TH 504 DISCUSSION.

If a nation is to successfully employ military force to achieve its desired national endstate, it is critical that military objectives and the military strategy pursued to achieve those objectives are developed (and periodically reassessed) with that endstate in mind. Hannibal's defeat in the protracted 2nd Punic War, despite a lengthy record of overwhelming tactical battlefield successes, illustrates the adverse consequences which result when this relationship is not taken into account. Hannibal's battlefield success does, however, provide some positive lessons learned with respect attaining battlefield synergy with joint (in his case, cavalry and infantry) and combined forces. His success also provides theory-to-practice insight into theoretical concepts and principles or war raised by the classical theorists in TH 503.

CONGRUENCE OF ENDS AND MEANS

LOQ. What imperial endstate did the Carthaginians' hope to achieve through the 2nd Punic War?

DISCUSSION. Rome's meddling in the affairs of the city of Saguntum (which was well within Carthage's recognized sphere of influence per the agreement reached between the two empires in 226 BC) is cited often cited as the event which triggered the 2nd Punic War. This suggests that Carthage's imperial endstate therefore involved forcing Rome to recognize Carthage's interests in the area south of the Ebro River in what today is Spain. Carthage's imperial interests at the time may well have expanded this endstate to include a reassertion of its dominance of the central Mediterranean which Carthage ceded to Rome following the First Punic War fifteen years earlier. This would necessitate its regaining control of Sardinia, Corsica, and surrounding sea lanes from the Romans.

FUQ. What military objectives did Hannibal identify to support Carthage's attainment of the imperial objectives discussed above? Were imperial and military objectives congruent?

DISCUSSION. In prosecuting the 2nd Punic War, Hannibal sought nothing less than the destruction of the Roman Empire as it existed at the time. In this sense he was employing "unlimited" means (the destruction of Rome) to achieve limited ends (a return to the status quo between the two empires as it existed prior to the first Punic War). Imperial and military objectives were therefore far from congruent.

FUQ. Why did this incongruence exist?

DISCUSSION. This incongruence existed for several reasons, the primary of which was the Hannibal's tremendous personal enmity towards Rome. This was the direct result of the humiliation his father, Hamilcar, suffered at Rome's hands during the First Punic War. Though just a boy, Hannibal was with his father at the fall of Syracuse, and subsequently shared his father's "exile" to Spain. The second, no less important reason for the incongruity was that since the First Punic War Carthage's sea power was distinctly inferior to that of Rome. If the larger endstate of returning to dominance in the central Mediterranean was to be achieved, it would have to be attained through means other than open warfare on the sea where an already outclassed Carthage would be unable to win a war of attrition.

FUQ. What military strategy did Hannibal pursue to attain his military objective? Why was this strategy unsuccessful?

DISCUSSION. Hannibal sought to defeat Rome by maneuvering a large army through the Alpine passes and invading the Italian peninsula from the northwest. Once established on the Italian plains, Hannibal intended to secure reinforcements for his army from the conquered peoples living in the region. Strengthened by these reinforcements and sustaining his army on Roman land, Hannibal hoped to become ever stronger until his army could decisively defeat the those of Rome and conquer that city.

Hannibal's strategy was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. Though he accomplished the unprecedented feat of negotiating the Alps with an insufficiently provisioned force and magically appeared behind Roman legions sent to block his expected route of advance, his army suffered casualties along the way that he would find difficult to replace. Hannibal assumed that upon his arrival in Roman territory thousands of disaffected people would flock to his banner. While he did, in fact, secure alliances with several peoples, most of those inhabiting the region remained either loyal to Rome or neutral. Hannibal was unable to significantly alter this situation in the decade and a half that he maneuvered about the peninsula despite his unbroken string of overwhelming victories such as those achieved at the Trebia River, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae.

Unable to gain reinforcements or adequate supply from his lines of communications which extended hundreds of miles through inhospitable terrain, and unable to gain the popular support necessary to decisively defeat the military might of Rome, Hannibal was reduced to fighting a war of attrition in a countryside with limited resources. His army would be slowly reduced in size by casualties and desertions while the people he hoped to win over became increasingly hostile over its depredations.

FUQ. What lesson can be learned from Hannibal's misreading the desires of the occupied peoples within the Roman Empire?

DISCUSSION. Hannibal fell victim to his own lack of situational awareness. He did not possess the degree of information and intelligence he needed on his enemy that Sun Tzu indicated would guarantee success in war. The Carthaginian's oppressive, often harsh treatment of its subjugated peoples inspired little loyalty in them. Hannibal therefore assumed that the conquered peoples in the Roman Empire would, like their counterparts in the Carthaginian Empire, view an invader as a liberator and enthusiastically support him. He did not understand that Rome's generally benevolent treatment of such peoples engendered a degree of loyalty which would be difficult to overcome. Arbitrarily ascribing one's own outlook to one's adversary is referred to as "mirror imaging". This fault is often discovered by those critically analyzing military campaigns.

THEORY TO PRACTICE IN THE 2ND PUNIC WAR

While Hannibal's military strategy did not permit him to accomplish his military objective - the decisive defeat of Roman arms - and therefore did not allow him to attain Carthage's desired endstate, his campaigns did provide an excellent laboratory from which to assess the validity of some of the theoretical concepts discussed in earlier lessons.

LOQ. How were Sun Tzu's hierarchy of strategies, Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity, and Jomini's concept of decisive points reflected in Hannibal's campaigns?

DISCUSSION. Elements of all three concepts are evident in Hannibal's campaigns. Like Sun Tzu, Hannibal recognized the advantages associated with attacking Rome's alliances prior to or in conjunction with his attack on Rome itself. His failure at successfully doing so was a primary reason his strategy failed. Hannibal correctly identified two centers of gravity within Rome: its conquered peoples and its armies. His inability to adequately influence the former resulted in his inability to completely defeat the latter. Hannibal also contributed to his own failure by failing to fully consider the difficulty of receiving reinforcements or resupply along a tremendously long, vulnerable line of communication. This umbilical cord constituted Hannibal's center of gravity. Hannibal therefore fails to meet Sun Tzu's dictum that a good commander 'knows himself.' Hannibal was most successful at identifying and exploiting Jominian decisive points on the battlefield. At the Trebia River, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae Hannibal consistently maneuvered his inferior army so as to mass overwhelming force at Roman weak points. The best example of this was his successful massing of an overwhelming cavalry force on his left flank at Cannae. This force was key to the success of his double envelopment.

FUQ. What other theoretical concepts of the "classical" theorists studied in the previous lesson seem to have been validated by Hannibal's campaigns.

DISCUSSION. Hannibal's operational and tactical successes seem to validate the emphasis that Sun Tzu and Jomini placed on obtaining as much information and intelligence as possible. Among the more important consequences that superior intelligence had on Hannibal's campaigns were the following: Information on the Alpine passes suitable for his army allowed Hannibal to adopt a military strategy involving an invasion of Rome by land, and intelligence gained by Hannibal enroute allowed him to avoid passes which Rome had garrisoned in anticipation of his possible invasion. Superior familiarity with the geography in his area of operations also permitted Hannibal to outmaneuver the Roman armies sent against him and assume positions from which he could launch successful attacks. Most significantly, Hannibal's knowledge of the Roman philosophy of command in situations where the forces of two consuls combined, coupled with his understanding of the personalities of the opposing consuls allowed him to take advantage of Varros' rashness and lure him into attacking at Cannae.

Hannibal's battlefield successes also support the importance that Sun Tzu's and Jomini's theories place on two related concepts: deception and surprise. In The Art of War Sun Tzu writes at great length about employing deception and surprise at all three levels of war. Jomini does not discuss these concepts at such length, but the importance he attached to both at the operational and tactical levels may be inferred by his concern for intelligence (thorough knowledge of enemy dispositions precludes surprise) and the premise of his fundamental principle (after all, doesn't deception facilitate massing decisive force at a decisive point, thereby surprising the enemy?). Hannibal's attack at Lake Trasimene was nothing more than an ambush on an army scale, and his deceptive disposition of troops at Cannae resulted in the complete encirclement and near massacre of two consular armies.

FUQ. Hannibal's successful double envelopment of the Roman armies at Cannae enthralled later military leaders. Generals von Schlieffen and von Moltke were inspired by the maneuver to in the development and refinement of what is commonly referred to the Schlieffen Plan. We will study this plan in the next lesson. What does a double envelopment entail?

DISCUSSION. According to the US Army's Field Manual 100-5: Operations, an envelopment occurs when an attacking force overlaps enemy flanks, allowing it to secure objectives in the enemy's rear. Thus, a double envelopment occurs when an attacking force is able to overlap both enemy flanks and exploit the enemy's rear area. At Cannae, once the Carthaginian cavalry successfully enveloped both Roman flanks, it was able to encircle entire Roman force, allowing it to be annihilated where it stood.

FUQ. Hannibal's army consisted was a polyglot of numerous peoples whose composition doubtless changed periodically over the course of his fighting on the Italian peninsula. What unique challenges attend commanding such a force?

DISCUSSION. The primary challenge Hannibal faced was gaining a rapid appreciation for the military capabilities of each element of his army. Upon completing his assessment, Hannibal had to improvise methods to best employ these elements as a team. His efforts would be complicated by the need to reconcile different warfighting philosophies, styles (doctrines), and weapons. The Yocherer reading and Cannae toolbook suggest that one method Hannibal used to partially overcome these obstacles was to place Carthaginian leaders within each element, and standardizing weaponry by making full use of Roman equipment left on the battlefields. Hannibal's creativity with respect to fully maximizing the unique capabilities of his diverse forces is most apparent in his disposition of his infantry at Cannae. In that battle, he positioned his stronger African (Phoenician) infantry on the shoulders of his infantry line to anchor it against the Roman assault and provide an interior encircling force once the Roman advance was halted. The center of the infantry line was composed of the more lightly armed, yet audacious Spanish and Celtic infantry who could be counted upon to fight ferociously against the superior Roman force. Their apparent defeat was key to the deception necessary to the success of the double envelopment.

CONCLUSION.

The above discussion of Hannibal's conduct of the 2nd Punic War and Cannae was the result of the informal exercise of some of the critical analysis tools to which we were exposed in TH 502, particularly the consideration of how contextual elements influence military strategy and objectives. In examining Hannibal's campaigns, we were also able to assess the validity of some aspects of military theory in practice. Perhaps the single greatest lesson learned was the importance of ensuring congruence between military objectives and strategy and the national strategy they are supposed to support. Keep this consideration in mind as you examine the Schlieffen Plan in the next lesson.