Requirements fall into three general categories, which, for convenience, we may call intelligence, command and control, and precision force (see Figure 1 for an illustration of interrelationships):

• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), involves sensor and reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as the new means by which we are able to keep track of what our own forces are doing. Because of advances in this area, we are expanding quite dramatically our capacity to maintain real-time, all-weather awareness of what is occurring in and above a wide geographical area.
• Command, control, communications, computer applications, and intelligence processing-advanced C4I, the technologies and techniques by which we translate the awareness of what is occurring in a broad geographical arena into an understanding of what is talking place there, and communicate that understanding quickly, surely, and accurately-in usable form-to combat forces. Advanced C4I is where processes like target identification mission assignment and force allocation take place. In other words, it is the realm in which we convert the understanding of a battlespace to missions and assignments designed to alter, control, and dominate that battlespace.
• Precision forces, which includes precision-guided weaponry. It is a broader concept, however, that emphasizes speed, accuracy, and precision in the use of force and therefore encompasses all our forces, the infantry as well as strategic bombers, and includes things like information warfare. This is the area in which the knowledge generated from the overlap of the first two areas leads to action. It is easy to miss the power generated by the interaction of ISR, advanced C4I and precision force, because we tend to see developments in each of the areas as discrete and separate. Consider Table 1, which lists some of the weapons and systems already budgeted and programmed that have entered the active inventories or will do so in the years ahead. Something about the way we plan and program in the Defense Department keeps us in compartmented perspectives.

What is happening, driven in part by broad conceptual architectures, in part by serendipity, is the creation of a new system of systems. Merging our increasing capacity to gather real-time, all-weather information continuously with our increasing capacity to process and make sense of this voluminous data builds the realm of dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK). DBK involves everything from automated target recognition to knowledge of an opponent's operational scheme and the networks relied on to pursue that scheme. The result will be an increasing gap between U.S. military forces and any opponent in awareness and understanding of everything of military significance in any arena in which we may be engaged.

Army
Information operations are "continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations."43 Information operations include "interacting with the global information environment and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary's information and decision systems." The Army recognizes that information affects operations far beyond the traditional battlefield and, thus, information operations is seen as the proper "word" to include both information warfare and command and control warfare.

NAVY
"Information Warfare will give us the ability to slow and influence the enemy's decision making cycle, to prepare the battlespace before the start of hostilities, and to dictate the battle on our terms."47 While naval doctrine for IW is in at least as much flux as that of the other services, current doctrine straddles the big view of IW and the little view of IW as C2W. Operations Naval Instruction (OPNAVIST) 3430.26 defines IW as "action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems.

AIR FORCE
The USAF recognizes correctly that information dominance is a broad concept and describes it, in Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD-1) "Air Force Basic Doctrine," in the war-fighting context as that condition in which the commanders have "greater understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and centers of gravity of an adversary's military, political, social, and economic infrastructure" than the enemy has about our side. Iinformation dominance provides a decisive degree of information-in-war that is essential for the successful application, enhancement, or employment of air and space power or, indeed, any other kind of military power. On the other hand, in Air Force Doctrine Document 5 (AFDD-5) "Information Warfare," information dominance is defined as that "degree of superiority in information functions that permit friendly forces to operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from opposing forces

The USAF, IW is any action to "deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information, information systems, and information operations" while protecting "friendly forces from similar actions." While the joint Staff, the Army, and Navy see part of IW as protecting our military systems and military information infrastructure, the USAF appears to envision part of IW as defending the armed forces against enemy information actions, as well as, defending the military information infrastructure.

The joint C4 architecture provides a framework of functional and technical relationships for achieving compatibility and interoperability of C4 systems. Architectures provide the logical link between operational requirements and C4 systems development. They are based on doctrine defining command relationships and information.

• The Common Global Vision. C4I For The Warrior (C4IFTW) (see Figure II-3) sets forth a 21st century vision of a global information infrastructure made up of a web of computer controlled telecommunications grids that transcends industry, media, government, military, and other nongovernment entities. C4IFTW provides a unifying theme, guiding principles, and milestones for achieving global command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) joint interoperability that:

• Will allow any warrior to perform any mission-any time, any place.
• Is responsive, reliable, and secure.
• Is affordable.

• The Infosphere Architecture. The C4I For The Warrior vision put the Armed Forces of the United States on a course toward an open systems architecture referred to as the global grid (see Figure II-4) that will provide virtual connectivity from anywhere to anywhere instantaneously on warrior demand. The architecture of grid networks can support both vertical and horizontal information flow to joint and multinational forces. Commanders at all levels require a distributed communications grid comprised of links employing any electronic transmission media overlaying an area of responsibility/joint operations area. Nodal points may be terrestrial, airborne, and/or space-based. Nodal points automatically store, relay, and process information. Voice, data, and imagery flows together in digitized form across all communication paths. Automated user terminals from man portable to more stationary types allow personnel to instantly connect in any fashion desired (e.g., electronic mail; instantly reconfigured (virtual) voice radio nets; imagery; connected sensor grids; or extended personal presence by creating synthetic environments such as virtual reality). The specific paths used to set-up virtual connectivity are controlled by computers. Warriors no longer depend on a single communication link, but have vastly increased reliability and flexibility with access via any of hundreds or thousands of circuits available through the GCCS and DOD information infrastructures, host nation, commercial service, or any combination. Virtual connectivity is automatically determined, established, and maintained on warrior demand through the grid network. When no longer needed, the resource is automatically made available providing efficient use of C4 resources.

• The Warrior Vision of the Infosphere. The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decisionmakers and warfighters at all levels and with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity. The JFC and subordinate leaders gain a coherent understanding of operational situations, regardless of the enemy's actions or responses, strategically, operationally, or tactically. Commanders see the battlespace together as a team-they perceive and move ideas and knowledge in a timely and coherent fashion. The virtual grid also links sensors to shooters to allow rapid exploitation of opportunity and generate quick, decisive actions.

Decision support systems are included within the umbrella definition of C4 systems. a. Joint Reporting System Support

• Reporting includes intelligence, situation reports from maneuver forces, and logistic status. The information varies from data required for staff planning, and significant events requiring a commander's immediate attention.
• The principal sources of operationally significant information are the C4 systems of the combatant commands, the management and/or information systems of the Services, the support systems of the DOD agencies, and the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The Joint Pub 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)," series prescribes standard JRS reporting within and between the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and agencies and details the procedures, formats, and reporting channels for the reports.
• Some principles for reporting:
• Commanders provide the organization and procedures so that reports receive command attention when required to support decisionmaking and control of mission execution.
• Reports adhere to standard formats when feasible to facilitate their handling through electronic systems and speed interpretation by people.
• Commanders review reporting requirements for their commands to assure that the content and frequency of reports support assigned missions without needlessly burdening subordinates.

b. Intelligence Support

• Intelligence organizations use a variety of sensors and other information sources to collect and analyze data and produce intelligence products. C4 systems support to intelligence is normally limited to providing the communications interface and media required to move intelligence information. C4 systems support does not typically cover the collection and production of intelligence.
• The basis for system interoperability is the application of standard data elements and structures and information exchange standards applicable to all levels of command and to all Services and supporting agencies. The Services and agencies are responsible for fielding intelligence systems based on these standards.
• Basic intelligence system principles:
• Intelligence requirements must be incorporated in the planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence staffs should coordinate with the J-6 staff to identify requirements and obtain an assessment of the intelligence communications required to support operations. Intelligence requirements generally exceed communication capabilities, therefore, communications and intelligence communities continue to develop concepts for expanding communication pipelines and imagery compression techniques.
• Each echelon of command receives organic and external intelligence support. Commanders direct requirements for assets through the J-2 staff element.
• Defense intelligence organizations and systems operate on a shared information basis. Accordingly, within limits imposed by security, intelligence is distributed up, down, and across echelons.
• The responsibility for the application of intelligence information is shared by intelligence and operations.c. Logistic Support. Accurate and timely logistic information is required for the management of critical resources. A principle source of operationally significant logistic information is the JRS. Information not routinely supplied through the JRS may be provided in response to specific queries from combatant command systems, Service logistic systems, and the DOD agencies.

d. Planning Support. In addition to conveying force status and intelligence information, C4 systems provide processing capabilities for planning.

e. Decision Support. Operational and tactical decision support systems also include maneuver, fire support and target planning, C2W, air operations, and C4 systems control and management. TARGETS FIXED TARGETS

The transition is Inevitable, but the speed at which we complete it depends on recognition of what is emerging and on our defense planning and programming decisions over the next several years. If accelerated the transition can be completed early in the next century. We could therefore be on the other side of this new revolution in military affairs years, perhaps decades, before any other nation. This is important for many reasons; one of the most significant is that completing the revolution offers us the opportunity to shape the international environment, rather than simply react to it. This, then, is the essence of the argument in favor of accelerating RMA. It is a bold vision and a controversial one. Visions count, however, only if people try to make them real, and the professional military should not try to reify this one unless it holds up to honest critique.

(OWENS)
Advantages: Our growing capacity to transfer DBK to all our forces, coupled with the real-time awareness of the status of all our forces and the understanding of what they can do with their growing capacity to apply force with speed, accuracy, and precision, builds the realm of "near perfect" mission allocation. We will increasingly assign the right mission to the right force, matching our forces to the most successful course of action at both the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Further, our increasing capacity to use force faster, more accurately, and more precisely over greater distances and interacting with the advances in ISR will build a qualitatively better realm of battle assessment. We will know the effects of our actions-and understand what those effects mean-with far more fidelity, far earlier than anything we have experienced to date. This dominant knowledge, in turn, will make any subsequent actions we undertake even more effective, because we will truly be able to operate within the opponent's decision cycle, and the opponent's capacity to operate at all will have been greatly eroded.

Disadvantages: The conflicts we face will remain competitions among thinking, learning, and adaptive human beings, so we need to recognize that any future opponent could diligently and intelligently try to counter capabilities the system-of-systems gives us. Assuming opponents will try to counter the system-of-systems does not mean they will succeed, however.

Reliance on "information" technologies-the kind of sensors, data processing and communications subsystems -carries an inherent weakness that opponents can exploit: the vulnerability of such technologies to offensive information warfare, or "hacking." Heavy reliance on the system-of-systems might make the United States vulnerable to catastrophic failure in efforts to use it successfully in conflict.

The system-of-systems may work only in a conflict similar to Desert Storm, with relatively open terrain and with an opponent who turns out to be scared and stupid, one who gives us enough time to amass an overwhelming force. That was the last war, however, not the next one. Future conflicts may take place in terrain less open, with an opponent not as militarily naive as Saddam Hussein, and against an army that is a lot more skilled in hiding. Urban areas, jungles, and mountains are as likely to be arenas as open deserts. There, it is argued, the system-of-systems is less applicable, and relying on it at the expense of a force built for close combat, in very ambiguous tactical situations, is a recipe for failure.

Excerpt from GEORGE STEIN Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025

The US Army
For the US Army, "information operations" replaces information warfare as the capstone concept. Information operations are "continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations."

Information operations include "interacting with the global information environment and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary's information and decision systems." That is, the Army recognizes that information affects operations far beyond the traditional battlefield and, thus, information operations is seen as the proper "word" to include both information warfare and command and control warfare. This is a potentially important evolution in Army thinking but, currently, it results in a limited view of information warfare. Information operations may, in fact, be a better word than information warfare, and could be adopted by the Joint Staff and the other services, but only if the concept is expanded to mean more than "military operations within the military information environment."

Information warfare, for the US Army, are actions "taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary's information system and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force."44 That is, information warfare remains in the universe of traditional platform-versus-platform thinking like "only armor can confront armor," with the information system as the new platform. Information warfare thus has been constrained to the universe of the combat support elements where techno-wizards will provide advantage for Willie and Joe to apply force with real weapons like tanks and artillery.

The US Army appears to confuse information-in-war with information warfare. The Army's goal to "assimilate thousands of bits of information to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action appropriate to the situation" is the use of information-in-war for traditional battle. The Army's "Information Age" Force XXI will "know the precise location of their own forces, while denying that kind of information to their foes" because, for the Army, information is "an essential dynamic enabling dominant military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels." This will be achieved by "using and protecting information infrastructures" while influencing or denying a potential adversary's use of these infrastructures.45

By constraining its doctrinal thinking to the infrastructure aspects of information and adopting uncritically the Joint Staff definition of C2W, the US Army may have let its traditional, and proper, land-warfare focus prematurely narrow its vision to the battlespace of armor, artillery, and infantry divisions. While it is undoubtedly important that the Army study and apply its notion of information warfare to C2W, it is also undoubtedly obvious that the Army must develop its concept of information operations beyond "the military information environment." Information operations, if conceived synergistically with the USAF concept of information attack, are much more than "integrated support to battle command" in traditional military operations.

The US Navy
The US Navy essentially shares the same view of information warfare as does the Air Force but, like the US Army, views information operations as a means through which to conduct traditional battle. Like the Air Force, the Navy views C2W as distinct and subordinate to information warfare proper. Like the Army, the Navy appears to view IW primarily as a means to prepare for battle. The chief of naval operations, Admiral J.M. Boorda, observed recently that because of the Navy's traditional forward deployment, "Information Warfare will give us the ability to slow and influence the enemy's decision making cycle, to prepare the battlespace before the start of hostilities, and to dictate the battle on our terms." While naval doctrine for IW is in at least as much flux as that of the other services, current doctrine straddles the big view of IW and the little view of IW as C2W. Operations Naval Instruction (OPNAVIST) 3430.26 defines IW as "action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems [emphasis added]." Platform-to-platform battle is again the model. Likewise, C2W is the "action taken by the military commander to realize the practical effects of IW on the battlefield." As a service the Navy may be expected to develop the tools and techniques of C2W for power projection from the sea with the growing awareness of the potential for IW to project the effect of combat power far inland from the combat forces that are the source of that power. The Navy recognizes that information warfare "encompasses political, economic, physical, and military infrastructures" and "expands the spectrum of warfare from competition to conflict." There is an obvious potential for mutual synergy in developing asymmetric strategies between the Navy's sea and air assets and the US Air Force's air and space assets for both C2W based information warfare and information attack.

The US Air Force
The USAF begins its reflections on information warfare from within its views on air and space power. For the USAF, air and space power are a means to an end, not the end itself. Like the Navy's "From the Sea," air and space power are "done" in and from a "place" that is "more than a place"-the air and space. Thus, air and space power include the projection of military force from air and space. The goal is air and space superiority as the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the application or employment of all other military power. And, as air and space surround the globe, the USAF sees itself as having a global mission of air and space superiority, global mobility, and the precision employment of air and space assets. The same vision informs USAF thinking on information warfare.

For the USAF, currently, information is seen as analogous to air and space. Information is seen as a realm in which dominance will be contested and in which and from which military power can be employed. Like air and space power, information dominance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the application or employment of all other military power and, likewise, is a global mission. Mastering information warfare, then, will become a USAF core competency like air and space superiority. Unfortunately, USAF thinking currently suffers some of the same internal contradictions as does the IW thinking of the Army and Navy and, more importantly, that of the Joint Staff. The issue is, again, confusion among information-in-war, information, and information warfare.

The USAF recognizes correctly that information dominance is a broad concept and describes it, in Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD-1) "Air Force Basic Doctrine," in the war-fighting context as that condition in which the commanders have "greater understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and centers of gravity of an adversary's military, political, social, and economic infrastructure" than the enemy has about our side.51 That is, information dominance provides a decisive degree of information-in-war that is essential for the successful application, enhancement, or employment of air and space power or, indeed, any other kind of military power. On the other hand, in Air Force Doctrine Document 5 (AFDD-5) "Information Warfare," information dominance is defined as that "degree of superiority in information functions that permit friendly forces to operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from opposing forces."52 As will be discussed presently, information "functions" is a problematic limitation. While information dominance must become a core USAF competency by 2025, it is only one key step, potentially, toward full-information warfare competency. Like the US Army, USAF thinking on information warfare must not be constrained to "information functions."

Unlike Joint Pub 3-13 (1995), Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, USAF thinking on information warfare appears to see aerospace power as not constrained by political considerations from protecting the military forces against hostile enemy information actions. That is, for the USAF, IW is any action to "deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information, information systems, and information operations" while protecting "friendly forces from similar actions." While the joint Staff, the Army, and Navy see part of IW as protecting our military systems and military information infrastructure, the USAF appears to envision part of IW as defending the armed forces against enemy information actions, as well as, defending the military information infrastructure. The USAF is right: waiting for an electronic Pearl Harbor and then beginning the slow buildup and deployment of Army land power to apply force is not the way to prepare the armed forces for the fight, or to deter fighting, in the information age.

We must assist in demonstrating to service providers the compelling need for a collaborative, teamed approach in crafting solution-not just to support the Department of Defense and to protect our national security, but to protect their own proprietary interests as well. . IW applies across all phases, the range of military operations, and at every level of warfare. Defensive IW activities are conducted on a continuous basis, in both peacetime and war, and are an inherent part of force protection. Offensive IW capabilities may be employed in a variety of circumstances across the range of military operations.

A common focus is essential to ensure a credible IW vision becomes a reality. The three principles of the Joint Staff's implementation vision are:

1. Reduce the opportunities presented to potential adversaries by educating, training, and increasing the awareness of warriors to vulnerabilities and protective measures.
2. Improve information attack capabilities and measures to protect against and detect attack on information and information systems by pursuing emerging technological capabilities and the synergy created by integrated defense-in-depth solutions.
3. Build the necessary relationships, within government and throughout the Nation, to secure the information needs of all constituencies. Seal those arrangements in law and policy, resulting in reconstituted national deterrence to preserve peace, security, and stability.

Efforts are under way to integrate IW into all aspects of joint warfare. The Joint Staff, in cooperation with the Services and Defense agencies, is focusing on a common approach toward operationalizing IW. Efforts in six major areas are coming together to support the warfighter. They include:

1. Education, training, and exercises.
2. Policy.
3. Doctrine.
4. Assessments.
5. Organizational infrastructure.
6. Technology.

Education, training, and exercises offer the greatest return on investment. High-level military education at the National Defense University and Service professional military education institutions focus on the study of IW concepts, policy issues, doctrine integration, and the role of IW throughout the range of military operations and all levels of war. Additionally, the DOD InterService Training Review Organization Initiative for Joint IW Training (DIIJIT) initiated 11 courses for DOD personnel. These courses range from senior-level awareness to technical training for systems administrators.

The DIIJIT is a great success story that epitomizes jointness. Additional courses are forthcoming that will continue to generate and focus IW study throughout the environment.

Information systems incident reports continue to reveal that most intrusions result from a lack of understanding and improper implementation of security measures by information users. Awareness and training modules are being inserted into a broad range of officer, enlisted, and civilian curriculum that explain vulnerabilities inherent in information systems, describe potential adversary threats, and educate people in proper system use.

Training for system and network administrators to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities is another investment yielding high dividends. Industry places a premium on and commits a great deal of resources to acquire and train specialists to administer and enforce information systems security policies. The Department of Defense should follow suit in this area.

At the organizational level, the Joint Staff is accelerating the integration of IW into joint exercises. Demonstration of IW concepts and capabilities in CINC-sponsored exercises will help planners and users better integrate IW into operations.

Definitions (from CORNERSTONES of IW)

• C2 Attack-Any action against any element of the enemy's command and control system.
• Command and Control-The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
• Counterinformation-Actions dedicated to controlling the information realm.
• Defensive Counterinformation-Actions protecting our military information functions from the adversary.
• Direct Information Warfare-Changing the adversary's information without involving the intervening perceptive and analytical functions.
• Indirect Information Warfare-Changing the adversary's information by creating phenomena that the adversary must then observe and analyze.
• Information-Data and instructions.
• Information Attack-Directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides.
• Information Function-Any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information.
• Information Operations-Any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information that enhances the employment of military forces.
• Information Warfare-Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions.
• Military Information Function-Any information function supporting and enhancing the employment of military forces.
• Offensive Counterinformation-Actions against the adversary's information functions.

AC COURSE OBJECTIVES:

• Know of the systems and understand the processes supporting the 21st Century battlespace and how those are integrated to achieve operational-level joint force missions. (OPMEP Learning Area 5)
• Comprehend how the various components of the joint planning and execution processes support force functioning at the operational level of war. (OPMEP Learning Area 2)
• Comprehend how the various components of the joint planning and execution processes support force functioning at the operational level of war. (OPMEP Learning Area 4)
• Comprehend how conflicts in doctrine and weaknesses in organizational structure impact unity of efforts in joint air operations.
• Analyze the impact of contextual and operational art elements on campaign planning.

CONTACT HOURS: This lesson can be completed in 8 hours.

1. Department of the Air Force, Cornerstones of Information Warfare
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace..The Decisive
3. Stein, "Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025"
4. Johnson and Libicki, eds., Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Great reading, must read)
5. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, pp. II-10 to II-15. (Good overview of C4I for the Warrior) Capture above...but see figures....
6. Stein, "Information Warfare" (so/so)
7. Rodgers, "Information Warfare: Applying the Lessons Today (Recommendations)" (so/so)
8. Tirpak, "The New World of Information Warfare" (so/so)

READING RATIONALE:
The Johnson and Libicki selection introduces Admiral Owens' systems of systems vision and counters some of the arguments against its viability. Tirpak outlines current and projected initiatives in the information warfare arena. Cornerstones provides the building blocks for USAF IW doctrine. The Stein papers provide a good overview of this topic by examining how we should use Air Force doctrine to develop information warfare doctrine and strategy and by outlining the various Service perspectives on information operations and information warfare. The JCS brochure published in December 1996 outlines basic IW concepts and summarizes ongoing initiatives (IW implementation strategy) translating vision into processes and capabilities supporting joint warfighting. Finally, Rodgers offers six recommendations for how to apply information warfare in the joint campaign.

LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: This lesson lays the foundation for understanding information's impact on the campaign. Though information-based warfare and command and control warfare (C2W) are not new, technology's impact in this realm and high-level guidance, like JV 2010, demands increased emphasis on information operations (IO) and information warfare (IW) in campaign planning. Unfortunately, this emphasis has also created confusion, due to the different Service perspectives and definitions of IO and IW. Notwithstanding, today's campaign planners must understand how IW can assist the NCA at the strategic level and what C2W means for warfighters at the operational and tactical levels.

Main Point I: The theoretical concept of dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK) provides the basis for its application in the form of information operations (IO) or information warfare (IW).
a. Know what these concepts mean.
b. Know what C4ISR systems and precision force weapons are required to achieve DBK, conduct IO and IW, and accomplish the JV 2010 objectives of information superiority and full-dimensional protection.
c. Explain how C4I For The Warrior will aid in achieving DBK.

Main Point II: The current doctrinal controversies and confusion in this area are rooted in the varying Service perspectives on IO and IW.
a. The Army emphasizes information operations, while the Air Force and Navy focus more heavily on information warfare.
b. The JCS categorizes IW into offensive IW and defensive IW and tends to stress the deterrence aspects associated with information warfare.

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE:
Though information permeates every military activity, the lessons most closely tied to this one are AC 505, Space in Campaign Planning, and AC 507, Emerging Technology.

LESSON OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department