TH 510 DISCUSSION

HOW WAS AIRPOWER EMPLOYED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WW II?

Airpower was used strategically to undermine the German military, industrial and economic systems to thus cause collapse, and to prepare for the ground invasion. Control of the air was essential to winning, either by strategic bombardment, or by ground invasion; therefore, the defeat of the Luftwaffe was always a primary target.

WHAT WERE THE EXPECTATIONS FOR AIRPOWER, BY THE AIRPOWER ADVOCATES AND THE INVASION LEADERSHIP, IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WW II?

The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys - European War - Pacific War pointed out, "In both the RAF and the United States Army Air Forces there were some who believed that air power could deliver the knockout blow against Germany, and force capitulation. This view, however, was not controlling in the overall Allied strategic plan." Knowing their plan had to get through the War Department and the Secretary of War, the authors of AWPD-1 devised their plan in such a way that it gave the opportunity for airpower to be decisive yet did not rule out a land invasion.

HOW DID TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IMPACT US STRATEGIC AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER?

There were several deficiencies in technology that impacted strategic airpower. Probably the most critical was the lack of a "battleplane" (bomber) that "would always get through," thus the need for fighter escorts.

See Media Clip "b17_lft7"

Early in the war, fighters did not have the fuel capacity for long-range escorting. Ferry tanks were ordered for the P-47C but had serious limitations. It was made of paper, leaked, had a 200 gallon capacity but could not provide fuel above 20,000 feet because it was not pressurized. A metal drop tank, of 100 gallon capacity, that could be pressurized was designed but because of a shortage of sheet metal was not readily available. External tanks were not available in quantity until July 1943. (Hansell) The external tanks and P-51s, available in large numbers in February 1944 added the range needed for deep penetration bombing raids into Germany.

Navigation was another problem. The first radar navigational aid (GEE), available in March 1942, still did not provide great accuracy. With GEE, you could drop fifty percent of the bombs within five miles of the aiming point, therefore, an attack on a target smaller than a city area of a 100,000 population was not economical. Accuracy was improved later on, especially during the summer of 1944.

Types of munitions available presented a limitation for airpower. The bombs used by the USAAF's were usually too light to accomplish the damage anticipated or required. Early in the war, the average weight was 388 pounds. Later, when they began using the two to four thousand pound bombs, they began to inflict permanent damage to heavy industrial installations. NOTE: The RAF were using 660 pound bombs during the oil offensive.

WHAT WERE THE CONFLICTING DEMANDS ON AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WW II?

Bombing operations began on the marshaling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in northern France on August 17, 1942 and were ineffectual. In fact, the first six months of bombing efforts were ineffectual. Within that six months, the chief target had changed to the German submarine campaign because of the effect the German submarines were having on Allied shipping. By August of 1943, ballbearings were the target. Before they could be substantially destroyed, the German aircraft industry, particularly airframe plants, became the target, culminating in February 1944. Then airpower was switched to preparation for the D-Day invasion, with several attacks on German oil production in May, but the bulk of attacks on oil did not occur until after D-Day. (USSBS). The USSBS Team put it most succinctly when they said, "In the European war, Allied air power was called upon to play many roles - partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battle; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of troops and critical supplies; and attacker of the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle lines." (USSBS)

HOW DID "FRICTION" IMPACT US STRATEGIC AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER?

Watts argues that the shortcomings of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), as outlined by Hansell, were not merely incidental "errors," rather they sprang from fundamentally flawed assumptions underlying basic US air doctrine. The planners of AWPD-1 and AWPD-42 ignored negative aspects of planning assumptions and accepted only positive aspects. This resulted in the acceptance of assumptions as facts rather than as suppositions or hypotheses. While individual negative aspects may not have led to dire consequences, Watts contends that the planners ignored the all-important feature of "collective risk" which resulted from the cumulative effects of flawed assumptions. Watts further states that "War is not a vast engineering project," therefore, "success in war cannot be reliably engineered." US planners, on-the-other-hand, believed that the campaign could be engineered-it was a simple matter of bringing sufficient force to bear against the proper targets.

Perhaps the biggest flaw in the ACTS/AWPD approach to war was the failure to regard the enemy as a thinking, reacting entity.

HOW DID THE USSBS RATE THE DECISIVENESS OF AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WW II?

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, USSBS did not differentiate between tactical and strategic airpower. (letter from Franklin D'Olier, Chairman of the USSBS to Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, which says, "The document seems to differentiate between strategic bombing and tactical bombing and to discredit the former. It calls all bombing after D-Day in Europe tactical bombing, ignoring the fact that the Survey made no such distinction and that almost 80% of all heavy bomber work was done after D-Day.") The USSBS states that "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe," but does address several exceptions to the successful employment of airpower which include: (1) The German power system was in a precarious condition from the beginning and should have been targeted. (2) The morale of the German people deteriorated because of the bombing, but because of the police state, this did not cause collapse. (3) The attacks on ball-bearing plants had no measurable effect on essential war production. (4) Knocking out a single industry with the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944 required continuous attacks for complete results. (5) The steel shortage was not decisive in the war. (6) The field of strategic intelligence was lacking and further and more accurate information was needed. Despite these shortcomings, the Survey stated airpower in the European theater was decisive with the attacks on transportation delivering the final blow that completely disorganized the German economy.

WHAT WERE THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WW II?

Airpower resources were used more strategically than tactically in the European theater and the results of strategic bombing were more significant in causing the collapse of Germany. Although tactical airpower was significant in preparing the battlefield and disrupting transportation lines so Germany could not move troops and supplies to the battlefield, it was strategic airpower that kept the skies virtually clear for the invasion and destroyed the German economy. The strategic bombing of oil production was felt throughout both the military and economic structures. The lack of fuel adversely affected the supply lines, armor capabilities, and the Germans' ability to train pilots. It also impeded German industry's ability to maintain the war and attacks on the transportation system delivered the decisive blow, completely disorganizing the German economy. (USSBS)

See Media Clip "b17_bm7"

HOW WAS AIRPOWER EMPLOYED IN THE PACIFIC THEATER DURING WW II?

Airpower in the Pacific was more tactically oriented initially. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair were the primary employment. However, in the fall 1943 strategic attacks against Japanese industrial targets in Manchuria and Kyushu began. Two thousand of these B-29 sorties were diverted from attacks on Japanese cities and industries and sent in strategic attacks against Kamikaze air fields in Kyushu. Long-range strategic bombing against the home islands was initiated from the Marianas in November 1944. (USSBS) Initial targets included the standard aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, etc. Then, in March 1945, urban attacks were initiated in force. (USSBS) This revision, initiated on 9 March 1945, instituted low-level, night attacks against four principal Japanese cities using incendiaries. (USSBS) Twenty-four percent of total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was dropped on the Japanese home islands. (USSBS)

WHAT WERE THE EXPECTATIONS FOR AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER DURING WW II?

The original plan was to succeed in the European theater before moving to the Pacific theater. Forces in the Pacific theater would be defensive until the European campaign was successfully completed. Because of this plan and the underestimation of the Japanese, air forces in the Pacific were small and technically inferior to the Japanese. (USSBS) Airpower in the Pacific was more intertwined with naval and ground forces than in the European theater, therefore, more tactically used than strategically, at least initially. Airpower is used to attack Japanese transports carrying troops, supplies, etc., warships, troops, aircraft support structures, e.g., warehouses, runways, etc. There were not many strategic targets until we began attacks on Japanese industrial targets in Manchuria and Kyushu in the fall of 1943 (USSBS) and then again when we attacked the Japanese home islands. An early exception to this was Doolittle's raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942.

HOW DID TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS IMPACT STRATEGIC AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER?

There were few strategic targets available in the Pacific during the early years of the war. The lack of long-range bombers delayed attacks on Japanese industry and her home population until bases could be secured within striking distance (1,500 nautical miles) of Japan. (USSBS) This drove Allied strategy to plan campaigns that brought them closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. This assault took two routes. "One was up the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines, the other across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to the Marianas and Palaus and then subsequently on to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Basically, the advance was for the purpose of projecting United States power to points which cut Japan's supply lines to the south and were within striking range of the Japanese home islands." (USSBS)

WHAT WERE THE CONFLICTING DEMANDS ON AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER?

Conflicting demands on airpower within the Pacific theater were not as varied as in the European theater because, as mentioned before, there were not that many strategic targets available initially. The major conflict was not so much how they would be employed but where they would be employed. Because the Allied plan was to eliminate Germany first and then turn to the Pacific concerns and because the Allies had underestimated the Japanese, the forces in the Pacific were inadequate and technologically inferior to the Japanese forces.

HOW DID THE USSBS RATE THE DECISIVENESS OF AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER DURING WW II?

The USSBS concluded that overall, airpower was decisive in WW II. It included several exceptions in the Pacific employment, as it did in the European employment. The major exceptions are: (1) we allocated too small a share of resources to airpower, particularly in the Pacific. (2) The correct targets to bring about the surrender of the Japanese either with or without invasion (after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants) were the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disrupting the transportation system and cities would have accomplished this. (3) Attacking the Hakkodate rail ferry, the Kanmon tunnels and 19 bridges and selected sections of line would have eliminated further coal movements, immobilized the remainder of rail movements through lack of coal and completed the strangulation of Japan's economy. This strangulation would have destroyed Japan's economic structure more efficiently and effectively than direct attack on industrial capacity.

WHAT WERE THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER DURING WW II?

Initially tactical, rather than strategic, airpower contributed more significantly to the Allied war effort in the Pacific. This was because of the lack of strategic targets within bomber range during the first several years of the war. However, in 1944, when the Japanese home islands came within range of the bombers, strategic airpower became dominant with attacks against Japanese industries and increasingly effective with the fire bombing of Japanese cities and the dropping of the atomic bombs.

WHAT OPINION DID AIRPOWER ADVOCATES HAVE OF THE WW II USE OF AIRPOWER?

Airpower advocates felt that WW- II validated the concept of strategic bombardment. "They continued to assert that bombing had been a decisive indeed, in the view of some, the decisive-force in the defeat of Germany and Japan." (Hastings)

SAC took the lion's share of funds for bombers. The "Bomb" provided a rational for increased funding and a doctrine of bombardment.

"The strategic implications of the atomic bomb coincided with the self-perception developing within the soon-to-be-independent Air Force that a well-planned and well executed air offensive would decide the outcome of future wars." (Tilford)

Atomic weapons offered a cheap alternative to mass armies and fit well into airpower doctrine.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) dominated the Air Force.

Tactical Air Forces nearly disappeared.

There existed an intense inter-service rivalry that led to the "revolt of the admirals" (Tilford)

WHAT WAS THE BASIC BELIEF OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AT ITS BIRTH IN 1947?

Airpower was decisive. Airpower could disable war economies, sink fleets, shatter armies and with atomic weapons perhaps even banish war. (Tilford)

HOW DID WHAT THE AIR FORCE BELIEVED INFLUENCE HOW IT FOUGHT IN KOREA?

Tactical forces were outmoded by the atomic bomb and development of the jet airplane cut funds for tactical aviation even further. (Mark)

How we expected to fight determined what force we retained and purchased. Our expectation was that bombers and fighters who would fly from fixed bases to destroy the Soviets. Hence we allowed expeditionary base engineering forces and attack aviation atropine.

WHAT IMPACT DID AIRPOWER HAVE ON THE EARLY FIGHTING?

Airpower was vital to the survival of the retreating South Korean & American forces. F-51 fighters provided air cover while attacks upon the ever-lengthening North Korean supply lines weakened their advance. (Tilford) Airpower seemed so effective there were some who believed the war might end before UN forces could intervene. (Tilford)

WHAT FACTORS INCREASED/DECREASED AIRPOWER'S IMPACT?

Lack of Korean air bases and lack of engineers to build then forced short loiter time "I have twenty minutes on station. Use me or loose me" (Hastings) and poor sortie rates. Also, the lengthy supply lines of the North Korean forces exposed a lucrative target to strikes (Tilford)

WHAT IMPACT DID AIRPOWER HAVE ON THE PURSUIT NORTH?

As the UN forces advanced out of Pusan toward the Yalu, close air support was vital to the effort. (Tilford)

See Media Clip "p80_cs7"

WHAT IMPACT DID AIRPOWER HAVE ON THE US RETREAT SOUTH?

Airpower bought time for UN forces to escape. When Chinese forces moved fast they were decimated. When the Chinese moved at night and with greater care their advance slowed. After Chinese forces were committed, the fight was for air superiority as the number of MiGs increased (Tilford)

See Media Clip "f86_df7"

WHAT IMPACT DID AIRPOWER HAVE ON THE STALEMATES

This is perhaps the most controversial. Even Futrell admits interdiction was not decisive, at least throughout most of the war. Why? Hastings sights low supply needs by the Communists while Futrell sights outstanding Communist countermeasures, extremely heavy air defenses, and too few UN air assets for the job. The eventual attacks on the hydroelectric plants had a greater impact as factories on both sides of the Chinese border depended on this electricity. Hastings dismisses the entire notion of strategic attack as if the Chinese grew their tanks in rice paddies.

WHAT IMPACT DID AIRPOWER HAVE ON ENDING THE WAR?

Authors vary. Many speculate that Eisenhower's threat of using atomic bombs may have been decisive.

Futrell speculates the destruction of some of North Korea's excess rice crop that had been feeding the Chinese army had placed an additional burden on the Communist logistic system so that it could not sustain additional offensives.

Others say the war ended because Stalin died or for some other reason that had nothing to do with airpower at all.

WHAT CONCLUSIONS DID HASTINGS DRAW CONCERNING AIRPOWER DUE TO THE KOREAN WAR?

North Korea was a relatively primitive society that contained only a fraction of the identifiable worthwhile targets of Germany or Japan. Hastings points out that airmen could not claim that this problem had never been foreseen. Alexander de Seversky was only one among many students of air warfare and as early as 1942 he wrote: "Total war from the air against an undeveloped country or region is well nigh futile; it is one of the curious features of the most modern weapon that it is especially effective against the most modern types of civilization." In Korea, the USAF belief in "victory through air power" was put to the test and found sorely wanting by many of those who were promised so much from it. (Hastings)

Hastings also writes that despite the all-out efforts of the air force in Korea, there was never a day when the trains did not run and the trucks did not roll behind the enemy lines in North Korea. "...it is plain that it could not, or at least did not, accomplish the mission Air Force theorists had repeatedly told the Army and the American people was sure to be accomplished, under conditions of such overwhelmingly one-sided aerial strength." (Hastings)

WHAT CONCLUSIONS DID THE AIR FORCE DRAW CONCERNING AIRPOWER DUE TO THE KOREAN WAR?

A trick question! The Air Force did not draw any lessons - they viewed Korea as an anomaly unique.

Following Korea, the American attack aviation went into decline once again. (Paret, Mark) Overwhelming emphasis was placed on the buildup of SAC. (Paret, Mark) The Korean experience was looked on as an aberration, unlikely to be repeated in the future. Even the Secretary of the Air Force during the Korean War, wrote that the war had been "a special case, and air power can learn little from there about its future role in US foreign policy in the East." (Paret) The final report of the FEAF agreed and stated that "certainly any attempt to build an air force from the model of the Korean requirements could be fatal to the US. (Paret)

Not all airmen shared those views. General Weyland returned from Korea to take over TAC. He began an unsuccessful attempt to gain an equal footing for tactical air Forces. Most of his effort was directed toward creating a nuclear capability for fighter-bombers. As a result, aircraft designed strictly for the air-to-air mission role (or air superiority) were neglected. (Paret)

Ironically, it was the British who seemed to grasp the impact of Korea...Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor said: "We must expect to be faced with other Koreas.... The idea that superior air power call in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and professional skill on the ground in this sort of war is beguiling but illusory;. . .all this is cold comfort for anyone who hopes that air power will provide some kind of short cut to victory." (Paret)

Finally, Tilford discussed Korea in his section on "Preludes to Vietnam" in his book Setup. He posits that Korea was a limited war where the threat of using nuclear weapons is inconceivable. He acknowledges that it was a limited war for the US "NOT" for the Koreans.

WHAT WERE SOME OF THE INFLUENCES ON AIR POWER DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS BETWEEN KOREA AND VIETNAM?

Perceived bomber gap, launching of Sputnik-missile gap, Cuban missile crisis, preoccupation with nuclear war with Soviet Union (Fulda Gap mentality), great society programs, Domino Theory, and the detonation of a Soviet hydrogen bomb (Tilford)

HOW DID WE USE THE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF THE EARLY AIR POWER THEORISTS IN VIETNAM? HOW EFFECTIVE WERE THESE PRINCIPLES?

BOMBING OF VITAL CENTERS: This doctrine never changed even after the experiences of Korea. It led Air Force leaders to believe that North Vietnam, a preindustrial, agricultural nation, could be subdued by the same kind of bombing that helped to defeat industrialized nation like Germany. (Tilford)

See Media Clip "f105_bm7"

DEFENSE AGAINST AERIAL OFFENSE: "The Air Defense Command (ADC) ranked below TAC in the SAC-dominated Air Force of the 1950s. The Air Force leadership assumed that since the bomber would always get through, the possibility of an effective air defense was remote; hence, air defense was somewhat heretical. Nuclear bombs made defense against aerial attack even more futile." (Tilford)

ATTACK AVIATION: Another indication of ADC's low status within the Air Force hierarchy was that the last requirement for an airplane specifically built as an interceptor was placed with Convair in September 1956 thus resulting in the F-106. TAC resembled a "junior SAC" According to Tilford, General Weyland figured the way to gain a measure of equality was to imitate the premier command's nuclear mission. Eventually, the F-105, a single engine jet fighter-bomber was produced that could deliver a tactical nuclear bomb. (Mark)

See Media Clip "f105_mg7"

INTERDICTION: Before the Tet Offensive, the Southern war was a guerrilla conflict. Viet Cong units composed five-sixths of the Communist army and intermingled with the local populace. Together with North Vietnamese troops, they fought an average of one day in thirty. The infrequency of combat produced external supply needs of only 34 tons of materiel daily, and no amount of bombing could stop this meager amount from reaching the South.

COMMAND AND CONTROL: Paret argues that from a theory and doctrine point of view, the US efforts in Indochina from 1965 through 1972 presented several problems. He argues that at it appeared five separate air wars were under way simultaneously in the conflict. Decisions regarding how to accomplish initial goals of interdiction were controlled by the government in Washington, which dictated the timing, pace, target priorities and even sortie rates. ROE limited the options open to commanders on the scene(no Auflragstaktik here) and even prohibited the necessary steps to achieve air superiority by preventing attacks against SAM sites under construction and even enemy airfields. (Paret)

"Wedded to strategic bombing, the Air Force neglected other mission, particularly CAS, which tended to tie air assets to the needs of ground commanders. This single-mindedness exacerbated interservice rivalries because, while the Air Force did not especially want the CAS mission neither did it want the Army to co-opt that mission and avail itself of the opportunity to procure combat airplanes." (Tilford)

The absence of a single air commander produced chaos. It prevented military chiefs from integrating Rolling Thunder with other air efforts in SEA. Besides bombing North Vietnam, American fighter squadrons raided Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and provided CAS for Laotian government forces battling in northern Laos. Pilots flew by far the largest number of sorties in support of friendly ground troops in South Vietnam. Interservice rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force also constrained Operation Rolling Thunder which led to "route packages." (Head)

WHAT WERE THE LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM?

1. Not all learned from it. Many believed it an was aberration - the American people would never allow us to fight a war like it again.

2. Need to know your enemy.

3. Need to seriously look at the past and learn from it.

4. What works in one war on an enemy may not necessarily work on another enemy in a different situation.

Technology has created a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weaponry rather than on that weaponry's effectiveness as a political instrument. (Head, pp. 303) American civilian and military leaders entered Vietnam convinced that bombing's lethality assured political results. They never really realized that air power's political efficacy varies according to many diverse elements, and that no specific formula guarantees success. (Head)

TILFORD SUGGESTS THAT AIRPOWER FAILED IN VIETNAM-WHAT WERE HIS REASONS FOR THAT?

History; We were "wedded" to strategic bombing at the expense of CAS.

Doctrine; Strategic bombing dominated Air Force doctrine.

Technology; Fascinated with technology and finding the "right" weapon to end the war. "...in the end, technologically sophisticated weapons proved no substitute for strategy." (Tilford)

Management; Sortie counts, bombs dropped, etc.-statistics were also no substitute for strategy.

Decreased Intellectual Acumen; Tilford argues that one of the reasons air power failed in Vietnam was because of a marked decline in doctrinal thinking. Air power leaders abdicated strategic thinking to civilian think tanks like RAND. "In Vietnam, the Air Force along with the other services was rarely outfought, but like the other services it was often outthought. (Tilford)

DID THE AIR FORCE LEARN FROM THIS CONFLICT IAW THE HISTORY> THEORY> DOCTRINE> STRATEGY> EXECUTION CYCLE OR REMAIN STUCK IN DOGMA?

Ziemke suggests (Head) that after Vietnam "the rest of the airpower community began to assert itself." This is an interesting twist...in Korea/Vietnam, the Strategic bombardment" faction was in charge prior to the war and the TAC Air faction fought for recognition. In Desert Storm, the TAC guys were predominant and were usurped by Colonel Warden and Checkmate, who were in favor of strategic bombardment. This is an argument that has been around since ACTS....

WE'VE TALKED ABOUT THE APPLICATION OF AIRPOWER IN KOREA AND VIETNAM-AIRPOWER ADVOCATES PUSHED STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT. WHAT STRATEGY DID GENERAL HORNER ADVOCATE AT THE BEGINNING OF DESERT STORM? WAS IT CHANGED?

Horner advocated, "Build a hose and point it where the ground commander sees that it's needed." (Mann) He and TAC resisted a strategic role for airpower.

This changed when Schwarzkopf called the Pentagon and asked for a strategic bombing campaign plan. (Mann)

Using new military technologies that promised to make the predictions of Douhet, Mitchell, and the AWPD-1 war planners come true, Warden's staff expected to demonstrate the decisiveness of modern airpower...while essentially ignoring the Iraqi army in Kuwait." (Mann)

Warden's plan includes a "news (not really) method of analysis, parallel warfare, targeting for effect, etc. (Mann)

Warden's plan becomes Phase I of the air campaign against Iraq. (Mann)

WHAT PRINCIPLES OF THE EARLY AIR POWER THEORISTS WERE USED IN DESERT STORM?

AIR SUPERIORITY: Unchallenged

INTERDICTION: The road to KhafJi...

STRATEGIC ATTACK: Introduction of parallel warfare; overwhelming an enemy through concentration and mass (Mann)

COMMAND AND CONTROL: Dispersion of much command and control activity outside the theater. Pentagon, Langley, Space Command, etc. (Head)

SEAD: The Gulf War operation departed from other conflicts in the speed, scope and relative cheapness in terms of casualties. Coalition forces conducted SEAD as an integrated attack designed to disable the entire Iraqi national level air defense system not in isolated efforts. (Head)

WHEN COMPARING KOREA, VIETNAM AND DESERT STORM, WHAT MADE DESERT STORM SO MUCH MORE SUCCESSFUL?

Could cause some discussion. Responses could be:

- The government had well defined objectives.

- Concentrated on paralysis of Iraq and its leadership instead of a war of attrition.

- Had a large coalition and the backing of the world.

- No real fear of Russian or Chinese intervention.

GWAPS STATES THAT THE ARGUMENT, "THIS WAR CONFIRMED THE THEORIES OF AIR POWER THEORISTS FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD", DOES NOT HOLD UP WELL. WHY DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WISE THIS STATEMENT?

The argument in Keaney is that Desert Storm focused on disorganizing the "central nervous system", not industrial production as evidenced in the theories of Douhet et al and attempted in Korea & Vietnam. Is this really a change?

WAS THE GULF WAR WON ON AIRPOWER ALONE?

Dr Robert Pape, a former faculty member at SAAS has argued that we had meet all four of our war goals BEFORE the first tank rolled North. Even mentioning this position should heat up the seminar period, especially if you have officers from the other branches of the armed forces. Ensure they support their answer, regardless of which side of the fence they are on. After some discussion you may want to rephrase the question, "did the ground pursuit result in a better state of peace then if we had accepted Saddam's surrender after the air war alone?

WHAT LESSONS DID WE LEARN FROM DESERT SHIELD/STORM?

Another trick question - nothing - some folks with green suit backgrounds are saying:

Desert Storm was an anomaly.

Airpower can win wars by it self.

Airpower can win wars by it self as long as you have a awesome ground force ready to smash the survivors of your air campaign if they don't surrender first. Airpower can defeat field armies.

Airpower can defeat field armies if you defeat his fighters, bring the F-4G out of the bone yard to defeat his SAMs and then have the enemy park his army in a desert for a month.

Airpower is a moderately useful though undependable junior members of the Air/Land team.

WHAT LESSONS DID OTHER NATIONS LEARN FROM DESERT SHIELD/STORM?

Don't fight the United States unless you have Nukes. (Retired Indian Chief of Staff)

Airpower is now the decisive arm in major wars. (Soviet/Russian Staff - a bit of an over simplification)

Never give the U.S. 6 months to get ready. (apparently universal)

DID THE AIR FORCE LEARN FROM THIS CONFLICT IAW THE HISTORY > THEORY > DOCTRINE > STRATEGY > EXECUTION CYCLE, OR REMAIN STUCK IN DOGMA?

There could be a great many. Here are just a few examples:

1967 Arab Israeli War - need for aircraft shelters - decisiveness of air power

1973 Arab Israeli War - the importance of SEAD - that airpower is not decisive

South Atlantic War - the value of aircraft carriers / expeditionary air base engineers

Bangladeshi War for Independence - value of Rapid Runway Repair / Air mobile operations

ZIEMKE FINDS SEVERAL AREAS WHERE THE "APOSTLES" OF AIRPOWER HAVE GONE WRONG OVER THE YEARS. WHAT WERE HER POINTS? DO YOU AGREE?

First, airpower theorists generally failed to anticipate the impact of non-aviation technologies on the theoretical capabilities of airpower. Future enemies are no doubt already looking for ways to defeat the US. Second mistake, compressing the time necessary for strategic bombardment to achieve its desired effects on enemy morale and capabilities. Third, failure to consider the effect of political and cultural differences among nations. Ethnocentrism has limited our ability to see war as limited for us, unlimited for our enemies. Forth, strategic tunnel vision. Making "airpower" synonymous with strategic bombardment limits the other uses of airpower. Finally (and the worst) is ahistoricism; not learning the lessons from past wars, dismissing as anomalous any disappointing experience.

ZIEMKE ALSO FINDS THAT THE "REAL QUESTION" IS NOT WHETHER IRAQ WAS SUCCESSFUL, BUT "WHAT HAS HAPPENED ELSEWHERE SINCE THEN." SHE NOTES SOMALIA, BOSNIA, HAITI, AND RWANDA AS PLACES WHERE STRATEGIC BOMBING IS NOT A LIKELY RESPONSE. SHE FINDS THIS STRATEGY IRRELEVANT. DO YOU AGREE?

This question is to generate discussion, there is no correct response.

HOW DO SOME OF YOUR AUTHORS FEEL ABOUT THE ROLE OF

TECHNOLOGY IN THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER?

The Paret article argues that the effects of technology and the actions of practitioners have from the beginning played greater roles than have ideas. The author believes that we are at a threshold of technological advance that may markedly change the identity of air power. He voices concern that "technology itself may be today's primary air power theorist; that invention may, for the moment, be the mother of application."

CLOSING

With 20/20 hindsight, we can see when potentially valuable lessons were not learned. The tuition to relearn these lessons was paid in blood. Tilford states in Setup, "Too few Air Force officers in the 1970s and 1980s read history books." He and others have decried the "decreased intellectual acumen" of airpower advocates and theorists. Did this lead to a Dogma of strategic bombardment and its use where it wasn't appropriate? Or was the patience of the airpower theorists finally rewarded in Desert Storm?