JO-504 - CASE STUDIES (OPERATION EAGLE CLAW and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)
LESSON OBJECTIVES: " OPERATION EAGLE CLAW "
REVIEW THE SLIDE SHOWS
504.1 Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces [I.1(a)].
SOBs:
Summarize the restrictions and limitations placed on US planners by equipment, security, training, or senior leadership.
OPSEC was the driving concern.
Summarize the planning process used by the US to accomplish the operation.
The planning effort was ad hoc, compartmentalized and no written product was ever
published. There were no joint rehearsals or exercises due in part to changes in alert
status from the white house. Planned training evolutions were canceled.
Describe problems encountered throughout the crisis, emphasizing joint aspects.
US lacked an existing organization with the special training, skilled personnel, and
required equipment to take on the rescue mission. Eleven groups of men were assembled from
every branch of the armed forces and each followed its own doctrine without a clear
understanding of what the other services were supposed to be doing. Given the
compartmentalized planning, contingency planning was minimalized. During execution this
proved to be a critical flaw.
504.2 Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed [I.1(b)].
SOB:
Describe the command and control structure used in the operation.
AD HOC, Col Kyle (C-130) was the FARP site (Desert One) commander, Col Beckwith Rescue
forc commander, An ARMY Major that was the refueling site security force commander, LtCol
Seiffert the Helicopter force commander. No commander wore any distinguishing markings and
alternate force commanders were less clearly defined.
504.3 Comprehend the formulation of solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine [I.2(c)].
SOB:
Describe how the application of current joint doctrine could have improved the operation under consideration.
A written document may have been produced that would have facilitated a better
understanding of the overall plan. Every member of the team may have had the
opportunity to develop contingency plans in the likely event that the plan failed at any
point during execution. Deviations from the published plan could be planned for and
executed with less confusion.
504.4 Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war [I.3(a)].
SOB:
Summarize the joint and multinational considerations which influenced US planners during the operation.
This joint team had never worked together before, the event was never rehearsed
fully and each commander retained control over his functional area but the command
relationships between the eleven units was never published or clearly defined.
505.5 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns and operations with a concentration on conflict termination [I.3(d)].
SOBs:
Discuss whether military objectives supported national objectives in the operation. National will called for military action.
The plan supported the national will. After failing to rescue attempt the national
will changed and only 29% of the American public endorsed the raid.
Describe the facts leading up to the mission.
53 Americans taken hostage after the Shah of Iran departs and the Ayatollah Khomeini returns and brands the US as the "great satan". Carter administration's desire was in good faith to retain relationship with Iran.
Explain the root causes of the crisis.
The Carter administration failed to predict the transfer of power within IRAN from the Shah to the Ayatolla and their return toMoslem fundamentalism.
Describe the immediate situation facing the US military before and during the operation
. How to respond to effect an immediate rescue of the hostages without a standing designated task force. Numberous changes in alert status adversely impacted the joint training scope and focus.
Describe the execution of the operation
. The execution phase of the mission began well. The first C-130, piloted by Colonel
James H. Kyle, landed on time at Desert One very early on that fateful 24 April morning.
Colonel Kyle was the Desert One site commander in a complicated and not well understood
command structure. On board were the secure radios, Farsi speaking interpreters, Colonel
Beckwith, the first section of commandos, and the site security force. No sooner had they
landed and secured the site than a bus full of passengers drove up the road toward them.
This was not a great surprise as the agents who had marked the landing field earlier
warned of possible vehicle traffic in the area. The driver refused to stop until shots
were fired over and under his bus. Once halted, the forty-five terrified passengers
cooperated fully. The decision was made to evacuate them on one of the C-130 aircraft and
return them to Iran after the mission. The events to follow would eliminate any need for
evacuation.
Soon after the bus situation was resolved, a small fuel truck followed by a pickup truck approached the site. They also refused to stop and fire from the security force ignited the fuel. The driver jumped into the pickup and they drove off, leaving some concern that the mission might be compromised. Whether it was or not proved to be an academic question. Other events would quickly become more critical. The fire from the truck was, however, much more than academic. The bright light was blinding to the pilots of inbound C-130 aircraft. The light of the fire caused the pilot's nightvision devices to fog and that created some exciting moments as they landed on the rough desert strip. While the planes were able to land safely, they ended up more dispersed than planned, exacerbating the already difficult communication problem.
All C-130s landed on schedule and four remained at Desert One, as planned. Three of them carried fuel pods to refuel the helicopters. The fourth was to carry security forces back to Egypt. They left their engines running to guard against restart problems. The choking dust, roaring engine noise, and dark combined to make a very difficult command and control situation under the best of circumstances. And this command and control situation was far from the "best of circumstances." The plan called for four "commanders" on the ground.9 First was Colonel Kyle, the Desert One Site Commander. There was Colonel Beckwith, Rescue Force Commander. Third, was an army major, who was the Refueling Site Security Force Commander. Fourth, still enroute to Desert One, was Marine Lieutenant Colonel Seiffert, the Helicopter Force Commander. None of the commanders wore any distinctive marking. Since there had been virtually no joint training, there was uncertainty as to who was in charge. The age old mandate for unity of command was not firmly established. It might have all worked out if no unexpected events occurred. But the task force was not to be that lucky. There had been no full-scale dress rehearsal. There was no written plan covering the entire operation and explaining how the pieces fit together. While communication between Desert One and the White House was easy, there was no communication between the Desert One and the helicopter pilots (who were not permitted radio transmissions) or even from the aircraft on the ground to the site security force. Time moved on. The helicopters were late. Nerves were on edge.
Meanwhile, the eight RH-53D Sea Stallions departed on time from the aircraft carrier Nimitz for their 600 mile flight. Between one and two hours into the flight the first incident hit. A warning light in one of the helicopters indicated a nitrogen leak from, and thus possibly a crack in, a main rotor blade. This problem had occurred in training and Sikorsky Corporation representatives had conducted experiments which indicated the blades had at least fifteen hours of time left when the light went on. Moreover, of the forty-three blades returned for inspection, none were actually cracked. However, the pilots were not fully briefed on the possibilities and the pilot of the endangered helicopter decided to land. It is difficult to blame the pilot in this episode. He was trained to believe that when a trouble light went on there was a serious problem. Another helicopter joined him on the ground, picked up the crew and all classified documents, and flew on toward Desert One.
About three hours into the mission, the flight of helicopters encountered a large dust cloud. The pilots had expected clear weather, although the CIA produced Intelligence Summary mentioned the possibility of low level dust clouds. This fact had not been shared with the helicopter pilots and they had not trained or planned contingencies for an encounter with thick dust.10 Thinking the dust storm might blow over, the mission leader (Lieutenant Colonel Seiffert) landed his helicopter, fully expecting all six of his fellow pilots to follow. Only one landed with him. After a few minutes he realized he had a problem and took off in pursuit of those he was tasked to lead. No sooner had the helicopters cleared the first dust cloud than they encountered a second, even larger one. Then an alarm flashed in one of the remaining seven helicopters. A malfunction caused instrument problems and the pilot determined he had to return to the carrier. Whether or not there was a real danger requiring him to return is a topic for debate. If some communication had been allowed among the helicopters, the flight leader could have become involved. But such communication was strictly forbidden for security reasons. In any case, only six helicopters were left, exactly the minimum essential number required to depart Desert One.
These six Sea Stallions landed at Desert One between an hour and eighty-five minutes late. Sadly, one of the six had experienced a failure in a hydraulic pump. The pilot had struggled forward in hope that it could be repaired at the site.
But it could not. Only five operational helicopters were available and the mission had to be canceled.
Now confusion reigned supreme. Two false reports of mission cancellation had already been circulated. That uncertainty, combined with the confusion caused by the dark, the dust, the deafening noise of C-130 and RH-53D engines, and the fuzzy command structure, led to near chaotic conditions. Then disaster struck. One of the helicopter pilots, after refueling, maneuvered his Sea Stallion too close to a C-130. His main rotor blade hit the left side of the aircraft's flight deck. Inside the C-130 were the partially full fuel bladders, the demolitions to be used to blow a hole in the embassy wall, the antiaircraft personnel with their Redeye missiles, and some of the commandos. Both helicopter and C-130 aircraft burst into flames. The calm, professional action of the crew chief allowed the passengers to escape from the aircraft, but the crew in the cockpit were lost. In all, eight died.
The remaining members of the task force boarded the three C-130 aircraft and departed.
Left behind were five helicopters, communications gear, weapons, maps, and important
secret documents. Nothing was destroyed-the site commander determined it was too risky at
this stage of the game. The only capability to destroy the equipment was with thermite
grenades carried by a Delta Force soldier. In the confusion of loading the force on the
C-130s, no one knew exactly where this key soldier was. An alternate plan for the air
force to bomb the site was called off so as not to endanger the forty-five passengers of
the bus captured earlier. Thus ended the valiant but unsuccessful rescue effort.
Summarize world reaction to the operation.
America got a black eye because of the failure and the compromise of classified
material gave the Ayatolla regime ammunition in portraying America as the "great
satan"
Explain the most significant lessons learned about joint operations as a result of the operation.
…. that there was simply too much emphasis on security and, as a result, sound
organization planning and preparation suffered. The lesson learned is clear and
inescapable. While security is important, even essential, it cannot be the overriding
factor if in the end sound planning and organization are degraded.
Discuss the relevance of the Special Operations Review Group Report (also called the Holloway Report) findings to current JTF planning and operations.
Two recommendations, (1) Defense department to establish counter-terrorist task force
with a permanently assigned staff and certain assigned forces. It should be a field agency
of the JCS. (2) establishment of an advisory panel of active or retired senior officers
with special operations, JCS, or Major command experience. They would review plans and
provide an objecitve, independent view in times of crisis. The DOD reorganization now in
motion will provide the special operations capability and the advisory panel has been
established.
504.6 Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning [I.4(c)].
SOB:
Describe how JOPES (or its predecessor JOPS) was used during planning.
It wasn't. Gen Vaught decided against using JCS contingency plan
and crisis action system.
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
504.1 Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces [I.1(a)].
SOBs:
Summarize the restrictions and limitations placed on US planners by equipment, security, training, or senior leadership.
Restoring democracy to a land with infrequent elections and occupied by a corrupt
military regime mandated that any relief effort must start as a grass roots efforts to
bring about the level of change required. Despite the existing chaos the ruling regime
needed to be replaced by local security forces. Training the replacement security forces
from the people within required the reestablishment of trust and Haitian self respect. In
a land devastated by tropical storms and plagued by disease, instilling hope and
overcoming political turmoil was the primary objective.
Summarize the planning process used by the US to accomplish the operation.
JOPES crisis action planning within the deliberate planning procedures. This
planning effort produced two plans: a hard forced entry approach or a soft landing
transition to peaceful negotiated return to democracy. Eventually a combination of the
two plans was utilized.
Describe problems encountered throughout the crisis, emphasizing joint aspects.
Training and educating the people to care for their own well being without living in
fear of reprisal. Haiti's immediate economic outlook is bleak and the situation isn't
hopeful. Haiti wealth is concentrated in only 4.5% of the population leaving the majority
of the population to fend for themselves.
504.2 Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed [I.1(b)].
SOB:
Describe the command and control structure used in the operation.
See Wilson article.
From an intelligence perspective, the key points are that all the JTFs described above had the same joint intelligence architecture, TTP manual, and interoperable dissemination system and equipment. This highlights the progress that has been made given past interoperability problems that plagued intelligence dissemination and the fact that the four JTF commanders (ranging from one- to three-star rank) represented three services (each with different-sized staffs and capabilities). Moreover, the commanders conducted planning and operations from varied locations in garrison and deployed, and from land and seabased facilities.
While addressing the entire intelligence spectrum, ATTP emphasize support from
theater-level JIC to JTF, This is particularly useful in determining joint and component
augmentation requirements, organizing JTF-level JICs, facilitating interoperability, and
accessing theater- and national-level data bases. ATTP fully complement national-level
JTTP and detailed component TTP being developed. ACOM credits much of the intelligence
success for Haiti operations to the fact that JTFs used a common document like the
intelligence cookbook. (Wright)
504.3 Comprehend the formulation of solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine [I.2(c)].
SOB:
Describe how the application of current joint doctrine could have improved the operation under consideration.
The Joint doctrine was applied in textbook type fashion. The short coming in the
operations was that once the orignal sanctions were lifted the corrupt leadership was
allowed the opportunity to restock the shelves and prepare to outlast and out maneuver the
US government. The perception is that the US and the UN are not willing to stay the
course.
504.4 Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war [I.3(a)].
SOB:
Summarize the joint and multinational considerations which influenced US planners during the operation.
Annual joint exercises held in the years following Operation Desert Storm were
marvelous proving grounds for equipment, procedures, and joint intelligence support
concepts used for Haiti. For example, Ocean Venture '92 was the first exercise in which
ACOM used the intelligence-pull concept of operations with extensive deployment of JDISS
equipment among JTF commanders and components. It was also the command's maiden attempt at
using a command-wide request for information (RFI) management system. (WRIGHT)
505.5 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns and operations with a concentration on conflict termination [I.3(d)].
SOBs:
Discuss whether military objectives supported national objectives in the operation.
Describe the facts leading up to the mission. In December 1990, the Hatian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President by an overwhelming margin in a free and fair election. The United States praised Haiti's success in peacefully implementing its democratic constitutional system and provided significant political and economic support to the new government. The Haitian military abruptly interrupted the consolidation of Haiti's new democracy when, in September 1991, it illegally and violently ousted President Aristide from office and drove him into exile.
The United States, on its own and with the Organization of American States (OAS),
immediately imposed sanctions against the illegal regime. Upon the recommendation of the
legitimate government of President Aristide and of the OAS, the United Nations Security
Council imposed incrementally a universal embargo on Haiti, beginning June 16, 1993, with
trade restrictions on certain strategic commodities. The United States actively supported
the efforts of the OAS and the United Nations to restore democracy to Haiti and to bring
about President Aristide's return by facilitating negotiations between the Haitian
parties. The United States and the international community also offered material
assistance within the context of an eventual negotiated settlement of the Haitian crisis
to support the return to democracy, build constitutional structures, and foster economic
well-being. (CLINTON)
The situation in Haiti and US interests there suggest strategic objectives which might be the basis for military operations requiring military resources. US military forces could be tasked to assist in several areas:
Explain the root causes of the crisis.
Multiple successive tropical storms, adject poverty, too few natural resources, sickness and disease and a corrupt inhumane ruling military faction called the FAD'H The Fad'H administered the nation at the departmental and rurual communal section levels and has traditionally enjoyed great influence over the daily activities of the Haitian people..
Describe the immediate situation facing the US military before and during the
operation.
Describe the execution of the operation.
The deployment of US Forces is essentially complete. Our Forces peaked at the neighborhood of some 21,000. Sunday, US Marines started pulling out our 1,300 Marines from Cap-Haitien, and completed that pull-out yesterday. These Marines, by the way, will now be on standby as an afloat reserve. We expect US troop strength to draw down in the near term to around 16,500; then down to some 15,000 by the end of the month; and down to 6,000 by the time we turn this operation over to the United Nations.
At the same time, some US troops are withdrawing [and] multinational forces are now beginning to arrive in Haiti. Over 200 Caribbean community troops recently arrived in Haiti, and international police monitors are arriving daily, and I'll have a little bit more to say about that in a minute.
Our Forces are establishing themselves ashore in many ways including: development of an on-shore logistics capability; an expeditionary medical facility in Port-au-Prince; and the reopening of Port-au-Prince International Airport to commercial traffic by tomorrow morning.
In the outlying areas of Haiti, our special forces teams are deployed to assist the Haitian people during this transition period by providing a more secure environment in which people can conduct their daily affairs.
Much has been reported about the security environment in Port-au-Prince. Multinational forces, I think, have made significant progress and will continue to act to establish the safe and secure environment necessary for the restoration of democratic government. We have successfully initiated a weapons control and reduction program-collecting, as of today, over 4,000 weapons, including over 1,000 hand grenades. We will aggressively continue all of our programs to this end.
Summarize world reaction to the operation.
That the US and the UN could be waited out and out maneuvered. To rectify this A worldwide UN embargo, enforced by warships of the United States and other interested nations, should be placed on all trade and aid except for food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and services. Sanctions should be targeted much more heavily on Haitian military and civilian elites than in the past. This means striking not only at the very top of the armed forces, but at the officer corps as a whole. Such measures (for instance, the seizure of foreign financial assets, the denial of visas, and the restriction of air traffic) should also be applied more broadly against the economic elite. The object is to create and aggravate divisions and provide the motivation for dissidents to challenge the power and policies of the current leadership.
Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies a powerful message and go a
long way toward restoring the credibility of the United States and the international
community. (RECONCILING..SCHULTZ/MARCELLA)
Explain the most significant lessons learned about joint operations as a result of the operation.
International sanctions have been a failure. They have further devastated the Haitian economy without restoring President Aristide. The Organization of American States (OAS) and UN embargoes have accelerated environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas and causing (in conjunction with other factors) extreme hardship for ordinary Haitians while only belatedly touching the elite. Indeed, many of the latter have grown richer through smuggling and drug-running operations.
US policy has been marked by confusing actions that have sent the wrong signals and are interpreted by Haitians as indecisive. Haitian leaders have concluded that Washington can be manipulated and outmaneuvered. Consequently, they have sought to stretch out negotiations and prolong the crisis expecting that the United States and the international community will back down rather than inflict unacceptable suffering on ordinary Haitians.
The July 1993 Governors Island Agreement to restore Aristide was inherently unworkable.
By providing for the lifting of sanctions before Aristide returned and at a time when
General Cedras, Colonel Francois, and their allies still occupied key positions of power,
the accord enabled the latter to obtain short-term relief while they restocked supplies
and protected foreign financial holdings in preparation for the longer struggle to
come.(RECONCILING …SCHULZ)
504.6 Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning [I.4(c)].
SOB:
Describe how JOPES (or its predecessor JOPS) was used during planning.
CJCS utilized JOPES planning procedures to issue planning order, obtain PSRC and after negations obtained an agreement, executed a combination of two OPLANs. See attached diagram.
By Summer 1994, as it became apparent that political initiatives would not lead to the
return of Aristide, ACOM expedited planning for various military options. Operation plans
(OPLANS) for non-permissive forced entry (kick-in-the-door) and semi-permissive
administrative entry (soft-landing) were developed. Both were planned as joint operations
with the former, JTF-180, under the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and the latter,
JTF-190, under the commander of the 10th Mountain Division. Plan excursions existed for
JTF-180 to be headquarters either afloat on USS Mount Whitney or ashore in Port au Prince
and for JTF-190 to be shorebased. A combination of these plans was executed involving both
commanders with headquarters afloat and ashore.(WRIGHT)
COURSE OBJECTIVES:
Comprehend the concepts and processes involved in developing joint doctrine, creating joint command relationships, and assessing joint readiness.
Comprehend the concepts and processes involved in planning and training for participation in joint activities and the processes used by combatant commanders to assess joint readiness.
Comprehend how campaign concepts are used at the operational level of warfare.
READINGS:
Operation Eagle Claw
Operation Uphold Democracy
READING RATIONALE:
Operation Eagle Claw Readings:
The Rescue Mission Report August 1980 (article 1) is an abbreviated summary of findings
from the Special Operations Review Group report on the operation.
Lt Col Thomas's piece (article 2) provides a pointed critique of obvious flaws in the
organization, planning, and execution of this operation.
Operation Uphold Democracy Readings:
The Perry article (article 3) illustrates the importance of lessons learned from the Haiti operation and future joint or multinational operations.
The Wilson article (article 4) is a somewhat self-congratulatory look at the joint intelligence effort for this operation.
President Clinton's message (article 5) describes American objectives concerning Haiti in the 1990s.
The Shalikashvili briefing (article 6) details the operations of US forces in support of the Haiti operation and illustrates the very real concerns the NCA felt about public support.
Mendel (article 7) and Shulz/Marcella (article 8) articles were written before the
operation and discuss issues that were involved in the contingency planning for the
operation and the policy dilemma the United States faced with respect to events in Haiti.
LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: America's experience with the Iranian hostage rescue attempt was one of the reasons the United States military has moved steadily toward a joint planning and execution environment. Analyzing selected aspects of the mission and discussing the lessons learned are important to comprehending the problems and difficulties that can accompany joint military efforts.
Haiti was a joint operation that ties together all the lessons learned from previous joint operations, including planning to deploy and employ decisive force, innovative force packaging and the building of coalitions for mutual benefits. The lessons learned from this operation will serve as a benchmark for planning future OOTW operations.
Main Point I: The mission
Main Point II: Lessons learned as a result of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt
Main Point III: Lessons learned as a result Uphold Democracy
LESSON INTEGRATION AND RATIONALE:
The case studies provide vivid examples of concepts taught in Joint Operations. As future participants and possible commanders of joint operations, it is imperative to study the lessons learned from past operations.
Operation Eagle Claw allows the reader to use actual historical military operations to extract and discuss lessons learned for military planners and others involved in the development or implementation of joint operations. Concepts from other courses provide the skills to analyze the relative merits of using political, information, economic, and military IOP's to achieve desired end states.
Operation Uphold Democracy gives us a good example of a military operation other than
war in a multinational environment. This operation also provides a good example of a joint
military operation in which we can learn valuable lessons in joint planning and execution
and discover possible linkages to future applications.
LESSON OPR: Joint Operations and Campaign Studies Department
ATTACHMENT 1: JOINT OPERATIONS CASE STUDY QUESTIONS