying. The rope must also be inspected for contamination of acid, alkaline compounds, salt water, fire extinguishing solutions, or petroleum-based solvents. Although used ropes gradually change color, such changes do not indicate a decrease in strength, unless the change is due to contact with strong chemicals. Changes in color caused by chemicals will probably be spotted; changes occurring because of use will be uniform throughout the length of the rope.

b. Rigging of fast rope in a UH-60. (See Figure 6-5.)

(1) Both cargo doors are locked in the open position.

NOTE: For arctic or other cold weather operations or during flights of long duration, the cargo doors may be closed and locked until the time specified for opening time.

(2) The center row (nine) troop seats are removed..

(3) Floor restraint provisions are provided to fast-rope personnel while aircraft is in flight. (Seat belts or CGU strap).

(4) The fast-rope master or safety extends the fast-rope bar and inserts the pit pin in the bar.

(5) The fast-rope master inspects the bar for cracks and frays.

(6) The fast-rope master rigs the fast rope to the fast-rope bar:

Places one retainer device on the fast-rope bar

Slides fast rope onto the fast-rope bar

Slides second rope retaining device onto the bar

Installs the rope keeper pin into the fast-rope bar.

MH-47E rear ramp FRIES hook up

A third MH-47E FRIES point is by the front fuselage rescue hoist

c. Rigging of Fast Rope in Other Aircraft. CH-47, CH-46, RH-53, C/HH-53 use the same type of fast-rope bar only double when using the ramps (see Figure 6-6).

d. Consideration for Safety. While in flight, the normal procedures for in-flight emergencies are used (see paragraph 6-2). Conducting fast-rope operations is dangerous. Doing so with heavy loads requires LRS teams to be proficient in fast-rope operations. While executing the fast-rope operations, the following procedures are used.

(1) Aircraft emergency.

Stop stick (cease fast-rope operations).

Ensure ropers are clear.

Take appropriate action.

(2) Unsafe drift or premature lift-off.

Lock in.

Stop stick.

Get back on target.

Continue operations.

(3) Hung rope.

Ensure ropers are clear.

Descend aircraft.

Release rope - use ground personnel to untangle rope from obstacle.

4) No communications.

Use hand signal to "stop stick" (clenched fist touching the chest).

Use hand signal for "ropers" (pointing a finger toward the exit).

Use hand signal for aircraft movement (open palm moved and faced in the direction required).

Use hand signal to stop aircraft movement (clenched fist).

NOTE: The last minute before "Ropes away" is a critical time. With the doors open and the safety line is the only thing to hold on to, any sudden aircraft movement may throw personnel out of the aircraft.

e. Fast-Rope Master Duties.

(1) Brief members of his team and aircrew.

(2) Inspect team members for appropriate equipment configuration and conduct briefback. (Work gloves, Sun, Wind, Dust Goggles (SWDGs) worn for eye protection, all equipment tied down on personnel. Also inspection of aircraft rigging.)

(3) Install the fast rope in the aircraft and conduct safety checks.

(4) Relay 10-minute, 6-minute, 1-minute, and 30-second time warnings to team members.

(5) Break chemical lights, if required. (Chemical lights are taped with one at anchor point, one at the bottom end of the rope and another five feet higher.)

(6) Ensure rope is properly configured for deployment (back-fed to prevent tangles).

(7) Ensure team members are in order of exit before 1-minute warning.

(8) Confirm target on final approach.

(9) Deploy rope and ensure it is on the ground before ropers descend. (During night operations, two chemical lights taped to the bottom should be used.)

(10) Deploy personnel using the following warnings to the pilot:

ROPE OUT--when fast-rope master deploys the rope over the target.

ROPERS AWAY--when first roper exits on fast rope.

ROPE CLEAR--informs pilot he is clear for flight.

HOLD--informs pilot to hold position.

MOVE, LEFT (RIGHT, FORWARD, BACK

f. Execution of Fast Roping. Individual ropers must--

Understand all aspects of the insertion and emergency procedures. Ensure correct equipment configuration to prevent snagging and injuries.

Maintain an orderly and rapid exit formation.

Grasp rope firmly before exit (do not jump for the rope).

On exit, rotate body 90 degrees to 180 degrees to clear the aircraft.

Descend down the rope, controlling the speed and breaking two-thirds of the distance down to avoid landing on another individual.

Upon landing, be prepared to execute a good parachute landing fall, and move rapidly away from the rope(s), avoid the front of the aircraft.

Consider individual safety:

--Each individual is responsible for identifying hazardous situations and inform the fast-rope master.

--During the fast roping, night vision goggles will not be used by fast ropers, due to limited depth perception and a tunnel-vision effect.

--During descent, ropers must maintain visual contact with lower ropers and watch for obstructions.

--Individual ropers will lock in during emergencies, by wrapping the rope

---

"Sir, some units, LRSD and Pathfinder, fast rope quite a lot, but most units seldom do. If you remember the accident involving 2 Blackhawks in July of 1996, that is what they were doing. They were practicing rescuing downed aircrew and the 2 helos collided as they came to hover above position to deploy fast ropes. Since then the oppurtunity to fast rope has been decreased significantly and usually only the specialized units do it on a regular basis.

This is not to say that the line units don't do it occasionally, but very rarely."

For further proof, read the 101st Air Assault Division's "Green Book online at the link below:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/101st-goldbook/index.html

Where is the fast rope and rappel insertion capability in the 101st's SOP? If its not in their "playbook" how will it be used on "game day"?

WHERE IS THE FAST ROPE TTP IN THE SOP ABOVE?

Playing it "safe" in peacetime may reduce accidents and preserve careers, but it handicaps us in time of war when we cannot do dangerous things needed to gain the advantage we need on the battlefield to WIN and SAVE LIVES. We must avoid the pitfalls of the open LZ danger area. EVERY U.S. Army combat arms Soldier should know how to rappel and fast rope from a helicopter into a battle below. They rappel from a tower in basic, why not slide down a fast rope? Rigger's belts should be a part of the BDU instead of the useless web belt so in an emergency men can be extracted by hovering helicopter, rappel and cross a rope bridge with a safety hook-up. During the evacuation of Kham Duc in Vietnam, 2 CIDG Soldiers and a marine aviator tried to escape the advancing NVA by holding onto the skid of a departing UH-1 Huey helicopter, but fell to their deaths from a thousand feet. Had they been equipped with a snap link, sling rope or even used their LBE to hook up to the skid, they may not have lost their grip and fell to their deaths. Tying a swiss seat with a sling rope needs to be a CTT Skill level 1 task.

They should be trained/conditioned to climb up caving ladders into hovering helicopters and/or snap in to their Rigger's belts (BDU shirt tails tucked in) until the helicopter can land safely as well as hold on to slide down a fast rope. This means physical training must be SPECIFIC to combat tasks, not SPORTS tasks like running, sit-ups and push-ups in t-shirt, shorts and running shoes.

We need entire infantry BATTALIONS of the 101st Air Assault, 82d Airborne inserting away from predictable LZs using FRIES, enough helicopters with Improved "I" bars need to be available for this. This includes their HMMWV ground vehicles from a helicopter external sling-load using diligent PATHFINDING techniques. At the very least 4x4 HMMWVs are needed on the ground to give these forces greater firepower and mobility than the Vietnam "foot slog"--the first "AIRmotorized" capability.

Getting out: how do we EXTRACT the men: FRIES, SPIES, STABO and Ladders

What many do not realize is that the Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction System (FRIES)has extraction loops on the rope end to hook up to 6 Soldiers per rope who wear a STABO or SPIE rig harness or in an emergency a swiss seat though the upright body position of the STABO/SPIE harnesses is preferred. SPIE is a cargo line with "D" rings sewn to it that hangs from the center belly cargo hook of a helicopter. The SPIE harness is a T-10 parachute harness with a "Donkey tail" of type XIII nylon with a loop to hold a snaplink/carabiner to connect to the cargo line "D" ring. A recon team under fire could snap in quickly to the line lowered from the hovering helicopter into a small opening in the jungle and be pulled out, but it was dangerous and several men died in Vietnam. Another downside to SPIE is its a harness with no patrol load bearing function--dead weight and time loss under enemy fire to put on. With FRIES, one system can be used for both insertion/extraction, simplifying logistics and the configuration complexity in the aircraft. The only downside to FRIES is that during insertion the rope is often dropped, and a 90 foot, 50 pound rope has no ground applications and is discarded at $1,000 a shot.

At least a rappelling rope can be used to cross rivers, descend cliffs etc. and is worth recovering and carrying along on the mission. This is to speed the helicopter away from its vulnerable position hovering. If the situation allows the fast rope should be pulled in by the fast rope master/crew chief and thought should be considered of a winch to reel the fast rope in--perhaps with the men attached.

STABO is a modified Army green line rappelling rope which is hooked up to a donut ring on the floor or roof of the helicopter, then tossed down the the Soldier below in a deployment bag, one rope per man. The Soldiers wear a patrol load bearing suspenders that is life support capable that has two "V" hooks that snaplinks to a bridle "Y" piece with a snap for the rope from the helicopter. 4 men at a time can be extracted as they tie a safety rope to each other for extra insurance. The downside to STABO is its leg straps are not designed to pull away from the groin like a parachute harness and is extremely uncomfortable when dangling from a helicopter.

Caving ladders like the flexible ladders used in Vietnam can be used to re-enter a helicopter while it hovers, but its time-consuming and tiring. Hydraulic hoists/jungle penetrator equipped helicopters can reel in at the most 3 men at a time, but is an option for a small force though time consuming.

The first solution here is the C.O.M.E.T. Enterprises (101 E. Main St. Marshville, NC) Infil-Exfil Tactical Load Bearing Vest (TLBV) with STABO/SPIE/FRIES capabilities built into the Soldier's load bearing system. This has split-saddle legs straps for comfort and fold up when not needed. The ultimate solution to the hovering insertion/extraction problem to steer away from predictable, open LZs requires an entirely new aircraft built with this purpose in mind.

STEALTHY HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER WITH HOVER INSERT/EXTRACT ABILITY

The main solution is to AIRmechanize with a stealthy heavy lift helicopter that can raise/lower an entire intact recon team or infantry platoon and/or light AFVs. It would have a bomb-bay floor which can lower to the ground from a hover or vice-a-versa.

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/nextchinook.htm

There WILL ALWAYS be a need for FRIES and rappel capabilities for smaller helicopters without the special lowering bomb-bay floor. With the ability to insert ANYWHERE on the map, the ground force with complete foot and vehicular mobility fights the enemy as a combined arms team, a full maneuver "player" on the AIRLAND battlefield. This is where we can end the "foot slogging" and LZ dependance plaguing Air Assault tactics.

BETTER RECON AND PATHFINDING

The NVA had "Head hunter" battalions--thats right entire battalions that would sweep over the terrain to flush out all our recon types, LRRPS, MAVC-SOG, Force recon, you name it. We never quite figured out the solution to that. The ultimate solution would be to wipe out their head hunters with our own Rangers/Raiders just as mobile on foot, more so with HPVs, better armed with light AFVs PLUS+ all the fire support available to U.S. armies. We must be prepared to fight for reconnaissance.

So all that HOOAH! stuff: "scuba diving", small boats etc. and "parachuting" is necessary to insert a LRS, SF SR team at least without being detected, otherwise we end up running for our lives. Its not just reasons to say "I'm better than you". That "hi-speed PT" is helpful but again arrogance blinds, it is not enough. We had studs in Vietnam. At best we are talking about 4-7 mph on foot. Again, not good enough. The latest ploy is to do away with HUMINT entirely and rely on UAVs, but last year's failed IDF naval commando raid showed that UAVs overflying an area can telegraph your intentions and result in you being ambushed.

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/5265/squad.htm

The solution?

*Human Powered Vehicles (HPVs):

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/recon.htm">HPVs for Recon work

That can be carried folded on board helicopters, and render 10-25 mph.

* Better stealth, using thermal camouflage suits etc. So once on the ground, the recon team is not detected by an enemy rapidly buying night vision devices (NVDs) on the open market. We may "Own the night" today, but neighbors are moving in next door.

WHAT HAPPENED DURING AND AFTER VIETNAM?

NEW REVELATIONS! The Ugly Truth About U.S. Army Air-Mobile (Helicopter) Forces: could have had light tracked armored fighting vehicles in Vietnam and need them today

Recently its become apparent that 10-ton M113A1 Gavins and 8-ton M56 Scorpion 90mm assault guns could have been "air-meched" by CH-54A/B SkyCranes into combat in Vietnam to avert near catastrophes like LZ X-Ray. Here's a pic of a CH-54 and a M56 Scorpion 90mm assault gun connected together as an outdoor static display:

Why did we have to wait 40 decades for 2 + 2 to be added together? Why wasn't this done in Vietnam to render fire support for Air Assault troops?

An M113A1 empty is 19,200 pounds (10 tons), the CH-54B can lift 12 tons, so track/engine removal is not required as the 25th LID caption implied. The M56 Scorpion was 8 tons.

When we get around to revising the 3rd edition of Air-Mech-Strike, we will have to raise the question of why wasn't this done? Our suspicion is that General Kinnard had a light infantry bias and was anti-armored vehicle resulting in the Army's helicopter 3D mobile units fighting the enemy at a disadvantage when not complimented by the 2D Armored Cavalry maneuveing in conjunction with them.

A Vietnam combat veteran writes:

Subj: [MASWG] Meet the CH-53E SkyCrane! (fwd)
Date: 9/7/2004 8:29:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: XXXXXX@att.net

"Mike,

Even without the mods, the CH54 could lift a M113... I had to call one in when I had a track blown up in Oct 1968. You have to watch out for the downforce upon lift. Well in Excess of 150 MPH when you are lifting 12 tons. Blew most of the BN HQ shelters out of the FOB. Sorry, no pics of same. I can only imagine what downforce lifting 20 tons would generate!

Again, nice job on the models. I was busy this weekend with Frances, still not recovered from Charley, and waiting on Ivan.

XXXXX"

You mean, this?

EDITOR: the caption is incorrect; a M113A1 empty is 19,200 pounds (10 tons), the CH-54B can lift 12 tons, so track/engine removal is not required.

CAPTION:

www.i-kirk.info/tlnews/tln232-03.jpg

New Generation Skycrane Saves Damaged Carrier

Soldiers of the 25th Div’s 2nd Bde scratched their heads in wonder recently as a armored personnel carrier (APC) from the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf, went flying overhead.

The carrier had hit a Viet Cong mine the day before. Removing it from the swampy lowlands along the Oriental River would have meant dragging it 15 kms to the nearest road for pickup.

The only answer was to fly it out, but the APC weighs 13 tons. Battalion officers figured that it would take 13 HU-1D helicopters pulling at once to lift it out.

The answer came flying into the unit’s forward base in the form of a giant “Skycrane” helicopter. The huge ship can easily lift a nine ton load.

To meet the weight restriction, the carrier’s tracks were broken, and the vehicle literally driven off its metal treads. Then the engine was removed and all radio equipment was stripped off.

Two Soldiers battled the 120 mile an hour rotor wash and hooked the cargo straps to the Skycrane’s hoist hook. Everyone stood back and watched as track number 33 flew off toward Cu Chi.

NEED A LIFT? - A “Skycrane” carries a damaged armored personnel carrier back to Cu Chi for repairs. (Photo by 1LT Karel)

AFTER VIETNAM

The 1st Cavalry converted back to a heavy armored division, we had no CAVALRY BRANCH to preserve the 2D/3D air/ground synergism created with helicopters and M113 Gavin tracks in Vietnam. We had the armor versus armo Yom Kippur war in 1973 where everyone thought the ATGM had "killed" the tank. With current generation U.S. tanks vulnerable to ATGMs, Armor branch went crazy to create a tank that would slug it out with the soviets in europe.

What happened to Air Assault tactics?

Even though the TRI-Cap armor/helicopter experiment worked very well in tests, the conservative Army leadership went back to emulating WWII, perhaps they were excited about George C. Scott in Patton?

I know most of the readers would parachute out of a plane to gain 3D positional advantage if asked to do so. The following remarks are directed at those who are not even willing to sit on a bench seat in a helicopter to get 3D advantage, either. My thesis is that American mounted warfare is also a form of "posturing" going through the motions of fighting but not really fighting except when in the coverless desert where we can kill the enemy from the safety of our armored cacoons. Perhaps by going to too-heavy AFVs like the M1/M2 we have created a built-in automatic excuse so Armor branch will never have to fight in jungles again, you certainly don't see any AFVs in the 25th LID anymore. General Don Starry and company certainly knew light tanks/AFVs were fantastic in Vietnam---perhaps they thought by going to heavy AFVs they could insure they wouldn't have to fight where infantry dismounted action would run the show? I'd love to interview these Army leaders that made these decisions and find out. Did they really think a 33-ton BFV is going to be as terrain agile as a M113 rumbling over the rice paddies in Vietnam? If they do, they are truly idiots, but I doubt that.

Personally, I think the Army--particularly Armor branch deliberately made itself too heavy so it wouldn't have to fight a Vietnam again. Just like the marines deliberately land-lock themselves and ship-deploy just token evac forces, all the while by spending as much tax-payer money as possible. If the shoe fits, wear it.

The failure of aviation/infantry/artillery to defeat the VC/NVA in Vietnam without taking too many casualties---resulted in leaders in the Army to resort to 2D heavy, armored cacoon mounted warfare oriented towards European confrontation against the Soviets. Instead of FIXING Airborne/Air Assault 3D maneuver units by giving them numerous air-deliverable light AFVs which would solve their vulnerability/firepower/ground mobility problems these heavyists who I suspect are "legs" (meaning unwilling to take personal risks by flying in aircraft=cowards) that are anti-3D maneuver because they think they can make up for this lack of 3D maneuver-gained-positional-advantage by extremely heavy armor protection/firepower that limits them to just 2D maneuver routes. A 2D force so heavy it cannot rapidly deploy strategically to be relevent in a world that moves by the speed of the AIR in a force that sits in the motor pool and watches the fight on CNN.

Heavyists want low/no risk warfare and think that those positions ahead that threaten them can be controlled by "deep fires" and thus they don't have to take any risks by flying forces ahead to control this ground. This is the "deep strike" mentality prevalent in the Army today because it thinks war is just killing and killing is firepower. These folks do not understand to control ground you need forces on the ground; and this means not relying on distant fires to do this. Controlling ground locally with close fires/patrolling is sound, trying to control ground miles and miles away with just the eyes of a robot plane or vehicle is madness. By being heavily mounted, they think they are so impervious to fires they can just stampede ahead without ill effect. Don't they see the repeated failures at NTC every time this is tried? Tracks are not Chobham armored--once BlueFor stampedes into a minefield kill zone its over. Heavyists are living on technotactical borrowed time as top-attack missiles are coming that will pierce their vehicle roofs that don't have 4 feet of Chobham/DU armor. A smart enemy will not let their fuel trucks travel down roads to refuel these heavy gas-guzzlers.

I know this is cruel, but I think it boils down to personal cowardice. (I call them as I see them)

3D maneuver requires movement inside aircraft and the 2D heavyists are afraid of flying. Yes, some aircraft will crash in peacetime and some of us are going to die. But the more numerous lives we will have saved in war will make it worth it. Don't believe me? Order everyone at Fort Knox to go to jump school or they will be discharged and see what happens. Am I saying they are lesser Soldiers? Yes, I am. If you are not willing to do WHATEVER IT TAKES to win a war, to include risks in peacetime to have a 3D maneuver capability, you are a coward and a phony. If Generals want to shoot shells at map coordinates and assume they are under our "control" are posturing cowards, too. When our 2D forces come by these terrain areas and the enemy is there, the junior officers/enlistedmen will pay for it with their lives. The only guy who is really got the pressure on in mounted warfare is the Driver; everyone else can relax and enjoy the ride. Its the worse kind of Fort Knox BS mentality possible, a lot of General Shinseki's transformation opposition sadly emanates from Armor types who are scared to fly in aircraft when it should be opposition to being in a road bound armored car in order to be light enough to fly in USAF aircraft when you can have a better, x-country capable tracked AFV that is so efficient with its weight that its Army helicopter transportable, too. Be against road-bound wheels not 3D deployability and battlefield maneuver.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH U.S. ARMY HELICOPTER AVIATION?

Thus, 3 decades after Vietnam, the current Army "transformation" has no role for Army aviation other than "ash and trash" missions. Thanks to TF Hawk's woes in Albania, faith in even heavily armored/armed Apache helicopter gunships flying alone into enemy territory as a "seperate maneuver element" is at an all-time low. The Russians in Chechnya have not had a lot of helicopter success, either. The essential problem is that Army Aviation has forgotten that ground maneuver wins wars and has become fixated with their own helicopter gunship mentality that's really an Army green version of "fighter-bomber jock syndrome" long associated with the USAF. This took place when Army Aviation became its own branch and became in essence its own bureaucracy seeking selfish instead of combined-arms goals. To fix this, the Army should force the TRANSPORT parts of Army Aviation into the transformation process by insisting that Armored Fighting Vehicles are used that can be transported by Army helicopters for an Air-Mech-Strike capability. Army helicopters and scouts should be used for Close Air Support (CAS) not their own prove-they-can win-the-war-by-themselves missions. USAF A-10s should be forced to deploy alongside Army helos in the Assault Zone (AZ) not be held back in the rear with the other USAF planes operating from secure concrete runways. The "Cactus Air Force" so successful in WWII must return, service bickering be damned.

The Army's AH-1s and UH-1s should not be thrown away nor their pilots---but transformed into the world's first "RoboCobra" Unmanned Close Air Support (UCAS) aircraft that would be flown by men in low threat environs and remotely in high threat areas. The lessons from TF Hawk and Chechnya is to have expendable UCAS aircraft locate thee nemy not just create expensive digital, stealthy Scout helicopters like the RAH-66 Comanche and the Russian KA-50 Black Shark. We also need to stop being snobby and bring back enlisted pilots and provide ground FACs to control Army helicopter attack missions.

A must read concerning the role of helicopters is the report below on Russian Air Operations in Chechnya:

http://www.amina.com/article/thomas_mili.html

www.milparade.com/1999/34/030.htm

Issue 34. July - August 1999
SHIELD AND SWORD
Grigory Kuznetsov, Candidate of Sciences (Technology)

Grigory Kuznetsov, retired colonel, candidate od sciences (technology), was in charge of the trials of the Mi-4A helicopters armed with the K-4V weapon system, and Mi-24D, Mi-24V, Mi-28 and Ka-50 combat helicopters.

Combat helicopters designed to provide fire support for friendly troops on the battlefield have virtually perpetrated a revolution in the tactical employment of armored and mechanized forces. By various estimates, the helicopters emerged victorious in various battles at a rate of 1:14, and even 1:20. This situation called for urgent equipment of armored units with both air defense artillery and surface-to-air missiles (ADA and SAM, respectively) to repel attacks of helicopters.

Fig. 1. AD area

A mobile point air defense (AD) system has been developed to protect units while on the defensive, on the march, and in combat formations on the battlefield. Schematically, it can be viewed as an inverted umbrella. For a schematic representation of a radial cross-section of the protective zone of such an AD shield for modern ADA and SAM systems see Fig. 1. Shown at 1 and 2 in the figure are possible positions of the combat helicopter for direct contact with ADA and SAM systems as well as armor materiel for their detection, identification and attack. Shown at the top is the permissible time of its flight within the ADA and SAM coverage, which depends on the distance to the helicopter; upon expiration of this lapse of time it can be destroyed with a probability close to unity.

Thus, the armor supremacy, once disturbed by combat helicopters, has been restored with the emergence of the powerful "shield". Now, army aviation tacticians and rotorcraft designers again face the complex problem of penetrating the point AD system. To attack even a preliminarily reconnoitered target, a strike helicopter has to first enter the AD coverage area for its detection and identification, which takes a certain length of time. Therefore, if a decision to attack an armored target 4 km away (the joint ADA and SAM coverage) is made, combat helicopters, types Mi-24, Ka-50, Ka-52 (Russia) and AH-64 (USA), will have only a few seconds to take aim, fire and then disappear behind cover or a screening obstacle.

A combat helicopter attacking a target at a range of up to 4 km can only use unguided aircraft rockets and guns with an aiming and firing time of 2 to 3 seconds. It is impractical to launch antitank guided missiles (ATGM) from ranges closer than 4 km, since the time required for their preparation and guidance is almost twice as long as the command and loading time of the ADA and SAM systems. The effective sighting range of rockets and guns of the Mi-24 and AH-64 helicopters is 1.5 to 2 km. This means they have to come dangerously close to the AD systems in every attack. The Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters are in a more advantageous position when rockets and guns are used, since they are armed with more powerful (80 and 122mm) rockets and a gun and outfitted with a sighting system with a range of up to 4 km.

Fig. 2. Tactical operation of combat helicopter using ATGMs

It should be said that the point AD systems have fully stripped the Mi-24 and AH-64 helicopters of their capability of attacking counterair-covered targets from a range of 2 to 4 km. An SAM system permits a combat helicopter to stay in the AD coverage area without impunity for only 15 to 20 seconds to detect and attack a target from a range of 4 to 6 km. In terms of the total time required for target detection and identification, aiming, ATGM launch and guidiance, the employment of ATGMs by all existing strike helicopters from the aforementioned ranges is like balancing on the brink of a foul play, to speak in the sports language. The Mi-24, Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters are in a better position with respect to the AH-64, because the domestic Shturm, Ataka and Vikhr ATGMs markedly surpass their American counterpart, the Hellfire missile. The tactics involving the use of ATGMs (rockets and guns) against counterair-covered armor materiel is illustrated in Fig. 2.

To substantially (almost by one half) reduce the AH-64 stay time in the AD coverage area, used to guide the Hellfire missile from the instant of launch till impact, considerable hopes are pinned on the OH-58D reconnaissance helicopter or ground-based laser illuminators. In this case, the AH-64 helicopter controls an ATGM till the instant the seeker locks onto the laser spot of the illuminated target, following which, the helicopter quickly leaves the AD coverage area. However, the reliability for the practical realization of this tactics is doubtful, because both the reconnaissance helicopter and ground-based laser illuminators are limited in range.

As a result, every time they have to approach targets as close as possible, and it is highly doubtful that the enemy will continue to let them do so.

Fig. 3. Fragment of combat operation

That is why Russian military experts and the Kamov company designers have set the concept of employment of the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters on two principles. The first of them is the best use of the experience in the employment of weapons at ranges of up to 5 km as compared with other domestic combat helicopters. In particular, this is enhanced by the hardware exchange of information between helicopters (aircraft) and command posts to obtain precise target designation data. The other principle is based on assuring the possibility for search and standoff attack of targets at a range of 6 to 10 km. This so-called "long hand" principle was realized on the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters owing to their surveillance and search systems which are capable of detecting and identifying targets at a range of 8 to 10 km, while allowing the Vikhr ATGM to hit tanks at a range of up to 8 km with a probability of 0.9.

The technique of strike helicopter employment against counterair-covered ground targets is based on flying at extremely low altitudes, using the screening features of the terrain, forests and structures beyond the coverage of ADA and SAM systems. Then a momentary "hop" is made to scan the surface ahead and then get behind cover. If necessary, "hops" are repeated with changes in the cover to cause maximum difficulty for the point AD system in detecting the helicopters. For a fragment of a combat operation involving the use of strike helicopters against armor materiel incorporating ADA and SAM systems refer to Fig. 3. Shown at 1, 2 and 3 are possible positions of a combat helicopter to detect and identify ground targets, and at 4, the ATGM attack lines.

Numerous exercises staged by the U.S. Army Aviation involving OH-58D reconnaissance helicopters, AH-64A (Apache), AH-64D and AH-64 Longbow attack rotorcraft, as well as some well-known military conflicts with their participation, have revealed insufficient effectiveness of the former, especially at night and in adverse weather conditions, which makes it impossible for the combat machine to fully realize its potential. In this context, the development of a new-generation reconnaissance helicopter, the RAH-66 Comanche, nears its completion. It has a takeoff weight of about 5,000 kg and is armed with four Hellfire ATGMs, a gun and air-to-air missiles.

According to the design concept specified by the customer, the state-of-the-art optical, laser, TV, thermal imaging and radar equipment installed aboard the new reconnaissance helicopter will be fully capable of performing reconnaissance missions, providing precise target designation to the combat helicopter and weapons on other platforms (aircraft, missile launchers and gun mounts) and laser illumination of targets for the helicopter's own ATGMs and the ATGMs carried by the AH-64 helicopter. The RAH-66 helicopter, whose takeoff weight is 2.5 times that of the OH-58D, is estimated by foreign specialists as having the effective reflective area which is 1/200 that of the latter. Built with the use of stealth technology it is practically invisible for the point AD system.

Installation of detachable wings to accommodate additional fuel tanks and armament (rockets, up to 14 Hellfire ATGMs and air-to-air missiles) on the base version turns the RAH-66 into a light combat helicopter also invisible for ADA and SAM systems. According to U.S. Army aviation specialists, the new tandem consisting of the RAH-66 reconnaissance helicopter and the AH-64 combat helicopter can fully realize the combat potential of the combat helicopter for destruction of enemy armor materiel and helicopters. A further increase in the effectiveness is planned to be achieved by gradually replacing the AH-64 by the RAH-66 in its combat version. So, the "shield versus sword" contest goes on.

The U.S. Army has tested and is now updating a combat system based on reconnaissance and strike helicopters. The ratio of the former to the latter in an Army grouping is adjusted from time to time. The updated Army aviation structure envisages, for example, a combination of nine Comanches and fifteen Apaches as part of a heavy division attack battalion. The armies of other countries using combat helicopters considerably lag behind the USA as far as the depth of elaboration of the helicopter employment concept is concerned.

The experience gained in the employment of combat helicopters in Russia allows the development of an alternative combat system whose effectiveness depends on the cooperation of Ka-50, Ka-52 and Ka-31 helicopters, informationally linked with ground and air command posts and AD systems.

If used properly, the ability of strike helicopters to defeat air targets can considerably affect the course of the "shield versus sword" confrontation. For this purpose, it suffices for the organization of a reliable cooperation between combat helicopters and the point AD system of friendly armor units. At present, this can be realized by employing an army aviation command vehicle, the Ka-52 helicopter, maintaining permanent overt and covert communication links with ground command posts and combat helicopters. The basic condition for effective alliance between the point AD system and combat helicopters must be the air superiority of domestic attack rotorcraft over similar enemy counterparts.

In Russia such helicopters are the Ka-50 and its two-seat version, the Ka-52. They boast a high thrust-to-weight ratio and unique agility, which allows them to take a position suitable for attack within the shortest time and minimum volume of air space. This is one of the qualities essential for gaining supremacy in a tight-turning dog fight.

To conduct an air fight, the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters possess a diverse arsenal of weapons. First, it is a powerful 30mm high firing rate gun capable of defeating air targets at ranges of up to 4 km. It is supplemented with air-to-air missiles with infrared homing heads, type Igla-V, and an effective range of 5 km, as well as supersonic Vikhr ATGMs with unified warheads used to kill both ground armor and air targets at ranges of up to 8 km. The said effective means of air target destruction, combined with the high agility of the machines, assure the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters a victory over the enemy.

The air space in which the helicopters are to fight may be either close to or above the line of contact, in the area with irregular terrain and multitude of smoke-and-dust formations. This makes the timely detection of air targets more difficult, though it may help in the delivery of sudden attacks from medium and short ranges. Sometimes, the decisive advantage in an air duel is gained by the side which was the first to detect an enemy aircraft.

In the given situation, a great help to friendly helicopters and AD systems in timely and early detection of enemy combat helicopters and aircraft can be the Ka-31 radar picket helicopter unparalleled in the world helicopter industry. This helicopter can operate in all weathers over the friendly territory at a distance of 100 to 150 km from the line of contact and detect air targets like rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, including those flying at extremely low altitudes, automatically track up to 20 of them and automatically send information over a covert communication link to ground and airborne command posts.

The Ka-31 has proved to be the essential link of the system, capable of informationally linking command posts, AD systems and Ka-52, and Ka-50 helicopters in the struggle with enemy helicopters, divesting their attacks of concealment and surprise. The new RAH-66 helicopter, built with the use of stealth technology, is not invisible for the Ka-31 either. The rotating main rotor of the RAH-66 is a non-concealment feature. Given information on the detected enemy helicopters and their movements, our combat helicopters have a great advantage in execution of a concealed maneuver and surprise attack.

In essence, we have an alternative armor protection system involving army aviation, leaving the enemy no chance for its successful penetration. The system may be connected, via ground command posts, to the guns on indirect laying positions. According to the information received, they can use volley fire to engage any enemy helicopters, including those flying at extremely low altitudes. The joint employment of the Ka-31, Ka-52 and Ka-50 helicopters, together with the AD systems, can make the "shield" protecting the armor materiel against air attacks more effective.

Helicopters in Urban Fighting?

Aviation Week & Space Technology
May 13, 2002
Pg. 27

IAF To Modify Helos To Fight In Cities

By Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, Palmachim AFB, Israel, and Tel Aviv

Weeks of intense attack helicopter operations in West Bank towns have produced important lessons for Israel Air Force pilots and service leaders; they need different weapons and more armed helicopters, and they have to learn to live with complex rules of engagement.

"[The major discovery] we made, during the last operation, was the importance of helicopters for urban fighting," said IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Dani Halutz. Israeli helicopter pilots in recent weeks have been flying precision strike missions continuously in the West Bank. "We found out there are many ways to ease the land force's [workload] by using helicopters in the proper ways."

Israeli helicopter crews are learning urban operations on the fly. Fighting in cities is a new problem and something "we never really trained for," said Capt. Gilad, a pilot in one of the IAF's two AH-1S Cobra attack helicopter squadrons.

Military planners realized in 1996 after unrest in the West Bank they could face an urban conflict, but it didn't lead to significant training in this area. "It is not an easy mission," Halutz noted.

Late last week, helicopter pilots were poised to resume combat operations, but this time in the Gaza Strip after a bombing near Tel Aviv earlier in the week that killed 15. Gaza was not targeted in the initial operation, but it is a stronghold of Hamas, which was blamed for the latest bombing.

During its West Bank operation, the town of Jenin and its refugee camp proved particularly challenging because it is such a heavily built-up area. The problem was further complicated by the strict rules of engagement that pilots said they had to abide by. Those were intended to limit harm to bystanders and to reduce their pilots' exposure to air defenses.

"We've had to be innovative all the time; it's a new war for us and the world," said a senior Cobra squadron member.

To ensure that the proper targets were attacked, helicopter crews coordinated closely with the commanders who had access to live imagery of targets provided by unmanned aerial vehicles. The UAV sensor operators, commanders and helicopter crews worked with a common grid map on which each house was given a four-digit designation. The scheme ensured all personnel were looking at the same location when discussing a potential target. Pilots also were given photos showing each target from different angles to further dispel confusion.

THE COOPERATION with the IAF's only UAV squadron was more intense than ever, said the senior Cobra pilot. Whenever attack helicopters took up position over a city, at least one unmanned aircraft was already on station. That allowed pilots to get information about the situation on the ground either from the air operations center that coordinated all activities or directly from the UAV unit.

Nevertheless, pilots faced many operational hurdles in adapting to the new mission. In one instance, IDF troops on the ground were in distress and called for help from the helicopter forces. However, pilots about to provide close-air support had to abort the attack because they spotted figures in women's clothing in the crowd. "There's a lot of dilemmas like that," Gilad said. Attack helicopters rather than tanks were often called on to limit damage on the ground, even though using tanks would have meant fewer casualties among Israeli troops, a second IAF officer said.

The IAF has used both Apache and Cobra attack helicopters for its campaign against perceived terrorist targets. Apaches have been used primarily against moving targets, while Cobras have been used mainly against buildings. The Tow missiles fired by Cobras have proven more useful for hitting structures than the Hellfire missiles shot from Apaches, IAF officials say. Among the Cobras' targets were snipers hiding in upper floors to shoot at IDF troops on the ground.

Cobras also have fired the Rafael-built N-TD weapon, an Israeli official said. The 6-km.-range antiarmor weapon can be used either in a fire-and-forget mode or it can be guided using a fiber-optic link. It can use both infrared or electro-optical seekers and carries a tandem warhead. Additionally, IDF ground forces used laser designators to guide Hellfire missiles fired by Apaches that remained hidden behind terrain features. The scheme was designed to prevent helicopter noise from spoiling surprise attacks, U.S. sources said.

One of the early lessons Cobra squadron members are drawing from their experience is that new warheads are required for the urban fight. The Tow and N-TD warheads are designed to penetrate tank hulls, but that means their performance is not ideal for attacking a room in a house. The antitank weapon doesn't produce enough of a blast to ensure that a person fighting from within a room is killed.

Moreover, when houses containing explosives were attacked, helicopters had to fire multiple antitank missiles to destroy the target. The solution helicopters pilots are looking for is a blast/fragmenting warhead that would be large enough to destroy a room without inflicting damage beyond it.

IAF officials now also are considering upgrading their UH-60 BlackHawks to carry weapons, a capability the U.S. Army has in its MH-60 special operations units. The IAF operates one BlackHawk squadron--with a mix of versions--and is about to field a second. The second squadron will receive its first helicopters this summer and become operational next year at a base near Be'er Sheeva in southern Israel. So far, BlackHawks have been deployed mainly to supply forces operating in the West Bank. The aircraft are receiving a desert brown paint scheme to make them more difficult to spot than in a black coating.

THE IAF ALSO IS planning to replace its Cobras. Service leaders expect to buy either more AH-64 Apaches or the new AH-1Z four-bladed Cobra. Logisticians see advantages to having a single-aircraft force. However, there are also concerns that a technical problem could force the grounding of the entire attack helicopter fleet.

Helicopter pilots have been ordered to avoid flying low unless it's absolutely necessary when operating over hostile territory. There is a deep concern that the loss of even a single aircraft would provide a huge morale boost to the opposition, even if it were due to a technical malfunction, rather than damage from ground fire. In addition, at least two helicopters always operate together for support and to summon aid.

Antiterrorism operations haven't been restricted to the West Bank. Helicopter pilots also have flown into southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah fighters have fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. However, there are many surface-to-air missiles in that area, such as infrared-guided SA-7s and SA-14s. One pilot said, "We think they may even have SA-18s," a more modern IR-missile. In its northern area, the IAF keeps at least two attack helicopters ready for takeoff within 10 min. to respond to terrorist activities.

1. Total war quantity can swallow quality
2. 4th Generation Wars are won by who captures the MINDS of the populace through MANEUVER that collapses and changes the will of the enemy
3. Air-Mech-Strike delivery of troops/AFVs is the right way to win battles by MANEUVER
4. Helicopters must be silenced, made to fly faster, given means to lay smokescreens, land away from predictable LZs, and be SURVIVABLE---the flimsy gadget plane V-22 will not make it
5. Fixed-wing CAS observation/attack aircraft like A-10, UCAS, SU-25, SU-39 must operate with ground maneuver forces from forward strips, are also more effective than manned helicopters as currently configured
6. Our RoboCobra concept of turning Army AH-1 into UCAS/recon platforms is sound
7. Russia is having helicopter maintainability woes, too
8. Russia is doing the RAH-66 digital scout thing with its KA-50s, more costly than expendable RoboCobras, however
9. Air strikes indiscriminate against civilians; ground firepower more surgical, more likely to not help enemy's 4th GenWar efforts by atrocities
10. We need better Air and Ground Forward Air Control from both the USAF and the Army
11. Last but not least, we need a better U.S. Army Air Assault Badge to better recognize the importance of Air Assault troops and capabilities in the power projection U.S. Army.

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