This is section twelve

THE SENATE AND SECESSION

Ronald Gordon Ziegler

The literature of political science treats the election of 1860 as at least the crux of a
classical example of realignment in American politics (1). The terminology can be
confusing if the analysis becomes too fixated on what is often considered to be the
archetypal realignment exemplar which formed during the 1930's around the New Deal
(2). That mistake has led to any number of scholars becoming locked into a variation of a
waiting for Godot trap as they looked for a replication of that realignment to declare that
an expected sequel had taken place. Something akin to that may apply to the ante-bellum
case, as well. Popular notions have it that the South Carolina secession was a response to
the election of Abraham Lincoln(3), but that was, in fact, the culminating event in a
realignment which was developing throughout the period, or at least a major road mark
along the way. It may be going too far to even brand it the last straw.

Part of the difficulty with the Presidential race in 1860 involves Lincoln garnering a
mere 39% of the popular vote. It is difficult, perhaps, to mesh that kind of tally with the
concept of realignment. But such analysis suffers from a variety of reductionist problems.
The 'realignment' had been proceeding on a broader basis for several years by 1860. Less
than obvious in the presidential election, it had been manifest clearly in House races.
Where this phenomenon, together with the Southern response to it, seems to have gone
largely unnoticed is in reference to the U.S. Senate.

TABLE I -- PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE U. S. HOUSE IN THE ANTE-BELLUM PERIOD(4)

Election Congress Democrats Whigs/Republicans Other

1848 31st 112 109 9

1850 32nd 140 88 5

1852 33rd 159 71 4

1854 34th 83 108(Rep) 43

1856 35th 118 92 26

1858 36th 92 114 31

1860 37th 43 105 30

Among those who have pointed to the political changes that marked the country in the
late 1850's, History Professor Mark Kruman of Detroit's Wayne State University argues
that the partisan realignment occurred as the North became Republican poised against a
Democratic South(5). The collapse of the Whig Party and the emergence of the
Republican Party took place along a shifting axis. By the end of the decade, the country
was diametrically divided with no Republicans from the Southern states and relatively few
Democratic officials outside the South.

What has gone largely unnoticed with the heightened intensity of Southern resistance
and of pro-slavery policy initiatives ranging from Roger Taney's Dred Scott ruling to
Buchanan's and Secretary of State Lewis Cass' response to secession, is the end of the
balance that had been maintained in the Senate for 70 years. By itself, it may not have
resulted in the rebellion. Coupled with a Republican and anti-slavery controlled House and
that 'black Republican' Lincoln as President, this transition of the Senate has been an over-
looked factor in the division. But the transition does reflect the sea change taking place in
the electorate of the nation.

Near the end of his second term, Andrew Jackson arranged for what may have been his
smoothest trick of the many that marked his Presidency. The controversy over the
admission of new states to the Union had flared up repeatedly, an unwritten rule having
been observed from the very start (it may be one of the reasons that earlier efforts to bring
Canada into the Union virtually disappeared -- in that Canada was 'free' and not slave
territory). When Vermont was admitted in 1791 as a state without slavery, two slave
states, Kentucky in 1792 and Tennessee in 1796, were admitted. Thus, as Washington left
office, there was an even split in the Senate between slave and free states. Ohio entered
the Union in 1803 as the 17th state and this gave 'free' Senators an 18 - 16 margin, but
partisan politics could still guarantee a more even balance as there would be Jeffersonian
Democrat Senators elected in 'Northern' non-slave states, giving pro-slavery forces real
control.

Over the ensuing decades prior to the Missouri Compromise, there was an apparent
deliberate pattern for maintaining the balance. During Madison's Presidency, Louisiana
was admitted with slavery in 1812, knotting the Senate at 18/18, but it was not until 1816
that Indiana's admission threatened to tip the balance (of course, Senators from Indiana
were hardly a unified force against slavery -- quite the opposite was, in fact, the case).
However, in his first year as President, Monroe saw Congress admit Mississippi, restoring
the delicate balance. And this was followed by admission of Illinois as a free state in 1818
and Alabama with slavery in 1819. Thus, by the time of the Missouri Compromise in 1820,
there was a division of the Senate at 22 members from free states and 22 from slave states.
For the first time, the unwritten rule became loudly articulated, so that out of the
agreement forged between North and South, Maine was admitted in 1820 without slavery
and Missouri with it the next year, as a set, as it were. What Jackson effected in 1836 and
1837 was a reflection of the balance doctrine which also demonstrated awareness of
political reality. Michigan, which became a state in January of 1837 following the
admission of Arkansas in June of the previous year as a slave state, was a 'free' state. But
it was one firmly under the control of Jacksonian pro-slavery Democrats.

Democratic strength in the Congress waned with the economic woes that followed
Jackson, but they were in control once more by the time James K. Polk moved into the
White House. Before the end of his first year, he had brought Texas into the Union,
something Tyler had not been able to effectuate, though Florida had become a state on
March 3, 1845, the day before he left office and Polk was inaugurated. Suddenly, the slave
states held a four vote edge, 30 to 26. While it is true that Democratic members of both
Houses generally agreed with Southerner positions on issues ranging from slavery to the
tariff, many in the slave states might have felt that such was too tenuous a guarantee, and
that only an actual effective southern veto in the form of a Senate balance would protect
their interests. But a veto would suffice, and so, agitation which resulted in the entrance
of Iowa in 1846 and Wisconsin in 1848, both free states, would not have been a problem,
especially if they could be relied upon to send Democrats to the Senate for the most part.
And even the admission in 1850 of California as a free state was accepted as part of the
Compromises packages that year (California sent two and Wisconsin one Democratic
Senators to Washington)(6). The Democrat's control of the Senate was 'guaranteed' and
acted as a protective barrier against those who might tamper with slavery.

CHART 2 -- FREE/SLAVE COMPOSITION OF THE UNION

# State Year Admitted Senators from Senators from
Free States Slave States
Original 13 14 12
14 Vermont 1791 16 12
15 Kentucky 1792 16 14
16 Tennessee 1796 16 16
17 Ohio 1803 18 16
18 Louisiana 1812 18 18
19 Indiana 1816 20 18
20 Mississippi 1817 20 20
21 Illinois 1818 22 20
22 Alabama 1819 20 22
23 Maine 1820 24 22
24 Missouri 1821 24 24
25 Arkansas 1836 24 26
26 Michigan 1837 26 26
27 Florida 1845 26 28
28 Texas 1845 26 30
29 Iowa 1846 28 30
30 Wisconsin 1848 30 30
31 California 1850 32 30
32 Minnesota 1858 34 30
33 Oregon 1859 36 30
34 Kansas 1861 38 30

Events through the 1850's would seem to have favored the southern cause as they
related to prospective statehood. The adoption of popular sovereignty, along with Dred
Scott, would make wide-spread slavery in new states possible. But, there were few areas
which might form as states where slavery would be practical. There were simply no new
slave states to be admitted. The Slavocracy was looking for them. From the Ostend
Manifesto to the Filibusters, they cast more than a lustful eye on the Caribbean and Gulf
region, hoping, there is some indication, to be able to structure a slave empire of the
Caribbean, but such hopes were dashed.

By 1858, other changes were afoot. Slavery was cracking the nation much like Poe's
House of Usher (which may have been a premonition also hinted at in the Usher's peculiar
disorder of hypersensitivity of skin). In the aftermath of Dred Scott and Harper's Ferry,
with the 36th Congress, anti-slavery forces led by the new Republican Party were in the
majority in the House. In the Senate, the Democrat slavocracy was holding on, by its
teeth. In 1858, Minnesota became a 'free' state, followed by Oregon the next year.
Originally, both sent two Democrats to the Senate(7).

Fissures in the Democratic Party had long seethed below the surface, but now further
compounded the dilemna. The issue of Senate control also fueled the bloodshed in Kansas
over that state's admission. It would be admitted as a free state only following a fight in
the party. Buchanan tried to get it accepted under the Lecompton Constitution and in this
he was opposed by Stephen Douglas. This took place against the back-drop of the
campaign of 1860, the splintering of the Democratic Party, and Southern secession, and in
the face of a prospective 38 to 30 edge for 'free' states in the Senate.

Another change was making itself felt in the United States Senate in 1860. The
Democrats had held a commanding majority in the upper house which began to erode by
about 1857. By 1858, however, they still held 41 seats, nearly two-thirds of them from
Southern 'slave' states, to 19 for the Republicans (at this point only four years on the
scene). There were also two seats held by other parties -- one by the Union and one left in
ostensibly 'Whig' hands. With 1859, the Democrats still had 40 seats, but the GOP total
had risen to 24. There were still the same other two party members, as well. Michigan's
legislature had replaced Democrat Lewis Cass with Republican Zachariah Chandler March
4, 1857, and it also sent another Republican, Kinsey Bingham, to fill the seat that
Democrat Charles Stuart had held March 4, 1859.(8)

With 1860, the margin dropped to 39 to 25 and by the next year, the Republicans had
30 seats to the 37 held by Democrats(9). By this time, however, even while it seems the
Democracy still held the upper hand, even though a weakening one, the rifts of the 1860
campaign had fragmented the Democratic Party. There were a rather small number of
Democratic Senators from non-slave states, but there seemed to have developed
something of a 'credibility gap' between them and those from the South. California and
Indiana both had two Democrats representing them as 1860 dawned, and there were
Democratic Senators from Minnesota, Illinois, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, as well.
Among these were some less than adamant on the slavery question, at least from the
Southern perspective, and one of them, Douglas, had been at the core of the split in the
party. Not far into 1861, the balance could be seen changing further, particularly because
of increases in the state legislative strength of Republicans in several states. By March 3,
Indiana would replace one of its Democrats with a Republican, and Oregon had put the
Republican Baker into the vacant seat formerly held by Democrat Delozan Smith(10).
There would be 35 Democrats to match wits with 32 Republicans and three Union Party
members. Whatever sentiments on key issues for the South -- slavery, the tariff, etc. --
they had lost their majority control over the chamber. Even the prospect of an effective
'veto' was gone, except for through the filibuster, which was a tenuous method at best, and
becoming even moreso as Republican strength grew.

South Carolina may have seceded upon hearing of Lincoln's election, followed by
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana, all of which held a convention to
form a Confederacy in February before Lincoln had become President, by which time
Texas had also voted to leave the Union over its Governor's attempt to block the move
(Houston resigned as Governor when he failed in this effort). But the transformation of
the Senate should not be neglected as a factor in the schism.

It was not until April of 1861 that Virginia voted its secession ordinance, followed by
Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina in May. But the number of Democratic Senators
was dwindling rapidly as Spring of 1861 approached anyway. One, James S. Green from
Missouri, was replaced by Union Party member Walden P. Johnson in March. Events in
Indiana undoubtedly aggravated the situation. By March,, Indiana had sent Republican
Henry Lane to the Senate in place of Democrat Graham Fitch. The other Senator from the
state, also a Democrat, Jesse Bryant, was expelled from the Senate February 5, 1862 after
he had written a letter to Jefferson Davis addressing him as President(12). By this time,
however, control of the body was firmly in Republican hands.

After having served as Oregon's Senator for a little over a year, the Republican Edward
Baker was replaced by a Democrat Benjamin Stake at the end of October in 1861, a
position he held himself only until the following September 12th (1862) when Benjamin F.
Harding, a Republican, replaced him in the Senate from Oregon(13). The conflict raging in
the east had consequences on the opposite coast, as well.

By the time that Oregon's Senators were playing musical chairs, the withdrawal of
Virginia had brought two more new Senators to Washington. Originally sitting as a 'rump'
legislature, the newly organized 'West' Virginia delegates chose new Senators to
'represent' Virginia. By this point, though, with the formation of the Confederacy well
under way, there were only ten Democrats left in the Senate compared with the 32
Republicans now there. 'West' Virginia's Senators were John Carlile, a member of the
Union party, who took his seat July 13, 1861, and a Republican, Waitman T. Willey, who
entered the Senate November 13 of 1861(14).

There had been some shuffling with one of Ohio's seats in March. Salmon Chase took
the seat on March 4th, but left it two days later to become Secretary of the Treasury.
Another Republican, John Sherman, was named Senator as of March 21st. In Illinois,
however, the demise of Stephen A. Douglas on June 3, 1861 led to his replacement by a
Republican Orville H. Browning by June 26th(15).

TABLE 3 -- PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE U.S SENATE 1858-1861(16)
1858 1859 1860 1861

Alabama D D D D D D D D
Arkansas D D D D D D D D
California D D D D D D D D
Connecticut R R R R R R R R
Delaware D D D D D D D D
Florida D D D D D D D D
Georgia D D D D D D D D
Illinois D R D R D R D->R R
Indiana D D D D D D D D->R
Iowa R R R R R R R R
Kansas -- -- -- -- -- -- R R
Kentucky D W D W D W D D
Louisiana D D D D D D D D
Maine R R R R R R R R
Maryland UN W/D UN W/D UN W/D UN W/D
Massachusetts FS/R R FS/R R R R R R
Michigan R D R R R R R R
Minnesota D D D R D R D R
Mississippi D D D D D D D D
Missouri D D D D D D D D->UN
New Hampshire R R R R R R R R
New Jersey D D D D->R D R D R
New York R W/R R W/R R W/R R R
North Carolina D D D D D D D D
Ohio W/R D R D R D R R
Oregon -- -- D D R D R->D D
Pennsylvania R D R D R D R R
Rhode Island R R R R R R R R
South Carolina D D D D D D D D
Tennessee D D D D D D D D
Texas D D D D D D D D
Vermont R R R R R R R R
Virginia D D D D D D D->R D->UN
Wisconsin D R D R D R D R

1/61 4/61
(would have
been)
Totals D 41 D 40 D 39 D 37 D 34
R 21 R 24 R 25 R 30 R 31
O 2 O 2 O 2 O 1 O 3

The one reversal for the Republicans besides Oregon occurred in Kentucky from which
a Democrat John C. Breckinridge (and past Vice President) on March 4, 1861 took the
seat left by John Crittenden, ostensibly still a Whig, March 3rd(17). Again, however, by
this time, the partisan count in both houses of the Congress was lopsided because
Southern members had withdrawn or been expelled subsequent to their state's secession
(the only 'Southern' Democrat left for a time was Tennessee's Andrew Johnson).

As inaccurate as it would be to conclude that the South seceded because they had lost
control of the Senate, it is almost as wrong to assert that it was due simply to Lincoln's
election. That takes nothing away from Lincoln -- it only puts greater emphasis on the
Congress and particularly the Senate. Broadening that statement to attributing secession to
Southern Democrat reaction to Republican victory and hegemony would make it more
accurate, especially given relative strength and importance of the executive and legislative
branches of government before Lincoln. That would put it in the context of Kruman's
realignment thesis. When secession began, it may have been as much due to the loss of
control by the South of the Senate as to anything else. At the very least, the
transformation of the U. S. Senate that took place just before the outbreak of the Civil
War contributed greatly to the fracture that took place.

January 4, 1996

REFERENCES
Asher, Herbert 1988. Presidential Elections and American Politics: Voters, Candidates,
and Campaigns Since 1952, 4th Ed., Brooks Cole
.

Beck, Paul Allen 1974. "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment" in Controversies
in American Voting Behavior, Niemi and Weisburg, Ed., CQ Press.

Boorstin, Daniel and Martha Kelley, 1990. A History of the United States, Prentis
Hall/Simon and Schuster.

Burnham, Walter Dean, 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics,
NY: Norton.

Chambers, William and Walter Burnham, 1975. The American Party System: Stages of
Political Development, 2nd Ed., NY: Oxford U Press.

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections, 2nd Ed., 1984, CQ Press.

Dimond, Stanley and Elmer Pflieger, 1973. Our American Government, Lippincott.

Gienapp, William, 1988. Origins of the Republican Party 1852-56, OUP.

Kruman, Mark 1993. Lectures in Civil War and Reconstruction, Wayne State University.

Schafer, Byron, Ed., 1991. The End of Realignment.

ENDNOTES

1. Asher, Herbert. Presidential Elections and American Politics.
2. Schafer, Byron, Ed. The End of Realignment.
3. Boorstin, Daniel and Martha Kelley. A History of the United States.
4. Dimond, Stanley and Elmer Pflieger. Our American Government.
5. Kruman, Marc. Lectures in Civil War and Reconstruction at Wayne State University.
6. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
7. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
8. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
9. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
10. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
11. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
12. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
13. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
14. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
15. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
16. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.
17. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections.

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