Nuremberg:
The Punching Bag of the Allied Powers
AP-IB World History
10/2/96
Michael Kadish
The Allied powers, after their European victory in World War II, wanted not only to force the former Axis nations into a total surrender and to destroy the previous enemy regime, but also to take the enemy's leadership and punish them before the world. Even before the Allied victory, President Franklin Roosevelt was determined that those responsible for Nazi crimes be tried in a court before the world. His desire for such a trial came to fruition, but not until 1945 after Roosevelt had died. These trials, known because of their location as the Nuremberg Trials, lasted from 1945 to 1946.
The Nuremberg Trials consisted of thirteen individual trials and twenty-four defendants. However, those most guilty of the crimes against humanity, the indictment many of the defendants faced, could not be tried. The two main leaders of the Nazi party, Hitler and Goebbels, were dead from their own hands. The Allies, needing to prove to the world that the law of the Reich was wrong, found military subordinates to try instead.
The premise that these subordinates should stand trial was unfair and ill-conceived. It soon became apparent the world was more interested in releasing anger than seeking justice. Indeed one of othe stated purposes of the trial was, according to Robert G. Storey, executive trial counsel, "the making of a record of the Hitlet regime which would withstand the test of history." This supposed higher aim, as noble as it may appear, presented an inherent conflict with the more common and natural trial goal, namely to render justice and nothing else. One nation judging another's beliefs and policies in court should not be viewed as more than a farce.
The custom of getting rid of the political enemy after defeating the enemy's army dates to at least Napoleon's time, as he was banished from France following his defeat. After World War I, the Kaiser's army was brought to the courts by the Allied powers in trials that were considered to be failures to all of the Allies except Britain, who saw fifteen of the eighteen men it brought up on charges convicted. Nevertheless, most of the men convicted escaped from jail and the Kaiser escaped before the trial. Even safe in his new castle, however, he was permanently disgraced. These precedent setting events caused victorious nations to believe they had both the right and the need to place high-level representatives of the defeated country on trial. The result of these trials inevitably was humiliation by the victors towards the deposed or defeated dictators. Maximillion was assassinated; Mussolini was hanged; and the Czars humiliated. Each time, it was the leader who faced blame with the underlying purpose of demonstrating his brand of terror would reign no more..
In the case of World War II, the Fuhrer could similarly have been disgraced, but unlike the other tyrants within a century time span, he, perhaps wisely, committed suicide. This saved his Reich some grace, as the world would never see his corpse spat as had happened to defeated leaders of the previous world war. One might even say that his suicide was the determining factor of Nazi beliefs lingering today.
The Allies felt an overwhelming obligation to expose the atrocities of the War. Feeling thus compelled, however, also required there to be a live person, or group of persons, on whom to place the blame. Someone had to be the scapegoat, the personification of evil. Following the suicides of both the number one and number two leaders of the Third Reich, the Allies could not afford to lose any more scapegoats. Thus, the trap was set.
The question arises: Why did the Allies go through the motions of making Nuremberg? Why didn't we just round up the big Nazis and shoot them? By claiming truthfully they were executing barbarians, it would probably have been acceptable to most. The answer comes in one of the many little Churchill anecdotes, the difference in this case being that the joke was on him.
He had suggested to Stalin and FDR in a meeting that the Nazis be rounded up and shot. Stalin retorted, "What if the people shoot back at us?" Recognizing they themselves would be viewed as equally guilty, Churchill changed his policies.
Churchill's realization that the Allies could be seen on the same level as the Nazis does have some legitimacy. While the big three created the retroactive law known as the London Agreement of 1945 to try the prisoners, the Allies had to make sure they were not guilty of the law. Three major groups of crimes established in the London Agreement were crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The Allies had to be careful, for they too, had committed some of these crimes. The U.S. dropped two large bombs on unprotected Japanese cities. Both Britain and the U.S. could be accused of having Jewish blood on their hands for their refusal to blow up the railroad tracks known to transport Jews to the camps. Russia attacked Finland and divided Poland in 1939 with impunity and was responsible for the massacre of fifty thousand Jews in Babi Yar.
The twenty-four defendants of Nuremberg were already known to have been at least associated with the killings of millions of civilians. Technically, by definition this was not a war crime, but this fact was ignored. The Nuremberg Trials were conducted in a military court, with judges from the U.S., Russia and Britain acting as the Tribunal. A French judge also assisted, but since France was still considered to be an occupied country, it was not until midway through the trials that one could consider the judges to be a quatribunal. The International Military Tribunal was that in name only. It really consisted of a court of the victorious. The major excuse that could have been offered by the defendants, "I was commanded to," was banned instantly, leaving these men with no excuse, even if the banned one had been legitimate.
Before continuing, we must of course be reminded that those on trial were indeed Nazis and were responsible for the worst atrocities in modern times. We are not here to defend them or to say they were mistreated, for nearly any punishment would seem appropriate, and in many minds, nothing could be harsh enough.
Nevertheless, the Allied powers turned the trials into a farce in their attempt to bring revenge and justice. Recognizing the goals of the Allied prosecutors, the American judge, Justice Robert H. Jackson, tried to establish some guidelines in an attempt to keep the trial from becoming an absolute farce. He had, in fact, tried to decline his appointment by Franklin Roosevelt to serve as a Nuremberg judge by warning, "You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a court...under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty." This warning, if properly heeded, should have given more legitimacy to the trials and should have given the defendants a chance.
Even Teleford Taylor, counsel for the prosecution, admitted a severe lack of evidence against those on trial. "Where's the evidence?" he lamented. At Nuremberg, despite the insistence that "Everybody knew," little hard evidence existed against the defendants.
Furthermore a good attorney for the defense could have shown the position in which these defendants were trapped. Since this was a military court, the defendants could not blame superiors for giving them the orders. But in this military court, they were being blamed for a different military's, and different nation's, rules. When Hitler came to power his beliefs were not new. His policies were designed simply to escalate the Germanic patriotic beliefs of being a higher race into the Master Race. The strict obedience and the feeling of superiority among the Germans already existed. Despite destroying the Nazis, we in no way attempted to dismantle the Germanic patriotism. Since the patriotic Germans still clung to these beliefs, the defendants were no different than any other German Nationalists during the Third Reich.
Some might read the previous statement and say exactly because it is true, the subordinate Nazis, or anyone who could support the Holocaust, should be executed. Yet, if we were to kill these Germans just for their beliefs, then perhaps we would have shown ourselves and our actions to be no better than theirs.
Another argument comes from an unusual source. In the Guinness Book of World Records, the dubious honor of being the largest mass murder is claimed by the Holocaust. This fact is listed on the same page as the Mafia and Far Eastern Mass murderers from the Renaissance Period, killing approximately six hundred people. The juxtaposition of the facts implies history does not consider the seven and a half million killed by the Nazis to be a military massacre, but instead a criminal killing.
Had Nuremberg not been a military court, not only could the defendants say they were ordered to do so, but also they could truthfully point out that they were coerced into position. With Hitler's violent temper, they were not in position of having a choice. Hitler first entered the political spotlight as he kidnapped the leaders of Germany and had his Blackshirts enter a government building by initiating a gun fight with the guards. Even if one refuses to describe him as unpredictable, his position alone could scare subordinates. Yet the court at Nuremberg would not accept a coercion defense.
The best demonstration of how trapped the Nazis became could be shown in the final judgment at Nuremberg. This sentencing was read on October 1, 1946, exactly fifty years ago. While handing down the decision of Field Marshall Keitel, it was read, "Superior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes so shocking and extensive have been committed. Guilty on all four counts."
Granted, these were shocking and terrible crimes, but there were not many alternatives. Resistance to the military policies was futile. The defense attorney, Prof. Hermann Jahrreiss, stated "that the only way to live in the Third Reich and not act as a Nazi was not to appear at all. For opposition was indeed 'utterly pointless' in the absence of all organization" Protesting against the Third Reich would only have brought the same fate they were now up against in Nuremberg.
Legitimately attempting peace negotiation also was irrelevant to the judges. Hoess flew to Scotland in 1943 to have a peace treaty worked out. Instead, he was imprisoned and was considered the prize catch at the Nuremberg Trials. Despite his attempts at peace, Hoess was given life, which in his case was forty-one more years. It was immaterial that Churchill stated, "In my view, [Hoess] was atoned for this by his completely devoted deed of lunatic benevolence....He came from his own free will."
Similarly, Werner Best demonstrated that he had been the one who had informed the Danish and was responsible for the eventual evacuation of the Danish Jews. He received a sentence of death. Walther Funk was a banker who assisted in the financing of some Nazi programs, but he never encouraged or fought for the Nazis. It was he though, who held on to the boxes of gold teeth of Nazi victims. He received a life sentence.
The tenth man to be hanged from Nuremberg verdicts was Julius Streicher. He was the only defendant found guilty and condemned to death solely on the crimes against humanity charge. He is also the only man in history sentenced to death by an American judge for his publications. The aforementioned works was Streicher's magazine Der Strmer. It was claimed that the writings incited the people to murder and to the extermination policy.
The application of Streicher's judgement is very eye-opening. Not only were these prisoners unable to use their German rights since we did not care about the Germanic beliefs, but also the American judges refused to extend American rights to the defendants, who could have strenuously fought on grounds of freedom of speech or of the press.
Thus, serious questions arise when one carefully examines the judgements at Nuremberg. The defendants were tried in a military court when their crimes were not defined by military law. In fact, the law under which they were tried was a retroactive one designed to convict the defendants. The attorneys and judges were all chosen from the victorious Allies, who certainly retained a bias. Since this had no precedent, the defendants had nothing to cite to support their defense. Yet, despite their apparent inequities, no protests were heard when the judgements were announced. Possibly due to the political climate and the world's shock at attrocities committed by the Germans during the war, people believed justice was meted out by the Nuremberg Trials verdicts to remnants of the Third Reich.
Footnotes
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem. (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p. 93.
Persico, Joseph E., "Nuremberg Time and Memory," American Heritage v 45 Jul-Aug 1994. p. 79.
Rosenberg, Tina, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia," The Nation. v 260 May 15, 1995. p. 690.
Persico, Joseph E., Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Viking Press, 1994), p. 361.
Ibid, p. 30.
Taylor, Teleford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc, 1992), p 45.
Ibid, p. 49.
"Watching for a Real Judgement of Evil." New York Times. Nov 12, 1995. p. 37.
Istven, Deek, "Judgement at Nuremberg; an Exchange," New York Times. Jan 13, 1994. p. 52.
McFarlan, Donald, Ed. The Guinness Book of World Records 1991. (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), p. 548.
Rosenberg, p. 689.
Persico, Joseph E., Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial, p. 398.
Arendt, p. 127.
Churchill, Winston. The Grand Alliance. (Liverpool: Macmillon, 1950) p. 55.
Persico, Joseph E., Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial, p. 398.
Davidson, Eugene. The Nuremberg Fallacy; Wars and War Crimes since WW II. (New York: Macmillan, 1973) p. 214.
Persico, Joseph E., Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial, p. 398.
Works Cited
1) Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York: The Viking Press, 1970
2) Churchill, Winston. The Grand Alliance. Liverpool: Macmillon, 1950
3) Davidson, Eugene. The Nuremberg Fallacy; Wars and War Crimes since WW II. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
4) Istven, Deek, "Judgement at Nuremberg; an Exchange." New York Times. Jan 13, 1994.
5) McFarlan, Donald, Ed. The Guinness Book of World Records 1991. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.
6) Persico, Joseph E., "Nuremberg Time and Memory," American Heritage v 45 Jul-Aug 1994.
7) Persico, Joseph E., Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial New York: Viking Press, 1994.
8) Rosenberg, Tina, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia," The Nation. v 260 May 15, 1995.
9) Taylor, Teleford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc, 1992.
10) "Watching for a Real Judgement of Evil." New York Times. Nov 12, 1995.