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General McClellan had risen at one leap to the command of the army, after its defeat at Bull Run, through the prestige of his successful campaign in western Virginia. This rapidity of his rise deprived him of the opportunity of more active service in minor commands. Yet he was without doubt absolutely unequalled as an organizer. His ability in this respect was phenomenal; his results were produced with remarkable rapidity. He knew that only well-organized and drilled troops could hope to succeed against those of the South, officered as they were for the most part, by graduates of the United States Military Academy. As the troops from the Northern States poured into Washington they were, through his efforts, transformed from recruits into soldiers. While a delay in resuming active operations against the South, was not only desirable, but necessary, an extended period of inactivity was little relished by the North. The Confederate army not only remained in possession of the Bull Run battlefield, in sight of Washington; but controlled the Potomac below the capital, thus crippling her commerce. McClellan, from his knowledge of the necessities of an army, was desirous of obtaining an ideal equipment of men and supplies before undertaking offensive movements. Hence no operations were undertaken from July to December, with the exception of that resulting in the disaster of Ball's Bluff, which only served to fan the flame of desire, on the part of the Government authorities, for action that would result in effective retaliation. As winter came on the difficulties of such operations increased. The soil and climate of Virginia are most unfavorable to military movements. Without warning, storms cause the rivers that flow across the State to rise with such speed as to preclude their being crossed by armies, and at the same time turn the roads into quagmires.
Notwithstanding this period of preparation, however, a battle was fought before the year closed. On December 19th, General McCall received reports, indicating that the enemy had pushed a strong foraging party towards Dranesville. He immediately ordered General Ord to move his brigade the next morning in that direction, with the two-fold object of driving away the enemy's pickets and of obtaining forage himself. To strengthen Ord's brigade, the Bucktails, a force of cavalry, and Captain Faston's Battery A, were ordered to accompany it.
The Confederate foraging party, in search of hay, was stronger than suspected. It was protected by four regiments of infantry, aggregating 1,6oo men, 150 cavalry, and a battery of four pieces, all under the command of General J. E. B. Stuart. No election having been held to fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Colonel Biddle, the command of the Bucktails naturally devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Kane. At this time he was lying ill in Washington. Fearful that some active operation or forward movement would be made, while he was absent, he had extorted promises from a friend and his surgeon to advise him should marching orders be received. Upon receiving notice of the projected reconnaissance through these sources, he insisted on being moved. Wrapped in blankets, he was carried to an ambulance and thus taken to his tent. The next morning, to the surprise of his regiment, he took his place on horseback at its head.
Starting at 5 A. M. General Ord moved his column along the road towards Dranesville. Reports had led him to believe that the force he was likely to meet was not very strong and was destitute of artillery. Some confusion in the movements of his own troops caused him to enter Dranesville, 12 miles from his starting place, with only his cavalry and artillery, supplemented by the Bucktail and Ninth regiments which were thrown out as flankers.
Dranesville is situated on the Leesburg pike, which runs southeast from Leesburg to Alexandria. The road from Camp Pierpont, over which the regiments had moved, runs into the Leesburg pike at a sharp angle, a short distance east of Dranesville, and at a still shorter distance east of this junction a road runs, at right angles from the pike, southwest to Centreville. South of the Leesburg pike, on both sides of the Centreville road, there is open ground; the clearing being double the width on the eastern side of the road than it is on the western side. In this wide clearing there is a brick house. Beyond the clearing and fields, on each side, are heavy woods.
As General Ord was in Dranesville, he was therefore in a position where the Centreville road entered the pike in his rear. While waiting for the other regiments to arrive he placed the artillery, cavalry, Ninth regiment and two companies of Bucktails in positions to defend the approaches of the town. The remaining ten companies of Bucktails, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kane were ordered to occupy the pike.
Kane, who during the advance to Dranesville, had been scouting, had already noticed the brick house, before mentioned, and realized that it would prove of great value, should the enemy, advancing up the Centreville road, attack on both sides of that road. His present duty, however, was to investigate the woods, between the Leesburg pike and the Potomac River. After some distance had been covered, the regiment arrived at a farmhouse, and here the Lieutenant Colonel captured a man accused of shooting pickets. Forwarding the captive to the proper authorities, the regiment commenced to retrace their steps; but hardly had they done so, when an orderly from General Ord, delivered a message to the Lieutenant Colonel. The latter raised himself in his stirrups and gave the command "Forward, Bucktails, there's fun ahead." The men broke into a run, came down the road to within a hundred yards of the enemy, filed right, and, came into line. The line covered the brick house, and Lieutenant Rice, with Company I, was ordered to take possession of the building itself.
By this time the Confederates were moving to the attack. Captain Niles, with Company K of the Bucktails, and Captain Smith, with Company A, of the Ninth regiment, having been detached and thrown forward as skirmishers, first felt the assault. They now, falling back slowly before the enemy, regained touch with their respective regiments. General Ord ordered his artillery into position, but in its endeavor to act promptly, the battery ran past its station and upset one of its guns. Thus the Confederate artillery opened fire about fifteen minutes before Captain Easton could get his guns working. When the battery did open, it did so with magnificent effect; its third shot hitting the opposing battery and compelling its withdrawal.
When the battle assumed form the Union line was formed by the Bucktails on the left (east of the Centreville road), a portion of the Sixth regiment in the center and the Ninth regiment on the right (both the latter west of the Centreville road), The battery was in the rear, fronting down the Centreville road, but on the north side of the Leesburg pike which runs at right angles to the Centreville road. The other regiments and the cavalry were in reserve. The Confederates had made an attempt to turn the Union left flank, leaving the cover of the woods and charging forward in good form. But the Bucktails had met the attack with such a vigorous and well directed fire that the Confederates had retreated to the woods. On the right Colonel Jackson's Ninth regiment had maintained its position bravely.
General Ord having placed his cavalry safely on the left flank; and ordered Captain Easton to right the overturned gun and place it with two others in an advantageous position, found that his artillery had practically silenced the enemy's, and showed no signs of being discomposed by the fire directed at it.
The other regiments assigned to positions in reserve, were sheltering themselves in ditches and under fences, as best they could. None of the brigade, with the exception of the Bucktails had previously been under fire; hence General Ord's decision, which he now made, to push forward his infantry, involved a test of their mettle. Their task, made easier by the wonderful practice of Captain Easton's battery, was to cross the fields, enter the woods and drive back the enemy.
General Ord personally superintended the charge, at the head of which Kane placed himself with his Bucktails. The Ninth regiment, led by the intrepid Jackson, was no less eager to prove its valor. The column swept forward, General Ord doing his utmost to urge on the rear regiments. In the front, Captain Niles of the Bucktails, his tall figure rendering him dangerously conspicuous, charged forward, till a bullet, piercing his lung, made him drop to the ground.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane was struck in the face by a ball that pierced his upper jaw. A moment's halt, just sufficient to tie a bandage of some sort, and he again, despite the pain and loss of blood, resumed his position at the lead of his men. In the face of such determination, resistance was useless. Breaking in disorder the Confederates fled. General Ord, having heard that General McCall had arrived on the ground, had, after he saw that the brigade had gained the woods, formerly occupied by the Confederates, gone to the rear to report. General McCall had ordered up the brigade of General Reynolds to support Ord's; but before it arrived the battle had been won. A pursuit of half a mile was all that was permitted, after which General McCall ordered General Ord to withdraw his brigade. The Bucktails, who requested a few minutes' grace, were thus deprived of the capture of a gun abandoned by their opponents.
The moral effect of the victory, thus achieved by one brigade of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, cannot be overestimated. It was the first victory gained by troops in the Army of the Potomac, and coming after the disaster of Bull Run and the massacre of Ball's Bluff, had an added significance. Though the number of men engaged was not large, the battle afforded proof, both of the ability of Northern officers, and the valor of Northern troops. General Ord's force was little, if any, superior in numbers to that of General Stuart's; yet he inflicted more than three times the punishment he received, his loss being 68, to Stuart's 194.
In a dispatch to General McClellan, General McCall said "Ord's brigade, with the First Rifles, and Easton's battery, had a brisk affair with four regiments and a battery of the rebels at 12 M. today. . . . The Rifles behaved finely. Lieutenant-Colonel Kane very slightly wounded, but still in the field."
In his official report, General Ord says: "The wounded officers, Lieutenant Colonel Kane and Captain Niles, of the Kane Rifles . . . were conspicuous, leading their men when wounded."
Lieutenant Colonel Kane in his official report, says: "Of my own officers and the men I love I am too proud "to say more than that they all, without an exception, did their duty; but it is my place to mention the courage of Captain Ent during the brief period when you were good enough to place the Sixth under my command. I cannot consider it out of place, either, for me to bear my own testimony to the admirable conduct of Captain Easton and the brave artillerists with him, who served the guns of Battery A, from the regiment of the gallant Charles T. Campbell.
I enclose a copy of the report of Dr. S. D. Freeman, regimental surgeon, showing a list of 3 killed and 27 wounded. I trust the life of Captain Niles will be spared to his friends and his country. He led the flankers on the left yesterday, and though his tall figure made him a conspicuous mark for the enemy's rifles, he did not cease exposing himself to cheer on his men until he fell. This was but little before the enemy "retired." The official casualty report shows the total loss of the brigade in killed, wounded and missing to have been 68. The Bucktail loss was the largest sustained by any regiment in the brigade. The Sixth regiment lost 15, and the Ninth 22; thus the three regiments that did the fighting before the charge lost 66 men. The Tenth and Twelfth lost 1 between them, the battery escaped miraculously with a loss of 1, and the cavalry was unengaged.
When the enemy fled he did so in disorder. "The "road was strewed with men and horses; two caissons, one of "them blown up; a limber; a gun-carriage wheel; a quantity "of artillery ammunition, small-arms, and an immense quantity "of heavy clothing, blankets, etc."
General McCall, in ordering the division to return to Camp Pierpont, was hampered by the want of ambulances; being compelled to leave many of his wounded prisoners in Dranesville, where they could receive proper attention. With him he took his forage-sixteen wagon loads of excellent hay and twenty-two of corn.
The troops arrived at their camp the same evening, thoroughly exhausted. In addition to doing battle they had marched twenty-five miles, hence they hastened to turn in as rapidly as possible.
So rejoiced were the Nation and the Government at the victory, that on December 28th, Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, addressed a congratulatory letter to General McCall, in which, after expressing his delight that it had been given to Pennsylvania troops to inspire confidence in the ultimate triumph of the cause, he added: "Other portions of the Army will be stimulated by their brave deeds, and men will be proud to say that at Dranesville they served under McCall and Ord."
Governor Curtin, through General Russell, Aide-de-Camp, also issued a congratulatory order, commencing "The gallantry of our troops at Dranesville demands a public acknowledgment." The Governor, in addition, personally visited the camp, to insure everything being done, that was possible, to help and relieve the wounded.
General McCall issued another congratulatory order, and caused both the letters from Secretary Cameron and Governor Curtin to be read to the different regiments. The colors of the regiments engaged in the battle were taken to Washington and on each flag, "Dranesville, December 20, 1861," was painted in golden letters.
