JP 4-0: "The process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations"

514.1 Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces [I.1(a)].

Main Point II: Strategic lift capabilities and limitations impact force projection and sustainment.

What are the components of the Defense Transportation System?

1. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
1. Air Mobility Command (AMC)
1. Military Sealift Command (MSC)

Not all US strategic airlifters' sport standard Air Force military paint jobs. Some bear the colors of Federal Express or World Airways, American Airlines, or any of the other civilian carriers that participate in the US Air Force's Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. They play a more critical role than ever before. During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis-Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm-US strategic airlift accounted for about four percent of the total lift, with the most critical contributions coming in the early weeks of the emergency. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) met much of the requirement-passenger and cargo aircraft those commercial carriers make available during crises. CRAF can provide as much as 41 percent of the US long-range commercial aircraft capacity to move people and more than 70 percent of its cargo capacity. Despite its significant lift contributions, however, CRAF can carry only about 45 percent of the full range of aircraft-compatible military equipment needed in a major regional conflict. Tanks and other armored vehicles, air defense weapons, many helicopters, and most trucks cannot be carried, while most civilian aircraft cannot airdrop equipment, supplies, and personnel. Special capabilities such as rapid off-load and operability from austere airfields is lacking. Thus, the US need for specialized military aircraft, with the mid-1995 air fleet comprising 104 C-5s, 199 C-141s, 20 C-17s, and 415 C-130s. In today's environment, air mobility is vital because it is the only way of ensuring that the needed force packages get to the fight on time. But the Air Force has not had a new airlift aircraft design in 25 years, and the fleet is beginning to show signs of excessive wear and tear, especially during this period of not quite peace.

Sealift remains the bulwark of the nation's ability to move the massive amounts of cargo that have been, and will have to be, carried in any major conflict. In World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War, sealift carried more than 95 percent of the "stuff" to the fight ... and back home, too. Today, US sealift needs for surge and sustainment shipping are being met with a polyglot of active merchant ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to the Military Sealift Command (MSC)-including thirteen ships in three squadrons prepositioned forward in critical world regions-and government-owned ships maintained by the MSC and Maritime Administration in ready-reserve status. The unquestioned ruler of the commercial seas in the aftermath of World War II, the US-flag merchant fleet has declined to a point where today it carries no more than four percent of the US ocean-borne trade. A naval logistics war game held at Naval War College in January 1995 raised issues about the ability of US Navy logistics/sealift to meet national requirements. Operations other than war, especially peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, placed great strain on DoD strategic lift.

How many, how much, and when have been key questions in the debates about strategic mobility. For example, the right mix of airlift and sealift has been one of the focuses of the new American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), which seeks to increase the number of ships of all kinds being built in US yards.

The association comprises the "big six" shipbuilders, together holding more than 90 percent of current US shipyard orders-Avondale Shipyards, Bath Iron Works, Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, Ingalls Shipbuilding, NASSCO, and Newport News. Association President Tom Bowler recently commented there "was no contest between sealift and airlift." While airlift is clearly critical in the early days and weeks of a crisis, sealift ensures campaign objectives can be reached.

The Gulf War buildup confronted airline executives with the sudden realization that a CRAF call-up might really occur and that mobilizations could affect their civilian business. A number of airlines felt that during the CRAF activation, they lost market share to competitors who did not participate, or did not participate as actively, in the program. Meanwhile, in the wake of the war, airlines saw the US military sharply declining in size. That meant the traditional incentive of Government business would likely get smaller as well, at the very moment the hardships of CRAF participation had become apparent. The upshot was that, to harried airline executives, CRAF no longer seemed a risk-free way to lock in Pentagon contracts. In the early 1990s, participation in the program began to fall off. "One of [the] biggest challenges concerning the CRAF is how to develop alternative incentives to encourage reluctant airlines to make a real commitment of assets to the program," concluded RAND in its assessment of the CRAF war effort. One method CRAF officials used to fight this trend was to look for every opportunity they could to bolster they're peacetime business base. US military airlifters must fly a certain amount to maintain training. There are some unique cargoes, such as heavy weapons or munitions, that the military is just more prepared to carry. Beyond that, "we try to contract commercially for the rest of our requirements," said Colonel Porter. The advanced age of the C-141 has paradoxically aided CRAF's quest. Dogged by airframe cracks and other problems, the C-141 fleet flew fewer hours in Fiscal 1994, providing a windfall of business for CRAF civilian carriers.

Heavy use of the Air Force for contingencies around the world also bolstered business. On a volunteer basis, airlines in the CRAF stable contracted to fly into Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, and other trouble spots. "All those civil carriers were right there supporting us," said Colonel Porter.

Main Point I: Joint Publication 4-0 embodies logistical doctrine and provides guidance to commanders for the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces.

Joint Support Responsibilities and Requirements. To avoid shortfalls or increased risk in operation plans (OPLANs), logistics must be balanced between the combatant commander's needs and logistic resource availability. Logistics is also a function of command. To have control over the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, one must also have control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) resources, and combat power but does not involve the transfer of forces or units. Support is characterized as mutual support, general support, direct support, (COCOM) over assigned forces. COCOM includes directive authority for logistics, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater. COCOM cannot be delegated.

The combatant commanders' operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels. Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment problem at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign.

1. Supply: combatant commanders are responsible for effectively coordinating supply support between the Service components, establishing supply buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels.

2. Maintenance: Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordination of maintenance and salvage within the theater. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use should be established, and inter-Service use of salvage assets should be emphasized.

3. Transportation: The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) has the mission to provide strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives across the range of military operations. Combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCTRANS who, with the transportation component commands, provides a complete movement system from origin to initial theater destination.

4. General Engineering: provides the construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or logistic enhancements required by the combatant commander to provide shelter, warehousing, hospitals, water and sewage treatment, and water and fuel storage distribution to enhance provision of sustainment and services.

5. Health Services: include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, dental services, and the required command, control, and communications.

6. Other Services: include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, dental services, and the required command, control, and communications. Other services are associated with nonmaterial support activities and consist of various functions and tasks provided by service troops and the logistic community that are essential to the technical management and support of a force (i.e., aerial delivery, laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and graves registration.)

1. RESPONSIVENESS: Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time.
2. SIMPLICITY: is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations. Mission-type orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity.
3. FLEXIBILITY: is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation.
4. ATTAINABILITY: is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations
5. SURVIVABILITY: is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction.
6. SUSTAINABILITY: is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation.
7. ECONOMY: Economy is the provision of support at the least cost.

Airlift Support Joint Pub 4-01.1
Sealift Support Joint Pub 4-01.2
Movement Control Joint Pub 4-01.3
Water Terminal Operations Joint Pub 4-01.5
Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Joint Pub 4-01.6
Medical Services DODD 6480 and Joint Pub 4-02 series
Blood Program DODD 6480 series
Petroleum Support DODD 4140 series and Joint Pup 4-03
Engineer Support Joint Pub 4-04
Mobilization Planning Joint Pub 4-05
Mortuary Services Joint Pub 4-06

• "Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management." LtCol George C. Thorpe: Pure Logistics (1917)

 rinciple functions of the DoD:

1. Secretary of Defense
2. Office of the Secretary of Defense
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
4. Military Departments
5. Military Services
6. Defense Logistics Agency

A Force Multiplier: Correlation of combat power between the opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive. Logistics plays a significant role, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the leverage potential from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by increasing the endurance of the force.

A Deterrent: Logistic forces and the activation of logistic Reserve forces play a key role in deterrence, a major element of the Nation's military strategy. Adequate logistic resources and capabilities convey a national will to fight a protracted conflict.

A Contributor to Flexibility: The composition and disposition of military forces and logistic resources are important considerations in developing flexibility. Essentially, logistics increases the employment options of the combatant commanders' forces.

Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment problem at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign. Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force; critical supply items; constricting bottlenecks; control of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies and host nations); and the sourcing of supplies and services from coalition sources.

Main Point III: Operation DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM provide good and bad examples of operational logistics.

Log Bases--flexibility, sustainability, responsiveness
Large quantities--sustainability, survivability, not economical
Airlift--responsiveness, flexibility
Desert Express--costly, but helped responsiveness, attainability, flexibility
CRAF--responsiveness, attainability, sustainability

Sound logistic planning forms the foundation for strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility and mobility. To influence the relative combat power of his force, the commander must have adequate control of the command's logistic support capability. A critical point often disregarded is that while attention would be focused on a regional crisis or conflict, US mobility assets would continue to meet lift requirements for US forces in other world regions, as was the case during Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie in 1990-1992. But as many observers recognize, DoD itself can't get there from here. Military assets, both airlift and sealift, are inadequate. Thus the long-standing policy of relying on commercial transportation resources to the maximum extent possible will continue. Issues unique to a specific joint operation plan they must support.

Demands of an Expanding Force
Critical Items
Bottlenecks
Movement Control
Push versus Pull Resupply
Civilian Supply Sources

Automatic resupply works best for certain commodities and when valid usage rates are available. Whether certain units can be resupplied automatically (push) or in response to their requisitions (pull), planners should determine supply requirements in the context of a unit's mission and its operating area. The plan should provide flexibility to adjust planning factors based on empirical data and to switch between push and pull resupply for various units, depending on the situation. History does repeat itself. First Vietnam, then Desert Storm

As already discussed, CRAF provides a sizable part of the nation's strategic mobility, so much so that Air Force officials say they are totally committed to fixing problems in the program revealed in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. That means:

• continuing to work on incentives for the airlines to increase the level of their CRAF participation.
• It means bolstering CRAF insurance protection.
• It means making sure civilian aircrews receive the same chemical weapons protection gear as their military counterparts

As with any operation, planning is the number one key factor. Remember-"If you fail to plan, you plan to fail."

Logistics initiatives that:

• promote combat capability
• enhance warfighting sustainability
• shrink the logistics footprint
• reduce infrastructure

Why is Lean Logistics Important To You?

• Reduces Costs
• Improves Responsiveness
• Increases Weapon System Availability

What is Just In Time Logistics?

• Reduced inventories
• Substituting rapid transportation and shorter repair times for forward-deployed logistics personnel and maintenance equipment

Removal of intermediate-level maintenance for selected avionics and engines

Base-level capability exchanged for fast, reliable transportation between base and repair depot

Instead of having a "work-in-progress" and replacement inventories at each of the several bases, there is a reduced number of items on hand (and in transit) at the depot

Depot will repair or procure items as needed and not by batch

Lean Logistics is an interrelated series of logistics initiatives that promote combat capability, enhance our warfighting sustainability, shrink the logistics footprint and reduce infrastructure. The goal is to enhance combat capability while reducing the annual operating costs of Air Force systems by adopting state-of-the art business practices once streamlined processes, and by reducing infrastructure throughout the Air Force logistics community.

Three ground rules apply: First, the Air Force "benchmarks" readiness and system availability at required Air Force rates to meet two, nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies or peacetime commitments-whichever are higher. Second, Lean Logistics business practices and processes are applicable and effective in peacetime and during contingencies, in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas. Third, logistics infrastructure reductions achieved by Lean Logistics allow the Air Force to operate effectively with fewer resources, while sustaining force structure; peacetime optempo and combat readiness. How does Lean Logistics change our current approach to logistics? Figure 1 helps illustrate the improvements. Our first foray into "leaner logistics" and enhanced readiness was Two-Level Maintenance (2LM), which now holds the prominent position in the Lean Logistics architecture. Two-Level Maintenance is an Air Force initiative that was implemented on 1 October 1993 via a phased-in schedule after a series of convincingly successful tests. The importance of this initiative is twofold: Two-Level Maintenance improves the operational focus, while simultaneously reducing the Air Force's mobility footprint and costs associated with supporting Air Force weapon systems. It does so by improving the "tooth-to-tail" ratio ("tooth-to-jawbone" says Lt. Gen. (Ret) Marquez).

The efficiencies realized from Lean Logistics and comparable concepts will help finance our commitment to our people, our technological edge and our readiness. We must size, structure and manage our logistics resources carefully if we are to continue fielding the world's most respected air and space forces. Through Lean Logistics and our individual and collective efforts, we'll turn this vision into a living reality. As we prepare to enter the 21st century, the opportunity, to do so is ours for the taking.

Main Point IV: The post-Cold War logistics structures must be transformed to meet the present day realities in order to project power anywhere in the world.

The challenge this new era in logistics poses makes it critical that Air Force logisticians chart the course of Air Force logistics in the coming years by encouraging innovation and by leading the effort to implement continuous improvements to business practices and logistics processes. Does this increasing focus on continuous improvement mean we should automatically discard current Air Force business practices and logistics processes? Absolutely not! We should evaluate what we do, consider why we do it, assess what it gives us, and determine if the output is worth the input given today's security requirements and resource limitations. Then, if change is needed, we should look everywhere---anywhere--for a better way to do the job at hand and the job we expect to do in the future. All of the above mentioned structures must remain in-place to guide us into the 21^st Century. Even modernized as necessary. Also, new paradigms must be conquered to propel the United States forward as the world leader....in military affairs.

To learn more about Gulf War logistics, read:

1. The Eagle in the Desert, by William Head and Earl. H. Tilford, Jr..

2. Moving Mountains, by William G. Pagonis.

3. Supplying War, by Martin Van Creveld.