A sporting event provides a good context for illustrating how people can view a particular event but come up with different or similar interpretations. Many times fans from opposing teams will disagree about an official's judgement about a play on the field. Both participants see the same event but interpret it differently. For example, one fan will comment how the official missed a call ("a foul") while another fan will say no foul occurred. The same process occurs when dealing with social perceptions. People can view the same event but have different interpretations

    According to Zebrowitz (1990), there are three general theoretical approaches used when studying social perception. The three types are structural, constructivist and ecological theories. She states "the basic assumption in [the structural] approach is that perceptions are derive from elementary sensations ... [they are] data-driven. It is built up from individual sensory elements, each of which bears some relation to the object" (Zebrowitz 1990:4) Constructivists, on the other hand, do not believe people enter a situation open-minded but with pre-conceived notions. "[Constructivists believe] perceptions are 'holistic' and 'theory-driven'" (Zebrowitz 1990:4). They emphasizes subjective perceptions - the object or person as perceived by an individual - rather than an objective analysis of the stimulus. Constructivists believe people see what they want to see. They maintain people have pre-conceived notions about the world around them and these notions help in the comprehension of incongruent/unknown information.

    The last theoretical approach, the ecological approach, incorporates ideas from both the structuralists' and constructivists' camps. Like structuralists, ecologists believe perceptions are shaped by the stimulus and are not constructions of the mind. But like constructivists, they also believe stimulus information can not be reduced to individual sensory elements but are holistic structures. Ecologists assume the information in the stimulus is itself structured rather than composed of individual elements; and that this structure is detected by the perceiver rather than being created by the perceiver (Zebrowitz 1990:5-6). Ecologists, unlike constructivists, assert perceivers "differ in the reality they detect not the reality they create" (Zebrowitz 1990:5). This last statement is the key to the ecological model. Using Figure 1 or 2, an ecologist would claim multiple "realities" can exist. A vase and two faces or the young and old woman are both present. It is up to the perceiver to detect which reality (woman) they see. Just because someone sees a young woman does not dictate that is the true reality. To that particular person, the young woman is reality. To another person, reality might involve seeing the old woman. Neither perceiver is wrong. They are perceiving what the stimulus and their cognitive processes enable them to see. The ecological model contends that the actual stimulus plus internal cognitive processes can cause perceivers to observe the same event but detect two different objects or realities.

    The author further points out that "it is likely that there is a congruent relationship between the structure of the mind and the structure of the environment" when dealing with perceptions (Zebrowitz 1990:6). This congruent relationship indicates that both the environment (the object) and the person (the subject) influence perceptions. She also claims that much of the research on social perception has dealt with processing rather than the content of the perception (Zebrowitz 1990:9). Processing involves cognitive mechanisms while content refers to the object. The ecological model provides a good frame for addressing perception formation by taking into account both the individual (the process) as well as environmental factors (the content). Perceptions are influenced by the object/stimulus as well as the perceiver's schema or cognitive processes.

    The term, ecology, has a different meaning in psychology than in sociology. In sociology, ecology is the study of the interrelationship between humans and institutions/the environment. While both disciplines are concerned with the way the environment/outside factors influence people, psychology's ecological model does not attempt to explain why people detect different things. They use the term "affordance," which is the quality an object has and gives off so people can detect it. But if affordance is inherent within the object, everyone should be able to notice it. As Figures 1 & 2 show, not everyone can detect the affordances. Recently, psychology's ecologists have recognized they have not accounted for social factors such as language and culture which might influence detection and, in turn, perceptions (Ginsburg 1990; Valenti and Good 1991; Michaels and Beek 1995). These social factors are where sociological models can improve the explanatory power of the ecological model.

    Two authors contribute additional insight into the formations of perceptions when used in conjunction with the ecological model. Gordon Allport, a social psychologist, researched cognitive processes while Alfred Schutz, a sociologist, explained the social nature (environment) of perceptions. Insights made by Schutz and Allport provide further information on detection processes and their influence on perceptions. Both Allport and Schutz argued that categorization (or generalizations) are very important in how one views the world (perceptions).

    Allport (1954) contended it was a natural human tendency to overgeneralize or categorize. He outlined several factors that explain why people categorize their worlds. First, people form large classes and clusters for guiding daily adjustment. This is done because the world is too complex and one cannot treat every event independently on its own merit. Hypothetically, one could spend all day with one event, trying to place it into its correct situation. Humans do not have the time to differentiate that narrowly. He states that one commonly "'types' a single event, places it within a familiar rubric, and acts accordingly" (Allport 1954:20). Putting an object into a category helps people interpret more efficiently the hundreds of things they see, hear, and feel everyday. Second, categorization assimilates as much as it can into the cluster. By this, Allport means a person wants to make life as simple as possible. The observer clumps together like objects, ignoring differences and focusing on the similarities because it is much easier to deal with a few things than with many things. He also states "we can do best if we can fit them [problems, objects, people] rapidly into a satisfactory category and use this category as a means of prejudging the solution" (Allport 1954:20). Third, a category enables one to quickly identify a related object. He remarked:
 

every event has certain marks that serve as a cue to bring the category of prejudgement into action ... thus categories have a close and immediate tie with what we see, how we judge, and what we do. In fact, their whole purpose seems to be to facilitate perception and conduct - in other words, to make our adjustment to life speedy, smooth, and consistent ... a person with dark brown skin will activate whatever concept of Negro is dominant in our mind (Allport 1954:21).

    Fourth, a category saturates all that it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavor. The category carries a "feeling tone of favor or disfavor" and does not operate in a vacuum. For example, the word Negro or black is a category that conjures certain feelings for that particular perceiver. It might be a good or bad feeling depending on the environment as well as the perceiver. This means that how one views a situation is dependant on the participant and the situation. A good example is how a white woman walking alone might view a young black male on a sidewalk coming towards her. The characteristics of the perceiver (is the woman fearful or confident), the situation (are there others on the sidewalk, is it daytime or nighttime) and the stimulus (is the young man dressed in a shirt and tie or wearing gang paraphernalia) will influence how she will perceive and react to the black male.

    The last quality necessary for categorization that Allport identified is categories may be more or less rational. People believe their categories are right and that they have created them in logical ways. Categories do or do not have to be confirmed through evidence or experience. Even when presented with contradictory evidence, a person may find it costs them more to reject or modify their previous category than to maintain them. He called this process "discounting." For example, a white person might state that all black people are athletic. When confronted with a black person who is not athletic, he will "discount" that particular person and explain why that person was an exception to the rule. Allport's five steps illustrate the processes people use to categorize objects and/or people. These steps are important because it illustrates how people deal with new occurrences.

    Another important contribution made by Allport is his concept of in-groups and out-groups. An in-group is composed of people who self-identify as well as are identified by others to belong to a particular subset. He said "members of an in-group all use the term we with the same essential significance" (Allport 1954:31). A boundary is created that excludes non-members and there are certain characteristics each member must possess. The characteristics can be something specific such as skin color, gender or clothing, or as vague as possessing a certain personality or style. In-groups can be fluid or very rigid. Allport hypothesized that one could not have an in-group without an out-group. How would one know they were an in-group member unless s/he could tell who was not one? In-groups are important because members gain a lot of information and knowledge from other in-group members. The most common in-group is the family.

    In-groups and out-groups represent categories. For example, a person can be Catholic, black and an American. All three of these terms fit the definition of a category as described by Allport. The terms provide a sense of grouping (a cluster) which is easily identifiable as a term (a cue) and releases particular feelings. When people hear these terms, they form perceptions of what that person should be like and how they will react to that person if they should meet them. The importance of in and out-groups will be addressed later when discussing Schutz's we/they relations.

    Allport's definition of categories adds more to the understanding of the ecological model by expressing how and why people categorize. These categorizes then determine what a person detects and interprets. People are able to detect particular objects or qualities because they resemble previously categorized items. But one is still left with the question of how one determines what is detectable. The next theorist ties it all together.

    Alfred Schutz (co-authored with Thomas Luckmann) was a phenomenologist who tried to understand the consciousness of everyday life. His main ideas revolved around two main concepts, "stocks of knowledge" and "typification." He examined how they interacted with and reinforced each other. Schutz argued that stocks of knowledge, which are the sedimentation of past experiences, are important in interpreting new or irregular events (Schutz and Luckmann 1973). Stocks of knowledge are used when "persons interpret their situation by using a stock of symbols, such as the words in their language, and other cultural knowledge" to make sense of the world around them (Collins 1988:275). This knowledge is socially based and is assumed to be obvious to everyone. The knowledge is important because it determines the social reality one detects and how one interprets events based on that detection. The stocks of knowledge contain not only an individual's past experiences but the experiences of others as well.
 

In both cases the experience of a contemporary is based either on my own past experiences, both my immediate as well as my mediate experiences of Others, or on the transmitted remarks of an Other concerning a third. It is obvious that all knowledge thus transmitted refers back to an original direct experience of fellow-men and is based on this. But I can also acquire knowledge of contemporaries in another way. My experiences of things and events in the life-world, of tools and artifacts in the broadest sense, contains references to the social world - to the world of my contemporaries and my forefathers. I can always interpret them as proofs of the conscious life of other beings "like me," as signs, marks, results of acts. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:74-75)

    These stocks of knowledge help determine which occurrences become classified or not classified as taken-for-granted experiences (Schutz and Luckmann 1973). Taken-for-granted experiences are a key component in social perception according to Schutz. Once a person or object resembles a taken-for-granted category, the situation is no longer problematic. The perceiver will react in routine ways according to definitions applied by their stocks of knowledge. These taken-for-granted experiences make life easy because one interprets events according to past experiences or categorization.
 

I am governed by the pragmatic motive. My stock of experience serves me for the solution to practical problems. In theoretical thinking, I can make doubt a methodological principle. In the world of everyday life, I am interested, in contrast, in being able to orient myself in my action in routine ways. The explications sedimented in my stock of knowledge have the status of actional directions: if things are thus and so, then I will act thus and so. Because of the successful employment of these directions, I do not need at every moment to go to new solutions of problems, horizonal explications, and the like, but rather I can act as I have already acted 'in such circumstances.' Thus, while the directions may therefore be opaque throughout their 'theoretical' horizons, they appear to me in 'practical' situations as obviously applicable. Their continuous 'practical' success guarantees their reliability for me, and they become habitualized as recipes. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:14-15).

But how do people obtain stocks of knowledge? As Schutz emphasized, people are born into a social structure and they accumulate it. Children accumulate stocks of knowledge primarily through language. Because language is contained within a particular culture and history, the stocks have been passed along from generation to generation and are no longer questioned. As he explained:
 

Language determines what is usually differentiated in the subjective experience of a typical member of society, and which potential differences are disregarded ... in short, the meaning-structures of the everyday life-world, of the "world of nature" as well as of "society," are indicated and expresses in language ... Language can then provide knowledge about realities which not only transcend the current experience of the individual, but also are practically, if not also in principle, inaccessible to him. Language thus provides knowledge that has its origin in the experiences and explications of ancestors or contemporaries. And finally, language can provide knowledge that refers to provinces of meaning which are in principle inaccessible in immediate experience (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:248, 250).

Objects and people can now become taken-for-granted even if it is the first time a child or adult has seen it because a close associate has told them so. Because of this process, Schutz said children and adults receive filtered information. Children learn these stocks from primary sources which Schutz referred to as we-relations. We-they relations resemble Allport's concept of in-groups and out-groups. We-relations are generally face-to-face interactions where both parties are mutually aware of each and intimate. Because they are intimate, both individuals have to invest time and energy for a meaningful interaction to occur. They both have to agree on certain meanings such as actions, behavior or language. If these things are not in place, interaction is very difficult. A good example is when people of different languages and cultures meet for the first time. In the beginning, interaction is very difficult, until a common "language" or signs are developed so that each can understand what the other is doing. Knowledge can then be passed back and forth. Initially, little common knowledge exists. Each person interprets events according to their own previous knowledge base. Cross-cultural relations are sometimes strained because of the lack of common stocks. What is acceptable in one culture might be seen as insulting another. Until both groups agree on a standard practice or begin to share a common stocks of knowledge, problems can occur.

    They-relations on the other hand typically do not involve intimate interactions, meaning relations are not face-to-face. People make judgements about others from a distance so individuals categorize other people into ideal types to make the processing of information easier. The adjustments and modifications necessary in we-relations are not present in they-relations. An individual does not have to share a common stocks of knowledge with another as they do in we-relations. Both we and they relations become very important when Schutz discusses typification because one's stock of knowledge favors the use of typification (categorization).

    Typification resembles an ideal type one uses as a reference when needing to evaluate new or strange occurrences. Typifications are when "one assumes the kinds of things that happen in one situation are taken as instances of the kinds of things that have happened before and that will happen again in the future" (Collins 1988:275). This step resembles Allport's five processes of categorization. Typifications allow incongruent events or information to be placed within pre-defined categories so one can make sense of the new information. For example, if an individual sees a man with a badge, a uniform and a gun, even in an unfamiliar environment, one's use of typifications and their stocks of knowledge will probably lead them to conclude the man is a police officer. Once this determination is made, any ensuing behaviors by the man will be framed around that particular role. Through the use of typifications, one has the ability to follow a routine, making life simpler when one encounters an event/person with qualities similar to past experiences as illustrated in this quote.
 

My behavior is determined by the expectation that certain behavior is probable on the part of certain contemporaries (mailmen, merchants, policemen). In relation to all these contemporaries I have a certain orientation. I have included these contemporaries in my own behavior; in short, I have a social relation with them, which we characterize with the expression they-orientation. It must be stressed that these relations concern not concrete and specific other persons but rather types to which I ascribe certain attributes, certain functions, certain behavior. They are relevant for me only insofar as they conform to these typifications (probably more or less "well"). In the they-orientation I conduct myself on the basis of my knowledge of the social world: ... My partners in they-relations are types. ... Most important of all, my stocks of knowledge of the social world consists of typifications. ... [With they-orientations] the most important variable is the degree of anonymity. We can say the world of contemporaries is stratified according to levels of anonymity. The more anonymous the type (by means of which a contemporary is experienced), the more strongly objectivated is the meaning-context that is foisted upon the Other. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:76-77,80).

What Schutz is saying here is that people's knowledge is based on types and that this "typical knowledge" varies by the degree of social distance. Thus the flexibility of these types is based on how one experiences a social relation, as either we or they relations. The more likely it is a face-to-face interaction or with people characterized as an in-group member, the more likely the experience will be contained within we-relations. As stated earlier, we-relations are very similar to Allport's in-groups, where belonging to an in-group is much more favorable and allows more flexibility in the application of attributes to others than if one was an out-group member. In-group members also tend to rate other in-group members more positively than out-group members. In-group members observe more variability within their group than out-group members. Members are not type cast meaning there are a variety of ways to explain their behavior. Like Allport (1954), Schutz claimed people need to simplify their social world, so typification of out-groups is more stringent because they are more anonymous. Thus as an individual gets farther and farther away (more anonymous), the more rigorously the type is applied.

    Since people develop their stocks of knowledge within we-relations, they develop similar stocks. This shared understanding of knowledge becomes problematic when one moves out of we-relations (in-group) and one becomes more and more interactive with they-relations. But this knowledge also is dependant on the social structure. Thus, while there is specific knowledge for each group, there is also a common stock that every shares.
 

The typical structures of experience are not the same for all members of society, but in their turn show a social distribution, since they are conditioned by various roles which are socially objectivated and in part also institutionalized (as well as being conditioned by the determinations of the situation dependant on them). Thus, for example, what is taken for granted in a society of hunters can be problematic for farmers; what for women is worthy of communication can usually remain unnoticed by men, etc. Not only are the typical contexts of experience and acts distributed socially, but so also is the knowledge relevant in them, as are their corresponding linguistic structures (above all vocabulary, semantic arrangement, and also syntax and morphology, such as the general style of language). ... Besides the elements of knowledge which both share, each has a stock of subjective knowledge that is not "objectivate," but also partly because it is related to problems relevant only for one and not for the other. To take an example: there are problems relevant only for a woman as woman and only for the man as man. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:251,289)

Schutz and Luckmann claim that knowledge is dependant on a number of factors: the type of relations the person is in (we versus they) and the social environment. In an environment containing two groups, each group probably shares a stock of common knowledge recognized by both groups as well as information that is specific to each group. Until one group develops a method of communicating their specific knowledge to the other (and the other group shares an interest in knowing it) there will be times when knowledge is known by one group and not the another.

    One final process taken from Schutz that is important to this study is how people come to share or not share similar experiences. Most people assume that others are sharing the same experiences as themselves. If people did not share this assumption, people would have to describe in exceptional detail what they meant within every situation, expending more energy and time than is available. Even if one did accomplish this feat, the other person could not truly comprehend everything that was said because each person is their own person. One cannot totally understand someone else's subjectivity, by definition, because is not available to others. You would have to be that person which is not possible. For example, when someone says to another "I feel happy today", they assume the other person knows what they mean by happiness but each surmises happiness is subjectively unique. Yet intersubjectivity is assumed, otherwise, time spent on interactions would be infinite and the interaction itself cumbersome. Thus, the more each person accepts the assumed reciprocity of perspectives, the more smoothly the social world will function. It is surmised that "each person makes certain assumptions about the world, assumes that anyone else who is there is making the same assumptions and that each one is assuming the other is assuming the same thing. If they were to switch positions, presumably each one would see the world as the other did" (Collins 1988:275).

    The problem of assumption becomes a major dilemma when two individuals or groups do not share the same body of knowledge but each presumes they do. Generally, this assumption is called into question when others are perceived as belonging to they-relations and thus possessing different stocks of knowledge. Extending this problem to the thesis of this research, blacks and whites might possess different stocks of knowledge because the information each group received within their we-relations was very different. What is relevant for a black person might not be a concern for a white person. Blacks are more attuned to notice discrimination and prejudice more often than whites because these events occur at a higher rate for blacks than whites. However, both groups share the same environment and American culture, so some stocks are common between both groups. This is why blacks and whites can share similar stocks on some things (knowing the score of the Super Bowl) but differ on others (knowledge of specific shows - i.e. whites prefer watching "Friends" while blacks watch "Martin"). Another example is that both groups are aware of particular American foods (McDonald's) but each group might have particular foods or events which are relevant only to each group (sweet potato pie vs. pumpkin pie).

    Schutz stated the contexts of experiences and linguistic systems differentiate and are shared by different sub-groupings within society, distinct we-groups, and these differentiated stocks of knowledge form perceptions which are then taken-for-granted as being common to us all (Allan, forthcoming). This might explain why most whites believe housing or job opportunities are fair and equal. Their experiences and knowledge in regards to housing and jobs generally have been positive so they believe other groups' experiences should have been positive too (reciprocity of perspectives). Using Table 4 regarding housing opportunities, blacks looking for housing assert they are treated unequally. Their stocks and typifications with regards to white realtors and practices lead them to claim opportunities are not fair or equal. White buyers on the other hand, do not share the same stocks or typifications. Their experiences are completely different from black prospective home buyers. Feagin and Vera (1995) evoke this type of explanation when they discussed the influence of experience and perceptions in comprehending events in why blacks and whites see situations differently (see Chapter III). For example, Feagin and Vera might claim racism is a type of stock of knowledge because it influences how one orients and perceives others and situations; it has been passed down so long and is embedded within the culture that it is no longer problematic for many whites (Van Dyk 1993; Doob 1993; Feagin and Vera 1995). White experiences commonly have been so different from blacks that they can only perceive situations one way - things are fair and equal.

    In American culture, what causes something to be important? Americans have decided that race is important because of economics, history and ideology. Slavery deemed it necessary to differentiate slaves from free men. Race then became a salient feature. Salience is very important in perception because it involves the degree of uniqueness/visibility in an object. Being the only white person in a group of black people generally makes race a salient issue, especially for the white person. If that person also happens to be the only female within that same group, gender also becomes salient. Depending on the social environment and the stocks of knowledge of the participants and society, the effects of gender and race might be independent, interactional or nonexistent. Race and gender are not always the most salient feature in a given situation. For example, the type of clothes someone wears might be a more salient factor than race or gender. At a funeral, someone wearing shorts and a tie-dyed t-shirt might receive more attention for their clothing than their race or gender. Allport (1954:129) stressed the importance of salience by stating "visibility and identifiability aid categorization." Allport called these salient features (such as gender or race) used in aiding categorization "condensing rods," because they typically initiate attributions containing certain information, thoughts or feelings toward that particular person. So if one lives in a racist society, race becomes a salient feature. Allport (1954:165) also reported "nothing that strikes our eyes or ears conveys its message directly to us" but is selected, accentuated and interpreted. The whole process reinforces one's categorization and what one believes. Categorization can be flexible, but most people want to make interpreting events as simple as possible.

    This chapter has shown that the use of the ecological model with the added insights of Allport, and especially Schutz, show how people come to categorize people and objects. These people and objects are "detected" and understood through the use of stocks of knowledge. This process enables people to either share similar perceptions or hold different perceptions. My research will contradict the idea contending that black and whites live in different worlds but that they detect different realities. And sometimes, both groups will hold similar perceptions.

    This thesis uses a hypothetical model utilizing concepts from the ecological approach, Allport and Schutz to illustrate the processes of perception (see Appendix C, Figure 11 ). An individual is born into a particular social structure. This structure contains two sections, the larger society and a smaller group structure. For example, a black child belongs to the greater social society (America) and a smaller one (black America). His stocks of knowledge will contain the history and culture of both the larger society and the micro one. He will categorize people and object based on existing categorizes not developed by him but by his parents, ancestors and others before him. The experiences he observes will also add to the growing body of knowledge he accumulates personally. When this black child enters a new environment, he will use this existing knowledge base to interpret an event. When two people judge or interpret an event, if they share similar stocks of knowledge, they will perceive similar things (see Figure 12). If they do not share similar stocks, even though they share the same environment, they will perceive differently (see Figure 13). The effect of degree of proximity (increased use of ideal types as distance increases) and the belief in racism will be further explained in the next chapter.

Table of Contents

Chpt. 1

Chpt. 2

Chpt. 3

Chpt. 4

Chpt. 5

Chpt. 6

Chpt. 7