LESSON OBJECTIVES:

Case I: Both sides have the capability and will to strike at each other's bases. (WWII Pacific)

Case II: One side is able to strike its enemy anyplace, while the enemy can do little more than reach the front. (WWII post 1943)

Case III: One side is vulnerable to attack but is unable to reach the enemy. (Battle of Britian)

Case IV: Neither side can operate against the rear areas and air bases of the enemy and therefore any air action is confined to the front. (Korea)

Case V: Results from neither side having any air power or through mutually agreed political constraints

(Warden Article)

In the first case, Case I, both sides have the capability and will to strike at each other's bases. This case was the situation in the Pacific in the first part of World War II, when both Japanese and Allied forces could and did strike bases behind each other's lines.

The second case, Case II, occurs when one side is able to strike its enemy anyplace, while the enemy can do little more than reach the front. Case II is typified by the Grand Alliance of the United States and Great Britain against Germany after 1943. From that point on, the Allied air forces were able to attack Germany without fear of militarily significant ripostes by the Germans. Case II also suggests that war involves phases. A war that starts out with a particular air situation may not end with the same situation prevailing. Phasing will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Case III is the reverse of Case II and is a dangerous situation. Here, one side is vulnerable to attack but is unable to reach the enemy. It is the situation in which Britain found herself during the Battle of Britain She did not feel she had the capability to strike the Luftwaffe fields in France; thus, for practical purposes, German bases were safe during the two months of the battle.

The fourth case, Case IV, describes the situation in which neither side can operate against the rear areas and air bases of the enemy, and in which air action therefore is confined to the front. Case IV is best illustrated by the Korean War, where the United States imposed on itself political constraints which prohibited operations against Chinese fields and infrastructure north of the Yalu River. The Communists, on the other hand, were unable to attack American fields effectively.

The last case, Case V, could come about through mutually agreed political constraints or because neither side had any air power. For example, proxies of two great powers might meet in a place where neither power chose to provide combat aircraft. Clearly, either side could change the rules; thus, it would be useful for participants to anticipate that possibility. Similarly, a war between two poor countries might not involve any significant air activity. Again, though, commanders on both sides would be prudent to think about what would hangmen if air maroon did arrive.

Blocking access - Attacking the means of theater access and sustainment. Methods are:

1. Deny basing 2. Interdict airlift and Blocking littorals

Active resistance - Attacking centers of gravity to disrupt the campaign's efficiency, targeting effectiveness and exact losses.

Passive resistance - Avoiding and deflecting the fury of American air campaign - to protect critical command and control functions, industrial infrastructure, and military forces.

Methods of Passive Resistance

• Dissimulation: Protects target by denying detection by the attacker(camoflauge)
• Simulation: Seeks to attract the attackers attention and munitions(ex: decoying)
• Fortify & Harden: Burying deep into underground facilities
• Dispersal: Dispersing the state's elements of power
• Mobility: Movement of forces and critical functions
• Exploiting Risk Tolerance: Positioning resources and forces close to areas posing high risk for collateral damage

SLIDES HERE

The strategist can employ the following principles to counter denial:

1. Centralized Control and Command-Uncoordinated and poorly planned strategies can do more damage by confusing friendly forces than damage to the victim.
2. Detailed Preparation-Requires careful intelligence gathering and wargaming the possible range of victim responses.
3. Logical Deception Ploy-Strategy must fall in line with victim's expectations. This is especially effective when victim deduces findings based on false information using his own intelligence analysis.
4. Corroboration of Sources-False information must be fed to multiple victim intelligence collectors. A balance must be maintained so not to create too good of a picture and arouse suspicion.
5. Timing-Give enough time for the victim to consume false indicators but not enough time to analyze.
6. Appearance and Maintenance of Security-The purposeful release of information cannot appear to be too easy and arouse suspicion. At the same time, the real strategy must be protected.

The strategist can employ the following techniques to counter denial:

1. Encouraging the Obvious-Confirming the victim's belief that the most likely objective is indeed intended, thus diverting attention from the real plan. An example is the Allies' build-up of an invasion force opposite of Calais which fed Hitler's conviction that this location allowed for allied air cover and use of a major port. The DESERT STORM amphibious demonstrations off the Kuwaiti coast is another example of this technique.
2. The Lure-Present the victim an unexpected and fortuitous opportunity which leads to a trap. Examples include feigned retreats and the use of POWs to provoke rescue attempts.
3. The Repetitive Process-Lull the victim into complacency by repeating exercises of what is ultimately the intended action.
4. The Double Bluff-Reveal the truth to a victim who expects deception in hopes that it will be rejected. This is one of the riskiest strategies.
5. The Unintentional Mistake-Encouraging the victim to believe that he has acquired valuable information by security mistakes on the part of the deceiver.
6. Bad Luck-Encouraging the victim to believe he has acquired vital information through events that are beyond the control of the deceiver (i.e. aircraft crashes, fog and friction of combat).
7. Substitution-Giving false information to the victim, encourage his continuing belief that is false, and then replace the false with the real. This can work in reverse as well.
8. Impersonation-Age old use of victim's uniforms, systems, and behaviors.
9. Physical Forms-Sensory deception based on camouflage, concealment, and decoys. See earlier discussion on simulation and dissimulation techniques.

(Cain Article - "Trial of Airpower - The Triumph of an Insurgency")

Despite total air superiority, initial Soviet efforts against the Mujahideen were clumsy and ineffective.

The Red Air Force attempted to target the resistance leadership. There were at least twelve major Mujahideen factions, plus numerous smaller anti-Soviet groups. Fragmentation among the factions and groups made it very difficult to successfully attack their leadership.

During their first 2 years in Afghanistan, the Soviets either built or improved 7 key airbases in Afghanistan. Each base was capable of handling several hundred tactical aircraft (SU-25 Frogfoot and helicopter gunships for example) at a time. Altogether the bases could operate a fleet of more than 1 thousand aircraft.

In the early years of the Afghan War the Soviets turned, out of frustration with their inability to identify, locate, and pin down the elusive Mujahideen, to carpet and reprisal bombings. It became a brutal, indiscriminate, and genocidal approach to waging war. By 1984 the Soviet air force targeted civilians in areas with the strongest Mujahideen support. Napalm bombs were used to burn crops and aircraft-delivered antipersonnel mines were used to discourage farming and isolate whole villages. The Russians found themselves in the same dilemma the United States found itself in Southeast Asia. Area bombing was not effective at curtailing guerrilla attacks.

Soviets resorted to free-fire zones in areas of known Afghan resistance-anyone found in these areas was a target. The entrances to valleys became favorite Soviet targets. Carpet bombing and huge artillery barrages were used to disperse peasant farmers and destroy valuable agriculture. Helicopter gunships terrified the rural population.

By late 1985 the Russians had nearly perfected their counterinsurgency operations and in 1986 they nearly destroyed the Mujahideen. The Russians followed a two-track approach in dealing with the Mujahideen.

The first employed was the classic method of dealing with guerrilla warfare: deny the insurgents their base of support. Terror, carpet bombing, and forced evacuations of the rural population from Mujahideen strongholds proved to be a successful tactic.

The second, and most successful, counterinsurgency tactic employed by the Soviets was the insertion of light infantry or special operations forces backed by attack aviation. The Russians perfected the art of the helicopter assault. A typical operation employed over 1 thousand troops transported in Mi-8 Hip helicopters and protected by Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships and SU-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft. The Soviet troops pinned down the Mujahideen with superior firepower and then used the Mi-24 gunships and SU-25 attack aircraft to destroy Mujahideen defensive positions.

By late 1985 and early 1986 the Russians concentrated their attacks near the Pakistani border in an attempt to stop the flow of supplies to the Mujahideen from their Islamic, Chinese, and Western supporters. Employing sophisticated satellite surveillance systems to locate supply routes, the Russians employed highly-trained special operations Spetsnaz forces to interdict the Mujahideen. Nighttime helicopter insertion of these forces using infrared and night-vision equipment completely disrupted the Mujahideen.

508.32 Discuss the Mujahideen countermeasures taken in response to the Russians. (Cain Article - "Trial of Airpower - The Triumph of an Insurgency")

By 1982, the numerous Mujahideen factions began attacking the Soviet air force both in the air and on the ground. China and numerous Islamic countries provided the Mujahideen resistance machine guns, Chinese produced Soviet SA-7 man-portable SAMs, rockets, and mortars. The Mujahideen quickly put these weapons to use with deadly consequences for the Soviets and Afghan government forces. Shoulder fired SA-7 SAM successes initially caused panic in Soviet aviation. However, by 1986 the Soviets had easily countered the SA-7 threat by employing infrared (IR) decoy flares and jamming equipment on their aircraft.

During the early years of the war, the resistance studied the vulnerable points of Soviet planes and the direction of their flights. Observation networks were established near air bases despite the rebels' lack of communications equipment. The Mujahideen employed several tactics that were often successful against helicopters.

They learned to setup ambushes near air bases, along known flying routes and in obvious approaches to bases. Some rebels organized ground ambushes near air bases for the express purpose of eliciting a response from the Soviet air force. "Helo-hunter" teams were set up on carefully selected ground and engaged the aircraft as they approached.

Another favorite tactic was to set up several different antiaircraft positions, using one position as a decoy. The decoy opened fire on an approaching helicopter either causing it to move away or bear in for an attack. If the helicopter continued the attack another machine-gun team would engage from close range from its hidden position.

The Mujahideen also attacked Soviet aviation on the ground. Aircraft were either sabotaged or hit by rocket or mortar fire.

Besides airfields, ground control stations that controlled fixed-wing aircraft were also vulnerable and became favored targets of Mujahideen ground attacks.

In early 1986, the Mujahideen had few viable options left other than giving up the fight.

Their first option was to move up higher in the mountains. They often camped in terrain so inhospitable that helicopter air assault was impossible. Moving higher into the mountains posed several problems for the Soviets. Mil-6 and Mil-8 transport helicopters faced operational restrictions in hot climates and at high altitudes. Mil-6 and Mil-8 helicopter engine performance was markedly less efficient at these altitudes, forcing engines to work harder and making hover operations difficult. Helicopter payloads were often reduced by a quarter as a result. Additionally both helicopters faced icing problems at altitude during the bitterly cold and harsh Afghan winters. From a tactical mobility standpoint, the Russians found the weather conditions most conducive to an offensive in the spring or autumn. Although effective as an excellent defensive tactic, high mountain operations exposed the Mujahideen to even harsher winters and more difficult conditions.

A second Mujahideen option was to conduct raids from Pakistan using three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan as a base of support. This of course presented the Russians with a dilemma-Pakistan was off-limits to Soviet aviation. Pakistani refugee camps became a sanctuary for the Mujahideen. The few Afghan-piloted aircraft that entered Pakistani airspace were quickly shot down. The Red Army and Air Force certainly had the military force and ability to eliminate the Mujahideen threat from the Pakistani refugee camps. However, Moscow did not have the political will to become embroiled in the politics of the Indian subcontinent and a possible direct confrontation with the United States and the West.

The third option available to the Mujahideen was to use the rebel supporters secretly working in the Afghan military. A number of sympathetic Afghan army officers and soldiers provided intelligence and support to the Mujahideen. They consistently drained the Afghan army of weapons and ammunition. The Russians often did not know which Afghans to trust with sensitive information regarding impending operations. Despite the advantage of overwhelming firepower in the form of SU-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships overhead, helicopter assault troops often found themselves landing in the middle of a carefully planned and executed ambush.

Despite the aforementioned options, by early 1986 the Mujahideen were desperate for a means to combat the incessant Soviet air attacks. The Americans and British, secretly happy to see the Russians bogged down in Afghanistan, decided to provide the Mujahideen with weapons they had been begging for-Stinger. In March 1986, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its British counterpart, MI-5, began delivery of American Stinger and British Blowpipe missiles to the Mujahideen. They also received modern Swiss manufactured Oerlikon 20 mm antiaircraft guns. The Stingers were extremely portable, while the Oerlikon 20 mm guns had to be dismantled and carried by teams of porters or animals.

Stinger was an effective weapon in the hands of the Mujahideen, who became credible Stinger operators with minimal training. The weapon was easy to use, especially in ambushes set up near air bases or areas where the Mujahideen could pick their targets and shoot under optimal conditions, rather than having to operate while under fire. The resistance found the British Blowpipe also an extremely effective weapon, especially since it could counter the presence of flares. However, the Blowpipe was more difficult to use. The resistance could not afford the two months often required to train a proficient operator.

The Mujahideen put Stinger to work with great effect targeting transport and attack aviation aircraft. The Soviets often used transport aircraft in a visual reconnaissance role and the presence of these aircraft overhead alerted the resistance to an impending attack. Using their observation network and Stinger, the Mujahideen effectively ambushed Soviet heliborne assaults. The Stinger was most effective against low-flying helicopters. Stinger forced the Russians to fly lower, nap of the earth missions, to avoid the missile threat. This brought the helicopters into the lethal range of Mujahideen 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm antiaircraft machine guns. The Mujahideen also employed rocket-propelled grenades against low-flying helicopters with some success.

The advent of Stinger was the turning point of the war. The Russians had come narrowly close to winning in early 1986; now events favored the Mujahideen dramatically in 1987.

The continual delivery and upgrades of Stinger so emboldened the Mujahideen that they even made raids inside the Soviet Union. By the summer of 1987, there was an evident change in Soviet tactics. Soviet helicopters and SU-25 attack aircraft were less frequently seen in those regions of Afghanistan where rebels had Stingers. The Soviets sharply reduced their close-air support of ground forces and use of helicopter gunships. The Soviet military command in Afghanistan, smarting from high aircraft losses, instead committed larger numbers of ground troops against the Mujahideen. This strategy exposed more Russian troops with less air cover to the Mujahideen who were often fighting out of their mountain strongholds. The Stinger also made it increasingly difficult to supply remote cities by air.

(My thoughts based on a generalization of the readings)

By failing to define adequate conflict termination conditions, the Soviets found themselves mired in a guerrilla war similar to the American Vietnam experience. Without clear cut conditions, the Soviets had no means to gauge success or failure and determine it was time to end the conflict. Termination occurred once the Soviets had decided the political, economic and miltary costs had exceeded what they were willing to expend.

(Cain Article - "Trial of Airpower - The Triumph of an Insurgency")

During Russia's involvement in Afghanistan, the Red Air Force was only second to the United States in its ability to deliver massive airpower-both in bombs on target and supplies transported. Just as the United States Air Force was designed to challenge the Soviet Union for air supremacy in a war that never occurred, the Soviet air force was tasked with achieving the same result against the West.

The first lesson to be drawn from Afghanistan is that in-country air bases are susceptible to insurgent attack and are difficult to secure. The main threats are sabotage from the inside and rocket or mortar fire from outside the base perimeter. Over two decades after the American involvement in Vietnam, and with the Russian experience in Afghanistan as a recent example, the American military is still grappling with how to adequately protect air bases. Joint Pub 3-10 provides a brief insightful analysis of the problems of rear area or air base defense in Vietnam:

Even though a "rear area" in Vietnam could not be defined by established linear boundaries, there were isolated pockets (de facto rear areas) that were considered to be relatively safe and yet found to be vulnerable to determined enemy attack.

The American experience in Vietnam and the Russian experience in Afghanistan should serve as a warning to American military planners should the need arise to base aircraft in Bosnia-Herzegovina or anywhere else guerrilla actions are likely. The irregular forces of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims can easily blend into the mountains and villages of Bosnia just as the guerrillas did in jungles and hamlets of Vietnam and mountains and villages of Afghanistan. Given the close proximity of Western air bases in Italy and the use of aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea, aircraft basing in Bosnia is probably not a realistic option. In other insurgent conflicts, the United States may have to conduct in-country basing and place American airpower at risk of being stopped on the ground.

Both the Russians in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam resorted to massive bombing campaigns. Whole regions of both nations were rendered uninhabitable and thousands of villages were razed. Massive bombing can reduce the effectiveness of the insurgents as it removes their base of support-villages and small towns. The political consequences of such a policy makes such a course of action often impossible to pursue.

Not only is massive bombing politically difficult, it may not even abate insurgent attacks. Despite heavy bombardment in and around rebel strongholds, the Mujahideen were still able to mount costly attacks against the Soviet invader. In many respects the bombing only strengthened the will of the resistance.

Guerrilla wars do not present clear targets such as those bombed in the recent Persian Gulf War. Both the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and United States in Indo-China resorted to massive bombing campaigns, often out of frustration for lack of clear targets, in an attempt to influence the outcome of an insurgency-both super-powers were unsuccessful. Given the ability to bomb with impunity, the Russians achieved the same inconclusive results as the Americans had in Vietnam against insurgents. Although in neither case was airpower stopped, it was rendered ineffective by the nature of the enemy. Just as in Vietnam and Afghanistan airpower cannot be stopped, but the Bosnian Serbs or some other future insurgent force have the means of rendering it ineffective.

When airpower is deployed in-country, it requires a secure and often complex logistics infrastructure. The Russians invaded a nation the size of Texas that had no railroads and only 3,000 miles of paved highway. Most of the highways were subject to Mujahideen attack. Twisting mountainous roads and narrow mountain passes were difficult to defend against the elusive Mujahideen. The large amounts of fuel and supplies modern air and ground forces require for sustained combat are staggering. The Russians had the luxury of basing some of their Afghan airpower in the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Americans based part of their Vietnamese airpower in Guam, Thailand, or off-shore on aircraft carriers. Logistics centers make favorite targets for insurgents.

Modern combat operations require an efficient and modern logistics system. Without railroads, port facilities, and pipelines to use for efficient logistics distribution, the United States military could face problems similar to those the Russians encountered in the bleakness of Afghanistan.

The epic battles of Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sanh, and Khost demonstrate the limitations of airpower, especially in the face of determined insurgent opposition. Each of these battles share extraordinary similarities.

The siege of Khost became a "siege" once the Mujahideen obtained the Stinger. Throughout much of the Afghan War the single road into Khost was under Mujahideen control. Despite bouts of poor weather, the Soviets successfully supplied the city and its Afghan army division by air. Once the Mujahideen obtained Stinger, the combination of poor weather and the missile threat made supply flights into Khost nearly impossible. The Russians were forced in the middle of the Afghan winter to launch a major offensive to resupply the city. Twenty thousand Russian troops required two months to fight their way through the 100 miles from Kabul to Khost. The "supply convoys" reaching the city consisted primarily of armored personnel carriers and tanks, operating without air support despite Russian air supremacy.

Fifteen nations manufacture man-portable antiaircraft missiles. Stinger and similar weapons were designed for last ditch divisional air defense. In the hands of special forces, terrorists, or insurgents, these weapons can be extremely effective against transport and ground attack aircraft. During Operation DESERT STORM, at least twelve American aircraft fell victim to Iraqi launched man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Simply put, man-portable antiaircraft missiles provide near stone-age warriors with state of the art high-technology weapons.

The Mujahideen carefully chose their targets and were expert at staging ambushes. The Mujahideen especially were adept at hiding at the end of a Soviet airstrip and launching their missiles at fuel-laden cargo planes. The Army, using the lessons learned from Afghanistan, has continued to improve the Stinger. The Russians, incidentally, have improved their equivalent weapons system. Given the Russian problems in dealing with the Stinger, it should be noted Russian Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship is not as maneuverable as American AH-64 Apache. The fact remains many nations continue to upgrade their man-portable antiaircraft missile systems and these will remain a viable threat to American aircraft.

In an insurgent campaign where target identification can be difficult and confusing, American attack aircraft, such as Apache helicopter gunships, A-10 Thunderbolt II, and Marine Corps Harrier attack jets, may have to fly lower to positively identify legitimate targets. By flying lower they will expose themselves to the threat from man-portable missiles. This threat is magnified in dense forest or mountainous terrain. (As an aside, the former Yugoslavia was a manufacturer of man-portable antiaircraft missiles. A copy of the Soviet designed SA-7 missile, it features an improved infrared seeker and larger warhead. Each faction in the current Balkan conflict is equipped with this missile.)

Stingers and their foreign counterparts also represent a grave threat to military and commercial transport aircraft. Many of the spectacular Mujahideen Stinger successes were against transport aircraft. Some bulk cargoes and large numbers of troops often travel by commercial aircraft. These planes carry no defense against man-portable missiles. Consider the deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT SHIELD-thousands of troops arrived in chartered Boeing-747s and MD-11s. One Stinger could have caused hundreds of casualties and altered American perceptions of the buildup.

The Mujahideen employed the Stinger in a role the United States Army never considered-offensive counterair operations. Stinger and its British cousin the Blowpipe are designed to be last-ditch defensive weapons for those few aircraft that can break through an American protective screen of F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18 fighters or long-range SAMs. For the Mujahideen, Stinger was an offensive weapon that allowed illiterate peasants to achieve spectacular results. All of this from a weapon a 1984 United States Army report concluded was "user-unfriendly" and too difficult for 70 percent of Stinger equipped troops to effectively employ!

AC COURSE OBJECTIVES:

Know the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. (OPMEP Learning Area 1)
Comprehend the linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national objectives. (OPMEP Learning Area 3)
Comprehend how the various components of the joint planning and execution processes support force functioning at the operational level of war. (OPMEP Learning Area 4)

CONTACT HOURS: This lesson can be completed in 5 hours.

READINGS:

Cain, et. al, "Stopping US Airpower"
Cain, et.al, "Trial of US Air Power - A Case in Counterinsurgency"

READING RATIONALE:
The Warden reading outlines a planning framework built around five air superiority cases of war. It provides numerous historical examples that demonstrate the criticality of air superiority, reinforce the advantages offered by the speed and range of air assets, and illustrate the importance of using the principles of mass, concentration, and economy of force to employ airpower. The Cain, et.al. research paper outlines three strategies for countering "traditional" application of US airpower and, through the Afghanistan case study, provides an excellent example of how an insurgent force denied air superiority to a superpower nation possessing superior airpower capabilities.

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: To employ airpower against a nation that doesn't have "force-on-force" capabilities and fights dispersed in the wilderness will surely raise the alarm of caution for asymmetric counterstrategies. The focus of this lesson is asymmetric strategies employed by an insurgent force. The reading outlines counterstrategies that insurgents might employ against US airpower and examines how the Mujahideen resistance forces countered the Soviet air campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan has similarities to the American experience in Vietnam. In light of the scant attention our doctrine devotes to insurgent wars, the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict are expecially applicable to American airpower.

Main Point I: Five air superiority cases for achieving and exercising air superiority.

a. Cases I - V.

Main Point II: Compare and contrast three types of counter strategies enemy forces may employ to counter US airpower strategies in MOOTW.

• Blocking Access, Active and Passive Resistance

Main Point III: Ideas for countering denial of air superiority and information dominance by a low-tech adversary.

• Methods for conducting Counterair and counterinformation operations

Main Point IV: Airpower in Afghanistan and the impact of the Russian failure to define conflict termination.

1. Russian employment of airpower in Afghanistan
2. Mujahideen response
3. Impact of the Russian failure to define conflict termination.

Main Point V: Lessons learned from the Soviet use of Airpower in Afghanistan and their applicability to American Airpower

1. Air Base Security
2. Limited Value of Airpower
3. Logistics infrastructure requirement
4. Sustaining operations by air
5. Effectiveness of Man-portable anti-aircraft missiles

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE:

This lesson focuses on the use of airpower in a counter insurgent. While the use of airpower against insurgents was briefly introduced in the opening lesson (ac501) this lesson more strongly highlights the role of airpower in accomplishing our objectives in an asymmetric environment.

LESSON OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department