TH 505 DISCUSSION
Prior to the confluence of political, industrial, and military revolutions which
provided the backdrop for the Napoleonic Wars, warfare was conducted by monarchs at the
head of small armies often comprised of mercenaries. A significant drain on royal
resources, wars were seasonal affairs fought for very limited objectives. They were
therefore very limited in scope. The general population was largely unaffected by this
sort of warfare. It physically impacted only upon those unfortunate enough to be on the
line of march (who would possibly suffer trampled fields and the plunder or requisition of
anything they possessed of value to the soldiers on the march) or those whom fate selected
to live on or adjacent to the battlefields. Frederick the Great of Prussia established the
foundations for an elite, well trained and equipped army ideal for this type of warfare.
The Prussians military successes in the 18th century made them a model for other states
aspiring to develop successful armies.
Such a force proved unsuitable, however, for warfare in the Napoleonic Era. Despite
operating as a part of a multi-state coalition, the Prussian army's caste-based leadership
was insufficiently trained to lead armies of the tremendous size necessary to counter the
huge conscript armies generated by Napoleon's levee en masse. The tremendous,
humiliating defeats suffered by the Prussians before the coalition was finally able to rid
Europe of Napoleon - the most notable of which was its defeat at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 -
resulted in a great post-war reform movement within the Prussian military establishment.
Led by such enlightened officers as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz (some of whose
ideas we examined in TH 503), the training of Prussian military leaders was completely
overhauled.
While still dominated by the Junker class, the officer corps in the post-Napoleonic Era
became open to all. Recognizing that officership was a profession and not simply and
occupation or social duty, a rigorous training program was established. The most promising
candidates were selected for more intensive training, and individual merit became an
increasingly important criteria for promotion. As Trevor Dupuy emphasized in A Genius
for War, the reformers sought to "institutionalize excellence". No longer
would battlefield success be so dependent on the military genius of a Frederick or
Napoleon. Senior officers would be extremely well trained, and officers at all levels
would possess a common way of looking at war which would permit them to function
harmoniously on chaotic modern battlefields whose size precluded timely communications.
How was this "institutionalized excellence" achieved? The
"kriegsakademie" stressed innovation and flexibility over mechanical,
doctrinaire, "school solutions" which had dominated training programs up to that
time. In a further attempt to break traditional institutional biases against change (ref.
the Howard reading in TH 502), the kriegsakademie leadership also stressed the advantages
of leveraging new technologies to the extent possible (ref. Krepinevich reading in TH
502). Individual initiative was deeply ingrained in the philosophy of command. Officers
were instructed to issue "mission orders" focusing on the what objectives they
wished their subordinate units to achieve, allowing their juniors the maximum possible
latitude to determine how to best proceed. The idea of "commander's intent" was
also emphasized. By not only understanding what was to be accomplished but why,
subordinates would be able to exercise their own initiative in the absence of orders, or
in the event that orders received were inappropriate for the situation actually
encountered. The term used for this command philosophy was auftragstaktik.
The reforms instituted by Scharnhorst and his successors quickly bore fruit. The
Prussian Army achieved masterful success in the Wars of German Unification and the Franco
Prussian War. These victories resulted in the formation of the German Empire in 1871.
Prussian (German) training philosophy and concepts were quickly adopted by other European
powers, and strongly influenced professional military education in the US. At the outset
of the 20th century, the German armed forces had a well-deserved reputation as the
dominant military power in the western world.
Despite the obvious strengths of its officer training program, the German General Staff
system proved incapable of successfully executing the Schlieffen Plan - its
comprehensively detailed, often rehearsed plan for the invasion of France should what we
now refer to as the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente come to blows - in 1914.
LOQ. What primary German strategic concern did the Schlieffen Plan address?
DISCUSSION. The Germans were surrounded by a hostile Franco-Russian alliance
whose combined military strength far exceeded their own. In the event of hostilities, the
German General Staff had to devise a plan which would permit them to deal with these
armies separately.
FUQ. What was the essence of the Schlieffen Plan?
DISCUSSION. The Schlieffen Plan dictated that in the event of war with France
and Russia, the Germans would rapidly mobilize and deploy roughly three-fourths of their
forces to the Belgian and Holland frontiers, placing its remaining forces in defensive
positions in the east and along the Franco-German border. Once in position, the German
armies deployed along the Belgian and Holland borders would maneuver west through those
countries, wheeling south upon reaching the French frontier, those on the flank
"brushing the English Channel with their sleeves." This huge turning movement
would envelope the French armies, crushing them between the invading armies and those
positioned in defensive positions along the Franco-German border to the south. In wheeling
south through France, the attacking armies were to occupy Paris. Following the rapid
destruction of the French armies, the Germans would redeploy its armies to the east, join
with forces already in place and attack to the east to decisively defeat the Russian
armies.
FUQ. Why was the initial attack to be directed against France?
DISCUSSION. The Germans recognized that France was not only the more capable
force, but it would also be more rapidly mobilized (IAW its Plan XVII - a major objective
of which was the reclaiming of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine). Were the Germans to
attempt to defeat the Russian armies first, the much larger force necessary to defend
against French attack while doing so would not permit adequate strength to be employed in
the invasion of Russia. Given the time Russia needed to mobilize and deploy forces west,
the Germans believed it could overwhelm the closer, more dangerous French armies and
redeploy in time to meet the Russians before the Russians could mount an major offensive
against them.
LOQ. How did the plan actually unfold?
DISCUSSION. The Germans executed the Schlieffen Plan in August 1914. After
mobilizing its forces and deploying them as outlined above, the German invading forces
fought their way across Belgium and wheeled left upon reaching France. Engaging both
French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as they progressed, the Germans
were forced to shorten their attacking front, swinging just east of Paris before finally
stalling along the Marne River. French and British forces were able to consolidate their
defensive positions along the Marne, after which they launched a series of successful
counterattacks, known collectively as "the race to the sea", which resulted in
the establishment of a heavily fortified front ultimately extending from the North Sea to
the Swiss border.
Locked in a protracted war with France and England in the west, the Germans were unable
to redeploy the intended numbers of forces to the east against the Russians. While
enjoying a number of early operational and tactical successes - most notably against the
combined forces of Samsonov and Rennenkampf during the Tannenberg campaign - the stalemate
in the west precluded the envisioned strategic offensive in the east.
FUQ. What modifications did von Moltke "the Younger" make to the
Schlieffen Plan and why?
DISCUSSION. Von Moltke "the Younger" was concerned that the original
Schlieffen Plan did not provide sufficient forces to defend against attack in the east and
along the Franco-German border in the west. He therefore detached a significant number of
forces earmarked for the left wheel to those areas. Recognizing the criticality of placing
overwhelming force on the German right which was conducting the left wheel through France,
Schlieffen planned for a force ratio of 7:1 between it and the German left wing which was
to defend against anticipated French attack along the Franco-German border. When the Plan
was executed by von Moltke, the ratio was between the right and left had been reduced to
3:1. Reduction of the German right wing dictated that its front be shortened. Its left
wheel would no longer involve Holland, and instead of "brushing the Channel",
the German right flank fell south of Brussels as it wheeled into France.
LOQ. What affect did von Moltke "the Younger's" modifications have on the
Plan?
DISCUSSION. Critics argue that had von Moltke "the Younger" not
altered original force dispositions, the German right wing's left wheel would have had
sufficient strength to complete the envelopment of the French armies while forces
allocated to the German left wing would have been sufficiently strong to withstand any
French attack in Alsace-Lorraine.
FUQ. What other factors led to the Plan's failure?
DISCUSSION. Consideration of the contextual and operational art elements
introduced in TH 502 is useful in identifying other influences which adversely affected
the Plan. It is apparent that the German General Staff did not adequately consider
international politics in its formulation. First, it did not believe that German violation
of Belgian neutrality would result in that country taking up arms to contest their
movements. Belgian defense of key mobility nodes such as Liege greatly slowed the initial
German advance. The Germans also miscalculated the British response to their invasion of
Belgium, and did not factor in the strength of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in
calculations of the force necessary to complete the envelopment. The unexpected addition
of the BEF to French forces deployed to the area under Plan XVII, coupled with von Moltke
"the Younger's"" pruning the attack forces to buttress German defensive
positions drastically reduced the German's chance for success.
Domestic politics also played a role in the miscalculation. The German General Staff
essentially developed the Plan independent of government oversight. Failing to appreciate
the closely integrated relationship between the government and the military that was key
to Clausewitz's theory of war, the German General Staff considered its operations
completely divorced from political concerns. If the nascent German government did share
that view, it was unsuccessful in subordinating German military planning to political
policy.
The leadership element also played a role in the Plan's failure. Stronger political
leadership (along the lines of that provided by Bismark) might have precluded the
development of a plan so fraught with international land mines, but once the Plan was
developed, a stronger leader than von Moltke "the Younger" might have had the
foresight and strength of will to execute it successfully in its original form.
The Plan itself also had a number of surprising weaknesses that reflected institutional
biases which the reform movement did not recognize or was unable to overcome. First among
these was insufficient logistics planning. Here German planning was flawed in two
respects: First, it assumed that the war in France would be short; second, it failed to
adequately consider the difficulties of supporting such a large force over such long lines
of communications. Planning for a short war of maneuver, the Germans were ill-prepared to
transport the large quantities of ammunition and artillery required for set-piece battles.
While the rail system within Germany was marginally sufficient to keep supplies flowing to
the frontiers, the railroads along the invasion route were grossly inadequate. Until
additional miles of track were constructed by German pioneers, supplies would have to be
transloaded from rail terminuses onto wagons or the occasional lorry and moved many miles
along roads whose poor quality was only made worse by the troops which had advanced over
them. The momentum required for a successful German envelopment simply could not be
sustained.
The German army also suffered at the operational level due to a lack of information.
The Germans had great difficulty in discerning the movements of the French armies in
response to their invasion. This led to the Germans engaging in counterproductive
offensive operations in the south (which were conducted with von Moltke's acquiescence in
direct opposition to the intent of the original Plan), and slowed the German's armies'
pursuit of French and British forces fleeing them from the north. Perhaps most decisively,
the Germans were not aware of the presence of a French army in Paris and left themselves
vulnerable to counterattack from that city when they decided to shorten their axis of
attack towards the Marne.
FUQ. Did the Schlieffen Plan correctly identify the appropriate centers of gravity
and decisive points?
DISCUSSION. Incorrectly identifying either their own or their adversary's
centers of gravity would have been a fundamental flaw in the Plan, but this does not
appear to have occurred. Schlieffen clearly recognized that Germany's army was its center
of gravity, and that the Plan's success depended upon keeping it concentrated and in
motion using the Jominian concept of interior lines. He also recognized that the French
centers of gravity were her armies and her capitol, Paris. Encirclement of the French
armies combined with the occupation of Paris would deal the French physical and
psychological blows from which they were unlikely to recover, particularly with the memory
of the Franco-Prussian War still etched in their minds. The tremendous physical expanse of
Russia suggests that its army was the sole center of gravity which the Germans could
reasonably affect.
Schlieffen also seemed to adequately consider the Jomini's concept of decisive points
at both the strategic and operational levels. Strategically, he recognized that he could
decisively defeat the French by massing his forces against the least well defended portion
of the French frontier - that opposite neutral Belgium. The frontier opposite neutral
Luxembourg was also comparatively lightly defended, but the geography was not suitable for
the conducting of large scale attacks. Operationally, Schlieffen recognized the importance
of key road and rail hubs such as Liege and bridges spanning the rivers along his line of
advance, and securing them were primary objectives for specified forces.
Despite the great success of military reforms instituted by Prussian following its experiences in the Napoleonic Wars which greatly enhanced its ability and, later, that of the Germans to plan and execute large scale military operations, the German's execution of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 failed for much the same reason that Hannibal failed in the 2nd Punic War - an ignorance or disregard for the influence of contextual elements on warfare. Military strategy can not be developed in a vacuum, but must take the entire environment into consideration. Its objectives and strategies must be fully integrated into and consistent with those of the nation which it serves. Sun Tzu enjoined military leaders to "know your enemy and know yourself" to ensure success in warfare. The Schlieffen Plan was weak on both counts.