Joe Orsulak, Baltimore
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 486 135 22 1 5 28 4 3 .278 .321 .358
Protected 276 79 14 1 2 11 3 2 .286 .318 .366
Unprotected 210 56 8 0 3 17 1 1 .267 .323 .348
Orsulak's usual spot was second, in front of Ripken, but he also came off the bench frequently, batting in random lineup spots, and spent one stretch in the cleanup spot in front of Milligan and Evans.
I suppose you could say that Orsulak had classic splits; he hit for a higher average when protected, with fewer walks giving him a lower OBP. But the splits are tiny, the smallest in the study; they would match if two singles were moved to the "Unprotected" line.
Gary Pettis, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 282 61 7 5 0 54 0 1 .216 .341 .277
Protected 122 21 3 2 0 16 0 0 .172 .268 .230
Unprotected 160 40 4 1 0 38 0 1 .250 .392 .313
When Pettis was in the starting lineup, he usually batted leadoff or ninth. In both spots, he was often in front of Franco, and occasionally Palmeiro; at other times, he was ninth in front of Downing, or leadoff in front of mediocre hitters. He also came off the bench, usually as a pinch-runner or defensive replacement for outfielders rather than as a pinch-hitter; this put him all over the lineup.
The small sample size means that these large splits are less significant than they appear to be. Even the large walk split is under two standard deviations. It's also probably not real; walks are not listed directly in the boxscore, which forced me to guess which one of two players walked when a lineup spot had four AB in five plate appearances. For most playes, this wasn't a serious problem, but Pettis had a lot of games in which he went 0-for-0 after entering as a defensive replacement or pinch-runner. I assumed that he didn't walk in these games, but probably got some wrong.
Likewise with the apparently large splits elsewhere; moving four singles and one double to "Protected" will balance the batting and slugging averages. Pettis's splits are of interest because they contribute to the overall totals.
Tony Phillips, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 564 160 28 4 17 79 3 6 .284 .371 .438
Protected 322 86 13 2 5 41 1 3 .267 .349 .366
Unprotected 242 74 15 2 12 38 2 3 .306 .401 .533
The protection situation is reasonably clear here, and there is a large sample of data. Phillips usually batted leadoff, with Whitaker slugging .489 and batting second. When Whitaker was out of the lineup or batted elsewhere, the second hitter was Moseby, Barnes, Trammell, or Fryman, none of them as good as Whitaker. Phillips also spent some time in the second spot in front of Trammell. For all that Trammell and Whitaker have been connected, Trammell had fallen to a .373 SLG that year.
Phillips lost so much power when protected that he had the only split of more than two standard deviations in slugging average in the whole study. If this were all the data available, it would be statistically significant evidence that protection hurts a batter, but given that twenty players were studied, you would expect to find one split this large if there were no effect. To match the lines requires moving 23 total bases; that is, you would have to move six homers to the "Protected" line and take back one single. This is much more than for any other player in the study.
Actually, there's a reason which has nothing to do with protection for part of the split. Most of the games Whitaker didn't start were against left-handed pitchers. Phillips, although a switch-hitter, has a large platoon split, but not this large.
Luis Polonia, California
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 604 179 28 9 2 52 1 3 .296 .352 .379
Protected 205 56 7 3 1 10 0 1 .273 .320 .351
Unprotected 399 123 21 5 1 42 1 2 .308 .374 .393
Another player with clear protection and a lot of data. Polonia was the Angels' leadoff hitter. Wally Joyner usually batted third, with Schofield, Hill, Sojo, or Felix second, but Joyner also spent a lot of time in the second spot, behind Polonia.
Polonia walked less when protected, and this split would actually be statistically significant in isolation. However, he declined in other areas as well. To make the batting and slugging averages match, you would need to move five singles and a double to the "Protected" line.
Carlos Quintana, Boston
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 478 141 21 1 11 61 2 3 .295 .375 .412
Protected 198 53 8 0 8 28 1 1 .268 .360 .429
Unprotected 280 99 13 1 3 33 1 2 .314 .389 .400
Another classic protection situation. When Quintana batted third, he was protected by Jack Clark; when he didn't bat third, he usually batted seventh in front of Pena, or sixth in front of assorted hitters. He also came off the bench a lot, which put him in random lineup spots.
In any study, you will find some weird splits by chance, and that's what happened here. Quintana hit for a higher average when he wasn't protected, but he lost most of his power. His OPS didn't change at all. Since we are primarily interested in SLG, he is considered a player who improved when protected.
The lines have to change a lot to balance; move nine singles to "Protected", and two homers and two doubles to "Unprotected".
Kevin Reimer, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 394 106 22 0 20 33 7 6 .269 .332 .477
Protected 218 63 13 0 7 22 6 3 .283 .365 .445
Unprotected 176 43 9 0 13 11 1 3 .244 .288 .517
A natural protection situation. Reimer often batted fifth or sixth in front of Juan Gonzalez, but he also batted sixth behind Gonzalez, with a weak hitter (often Buechele, but several weaker hitters as well) batting seventh. Reimer also pinch-hit a lot, which put him in random spots near the bottom of the lineup.
Yes, the lines above are in the correct order; Reimer hit for more power when he didn't have Gonzalez on deck, but drew more walks when Gonzalez was in position to drive him in. Although his OPS was higher when he was protected, we are primarily interested in SLG, and will consider him as a player who hit better when unprotected.
The near-even split of protected and unprotected AB makes his data moderately reliable despite the small sample size. But as with Quintana, the weird splits mean that more change is needed to balance the lines than would be suggested by the difference. We need to move four homers to "Protected", and seven singles and a double back, to switch seven total bases while balancing the batting average.
Harold Reynolds, Seattle
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 631 160 34 6 3 72 5 6 .253 .331 .340
Protected 377 106 17 3 2 42 1 1 .281 .353 .358
Unprotected 254 54 17 3 1 30 4 5 .213 .300 .314
The existence of protection is clear here, and Reynolds gives a large sample both ways. When Reynolds batted second, Ken Griffey Jr. was almost always on deck. When he batted leadoff, the #2 hitter was usually Briley or Cotto, and only rarely Martinez.
Reynolds hit for a much higher average when protected; this is the most significant batting-average split, although it's just under two standard deviations. But the net gain isn't that great, because he lost a bit of power. To get a good match, you would have to move 14 singles to the "Unprotected" line, and four doubles back.
Luis Rivera, Boston
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 414 107 22 3 8 35 3 4 .258 .318 .384
Protected 255 59 11 3 3 19 3 1 .231 .291 .333
Unprotected 159 48 11 0 5 16 0 3 .302 .360 .465
Rivera was protected in an unconventional way. He usually batted ninth, with Wade Boggs batting leadoff. When Boggs batted third, Steve Lyons and Jody Reed, neither one close to Boggs's ability, batted leadoff behind Rivera. Rivera also had a few games in which he batted elsewhere near the bottom of the lineup, in front of miscellaneous mediocre hitters.
Rivera hit much better when he didn't have Boggs on deck; he hit like a shortstop when he was protected, and like a high-average power hitter when he was. The splits aren't statistically significant in isolation, but they are fairly strong. To match the lines, you would need to move five singles and two homers to the "Protected" line.
Ruben Sierra, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 661 203 44 5 25 56 0 9 .307 .357 .502
Protected 513 149 29 4 20 45 0 6 .290 .350 .480
Unprotected 148 54 15 1 5 11 0 3 .365 .401 .581
Texas had several excellent hitters to bat behind Sierra. Sierra usually batted cleanup in front of Julio Franco, but also often hit third in front of Rafael Palmeiro or Juan Gonzalez, both certainly capable of protecting him as well as Franco did. The "Unprotected" games were almost all in front of Kevin Reimer, who had a slugging average as high as Franco and Gonzalez had, but didn't have a reputation as a great hitter.
Sierra hit much better when he wasn't protected, with three brief hot streaks coinciding with periods in which Reimer batted behind him. Six singles and three doubles would have to be moved to "Protected" to cover the difference.
Dale Sveum, Milwaukee
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 266 64 19 1 4 32 1 4 .241 .320 .365
Protected 125 25 11 1 0 17 0 2 .200 .292 .304
Unprotected 141 39 8 0 4 15 1 2 .277 .346 .418
As with Rivera, this isn't what you normally think of as protection, but the effect should be the same. Sveum batted ninth half the time, with leadoff hitter Paul Molitor on deck. Otherwise, he usually batted eighth, with Spiers on deck.
It's only a small sample, but it shows the reverse of the expected effects of protection. Sveum hit for a much higher average with decent power and fewer walks when Molitor wasn't on deck to drive him in. To balance the lines, you would need to move four singles and a homer to the "Protected" line.
Robin Ventura, Chicago
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 606 172 25 1 23 80 4 7 .284 .367 .442
Protected 505 145 22 1 22 63 3 6 .287 .366 .465
Unprotected 101 27 3 0 1 17 1 1 .267 .375 .327
He barely made the study, but it's a classic case of protection, and he had the biggest gains when protected of anyone in the study. Ventura usually batted third in front of Frank Thomas. When Thomas wasn't batting cleanup, Fisk batted there, and didn't hit well; Ventura also spend a short stretch batting fifth or sixth in front of Sosa.
Ventura had strong, classic splits; he had no power at all when Thomas wasn't on deck. To balance the lines, you would need to move three homers and two doubles to "Unprotected", and two singles back. It's not likely that such a large split would happen by chance, but it is possible; the slugging average split still isn't statistically significant, and power hitters can spend one month without hitting any homers.
Now, we have twenty-five hitters, of varying quality, style, and protection situations. Some hit better when protected, while some hit worse. Only one individual split in slugging average, none in batting average, and three in walks are more than two standard deviations from even, which is about what you would expect if there were no effect, or if the individual effects were too small to measure. In all, the players had 7407 AB protected, 5092 not protected, and 4032 taking the smaller subset for each player, which is enough to make totals meaningful; the standard deviation of batting average in 5092 AB is only .006.
Let's add together the differences, to see what would have to be changed for the players to have matching splits in batting and slugging averages. A plus sign below means that the extra hit would have to be moved to the "Unprotected" totals to get a balance, because the player hit better when protected.
1B 2B 3B HR H TB Alomar +4 +1 0 +1 +6 +10 Anderson +6 -2 0 0 +4 +2 Baerga 0 -1 -1 -1 -3 -9 Brett -3 0 -2 0 -5 -9 Canseco 0 0 +1 0 +1 +3 Cuyler -1 0 -2 0 -3 -7 Davis +6 -4 0 -2 0 -10 Downing -5 -1 0 -1 -7 -11 Fielder -2 +1 0 +2 +1 +8 Franco +8 0 +1 0 +9 +11 Gruber +2 -1 0 -2 -1 -8 Harper 0 0 +1 -4 -3 -13 Henderson -7 +3 0 +3 -1 +11 Joyner +7 0 0 -1 +6 +3 Orsulak +2 0 0 0 +2 +2 Pettis -4 -1 0 0 -5 -6 Phillips +1 0 0 -6 -5 -23 Polonia -5 -2 0 0 -7 -9 Quintana +9 -2 0 -2 +5 -3 Reimer +7 +1 0 -4 +4 -7 Reynolds +14 -4 0 0 +10 +6 Rivera -5 0 0 -2 -7 -13 Sierra -6 -3 0 0 -9 -12 Sveum -4 0 0 -1 -5 -8 Ventura -2 +2 0 +3 +3 +14 TOTALS +22 -13 -2 -17 -10 -78
The players hit slightly better when *not* protected. In 5092 protected AB, the difference would be two points of batting average and fifteen points of slugging average, and in 7407 unprotected AB, it would be one point of batting average and ten points of slugging average. The overall difference is thus three points of BA and 26 points of SLG (not 25 because of rounding)
In baseball terms, that's a small split, with little effect on the players' value. But in statistical terms, it's actually fairly large because of the huge sample; 12499 AB is almost one-sixth of all the AB in the AL that year. I estimate the standard deviation of the difference in SLG to be .015. Thus the .026 isn't statistically significant evidence that protection hurts hitters, or even that it doesn't help, but it is statistically significant evidence that protection doesn't help SLG by more than .004.
There also wasn't any consistency to the players who were helped or hurt by protection, which suggests that there isn't an ability which helps some subset of the players. Phillips and Ventura had almost identical batting records, but they had the most extreme splits in opposite directions. Reynolds and Cuyler were similar players with opposite splits. Reimer and Sierra hit worse when protected, while Fielder and Henderson hit better. Three of the ten undisciplined hitters (less than one walk per 10 AB) hit better when protected, while seven hit worse.
The evidence thus suggests that protection doesn't matter at the major-league level; it doesn't help to bat in front of a big-name hitter.