505.11 Explain how US space forces are organized. (Kelly)

• US Space Command
• Unified, Functional command. CINC has combatant command over SECDEF assigned space forces--all military space forces are controlled by one commander.
• Single authority for coordinating and controlling space forces for space operations.
• While command direction is centralized, operational control of space forces is delegated to the separate space component commanders (Air Force, Army, and Naval Space Commands)
• Provides centralized control of assigned US space forces for more effective and efficient use of resources. However, does not have combatant command over all US space resources (does not have control over payloads of communications satellites, for example).
• US Space represents only one part of four distinct organizations that influence our space forces. (only one part is military)
• National Intelligence Community: provide NCA comprehensive surveillance
• Civil governmental agencies (e.g. Commerce owns the National Oceanic Agency weather satellites)
• Commercial (private industry, mostly communications, although some provide imagery)
• Result: fragmented space community.
• AF Space Command is the Air Component for USSPACE. It has two numbered airforces: 14^th (Space Operations, including the missile warning centers) and 20^th (ICBM missile launch sites).

505.21 Explain the satellite support planning, coordination, and approval process.

• Key document to support planning is Annex N of the OPLAN/OPORD. (More description follows)
• Due to global nature of satellites and their support to National, Civil, and DoD agencies, management of space capabilities is held at the highest levels.
• Control is based on who manages the information derived from the payload portion of the satellite system as shown by the following Gulf War examples.
• Therefore, CINCSPACE does not control all satellites, even all military satellites. He acts as the focal point, or funnel, for other CINCs’ satellite support requirements. CINCSPACE has combatant command of Department of Defense assigned space assets, however, this does not mean that in all cases operational direction of the bus or payload rests with him or any of the organizations in his chain of command
• Example from Desert Storm communications requirements process is illustrative:

--CENTCOM J-6, in coordination with functional service component counterparts, consolidated, validated, and prioritized all in-theater requests for use of military satellite communications systems. Reviewed by CINC and forwarded Joint Staff for Competing military satellite communications users, federal agencies. Joint Staff racked and stacked submitted requirements to their approval authorities for review and validation through the CJCS to a Joint MILSATCOM Panel. Once requirements were validated, allocated and adjudicated, the panel tasked the appropriate satellite communications system to provide access to communications channels. US Space Command, in conjunction with the systems managers and the joint panel, served as a coordination focal point for assessment of system availability

• Request, validation and tasking process flow looks something like this:

Components® CINC® JCS® USPACE® Satellite controlling agency.

This was the case for Desert Storm and with space forces, as Kelly notes. The US had the advantage in that war, but in our potential enemies in the future will use those lessons learned and not give us the same advantage. Like we learned in the previous experiences, we must further space force employment concepts and capabilities.

Also not in readings directly. Originally thought they are asking for definitions of the three.

• Space Support
• Space Force Enhancement
• Space Force Application

However, it is possible they are hitting at a major point in the Kelly reading: lessons learned from Desert Storm (not addressed directly in other SOBs).

From Kelly: "At the strategic level of war, the military looks to space forces for enhanced surveillance, intelligence, and communications capabilities to define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of power. On the operational level, planners and commanders call upon (application?) space forces to improve upon existing terrestrial capabilities in areas such as warning, current intelligence, surveillance of areas of interest, communications, mapping, charting, and geodesy, and protection from enemy space systems. While on the tactical level, space forces provide real-time and near-real time support to the forces that execute campaigns. Support includes sequencing, positional data, surveillance and warning of enemy locations and activities, current and projected weather information, and both internal and external communications.

Other lessons Kelly brings out:

• The Annex N of the OPLAN details all the Space Support information. In Desert Storm this, the level of detail reflected the relative immaturity of the space mission. Some space force functional areas, such as communications, weather, and intelligence, contained enough detail to be of use. On the other hand, navigation, early warning, and geodesy lacked even basic information. Any good planning found in Annex N can be largely attributed to the fact that there were separate, detailed annexes in some functional areas, such as communications, intelligence, and weather. Nevertheless, even in these areas pre-planning was not totally acceptable.
• Three big lesson for space application

• Planning
• Gen Kutyna identified preplanning for space support as USPACECOM’s number one lesson.
• Result, SPACECOM developed Space Planning Support Teams
• Normalization
• Ensure the people who ultimately use space systems to maximize combat capabilities--airmen, soldiers and sailors--know what space capabilities are available to them, how to get the data, and how to best exploit it. Understanding capabilities of communications, navigation, weather, missile warning systems.
• Result: created FSST teams—Forward Space Support in Theater. Regionally organized and trained to help the theater JFACC understand and acquire space support for air operations, usually in a joint campaign environment. These teams are geared to help integrate available space capabilities and outputs into theater command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) support processes. The goal is synchronized action of space forces designed to help achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. A space support team's aim is to enable conduct of air operations at a tempo that exceeds the enemy's ability to respond in a coordinated fashion..
• Training
• Gulf War demonstrated that the US military was not prepared to use space assets efficiently. A lack of preparedness resulted in many ad hoc relationships created to gain access to force enhancement capabilities from space. One lesson is that peacetime training must simulate, as close as possible, wartime conditions to include the deployment and employment of space forces and of equipment required to take advantage of space. Realistic training is the cornerstone of planning for the use of and the continued normalization of space systems into the force structure. Probably the most important lesson is that well-trained and well-led people win wars. Weapons are important, but they alone are not decisive
• A third initiative: "exercising with space, seeks to close the loop between planning for and normalization of space support

505.31 Describe the functions and capabilities of various types of space assets. (Source is the AFA home page documents listed below). Both civilian and military satellites are used for these functions: navigation, communications, intelligence (imagery and warning) and weather.

Weather:

• National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration/Television Infrared Observation Satellite (NOAA/TIROS) is a Government owned (Commerce), civilian operated satellite system that provides specialized meteorological information to world-wide weather forecasters.
• Geo-stationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES): Government owned (Commerce) satellite system provides supplemental meteorological information to military weather forecasters

• International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT): Consortium of satellite companies that provide mobile communications. Has seventy-seven member-countries. US signatory is Comsat Corp. INMARSAT satellites used by US military forces equipped with briefcase-sized satellite phone terminals to communicate from Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Haiti, and other theaters of operation
• International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) Consortium for a global constellation of communications satellites. Has 134 members and 24 satellites. US signatory to INTELSAT is Comsat Corp. US military use of the system is for routine communications and to distribute the Armed Forces Radio and TV Services network.

• Landsat: US government's civilian remote sensing satellite system. Used in polar orbit; carries a multi-spectral scanner able to operate at a resolution of thirty meters and provide imagery that can be computer enhanced to show deforestation, expanding deserts, crop blight, urban sprawl, and other phenomena. Operated by a private company. Military use includes mapping and planning for tactical operations.
• Satellite Pour L'Observation de la Terre (SPOT) Remote sensing satellite system developed by the French space agency. Owned and operated by commercial firm. Three satellites produce images with resolution as fine as ten meters and can be used for stereoscopic viewing for three-dimensional terrain modeling. DoD is one of the company's largest customers, purchasing the images for mission-planning systems, terrain analysis, mapping, and humanitarian relief missions. The images also can be used in weapon-guidance systems.

• Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP): a polar-orbiting, DoD meteorological satellite system that provides terrestrial, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical data to civilian and military user.

• Global Positioning System (GPS). Navigation aid. Twenty-four satellites used by many organizations to determine a precise location on Earth. Highly precise signal gives location within sixteen meters; the degraded signal is accurate to within 100 meters. GPS is finding wide applications within weapon systems. Growing DoD concern has been the enemy's use of GPS during a future conflict.

• Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). Provides voice, data, digital, and television transmissions between major military terminals and national command authorities. Secure voice and high-data-rate communications, operating in SHF, primarily for high-capacity fixed users.
• Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (Milstar): Survivable, enduring, essential communications for command and control of strategic and tactical forces through all levels of conflict. Near geo-synchronous satellites, provide worldwide coverage between 65 north and 65 south latitude. Worldwide connectivity will be established using satellite-to-satellite "crosslinks" instead of potentially vulnerable intermediate ground stations. Low-data-rate payload on all satellites. Last four to be launched will also include a medium-data-rate payload.
• Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM): Operated by USN, USAF, and the presidential command network. A secure link among the three, providing UHF communications. Satellites carry experimental extremely high frequency (EHF) payloads, plus twenty-three channels for communications with naval forces, nuclear forces, and national command authorities.
• UHF Follow-On (UFO) Satellites: New generation of satellites providing UHF communications to replace FLTSATCOM. Includes an EHF communications payload with enhanced antijam telemetry, command, broadcast, and fleet interconnectivity.

• Defense Support Program (DSP): Infrared detectors aboard these satellites provide early warning of ballistic missile attack. Used in national missile defense (strategic warning) as well as theater ballistic missile defense.
• Spacebased Infrared (SBIR) System. Advanced early-warning satellites to replace DSP. SBIR is the latest early-warning-satellite proposed by USAF.
• Dark and Spooky: An undisclosed number and type of intelligence satellites are operated by the intelligence agencies in cooperation with the military. The satellites, which monitor Earth with radar, optical sensors, and electronic intercept capability, have been treated as closely guarded secrets since the start of the space age. Even the names of satellites like LaCrosse (radar imaging), Keyhole (optical imaging), White Cloud (ocean reconnaissance), and Aquacade (electronic ferret) are secret and cannot be confirmed by the intelligence agencies. However, the move to declassify the space systems has begun, leading in the last year to the release of extensive information about one now-obsolete spy satellite called Corona. The intelligence community also will release selected archival images obtained by older spy satellites for scientific use.

• Support activities across the range of military activities
• MILSTAR: Survivable, enduring, essential communications for C2 of strategic and tactical forces through all levels of conflict
• Navigation and precision targeting (GPS)
• Weather satellites (DMSP, NOAA, GOES)
• Support smooth, orderly transition from peace to war
• Various communications satellites. Includes DSCS, INTELLSAT, INMARSAT.
• Monitor and assess status of US, multinational, neutral, and enemy forces and resources
• Intelligence satellites: Monitor Earth with radar, optical sensors, and electronic intercept capability
• SPOT, LANDSAT, etc.
• Provide for the collection , processing, transmission, and dissemination of data and products
• DSCS:
• Provide warning and attack assessment, and disseminate alert notification
• DSP/SBIRS: infrared theater and strategic missile warning.
• Monitor the execution of selected options
• Provide for the tracking, control, and reporting of reinforcing forces and materiel
• Various communications satellites support GCCS.
• Support reconstitution and resource allocation
• Support transition from hostilities to peace
• Protect systems/networks through C4 defensive measures
• UHF Follow-On (UFO) Satellites:. Includes an EHF communications payload with enhanced anti-jam telemetry, command, broadcast, and fleet interconnectivity

505.33 Summarize the key C4 elements and systems that provided connectivity between the theater and the NCA, CENTCOM, subordinate component elements, and other Coalition forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. (JCS Pub 6-0 Chapt 3)

• Super High Frequency (SHF) Satcom
• Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satcom: relied upon heavily.
• Ground Mobile Force/Defense Satellite Communications System (GMF/DSCS)
• Commercial satellite terminals (SPOT, INMARSAT, INTELLSAT, etc.)
• GPS
• DSP

505.41 Summarize the benefits of space resources in support of a campaign.

• See 505.22 above. I believe Kelly’s comments on space support, enhancement, application answers this too. Checking with ACSC. Check back on web site for a change.

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Final oh by the way comment from Kelly that might be of interest to test takers: he talks about two perspectives on who’s in charge. Joint Doctrine states it’s best to have the JFC/J3 (Director of Ops) as the single integrator AF doctrine states JFACC has the wherewithal to be the single integrator for space support.

The first alternative is the current joint doctrine approach, which assigns the theater commander's Operations Director, J-3, as the central point of contact for space support. This option offers an acceptable way to provide for theater-wide force enhancement but falls short in providing for an integrated space control campaign. In addition, it places tactical employment of space on the theater commander's shoulders. This option, in effect, makes the theater commander his own space component commander, a responsibility that may unnecessarily distract him from a theater focus. The second alternative proposes the JFACC take responsibility for the space campaign and plan the employment of space assets across the theater of operations. This option appears to offer a more complete focus on both theater force enhancement and space control. Already staffed to conduct an air campaign, the JFACC could take advantage of the forward space support in theater teams to plan for and conduct a space campaign. Once given the responsibility for space in theater, the JFACC could efficiently and effectively plan, normalize, and train with space forces. In a sense, this option takes a proactive approach to space versus the more reactive approach of the J3. Whereas, the J3 would be expected to simply trade-off space requests made by the three component commanders--a JFACC might be expected to be considerably more proactive in assuring all three component commanders (himself included) better used and integrated space forces and in denying the enemy use of space forces. Doctrinally, the Air Force is already wedded to space. This makes the JFACC a natural advocate for the integration of space into theater campaign plans.

READINGS:
Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, Chapter III.
Kelly, "Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a Joint Force Commander," (extracted), School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB AL, September 1944.
Various readings from http://www.afa.org/

ADDITIONAL READINGS: http://www.afa.org/

READING RATIONALE:
The various readings from the cited web page provide a basic understanding of US commercial and military space systems. The Kelly thesis discusses the role of space support teams and outlines lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War.

LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: Space support in such areas as communications, navigation, surveillence, and weather is often taken for granted; in fact, many use space capabilities without an appreciation for the complexities and vulnerabilities these essential platforms possess. Campaign planners need an understanding of space force capabilities and vulnerabilities, and must know how to integrate these assets into the warfighter’s overall campaign vision.

Main Point 1: There are a variety of space assets that provide indespensible service during the joint campaign and that may be used to accomplish the mandatory C4 capabilities outlined in Joint Pub 6-0. These services include communications, navigation, meteorological support, warning, and surveillance.

Main Point 2: Services maintain separate commands supporting USSPACECOM. The 14th Air Force is a component of USSPACECOM for space forces, while the 20th Air Force is a component of USSPACECOM for missile forces.

Main Point 3: Space support, force enhancement, force application, and force control generally describe the missions of our space forces. Because these forces significantly contribute to a campaign’s success; planning for their integration and protection is crucial.

1. Whether an adversary is space capable or not, we must protect against our space vulnerabilities.
2. Planners need to understand the capabilities of space assets and the missions they can perform so they know when and how to solicit space support for the various phases of the joint campaign.

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE:
Because space assets are critical for achieving and maintaining the core competency of information superiority, may be included as part of several new technologies, and were first employed to any extent in the Gulf War, this lesson links to AC506 (Information Operations and Information Warfare), AC507 (Emerging Technology), and AC510 (Desert Storm Case Study).