WR 503 - The Role of the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Military

Lesson Objectives

503.1 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns, and operations with a concentration on conflict termination.

Strategic objectives are the actions planned to reach the desired end state. They must be congruent with the Grand Strategy. Strategic obj. may be accomplished by employing the national instruments of power (IOP), economical, political , military , or informational or any combination. Peace ops to support democracy or conflict resolution is an important part of the Nat'l Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Peace ops are often the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly or deadly.

Nation assistance, security assistance, HA, PKO, sanctions enforcement, are several means of supporting Nat'l Military Strategies of peacetime engagements and deterrence of aggression and conflict prevention.

Example: Haiti - Operation Uphold Democracy: Strategic obj: Restore legitimate government; Stabilize country to reduce #'s of of Haitians fleeing which was costing US $168M/year.

503.11 Relate the issues in this lesson to current and potential scenarios to discover the best method of employing NGOs during war and conflict resolution planning and execution.

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command  and control, you create a political committee, a civil military  operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center." Lt General A.C. Zinni, USMC CG, I MEF

Issues to consider about NGO, PVO, & IOs during planning and execution : individuality, availability, military culture, competing objectives, and cultural clash during planning and execution:

• Competing Objectives: NGOs often have ideas, values and missions which are different-Because of these differences, our objectives may be incongruent. This problem inhibits our ability to proactively plan to use these organizations
• NGO/IO Availability - NGO/IOs are independent, NGO/IOs can leave an area at any time, Planners can never really be sure about their reliability
• Military Culture Because military planners have often divorced end state planning from the campaign process, they have not fully employed these organizations, Military mind-set that "what happens after shooting stops is the responsibility of the politicians" has caused us to fail to consider NGO/IOs at any stage of operation
• Culture Clash Planner must balance NGO desire to remain fluid & structureless with our desire for structure. Failure to accept NGO/IOs as different and resistance to employment of them could be disastrous. Could result in:
  • Increased hostilities and increased casualties
  • Decreased US influence abroad and perception US military is incompetent
• The characteristics, mission, and capabilities of individual NGOs and PVOs are diverse, each NGO/PVO operates individually, often in high risk areas, NGO/PVOs are funded primarily by donations -- they frequently have scarce resources

Relationships with nonmilitary agencies should be based on an appreciation of missions, lines of communication, and standardization of support. It is important to note that not all NGOs, PVOs, and IOs appreciate military involvement in HA operations. Some NGOs', PVOs' and IOs' charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based upon fundamental mandates or human rights beliefs.

Cooperation between military and civilian activities is imperative for a successful operation. When joint operations are occurring clear roles and responsibilities must be outlined. Cooperation can be gained and maintained if agencies have an understanding and/or receive support characterized by clear communication of each other's mission. Commanders may find it beneficial to employ third parties for liaison and coordination with those NGOs and PVOs that are reluctant to establish direct contact. OFDA representatives have proven invaluable in providing coordination and linkages between the NGOs, PVOs, or IOs and the military at the operational level.

INTEGRATING NGO/IOs INTO WCR PLANNING/EXECUTION WHY DO IT?

"US governmental, civil, and military authorities; other governments; the UN; and NGO, PVO, and IO relief agencies share responsibilities for the conduct of relief operations. With so many organizations involved, planners at the strategic and operational levels may encounter problems because the strategic plans and goals of these organizations may not be compatible with military objectives....Effective US action in such an environment necessitates strong central coordination and leadership and should include interface with NGOs, PVOs, and IOs."FM 100-23-1, Oct 1994

Programs that are started must be sustainable once the JTF redeploys. Organizations such as NGOs and PVOs can provide sustainability; this assists in the long-term peace operations solutions. NGOs and PVOs are important resources who can provide excellent information on local customs, infrastructure, local government structure, procurement and pay scales, and relief assessments. They also can provide technical expertise such as:

• Disaster relief or development.
• Feeding programs, agriculture, public health, water, sanitation, etc.
  • Local solutions for local problems.
    

How do we employ them during WCR planning and execution:
At the strategic level, it begins with the National Command Authorities (NCA) and senior State and Defense Department representatives, with cooperation from other cabinet authorities and the total involvement of the supported and supporting combatant commanders. In UN operations, strategic-level planning is not as clearly defined. One of the challenges for US military planners at strategic levels is to determine when and with what other organizations to begin the coordination process.

Coordinating Mechanisms at the Strategic Level
By directive of 15 September 1993, the NSC has designated the USAID administrator as the special coordinator (SC) for International Disaster Assistance. The SC performs his interagency coordination functions for the US in complex international emergencies through the interagency working group (IWG) which he chairs or cochairs with a representative of the NSC. DoS may also lead an IWG, in those cases when not convened by the SC or NSC, to determine the policy for a particular relief operation.
DoD officials participate in IWG that will normally be chaired by the SC or NSC or by the NSC and/or SC cochair arrangement. DoD will be represented in other IWGs on humanitarian emergencies which may be chaired DoD, DoS, and/or USAID.

Each HA situation is unique and requires a unique response; however, there are three essential elements--political, military, humanitarian--present whenever HA is provided. Each operation must carefully balance these essential elements to ensure success of a large-scale HA.

The number of NGOs and PVOs that a JTF may find in an AO could be very large. Over 350 agencies, many of which are capable of responding in HA operations, are registered with USAID. Some foreign-based organizations are not required to register in the US. USAID publishes a yearly report, Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organizations. This report should be part of the combatant commander's library. Disaster assistance evolution will likely expand number of NGOs and PVOs in future.

Key elements that commanders and other decisionmakers should understand about NGO/PVO communities include: Military interactions with NGO and PVO communities should be coordinated with the US country team, particularly OFDA-DART representatives.

• The characteristics, mission, and capabilities of individual NGOs and PVOs are diverse. All are involved in direct humanitarian aid with host populations. Each organization operates individually.
• NGOs and PVOs will provide the bulk of HA at the grassroots level. The military structure can provide the logistical and security assistance to provide assistance to remote and unsecured areas.
• NGOs and PVOs may be operating in areas of high risk, where other organizations are hesitant to go.
• NGO and PVO assessments often are an excellent source of information of the HA situation.
• NGOs and PVOs are funded primarily by donations from the public as well as governments and the UN. They frequently have scarce resources, both at the donor level and in the field.
• NGOs and PVOs will probably be operating in the affected area long after the military leave. It is important that military commanders consider the implications of any US military HA projects that they initiate while in the field.

Developing the HA military mission statement is a difficult but critical task for the CINC and his staff. The strategic mission statement should aim for an understandable and achievable strategic end state even for a short-duration operation. It is normally coordinated through an interagency process while the CINC formulates it with USAID's and OFDA's assistance.

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major airports and seaports, key installations, and food distribution points; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations;and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UNauspices.

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST)

The HAST deploys to the AOR to assess existing conditions and the need for follow-on forces

Assessment is a fundamental task for providing effective disaster relief and HA

HAST formulates recommendations on HA missions and desired capabilities

HAST establishes liaison with US diplomatic personnel, host nation and relief agencies

**NGOs, PVOs, and IOs will be players whether we like it or not - treat as partners

Opportunity for better results if: Plan for their involvement, Establish structures for coordination, Train for interagency operation
Some key considerations/ impacts of NGO/IOS for End State Achievement
A clearly defined mission is key to successful planning and execution of peace and humanitarian assistance

Mission Statement development considerations: Higher strategic direction & Desired end state; Security of the operation; Military assistance to USAID/OFDA, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs

Campaign plan is an essential tool for linking the mission to the desired end state; Lays out clearly defined path to the end state; concept for transition and termination is absolutely essential to the campaign plan. Planners must consider the media, NGOs, PVOs, and coalition partners and allies as primary players

Transition Planning may involve transfers of certain responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies; Close coordination between the military and other agencies or organizations are required during transitions

End state is the grand strategic vision achieved by the fulfillment or partial fulfillment of politico-military objectives and defined in terms of all IOPs, geography, and duration. The desired end state may be a moving target, one which needs continuous refinement throughout the operation or conflict resolution process. NGOs and PVOs may be responsible for the ultimate success of peace and humanitarian assistance operations, perhaps with significant US support to include military forces Mission success depends on the US military turnover of HA and Peace operations, including security, to the host nation, the UN, or relief agencies.

• Positive Impacts of NGO/Ios - Humanitarian benefits (food, water, medicine, etc.); They have knowledge of and contacts within the AOR (already there operating); Some NGOs/IOs have consistently provided positive assistance to complement the attainment of military objectives; ICRC has historically provided relief to enemy POWs & continues to protect and assist victims in the field
• Negative Impacts - Can impede your ability to reach a negotiated peace; Have no control over them; Can adversely impact your ability to perform your mission; Have to plan for their medical care, security, transportation, and evacuation as required

Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) A CMOC can serve as the primary interface between all humanitarian organizations (NGOs and PVOs) and military forces.
Key members of the CMOC should include selected JTF and service component staff members and DoS representatives to include USAID, OFDA/DART. To ensure continuous coordination and cooperation among all the players in the region, members of the CMOC, as well as UN agencies' representatives, military liaison personnel from participating countries, representatives from NGOs and PVOs, and other governmental agencies, should meet frequently to discuss problems and coordinate actions (both short and long term). This will facilitate better communications among all participants in the operation. The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure 1.

Sample Composition of a CMOC

In Somalia, a daily meeting was held where the NGOs were briefed on the current situation from all military participants. A review of ongoing humanitarian actions was briefed by NGOs and security requests for throughout the country were processed by the assisting units. Also the CMOC served as the venue for UN humanitarian programs to operate from. Organizations such as Food and Agriculture, Education, and Water held coordination meetings at the CMOC and developed nationwide plans for operations in-country.

Successful combined operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT have convinced some observers that the gap between humanitarian and military personnel involved in combined operations may be smaller than it initially appears. The international effort in northern Iraq demonstrated the ability of uniformed and civilian personnel to coordinate their efforts in a way which reduced the overall number of personnel required. Military personnel shared fuel, transportation, and other logistical assets with civilian humanitarian operators, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Both sides collaborated in the drafting of plans to transition from military to civilian-driven operations. For those who view PROVIDE COMFORT as an exemplary success story, the key challenge facing both military and civilian participants is assuring that they maintain the flexibility to meet the unique necessities of each combined operation.

Lessons Learned -- A number of generalizations emerge from a cursory review of past and present operations. The success of combined operations is largely dependent on the clarity of the mission, cooperation between civilian NGOs and military personnel, and simplicity of the target population's needs. Combined efforts must be characterized by at least some shared, if not identical, objectives. A well-structured operation without a plan will not assure success. Leadership ultimately must pass to civilian authorities who cannot let themselves be driven by military operations.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is viewed by many as the genesis of an emerging concept of civilian-military cooperation. The operation witnessed early cooperation at all levels, but particularly in the area of logistics and intelligence sharing. It was successful despite difficult circumstances, characterized by closed borders and a constrained political environment. Field initiatives on the ground superseded Washington's instructions. For example, the military and the DART believed repatriating refugees was the most effective course of action, despite Washington's suggestion to form refugee camps.

Civil affairs, DART, and special forces each had input into the planning process at the early stages, working closely with PVOs and NGOs, devising a framework for decision making on security objectives. Special forces units proved especially valuable because they are accustomed to entering situations, creating small teams, and identifying leaders. To enhance coordination, humanitarian organization staff members were assigned equivalent military ranks and the classification of information was eliminated. The military also had a list of every NGO and PVO worker in-country in case a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) was required. Both sides fully appreciated the need to look at humanitarian operations from a tactical as well as a strategic point of view. Finally, the military resisted leaving until it was convinced NGOs, PVOs, and the UN were prepared to take over the situation.

The lessons learned from this and other success stories are not easily or always carried over into subsequent efforts. PROVIDE COMFORT was a unique experience which, despite its many positive aspects, exposed major weaknesses in the UN's humanitarian response ability.

On the negative side…

The Cambodia operation had seven different components which had very little horizontal integration; what little integration occurred was strictly ad hoc. The military provided a degree of de facto integration because it was the only component that performed advance planning. The operation's military command structure was very flat, consisting of a force commander and eleven infantry commanders immediately subordinate to him. No country involved in the operation desired an intermediate level of command. This command structure functioned well, although it might not have if the CAMBODIA Operation had been more militarily demanding requiring more complex operations. The need for detailed information on the decision-making structure of the host country was highlighted by the vast difference between Cambodia's formal bureaucratic hierarchy and its informal chain of command. As a result, the real decision makers were not immediately apparent upon the mission's arrival in-country.

Although it was well structured, Operation RESTORE HOPE lacked a clear mission. Moreover, humanitarian organizations were not involved in the planning process, and the military rejected most of OFDA' s suggestions. Thus, the participants did not have a full understanding of the nature of conflict-induced famine, and failed to appreciate the market aspects of famine and the importance of refugee repatriation. Humanitarian operations were further compromised by violent military responses to armed attacks, thereby undermining impartiality which is so crucial to an operation's effectiveness. The UN effort in Somalia ultimately failed to combine civilian and military missions. Leadership issues have not been resolved satisfactorily in the ongoing Bosnian crisis. Clarity in both mission and structure is lacking, the link between UNPROFOR and NGOs are weak, and civil affairs personnel do not meet professional standards.

Bitter experiences in Somalia demonstrated that the threat of force is much more effective than its application, that attempts to solve problems through the use of force will ultimately lead to failure, and that playing a "king making" role is counterproductive. Rather, positive reinforcement tends to bring better results. The Somali experience also calls for more detailed and extensive knowledge of the structure of the opposing forces.

Both military and humanitarian organizations must have realistic expectations of the extent to which complete coordination or integration of efforts is possible. Ultimately, a loose degree of cooperation may be the best that can be accomplished, but it will vary with each operation. This will frequently depend on whether the mission is a peacekeeping, peacemaking, or disaster relief effort. All members of such joint operations must avoid the risk of "mission creep" and the ensuing risk that their explicit or implicit political goals will outreach their military or materiel grasp. A judicious combination of the military's means with NGO expertise can lead to improved coordination and performance.

The relative importance of military versus humanitarian operations in a given situation will affect strongly which aspect takes the lead in an operation. The military, however, tends to take the lead in combined operations because it is generally the only party that is planning ahead and calculating logistical requirements. This fact argues for the assignment of a civilian authority to the overall leadership of an intervention after field operations have begun to ensure that political priorities and objectives remain paramount, and to guarantee overall balance between humanitarian and military operations. The civilian authority, however, should have clear, concise orders, and prior understanding of how the mission's success will be measured.

503.2 Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the National Command Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFC)s. [I.1c]

1. National Command Authorities The President of the US and Secretary of Defense form NCA. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the armed forces to execute military action. Movement of troops and execution of military action must be authorized by the NCA. By law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action. Relief operations may be directed by the NCA when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the US, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation by itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of the armed forces. The NCA issues its orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the Combatant Commanders.

2. National Security Council Membership includes four statutory members--the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisors to the NSC. Other advisors may be appointed by the President. By directive of 15 September 1993, the NSC has designated the USAID administrator as the special coordinator (SC) for International Disaster Assistance. The SC performs his interagency coordination functions for the US in complex international emergencies through the interagency working group (IWG) which he chairs or cochairs with a representative of the NSC. The NSC is the principal forum to consider national security issues requiring Presidential decision.

3. The Unified Command- Combatant commanders

The military's operational-level organization is the unified command, which is responsible for a region known as a theater of operations. The CINC establishes the operational objectives needed to transform national-level policy and guidance into effective HA operations. The CINC provides authoritative direction, initiates actions, sequences events, and applies resources to bring about and sustain the military contribution to HA.

The Unified CINC for the affected region is responsible for developing the military response to HA operations. In addition to the Title 10 responsibilities (see Chapter 1), the CINC may create a JTF to accomplish the HA mission. A discussion on the JTF will be presented later in the chapter.

Once the decision is made to organize a task force to execute a HA operation, the CINC may organize and send a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area to acquire information necessary for the development of a clear mission statement and plan for the operation. He may also opt to establish offices at his headquarters to administer the unique requirements of HA. These could include a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), or similar crisis action organization to assist the CINC in planning and executing the operation, a logistics operations center, and a liaison

Representatives of this UN department should be consulted by strategic and operational planners when developing recommendations for the involvement of US military forces. This consultation may take place through USAID and OFDA rather than through direct UN-DoD/unified command interface.

Military commanders of HA forces must have a working knowledge of the aims and objectives pursued by the UN organizations in the AO. This information is essential during the planning process to reconcile the objectives of the military plan with UN HA objectives. These broad objectives are to:

• Keep the emergency from happening, or, when an emergency threatens, to mitigate its effects.
• Minimize human casualties and destruction of property. Ensure the survival of the maximum number of victims through effective relief actions.
• Reestablish self-sufficiency and essential services as soon as possible for all affected populations, with special attention to the most vulnerable segments; i.e., children, disabled, and the elderly.
• Ensure that relief action promotes and does not impede rehabilitation and longer term development efforts. Conduct these activities in a manner that contributes to long-term development goals and reduces vulnerability to any future recurrence of potentially damaging man-made or natural hazards.
• Protect the main effort, humanitarian relief implementers, through judicious use of security component of the triad.
• Find durable solutions, as quickly as possible, with special attention to displaced and affected populations, while assuring protection and assistance to these populations in the process.
  

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff The NCA issues its orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the Combatant Commanders.

PROCESS: When the NAC determines that a US response to a complex emergency may be required, the SC may be directed to convene an appropriate IWG to recommend the policy and actions that should be followed. The IWG merges information received from all appropriate cabinet-level representatives, to include the US ambassador to the UN and regional organizations, and from the US ambassador or chief of the mission. The ambassador or chief of mission will usually gather his input by consulting with the country team.

The IWG immediately develops an information collection plan and tasks all resources to implement the plan. The unified commander is an important information source and will modify his own collection plan to support the requirement created by the complex emergency. This information is usually communicated through the country team but also follows channels through the CJCS to the DoD representative on the IWG. Another potential source is the political advisor assigned to the CINC who can link directly with the DoS representative on the IWG.

Interagency Planning

Concurrently, the IWG develops a comprehensive strategy and plan of operations with tasks for each of the key participants. Key to the development of a sound strategic plan is the inclusion of all elements that should be involved in the crisis. The SC must ensure the integrity of this comprehensive process. In addition, to ensure a coordinated approach, the unified commander will have to consider how to integrate ongoing in-country programs under Title 10 authorities.

Key to the development of sound recommendations is including other elements that may be involved in the crisis. For example, the DoS should consider the involvement of USAID, UN organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs that may be already operating in the country. Various organizations may establish a crisis task force or crisis action team to manage the situation.

The difficulties in integrating strategic- operational- and tactical level planning with the diverse mixture of other organizations involved can be minimized through an active interface role of the SC. The SC needs to facilitate the links between the military and those other organizations whose organizational structures and procedures are not as formally defined, as those of the military. The SC is responsible for coordinating these planning and operational interfaces throughout the life cycle of a complex humanitarian emergency.

5. Joint Force Commanders- "JFC's should ensure that their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations."

6. Service Chiefs - Wear two hats. Advise President, Sec of Defense and NSC. They are responsible to the secretary for management of their respective services.

7. Coalition Unit Liaison Elements -- Along with US operations, other nations might deploy military forces to operate with the JTF. Some Coalition units may provide liaison elements to the CINC as well as at the JTF level.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center -- The CINC may establish a HACC to assist with interagency planning and coordination. Staffing for the HACC should include an USAID and OFDA advisor-liaison who serves as the HACC director, a NGO or PVO advisor, a CA officer, a legal advisor, public affairs (PA) officer, and other augmentation as required. The HACC would provide the link between the CINC, USAID, OFDA, NGOs, and PVOs, and other agencies that might participate.

USAID and OFDA can coordinate directly with the DoD for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected nation and arranging DoD transportation. DoD Directive 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DoD, USAID, or OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is the primary point of contact. When USAID and OFDA request specific services from DoD (typically airlift), USAID and OFDA pay for those services and/or commodities. The CINC should also have a coordination linkage with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID and OFDA provide an excellent means for military and civilian operational-level coordination.

An example of a unified command structure at operational level with appropriate sections unique to HA

8. JTF COMMANDER The JTF is usually tasked to support other agencies. A JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF will require execution of responsibilities involving two or more services on a significant scale and close integration of effort. A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved.

• Work with other military and civilian officials to become aware of the responsibilities, capabilities, goals, objectives, and limitations of civil organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and military elements involved in peace operations.
• Be aware of and understand the capabilities of an umbrella association called "InterAction," which is normally involved in disaster relief and response.
• Conduct planning, preparations, and training with civilian organizations prior to deployment.
• Develop, with the civilian agencies, a list of common concepts, goals, and procedures at the operational level that can be used throughout the entire operation.
• Reinforce a positive attitude with your staff and other military personnel toward the capabilities of NGOs and PVOs.
• Realize as conditions improve in the area of operations and the duration of the operation lengthens, agendas change to include those of NGOs and PVO--mutual cooperation may be more difficult to achieve.
• Share lessons learned with appropriate organizations.
  

503.21 Summarize the issues surrounding the role of the UN, NGOs, and the military during war and conflict resolution planning and execution in support of end state accomplishments.

Programs that are started must be sustainable once the JTF redeploys. Organizations such as NGOs and PVOs can provide sustainability; this assists in the long-term peace operations solutions.

NGOs and PVOs may be responsible for the ultimate success of peace and humanitarian assistance operations, perhaps with significant US support to include military forces. Mission success depends on the US military turnover of HA and Peace operations, including security, to the host nation, the UN, or relief agencies.

Other notes:

Leadership The military often becomes the de facto leader of a combined or civil-military operation because it plans ahead and focuses on logistical details. Thus, it becomes the organizer and initiator.

Nevertheless, civilians must not allow the military to drive the operation; a political person with clear and concise orders and control over resources should be in charge of the overall operation.

More standby arrangements with national civil defense agencies are needed urgently to permit reliable UN access to logistics and transportation assets on short notice.

There is likely to be a greater need for multinational operations in "stateless" countries, requiring an emphasis on issues which will outweigh past concerns about sovereignty.

NGO and PVO Roles Military forces should take immediate advantage of logistical and ground knowledge possessed by PVO and NGO operators to act on early warning of humanitarian disasters, and in conducting field operations during an intervention..

The Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) is the primary mechanism by which the USG responds to humanitarian assistance operations. Early combined civil affairs, DART, and special forces input into the planning process has proven an effective mechanism for achieving cooperation.

Although the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Assistance (UNDHA) provides little operational and emergency response capability, they can improve their capabilities through standby agreements for resources with individual governments.

ICRC, foreign, and many domestic NGOs and PVOs will seek to remain as independent as possible, and will be reluctant to coordinate and integrate operations. Independence does not preclude some degree of cooperation, however.

Logistical and other constraints on non-US, even Western forces, make it unlikely and probably undesirable to expect more regional multinational forces (e.g. ECOMOG in Liberia) to get involved in the world's conflicts.

Military Roles militaries must begin to examine the idea of projecting force into areas where they can aid the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Special forces tend to function well in humanitarian intervention operations because they are accustomed to creating small teams and working effectively with the locals.

Multilateral military operations are limiting. The UN can only exercise a very limited degree of authority even among its own military forces which insist on maximum independence at the cost of the ability to conduct complex operations.

Although the UN has no military planning or crisis response capacity, there appears to be a growing consensus favoring the establishment of these planning offices at the UN. The US can and has shared intelligence with the UN, but this capability is limited if the US is not involved in an operation. PDD-25 attempts to coordinate UNDHA and UNDPKO planning with US peacekeeping operations planning, but the UN is not a command organization, and has difficulty exercising authority over its own military forces. Thus far, all operational planning and coordination has taken place in-country, and when the US commits forces to an operation, it tends to gain de facto authority. If the UN intends to remain as active as it has been, it clearly is going to have to develop eventually an integrated military staff so that it can develop its own capabilities.

Course Objectives

• Know the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. [PJE Area 1 - National Military Capabilities and Command Structure]
• Know the employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war and comprehend the linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national objectives. [PJE Area 3 - Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War]
• Comprehend the basic concepts/issues in planning and executing conflict resolution strategy in support of desired end state.
• Comprehend the roles of the State Department, Private Voluntary Organizations, International Organizations and US military forces in post-hostilities environments.
• Comprehend conflict resolution concepts/issues in historical, current and potential scenarios to achieve a desired end state.
• Comprehend conflict resolution concepts and issues in historical and current scenarios.

Readings
"Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations." Report from United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 23 June 1994.
Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, Joint Warfighting Center,
Department of the Army, FM 100-23-2, Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations,
Arnold, Stephen L., "Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons from Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations." In Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Missions, eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., pp 281-298. Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
"Statement of Red Cross for military training manuals." Dated 17 May 1993.
Sewall, John O. B. "Implications for UN Peacekeeping." Joint Force Quarterly 3, Winter 1993-1994, pp 29-33.

Reading Rationale
The "Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations" provides a comprehensive look at the current status of US attempts to improve the coordination of humanitarian and military operations. It identifies the cultural clash existing between nongovernmental organizations and the military, and discusses the lessons we have learned from past (and present) operations.

The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations excerpt provides definitions of the key terms involved with the organization of the Joint Task Force.

FM 100-23-2, Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations also provides critical definitions. Further, it discusses the roles and responsibilities of the major governmental, civilian, and military actors who plan and execute humanitarian operations. It provides a "notional coordination framework" to show the relationships that exist at the operational level. The appendices listed below provide a "current snapshot" of the non-governmental organizations which exist today. Appendix C lists a few nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, summarizing the purposes of these organizations. Appendix D focuses on United Nations Organizations for Humanitarian Assistance. Appendix E provides an "assessment checklist" which outlines the process of assessment and a few of the questions that need to be addressed during Humanitarian Assistance operations. Arnold's article entitled, "Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons from Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations," highlights the lessons learned from these natural disasters and shows their linkage to the planning process for the conduct of future operations. His article focuses on three areas: "mission and end state planning challenges," "the complexity level of operations other than war," and the "training and other preparations required for such operations."

The one-page excerpt entitled, "Statement of Red Cross for military training manuals," explains Red Cross integration with the military. Specifically, it discusses the relationship between these organizations and delineates the structure of the Red Cross. Sewall's "Implications for UN Peacekeeping" outlines proposals intended to better support the United Nations. It's focus is on organizational support, the definition problems involved with UN operations, and the importance of complementary doctrine.

Lesson Outline

Thesis: Organizations other than those officially sanctioned by sovereign governments will play an increasingly important role on the international stage. These organizations, which can be either nongovernmental or intergovernmental agencies, can both aid and hinder the planning and execution processes of military campaigns. With regard to war and conflict resolution efforts, these organizations can either assist our attainment of national objectives or they can impede our ability to achieve our desired end state.
MAIN POINT I: Issues surrounding the employment of various non-governmental organizations during end state planning and war and conflict resolution execution.
a. Identification of potential actors in any crisis.
b. Implications of their presence.
c. Impact on campaign planning process.

MAIN POINT II: Current and potential world conflicts will demand better methods of employing non-governmental organizations during planning and execution for war and conflict resolution and end state accomplishment.
a. Potential solutions to current problems regarding non-governmental organization integration.
b. Incorporation of non-governmental organizations into campaign planning.
Lesson Integration and Rationale War and Conflict Resolution course: All lessons. This lesson provides a framework for thinking about the issues surrounding the employment of non-governmental organizations during campaign planning, specifically war and conflict resolution.