TH 508 DISCUSSION.
In earlier lessons we have discussed the core concepts of Sun Tzu,
Clausewitz, and Jomini and observed how later theorists built upon those ideas to better
explain and discuss modern warfare on land and sea. In this lesson we will study the ideas
of Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell. They are the pioneering theorists of
air (and space) power. Their thoughts on command and control of the third dimension also
evolved from earlier theories, and continue to influence how we think about air and space
power today. We will also look at important refinements of Douhet's Trenchard's and
Mitchell's concepts at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) - ACSC's predecessor - during
the interwar period.
The Lawson excerpts drive home the point that while airpower was used to
an ever-widening extent during W.W.I, it was far from being a mature MTR as defined and
discussed in TH 502. The results of the war hinted at the airpower's potential in the
areas of reconnaissance, close air support, interdiction, and strategic bombing, but there
was no existing theory to steer further technological developments or form the foundation
for an air doctrine and associated organizations. Without such a theory, air power was
destined to remain little more than an aerial reconnaissance and artillery spotting tool
for the Army.
Fortunately, efforts to develop such a theory were ongoing even as the
war progressed. Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell all recognized that air power could
fundamentally alter the way war was conducted. Free from the maneuver constraints
associated with military operations on the ground, air power had the potential to
eliminate trench warfare and dramatically reduce the human cost of war. Building upon the
three "air pioneers," the Air Corps Tactical School refined thinking on
strategic bombing during the years leading up to W.W.II.
LOQ. Just as Mahan and Corbett built their theories around the idea of command of the sea, Douhet recognized the need for command of the air and discussed this concept at length. How did Douhet define "command of the air"? How did he suggest it be achieved?
DISCUSSION. Douhet believed that command of the air transcended
our current concepts of air superiority and air supremacy. Command of the air existed when
"we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do
likewise." Douhet believed that air supremacy reflected only a capability until it
was executed to actually command the air.
Douhet posited that command of the air was achieved in much the same way
as Mahan sought to achieve command of the sea. The enemy's air force was to be destroyed
to the extent that it no longer constituted a threat. Douhet believed that this was
ideally accomplished by preemptive strikes against enemy aircraft, airfields, and related
industries. This would destroy enemy aircraft on the ground, eliminating the possibility
of their striking similar friendly targets. When such a strike was either unfeasible or
not totally successful, air combat would ensue as each side vied to achieve command of the
air.
FUQ. What did the pioneers believe was the best defense against air attack?
DISCUSSION. All three recognized that effective defense against air attack was impossible save through command of the air. Douhet believed that in the event of air combat, attacks from the air could not be prevented. The side which could best withstand the effects of air attacks would prevail. Trenchard would devote a significant portion of his airpower resources to develop pursuit aircraft for use in defensive counterair (DCA) roles, but did so only as a sop to the British public. He had no faith in its success as a concept. Neither did Mitchell, though in Winged Defense he suggested that a rather complex combination of advanced listing posts, surveillance and pursuit aircraft, search lights, and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) would provide the best defense possible. None of the theorists foresaw the development of radar, whose development would contribute so much to the British victory in the Battle of Britain discussed in the next lesson.
LOQ. How did Douhet believe airpower should be used once command of the air is attained? How did Trenchard and Mitchell differ from Douhet on this subject? What did the air pioneers' views have in common with those of Mahan and Corbett?
DISCUSSION. Once command of the air was achieved, Douhet believed airpower should be used exclusively as a strategic, offensive force to eliminate the enemy's war making capability and will to resist. In his single-mindedness, he followed in the tradition of Mahan who insisted that the navy's sole purpose was to assume the offensive and win decisive fleet-on-fleet battles at sea. Douhet also shared Mahan's conviction that his branch of service (in this case, the air force) could be decisive in combat, either eliminating the need for other services or relegating them to minor support roles. Trenchard came to adopt this view only late in his professional life, whereas Mitchell never did so.
While Trenchard and Mitchell (to a lesser extent) appreciated the
rewards of strategic bombing as advocated by Douhet, their W.W.I experiences gave them
broader perspectives which allowed them to recognize the contribution that airpower could
make by assuming other, sometimes defensive, roles. In this sense, their relationship to
Douhet was similar to that of Corbett to Mahan. Trenchard and Mitchell had commanded large
air organizations during W.W.I. Trenchard commanded Great Britain's Royal Flying Corps
(RFC) and, later, its Independent Air Force (IAF) while Mitchell commanded the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF). They saw that despite the trench warfare stalemate, airpower
provided critical support to ground forces in the form of reconnaissance, observation,
close air support, and air interdiction. Indeed, the coalition aircraft brought together
to support the St. Mihiel offensive which was commanded by Mitchell performed in all of
these roles in a single operation in 1918.
FOQ. The aircraft mixes proposed by the pioneers reflected both how they believed airpower should be employed and unique contexts in which each wrote. What type of aircraft did Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell propose to produce and why?
DISCUSSION. Douhet's aircraft requirements reflected his belief
that airpower was by itself decisive in combat, and that that decisiveness was achieved
through strategic bombing. He ultimately concluded that airpower could best be exercised
by a single type of aircraft: the multi-functional "battleplane." His
battleplane would not only have the payload and range required to carry out strategic
bombing missions, it would be sufficiently armed and armored to engage in air-to-air
combat en route. This would eliminate the need for special escort or pursuit aircraft.
Adoption of the battleplane concept would also allow for economies of scale, reduced
costs, easier maintenance, and production surges to support wartime requirements.
Trenchard's final view on the ideal composition for the British air
force reflected his belief in the decisiveness of strategic bombing tempered by his
sensitivity to British popular concerns. While Trenchard did not believe in the concept of
air defense except through command of the air, he recognized that the British public
(which had been terrorized by Zeppelin attacks mounted against it during W.W.I) would
insist that its air force devote some of its force structure to defense of the island
against air attack. He therefore proposed that one-third of the air force be comprised of
pursuit aircraft and the remaining two-thirds be devoted to strategic bombing.
Mitchell encouraged the development of a variety of aircraft consistent
with the broader role he envisioned for airpower. He recognized three broad categories of
aircraft: pursuit, attack, and bomber, which he proposed to supplement with various
specialty aircraft. Like Trenchard and Douhet, Mitchell built his air force around
bombers. Appreciating US altruism and isolation, he couched the need for these bombers in
defensive terms. He stressed that their importance did not lay in their ability to win
wars through offensive strategic bombing, but in their ability to defend the US from
attack from the sea. His successful sinking of the Ostfriesland was key to the
expansion of US airpower following W.W.I.
FOQ. Trenchard and Douhet believed that employing airpower in a concentrated, strategic bombing campaigns could defeat an enemy without resorting to traditional naval or ground forces. What targeting strategy did each suggest and why?
DISCUSSION. Douhet believed that strategic bombing campaigns
should target both population centers and industries. Successfully doing so would result
in the collapse of enemy material and morale capabilities to resist. Douhet suggested that
a mix of high-explosive, incendiary, and poison gas munitions best achieved the desired
results.
Trenchard's views on strategic bombing are less clearly stated, but like
Douhet he believed that bombing campaigns should achieve both material and morale effects.
He placed higher value on the latter, believing that "the morale was to the material
as 20:1." Trenchard believed that desired material effects would be achieved by the
successful targeting of enemy "vital centres." Examples of such vital centers
included war-related industries and key transportation facilities. He was less forthcoming
on how best to affect morale. Morale of factory workers would be affected by the fear of
attack even if that attack was not forthcoming. Defense measures would be disruptive to
their routines, and destruction of industries producing goods used by soldiers and
civilians alike would result in shortages and a decline in the standard of living.
But would this be strategy be successful? Probably not. Trenchard
recognized he would not have enough bombers to execute a decisive bombing campaign as
outlined above, particularly given the need to devote one-third of his resources to
fighter aircraft. Bomber payloads were too small, and bomb sights were too unsophisticated
to achieve the desired level of material and morale disruption by limiting strategic
targets to vital centres. If strategic bombing was to be effective, target sets would have
to be expanded to include the intentional bombing of population centers. The British were
not culturally prepared to do this. Trenchard therefore had to express his strategic
bombing strategy vaguely. Target sets were generally expressed in the context of vital
centres, recognizing that successfully engaging them would entail significant destruction
of non-military property and high civilian casualties.
FUQ. Mitchell did not believe that airpower would marginalize armies and navies to the extent of Douhet and Trenchard, but he did see airpower assuming many of their traditional missions. What missions did Mitchell believe airpower could accomplish more economically and effectively than the senior services?
DISCUSSION. Mitchell believed that airpower would assume the
responsibility of coastal defense from the army and navy. He also envisioned airpower
assuming the troop transportation mission from the navy due primarily to the vulnerability
of surface vessels to submarine attack. Mitchell argued that the navy's surface fleet
requirements would decrease proportionally with increases in bomber range until the navy
consisted only of submarines.
FOQ. Douhet recognized that proper employment of airpower dictated that an independent air force be established. Trenchard and Mitchell agreed completely with this view. Why did they believe this was critical? How successful were Trenchard and Mitchell in achieving independent air forces?
DISCUSSION. Their arguments all centered around what Mitchell
referred to as "airmindedness". The pioneers believed that airpower could only
be properly developed and employed by commanders who fully appreciated its unique
capabilities. Airpower was liable to be underfunded and its capabilities were likely to be
overlooked if it was controlled by the other services. Trenchard was successful in
establishing an independent Royal Air Force (RAF) between World Wars I & II.
Mitchell's efforts contributed to the establishment of a semi-autonomous Army Air Service
in 1926, but a fully independent US Air Force would not be created until 1946.
Within the US Army Air Corps resided a group of aviators who shared the
air pioneers' visions of a strategically employed air force which existed as at least a
co-equal to the land and sea arms. The instructors and students of the Air Corps Tactical
School (ACTS) refined the strategic bombing concepts of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell.
Then, as air leaders in W.W.II, they applied their refined strategy in successful air
campaigns in both Europe and the Pacific. As TH 510 will demonstrate, ACTS strategic
bombing strategy has continued to be employed with only minor modifications in all
subsequent wars, and is still evident in the current doctrine of "Global Reach-Global
Power."
LOQ. How did the ACTS come into being? What was its initial relationship to the Army?
DISCUSSION. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 did not establish
an independent air force, but it did create the Air Service as a combatant arm of the
Army. The Air Service School's (ACTS after 1926) initial goal was to indoctrinate air
service officers in the tactical employment of aviation in preparation for their
attendance at Army Command & General Staff College. Fortunately, in keeping with the
air pioneers, the ACTS took it upon itself to shift this focus to the more appropriate
strategic level of war.
FUQ. What contextual and operational art elements most influenced the ACTS during the interwar years?
DISCUSSION. ACTS was perhaps most affected by the socio-cultural,
economic, and political contextual elements, and operational art element technology. The
US resumed an isolationist posture following W.W.I. and as the Howard article (TH 502)
recognized, it is difficult to affect significant change the military during such
"ages of peace". This difficulty was exacerbated by the Great Depression which
further decreased the government's ability and willingness to devote funds towards
defense. At the same time, while rapid changes in aircraft technology seemed to support
the development of strategic bombing theory, it made procurement risky. Similar to our
situation with respect to automation today, during the interwar years what was
"cutting edge" aircraft technology one day was dangerously obsolete the next.
FUQ. What was the essence of the ACTS interwar strategic bombing theory?
DISCUSSION. ACTS theory involved the destruction of an enemy's
"industrial web" (key industries, utilities, and infrastructure) via
strategic daylight precision bombing.
FUQ. What were the primary challenges facing the ACTS' faculty and students had to address as they developed their strategic bombing theory?
DISCUSSION. Their primary challenge was to overcome an absence of
historical experience. The scant data available from the W.W.I experimentation with
bombing did not provide a solid basis from which the ACTS could build a valid strategic
bombing theory. (The relationship between history and theory was discussed in TH 501.)
Additionally, little of the data concerning industries, utilities, and infrastructure and
their relationships to one another was readily available. Such information was critical to
successfully identifying target sets. ACTS students therefore painstakingly developed such
a database based upon US-specific information. This database not only assisted ACTS
strategists to identify possible enemy centers of gravity for attack, it also provided
insight into potential US vulnerabilities. In TH 503 Sun Tzu stressed the importance of
understanding both the enemy and oneself. The development of the "industrial
web" database was perhaps the ACTS' greatest achievement.
FUQ. What were some weaknesses of ACTS theory?
DISCUSSION. In hindsight, the three most easily identified
weaknesses were: First, ACTS theory was based upon successful strategic engagement of an
enemy's "industrial web". This strategy presupposed that the US's future enemies
would resemble its general character.(The danger of "mirror imaging" was
introduced in TH 504.) Second, borrowing from Douhet and Trenchard, the ACTS' theory
assumed that bomber formations would be able to adequately defend themselves against
ineffective air defense measures and would reach the target area largely intact. Its
strategic bombing theory ignored the possible need (or escort) aircraft. This aspect of
the theory was perhaps the most hotly debated at the school. Third, the success of the
theory depended upon a degree of technological development that was not yet available. The
greatest technological deficiency was bomb sights. ACTS theorists greatly overestimated
future bombing accuracy despite their incorporation of a "combat factor" in
their planning estimates. Overestimation of bombing efficiency resulted in a corresponding
underestimation of the numbers of aircraft and amounts of bombs required to execute
successful strategic bombing campaigns.
Building upon the core concepts of the classical theorists, Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell applied the lessons learned from airpower's initial use in W.W.I to establish the first theories of airpower. These theories that airpower could be decisive in future wars if it was used in an offensively to engage strategic targets in rear areas which would destroy enemy material and moral capability to continue to resist. Building upon the air pioneers' ideas, the ACTS overcame a lack of historical experience and inadequate knowledge of the "industrial web" to develop a theory of strategic daylight precision bombing which served as the basis for successful bombing campaigns in W.W.II as well as subsequent bombing campaigns in Korea, Viet Nam, and Southwest Asia. These campaigns are the subject of the next two lessons.