ANSWER: From Joint Pub 3-56.1

The JFC staff should be organized and manned so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force. The JFC staff operates out of the joint operations center (JOC). Under the JFC staff option, the JOC also functions as the JAOC. From the JAOC, the JFC staff plans, monitors, and directs the execution of joint air operations for the JFC. JFC staff manning should include expertise necessary to plan and execute joint air operations. These staff billets and personnel should be identified and trained to be effective in combat operations.

The JFC may assign C2 of joint air operations to a JFACC when the duration and scope of joint air operations exceed the JFC's span of control. Additionally, the JFC may transfer designated mission experts and functional area augmentees from the JFC staff to the JFACC's JAOC to assist in the transition and coordination of joint air operations. Conversely, a transition from JFACC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC determines that joint air operations are no longer of the size and scope to warrant a JFACC. Airspace Control in the Combat Zone."

The JFACC's staff should be organized and manned so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force. This representation will provide the JFACC with the expertise needed to effectively employ the capabilities/forces made available. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. JFACC staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when JFACC staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations. JFACC staffs should include appropriate component representation at all levels.

The JFC may establish and task an organization within the JFC staff to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander (e.g., JFACC). Typically, the JFC organizes a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center to accomplish the broad targeting oversight functions, or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and if required, their subordinate units.

**** The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews targeting information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB must also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.****

• The JTCB may assist the JFC in developing or revising the targeting guidance and/or priorities. The JTCB maintains a macro-level view of the AOR/JOA and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC's campaign plan.

I could find nothing in the readings on Joint Target Steering Board

Phase 1: Operational Environment Research. The product of this phase is primarily the intelligence preparation of the battlespace and gathering an in-depth knowledge of the operational environment. This phase is focused on gaining information about friendly and adversary capabilities and intentions, doctrine, and the environment in which the operations will take place. The goal of this phase is to gain an understanding of the theater of operations, the adversary, and friendly forces available to accomplish the JFC's objectives. Available forces, command relationships (US and multinational), ROE, applicable treaties and agreements, base-use rights, and overflight rights are examples of information in this phase

Phase 2: Objective Determination. The products of this phase are clearly defined and quantifiable objectives that will contribute to the accomplishment of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives.

Joint air objectives and supporting objectives must be identified by listing those objectives at each level (strategic, operational, and tactical). The objectives of each level must support the objectives of the higher level to ensure unity of effort.

Phase 3: Strategy Identification. The product of this phase is a clearly defined joint air strategy statement. The operation or campaign plan communicates the JFC's strategy. The joint air strategy states how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air capabilities/ forces to support the JFC's objectives.

The joint air operations plan is how the JFACC communicates, promulgates, and articulates this strategy.

Phase 4: Center(s) of Gravity (COG) Identification. The product of this phase is the identification of those COGs that could be defeated to satisfy the JFC's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and those friendly (including multinational partners) COGs to defend. Clausewitz describes a COG as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." Joint doctrine defines COGs as "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." COG describes the central feature(s) of power that if defeated may have the most decisive result. Airpower may have the ability to attack centers of gravity throughout the AOR/JOA to engage sets of targets associated with each and engage these targets simultaneously rather than sequentially. It is important to remember that the type of COG and method of attack may vary widely throughout the range of military operations. For example, in a MOOTW environment, the COG could be starvation. In this case, the "target" may be a drop zone that is "engaged" by air dropping pallets of food and supplies to help "attack" the starvation COG. The objectives and strategy must be clearly understood, and the operational environment carefully analyzed, to help the JFC identify COGs. The greatest barrier in selection of a COG lies in not considering all possibilities of the adversary's power and friendly forces. A thorough understanding of the AOR/ JOA and the adversary facilitates identification of the correct COG.

Examples of pertinent questions to consider when deciding how to attack an identified COG include: Will disruption of activity at this target satisfy a military objective? Is air the most appropriate and efficient way to strike this target? Are the expected results commensurate with the military risk? What will be the impact on US public opinion? World opinion? Consistent with LOAC and ROE, can we minimize collateral damage? Do the risks and levels of anticipated collateral damage exceed the military advantage to be gained? The same process for identifying COGs should be applied to friendly for sys from the enemy's perspective. After the JFC defines friendly COGs and deployment and employment plans, the air defense section of the joint air operations plan can be developed. Friendly centers of gravity should normally be defended in-depth.

Phase 5: The Joint Air Operations Plan Development. The product of this phase is the joint air operations plan that details how joint air operations will support the JFC's operation or campaign plan. Based on the JFC's guidance, the JFACC develops the joint air operations plan. The joint air operations plan developed during this process should:

• Integrate the efforts of joint air capabilities/forces in achieving JFC objectives.
• Identify objectives and targets by priority order, describing in what order they should be attacked or dealt with, the desired results, and the weight of effort required to achieve the desired results in support of the JFC's objectives. (Targets prioritized by significance do not necessarily indicate order to be attacked.)
• Account for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive threats.
• Conduct target development/ system analysis to identify those specific targets that should be reattacked to achieve the objectives.
• Indicate the phasing of joint air operations in relation to the JFC's operation or campaign plan phasing and in relation to each other.
• Indicate what capabilities/forces will be required to achieve joint air operations objectives.
• Include a comprehensive sustain-ability assessment for the joint air operations plan.
• Include procedures for allocating, tasking, and exercising command and control of joint air capabilities/forces made available.

Current joint doctrine development efforts address virtually every facet of military organization for warfighting. Joint doctrine covers subjects ranging from our broad fighting philosophy down to such specifics as radar beacon parameters, communications architectures, and bulk petroleum doctrine. The organizations tasked to draft these documents for the joint staff have different arrays of experience and interests. Inevitably, some emerging joint doctrine documents contain some ideas and approaches that serve some specialty or community at the expense of larger needs that the writers are unfamiliar with. The Air Force has concern with cases where proposed doctrine conflicts with the best evidence and sound military practices proven in war, not to stifle original thought, but to ensure that unproved ideas are not registered as our "default" procedures. All readers of this "primer" need to understand these concerns.

ISSUE: What is the best way to plan the theater offensive air effort?

AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE: The most likely way to identify the highest payoff options for attack operations is to use top-down planning.

ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: Commanders at all echelons need more than their organic firepower can provide at times. Fire support maximizes the potential of maneuver forces; it exists to enable our own forces to meet the enemy's maneuver forces with all the advantages possible.

COMPARISON: These are two different views of a common concern. Maneuver commanders may tend to see air attacks as fire support, which is a staff function performed in each headquarters, from battalion to corps. In contrast, targeting is a command function to airmen -- it is the principal way air commanders orient their offensive operations to accomplish assigned objectives. Objectives vary with circumstances, and supporting maneuver forces by attacking targets of their selection will often be a main objective for air operations.

CONCLUSION: The one perspective all component commanders can share is the JFC's view. Coherent and effective air targeting doesn't require bureaucracies or new investment; it just takes clear communications between the JFC and the components, free dialogue among the components, and effective component liaison elements on the JFACC's staff. Targeting boards that constrict the operations of any commander or duplicate the actions of any staff are a burden on the joint force.

ISSUE: The JFACC's ability to integrate air assets to accomplish theater objectives may be limited by other component's direct air support requirements as outlined in joint and service doctrine.

AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE: Unless there's specific JFC guidance to the contrary, joint and service doctrines/agreements give the JFACC control of only part of the total theater air assets available. If the JFACC is Air Force (for example) components will make the following assets available in the absence of additional JFC guidance:

1. Marine sorties for long-range interdiction, long-range reconnaissance and air defense PLUS
2. Naval air in excess of maritime air operations requirements
3. TLAM interdiction missions beyond Army boundaries
4. Army Aviation and ATACMs interdiction missions beyond Army boundaries

ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: The following mission capable assets should be withheld as unavailable (unless the JFC issues guidance to the contrary):

1. Marine air in direct support of MAGTF ground forces
2. Naval air in direct support of maritime operations
3. Army air (with the possible exception of ATACMs)
4. All SOF air operations
5. TLAM missions

ISSUE: Who should have responsibility for integrating the interdiction effort beyond the FSCL?

AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE: The component commanders with forces at risk beyond the FSCL are the JFACC and the Special Operations Component Commander. The JFACC's C3I architecture is uniquely capable of planning and controlling operations in territory occupied by hostile forces. The JFACC is responsible for a number of missions, none of which is geographically bounded. Responsibility for synchronizing theater interdiction assets should be vested in the commander who has the preponderance of attack assets and the C3I capability to conduct these operations; for interdiction it is normally the JFACC.

ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: Longer range weapons such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the ability to see deeper with systems like JSTARS increase the capabilities ground commanders possess to influence the battlefield at greater ranges. Corps Commanders should be responsible for controlling all operations within their areas of operations.

ISSUE: Maximizing the effectiveness of theater air and missile defense assets.

AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE: Air and missile threats have theater range; defeating enemy air and missile threats with limited resources requires theater-level organization, planning, and control. Centralized control of theater air and missile defense provides unity of effort, optimizes weapons systems and target pairing, minimizes possibility of fratricide, and ensures unity of command to prioritize competing demands for limited theater assets. Currently theater air and missile defense operations fall within established AF roles and missions; missile defense is a part of counterair. The existing Theater Air Control System (TACS), in conjunction with dedicated or prioritized communications into theater from strategic systems, provides the baseline capability to support theater air defense operations.

ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: All Services primary functions include air and missile defense (DOD Dir 5100.1) Many in the Army feel that missile active defense is separate from air defense of aircraft and separate from JFACC/AADC control. As a consequence, for missile defense the AADC provides only attack warning, but not fire control. This Army view holds that the planning for and execution of missile defense is different from air defense and is not part of the AADC's counterair operations responsibilities. Army air defenders view their Tactical Operations Center (ADTOC; the THAAD operations center) as the equivalent of the TACC. Consequently they propose to establish a stand alone air defense architecture for missile defense and alter the existing Army/AF relationship for missile defense (i.e., Army responsible for point defense/AF responsible for area defense).

When designated as a JFACC, the AFCC employs the theater air control system (TACS) to plan, direct, and control theater air operations. The TACS consists of both ground and airborne elements. The TACS can also be adopted for use by allied air forces. The TACS has the C4I necessary to plan, direct, coordinate, and control all air operations, including air defense and airspace control. The size and structure of the TACS is tailored to meet theater-specific needs determined by the JFACC. The structure of the TACS should reflect sensor coverage, component liaison elements, and the communications required to provide adequate support. The TACS consists of the Air Operations Center and subordinate air and ground control elements. In combined commands, the name and function of certain TACS elements may differ, but combined air component C4I systems have similar functions.

JAOC. The JAOC is the JFACC's air campaign planning and execution center. The AOC is responsible for centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of air operations. The JAOC monitors execution of air operations and directs changes as the situation dictates. As the focal point of the TACS, the JAOC must have secure and redundant communications with operations, logistics, weather, and intelligence centers, higher and lateral headquarters, as well as subordinate units to preclude degradation in its ability to control air forces.

Other Centers and Liaison Elements. Other centers and elements within the AOC provide coordination and interface for specialized functions, such as special operations and rescue. Liaison elements provide senior level interface for supported land, maritime, and special operation forces. Appropriate liaison elements are established within the JFACC's staff to coordinate efforts of theater air assets. These liaison elements should have adequate communications with their respective component commands to support informed decisions regarding the use and sustainability of their force's assets.

National Assets. While not assigned to combatant commands or the TACS, certain air and space forces controlled at the national level may be tasked to support the JFC. When these national assets are tasked to support the JFC, appropriate liaison cells are established at the JAOC to ensure effective employment. National assets include space systems which provide surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, environmental, navigation, and communications support for planning and executing the theater campaign plan and the daily ATO.

Subordinate Control Elements. Normally, the JFACC delegates some day-to-day planning, direction, and control authority to subordinate control elements. Subordinate control elements operate at the execution level, conducting detailed planning to carry out the missions assigned by the JAOC. Subordinate elements further delegate authority to appropriate levels. Subordinate elements are both airborne and ground-based to provide overlapping and extended coverage, as well as redundancy.

Airborne Elements. Airborne elements of the TACS provide a highly responsive, flexible, and survivable system to support the execution and coordination of theater air operations. They may be employed autonomously during the early stages of theater contingencies and conflict and/or in concert with multinational and joint service command and control systems. As demonstrated during Desert Storm, airborne elements of the TACS can rapidly react to changing situations by adjusting sensor and communications coverage to support ATO execution. Airborne elements rely on onboard systems as well as direct connectivity with off-board intelligence collectors (such as RC-135 Rivet Joint) to accurately assess the combat arena and adjust force execution. The JFACC augments the airborne battlestaff with direct representation having the authority to modify the ATO.

Ground Elements. Ground-based elements of the TACS, subordinate to the JAOC, provide similar capabilities as airborne elements, but with reduced range, flexibility, and mobility. However, ground-based elements do not depend on high value-assets for continuous operations. Additionally, they offer an important interface between the TACS and ground-based air defense activities. Ground TACS responsibilities are often delegated to the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) and Air Support Operations Center (ASOC).

***Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP). TACPs are subordinate to the ASOC and are the single points of direct Air Force interaction with supported ground combat maneuver units. Each combat maneuver battalion, brigade, division, and corps headquarters will have an aligned TACP. Combat aviation (attack only) brigades will also have an aligned TACP. TACPs are made up of ALOs and Tactical Air Command and Control Specialists/Technicians (TACCS). They conduct liaison and control functions appropriate to the level of combat maneuver force supported. ALOs, Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETAC), TACCS and airborne Forward Air Controllers (FAC) are the only authorized personnel who can perform terminal control of air support attack aircraft during operations (combat and peacetime) in support of their ground combat units.

I chose this answer after talking with Maj Carlson, AC 503 POC at AU. He could not give me a direct reference for either question under 503.5. He says Whitlow speaks to the issues somewhat so here's my best guess.

The methods of addressing a corps-level commander's need for interdiction in his area of operations (AO) are not very clear. Marines talk of MAGTF and a need for direct support sorties which are primarily CAS and interdiction missions flown within the MAGTF AO. The term direct support sorties has been coined basically to frame the argument about "who's in charge" of their tasking and control. Direct support sorties apply to both CAS and interdiction missions within the Marine AO.

The Navy's need to conduct air operations at sea has long been accepted. But as a result this need has been widely ignored in joint air operations, and interest is usually expressed in terms of how much they can contribute to the joint effort. The notion that the Navy also has a need for interdiction sorties, and that the sea and the littoral may be an area of operations for a naval component commander, has not generally been a joint consideration. This has been true except for operations within an Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), a recognized amphibious concept.

A corps commander has no direct way of obtaining a level of interdiction support by fixed wing aircraft in an AO. Instead targets must be nominated to a JFACC or JFC staff, then compete for priority with theater-level targets. Perhaps this explains the Army's great helicopter capabilities and Army Attack Missile Systems (ATACMS). At least the Army has some control over these capabilities.

Notwithstanding control, something is missing from the realm of joint warfighting. Each of the preceding descriptions was about battlefield air interdiction (BAI), but the concept does not exist in joint doctrine. The term does not appear in the joint lexicon. In order to add clarity to the joint air tasking process, we must promote the concept of battlefield air interdiction and adopt the term. JFCs need it to properly influence the battle.

Target Prioritization. And what is target prioritization? I do not believe that it means a JFC will prioritize targets in a subordinate commander's AO. However, if it implies that BAI targets must always compete with theater targets for attention, BAI will usually come up short. This will likely remain true until such time as the ground war goes to hell in a handbasket, or the importance of mission success in that AOs take on theater-level significance. While this may be an exaggeration, my point is that we have a clumsy system in place that prioritizes aviation-related targets only at JFC-level. We need a true purple system that prioritizes theater-level targets for theater commanders, allows BAI-level targets to be prioritized by commanders who are in charge of their associated AOs, and apportions by prioritizing under three interdiction categories: theater air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, and offensive counter air.

The future is one in which the joint air C4I system is real time and completely interactive, not single host; component air C4I systems are the same or fully interoperable; controlled input is made to ATO from off site and various sources; all services adopt air tasking methodologies that are similar to the joint system; and every air capable component may host a JFACC or alternately interact efficiently with a JFACC on a real time basis.

A notional scenario under such a system might see the Navy arriving first on the scene of a crisis, conducting initial air operations using an ATO and tasking system compatible with the joint air C4I system. The ATO is initially written on a carrier and then on a command ship as the Naval Expeditionary Force expands. As units arrive in theater and are brought to bear, the ATO address list grows to include them. At some point a JFC is named and an officer from within the naval component is designated JFACC. Then the marines kick in the door and come ashore. The land AOR starts to expand. A Marine air command and control system is created and works well with a JFACC afloat. Direct support sorties for the Marines are written into the ATO from forces ashore, yet they are deconflicted and supported with tankers by a JFACC afloat. This could all appear on a single ATO, or applicable sections might be selected.

In another phase a JFC and his staff come ashore to coordinate with the American embassy and host nation. A decision is made to designate the Marine ACE commander as JFACC because of his proximity to a JFC. JFACC cadre (from the standing theater JFACC come ashore. JFACC responsibilities shift to Marine Allied Command, Europe (ACE)-which is not a big deal since the ATO and joint air operations continue. Naval force direct support sorties now are written into the ATO from afloat and deconflicted ashore. Liaison officers are added to the JFACC staff as new capabilities and units arrive in theater.

The theater then expands as the Marines move out. Army forces are present in theater and operational. Boundaries are drawn and separate AOs for land forces unfold. The Air Force AOC stands up. Marine expeditionary airfields become operational and ACE relocates with the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander. A decision is made to transfer JFACC responsibilities to the Air Force component commander. Again, there is no-big deal, the ATO and joint air operations continue. The big guns are there and each component focuses on its AO. The test is that through all this time B-52s operating from Guam received the ATO and struck the correct targets for a JFC, oblivious to where JFACC responsibility rested in any given phase. Each component contributed to the joint air effort while fighting the war in its respective AOR according to its own organization, training, and equipment.

Joint Pub 3-56.1, Chapters 3 and 4, Appendix C

Whitlow, "JFACC: Who's in Charge?"

Shugg, Planning Airpower Strategies

HQ USAF/XOOC (Checkmate), "Air Campaign Planning Process"

"Theater Air-Ground Systems: Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Combat Forces"

Fischer, Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations

Reimer-Fogleman, "Joint Warfare and the Army - Air Force Team" - also in coursebook

The JFACC Primer examines JFACC selection and responsibilities and provides a synopsis of the airman's perspective on various doctrinal issues. Joint Pub 3-56.1 outlines the responsibilities of the JFACC, the five phases in the joint air operations planning process, targeting responsibilities, and the joint ATO tasking cycle. It also provides a description of a Joint Air Operations Center. Whitlow examines four areas where progress in the use of a JFACC needs to be made (apportionment, targeting, concept of a purple JFACC, and a future vision) as well as addressing issues such as battlefield air interdiction, target prioritization, and target validation. AFDD 2 outlines the functions of the TACS in detail, addresses how this system is a tool for the JFACC, and discusses phasing and target prioritization from an Air Force doctrinal perspective. The Shugg reading examines the attributes of an effective airpower strategy and uses them as the basis for a notional air component commander's campaign planning organization. The Checkmate reading covers the process Checkmate uses to design and develop an air campaign. This process uses the strategy-to-tasks methodology and includes an examination of existing national strategy, an analysis of the enemy's proposed course of action, identification of COGs, and development of strategy. "Theater Air-Ground Systems" describes the functions and activities of the Air Operations Center and the Tactical Air Control System. This includes how the TACS links with Army, Navy, and Marine air control systems. Fischer proposes a change in the way air missions are tasked to allow subordinate units greater flexibility to conduct decentralized air operations planning. Finally the Reimer-Fogleman article addresses issues critical to the joint Army - Air Force team. View 503dl.doc for the script to accompany the powerpoint slides.

Thesis: The purpose of our continually evolving organizational framework for joint air operations is to maximize the impact of all air assets to achieving our national objectives. Maximizing airpower's impact calls for a delicate balance of centralized control (to bring the full force of airpower to bear where it will contribute the most) and decentralized execution (to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and/or respond to rapidly changing events). Experience has shown that three steps are necessary to make this happen: 1) airpower strategy and objectives must be integrated within the context of the overall theater campaign strategy; 2) this strategy must be translated into a theater-wide plan (MAAP/ATO) defining how joint airpower operations will be conducted to accomplish these objectives; and 3) the plan must be executed in a flexible and responsive way to exploit rapidly changing battlefield situations. Carrying out these three functions is the responsibility of the TACS.

Main Point I: Creating an airpower strategy.

• JFC responsibilities.
• JFACC responsibilities.
• AOC structure.
• Problems/shortcomings of current system.

Main Point II: Translating strategy into an executable plan.

• JTSG/JTCB responsibilities.
• MAAP production.
• ATO production.
• Interservice coordination issues.
• FSCL.
• Special Operations

Main Point III: Flexible execution.

• TACS structure.
• AOC Combat Operations.
• Options for further decentralization.

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE: This lesson describes how all Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps airpower and/or air defense units described in Operational Structures (OS) are tied together into a joint air campaign. It follows up on the Joint Operations (JO) campaign planning lessons concerning strategy development and execution. Specific linkages are made between this lesson and AC 502, Southwest Pacific Campaign case study and AC504, Targeting for Effect and Combat Assessment.

LESSON OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department