Mutual Security Act, Concerning Conditions on Aid to the French Effort in Indochina

Mr. KENNEDY: I arise today to speak on a matter of vital importance to the security of the United States and the entire free world. It is my firm opinion that the expenditure and distribution of the funds, equipment, materials, and service authorized under this bill on behalf of the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam should be administered in such a way as to encourage through all available means the freedom and independence desired by the peoples of the Associated States, including the intensification of the military training of the Vietnamese.

I say that because it is my opinion, based upon the evidence of the accords and treaties that bind the Associated States to the French Union, that genuine independence as we understand it is lacking in this area--that local government is circumscribed in its functions--that the Government of Viet-Nam, the state of which is of the greatest importance in this area, lacks popular support--that the degree of military, civil, political, and economic control maintained by the French goes well beyond what is necessary to fight a war. These are harsh words to say about an ancient friend and ally, France. They are particularly hard to say because, during a visit to Indochina over a year ago, I saw something of the burdens that France carries in that area. The troops she has there are as good as any in the world--certainly the flower of her army--and she has maintained the jungle war against numerous and skillful native armies for a long period. We are well aware, in addition, that if France were to withdraw her troops today, Communists would overrun not only French Indochina but southeast Asia. But it is because we want the war to be brought to a successful conclusion that we should insist on genuine independence. The war has been going on since 1946. There is evidence that the position of the French is not improving. Meanwhile the assistance the United States is giving is steadily increasing. S. 2128 provides $400 million for the procurement of equipment, materials, and services for the forces in Indochina, nearly $25 million for economic and technical assistance while the fighting continues, and a classified amount included under military assistance for the Far East which totals $1,081,420,493. The total for Indochina alone under all three categories could well exceed $1 billion.

The New York Times has stated that we will be paying at least 40 percent of the cost of the war, and I believe that it will eventually mount up to a great deal more. Yet regardless of our united effort, it is a truism that the war can never be successful unless numbers of the people of Viet-Nam are won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and fully support its successful conclusion. This can never be done unless they are reassured beyond doubt that complete independence will be theirs at the conclusion of the war. In order to assay the degree of control now possessed by the French, it is necessary to review briefly the history of recent years.

The French won control of free Viet-Nam in 1860. It became, particularly in its southern province--Cochin China--a source of great wealth to the French until the beginning of the Second World War. During that period of time, France maintained stringent control over the area: Suffrage and eligibility for office were accorded only to the French--and the Annamites could get citizenship only by an act analogous to naturalization. In 1937, for example, there were only 2,555 naturalized French Annamites.

During World War II, after the Japanese assumed control of Indochina, the guerrilla movement against the Japanese in that area was led by Ho Chi Minh, the present leader of the Vietminh forces and a man with a long and intimate association with the Communist movement, but who enjoyed and still enjoys a great prestige among the people of the area for his unrelenting struggle against their traditional masters, the French. It has been estimated that in 1944 the military commander of the guerrilla forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, now the leader of the Vietminh armies, had over 10,000 men under his command, which became the nucleus of the later Communist armies.

In March 1945 the Japanese officially ended the French administration of Indochina. Bao Dai, the present emperor, proclaimed the independence of Annam by the consent of the Japanese and eventually gained some degree of control over the entire country of Viet-Nam,

In August 1945, at the conclusion of World War II, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh supporters declared the independence of the democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Bao Dai abdicated and became supreme political adviser to Ho Chi Minh, who was then leading the popular-front movement. Many people have since argued that Ho Chi Minh was at that time ripe for Titoism if the French had been willing to grant him sufficient political concessions. It is difficult to be convinced of this, although it is true that in November 1945 he did dissolve the Indochinese Communist Party and took similar conciliatory steps to gain the support of a majority of the people. But his record as a leading and active world Communist figure argues against this theory of Titoism, and the seizure of control by the Communists in China at a later date would have placed him in a most difficult position if he had attempted to break his ties with Moscow.

At Potsdam it had been decided, as in Korea, that the surrender of the Japanese troops north of the 16th parallel would be accepted by the Chinese, south of the 16th parallel by the Southeast Asia Command under Mountbatten to which was attached a French expeditionary corps which, with the British troops, took control of southern Viet-Nam at the end of 1945 amid scenes of violence.

The basis for negotiation between the French and the Vietminh was laid down in General DeGaulle's statement of policy of March 24, 1945. In it he provided that the Indochinese federation, composed of five distinct countries--Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos--was to have an Indochinese government, presided over by a governor general representing France, and composed of French ministers and Autochthons responsible to them. This government was to be assisted by an equally mixed assembly, so composed that Annamite countries had a maximum percentage of the seats. The powers of this assembly were to be limited to voting on the budget, and deliberating law projects prepared by the council of state. No definition was made of the role to be played by local governments, except to state vaguely that they would be protected and reformed. These terms were obviously unsatisfactory to the natives who were desirous of complete independence, and the negotiations were fruitless.

Finally, on March 6, 1946, an accord was signed which regulated the relationships between the French and Ho Chi Minh, an accord which--in spite of Ho Chi Minh's personal prestige--was greeted with widespread dissatisfaction by the people, for again it fell far short of their hopes and expectations of independence. Genuine independence was not promised, nor was the unification of the three provinces of Viet-Nam achieved.

On June 1, 1946, the autonomous Republic of Cochin China was proclaimed, but the French High Commissioner remained in complete control. At Fontainebleau on July 6 of that year, new negotiations were begun between the French and Ho Chi Minh. France once again refused to give in to Ho's request that Viet-Nam be permitted to control its own army, that a time limit be set on France's use of military bases in the area, that Viet-Nam be permitted to exchange diplomatic representatives with other countries, that Viet-Nam have the unlimited right to purchase French enterprises in Viet-Nam, and, finally, that Cochin China be joined with the remainder of the country.

On September 14, 1946, Ho Chi Minh signed a Modus Vivendi which further clarified the relationships between the two countries, but which maintained a heavy and substantial degree of French control over the internal and external affairs of Viet-Nam. Ho Chi Minh, recognizing that the Modus Vivendi fell far short of the people's expectations, said upon signing it,"I have just signed my own death sentence."

Thus, in the fall of 1946, the situation In Viet-Nam continued to deteriorate. Finally, on December 19, 1946, as a result of an outbreak of violence and killing in Hanoi, the war began which has since continued with increasing fury. Since that date, the French have been faced with the difficult task of achieving the fine balance between giving sufficient liberty to the governments they have supported, in order that these governments might win the devotion of the people, and, at the same time, maintaining the basic French influence and control of the area. But concessions which the French have made to the successive governments have been considerable and if extended to Ho Chi Minh, or other popular leaders in 1945 and 1946, might have changed the entire history of that area.

In April 1947, the Mus mission was sent out as a last attempt to bargain with Ho Chi Minh. It demanded that the Vietnamese lay down their arms and permit French troops to circulate freely in Vietnamese territory. Paul Mus, the French leader of the mission, later described the terms as a request, for "guaranties equivalent to surrender." Ho's terms continued the same--the Republic must include Cochin China and must have all other attributes of independence.

In 1948 a government of Emperor Bao Dai, who had left Ho Chi Minh in 1946, for China, was set up under General Xuan. The dilemma remained: This government could gain popular support only by securing from the French terms which the French were unwilling to grant Ho; yet it was valuable to the French only if it did not insist upon obtaining as much as Ho wanted. On June 5, 1948, France sought a way out of this dilemma by stating that "France solemnly recognizes the independence of Viet-Nam. The independence of Viet-Nam has no other limits than those imposed upon it by adherence to the French Union." On May 21, 1948, the French Assembly voted to end the colonial status of Cochin China and it was attached to Viet-Nam. This represented a substantial victory for Bao Dai, and as a result he returned to his country on May 21, 1949. In January 1950, the accords of March 8, 1949, signalized by letters exchanged between Bao Dai and President Auriol of France, were approved by the French Assembly giving Viet-Nam not only unity but "independence within the French Union."

Unfortunately, to this day "independence within the French Union" represents to the majority of Vietnamese a contradiction in terms. Many Viet-namese have believed that concessions from the French were gained only as the result of military victories; that the concessions of 1949 were gained from the French only as the result of Communist victories in China; and that the concessions gained at the PAU Economic Conference of November 1950, which I shall mention in a moment, were gained only as the result of military victories of the Vietminh in the fall of 1950. These military victories were substantial and represented a major political and military defeat for the French. Major concessions by the French were still essential if any degree of support was to be achieved by the new government; for the Vietnamese people continued to be discontented, as shown by the statement of Premier Tran Van Huu, who stated upon returning from France in October 1950:

At the PAU Economic Conference, on November 27, 1950, the French turned over to Viet-Nam the control of customs, communications, immigration, and foreign-trade regulations. In addition, they agreed to the creation of a national army without which General LeClerc had earlier declared "there can be no military solution." On December 8, 1950, a new agreement abrogated the agreement of December 30, 1949, and recognized that the native army would technically come under the Emperor and not the French, although the training, equipping, and control was maintained by the French. Further agreements regulating the relationship between the Associated States and France were reached by the March 8, 1952, accords, and at the second meeting of the High Council of the French Union in November 1952.

This compressed history of the negotiations between France and Viet-Nam, and the negotiations between France and Laos and Cambodia, differing only in detail, is important in that it lays the foundation for the modern relationship which governs the Associated States and France. I have believed that the successive French grants of limited independence to the people of Viet-Nam have always been too little and too late. The clearest evidence of this is the success that the Viet-Minh forces are today achieving, and the painfully slow growth in popular support which successive governments of Bao Dai have gained from the people. Unless the people of this area are assured that they are fighting for their own independence and not for the maintenance of French control when victory is won, all of our military assistance and all of the French sacrifices of their youth and treasure will go for naught.

In a letter to me from the Department of State on May 13, 1953 it was stated:

It is of basic importance, at a time when we authorize the expenditure of large sums of money so that the war may be brought to a successful conclusion, that we realize that conditions are present in the relationship between France and the Associated States that make it difficult to win the wholehearted support of the natives in the struggle against the Communists. I strongly believe that the French cannot succeed in their mission in Indochina without giving concessions necessary to make the native army a reliable and crusading force.

Senators may have read recently about the kidnapping of a Viet-Nam Officer Training Corps by a company of Viet-Minh forces about 2 months ago. The fact is that more than 500 officer candidates were kidnapped, if we can believe the story, by a company of Viet-Minh rebels. Yet the kidnapped were men upon whom the French expected to rely for leadership in a native army.

At present the French control is extensive and paramount. The Associated States, are "independent within the French Union," although there is no representative body within Viet-Nam that can ratify the treaty relationships between the two countries. The organs of the French Union were developed at the conclusion of World War II to insure the continued dominance of Metropolitan France over the other countries of the Union. For example, the French always have a permanent majority in the High Council of the French Union, the President of France is the President of the Union, and the Government of France guides its actions. In the assembly of the French Union the control is again rested in the Government of France, and the Assembly can express its opinions only on bills submitted to it by the French Assembly or the governments of the Associated States. Article 62 of the French Constitution states that-

There are other limitations upon Viet-Nam independence as a result of their intimate connection with the French Union. Their foreign policy must be coordinated with that of France, and the French must give consent to the sending of diplomatic missions to foreign countries, although that consent is almost automatic.

The French control over the military situation, including the native armies of Viet-Nam, is nearly complete. I quote from a recent letter to me from the Department of State:

The Vietnamese Government is obliged to turn to the French whenever it desires to secure foreign counselors and technicians. As the French did not develop experienced governmental administrators during the period before World War II, this provision has given the French in the past an opportunity to guide to some degree actions within the local governments. The University of Viet-Nam was jointly established with a French rector installed for a 6-year minimum, and all instruction in the local university must be in French, a move which put the French directly in contact with the training of the intellectual youth of the country. The French control over the economic life of the country is extensive, and the possession of property belonging to the French cannot be changed without permission of the French. The French still control the country's basic resources, transportation, and trade. In Viet-Nam the French control 66 percent of the rice export trade; 100 percent of rubber products for export; practically all export and import businesses, all international shipping and the principal coastal shipping. In the field of foreign commerce, it is estimated that French control is nearly 100 percent.

France shares the veto right under the PAU agreement on matters affecting French Union export and import trade. French Union subjects are given special legal exemptions. They are given the privilege of extraterritoriality, and are tried in courts in which French law prevails. Until peace is restored, the French High Commissioner will continue to exercise powers with respect to the internal security of the associated states. After the restoration of peace, the French will have a liaison mission "charged with guarding the security of the French Union, in cooperation with the police and sûreté of Viet-Nam," according to the agreement of December 30, 1949. When Vietnamese taxes affect French Union subjects, there must be consultation with the representatives of the countries concerned before they are imposed. The degree of French control in Viet-Nam is enhanced, as I have said, by the lack of any popular assembly which represents the will of the people.

Some may feel that this is an injudicious time to discuss this matter--that many in France are tired of the war and would gladly see France pull out and retreat to North Africa. If the French are asked to give up all they have in Indochina, it is said, will there be anything to hold them there?

I do not believe that the French are fighting in Indochina wholly for material things. The war and money alone have already cost them substantially more than their total capital investment. Men like General De Lattre fought for the honor of France; and the French now are fighting because they know that if they retreat, all of Southeast Asia will go to the Communists--that their position in North Africa will become endangered and that the security of Metropolitan France itself will be threatened. Thus they fight on, and deserve our wholehearted support.

But I believe it vital for the cause for which both of us fight that conditions be established there that will make it possible for the French to win--that will rally the support of native elements to take their share of the struggle. Which, in fact, is more likely to cause the French to withdraw: another season of fruitless and bloody campaigns, or the prospect of eventual victory, even though it means the loss of some of the French states in that area? I do not believe there can be any question as to which is the proper course to take. I believe that men with responsible positions in France know this and are moving in that direction. I believe it is of the utmost importance at a time when the United States is committing itself deeper and deeper into Indochina, that our influence and prestige with the French be used to promote the independence and well-being of the people of the Associated States. If we do so, not only would the prospects of victory be substantially enhanced, but the position of the United States and France and of the whole Western alliance in Asia will be materially advanced in Asia.

   Text Courtesy of New Generation

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