XVI. Liberal Absolutism There is, indeed, a ghost haunting America and it has been responsible for the current haunting of the White House. But, there is a self-exercising exorcism inherent in the diminishing marginal returns of the phenomenon. Neither the unions, the DNC, Perot, the reporters, or the pollsters will be able to expend the resources necessary to continue the flim flam game indefinitely. Then too, the exorcism of the White House may yet get some help. Many individuals there spend a lot time listening for the other shoe to drop (as well as for ghosts). Of course, Democrat control of the White House does pose potentially dilatory consequences for America: the judges appointed, less discipline for budgetary responsibility, continuing destruction of the military, etc. But it did help usher in the Republican Congress and welfare reform, and that may hasten movement toward a balanced budget. There is, as well, a countervailing spirit at work. Clinton could not have won had he not presented himself, at least rhetorically, as a 'new Democrat.' During the '96 campaign, he even took to referring to himself as a 'conservative.'! If a regular campaign of distortion and disinformation waged against Republican candidates since 1964 sounds too rich to many ears, one might wonder where they have been, but it should be remembered that there is no contention of any elaborate conspiratorial coordinated effort toward that end. However difficult it may be to explain away the indication of what often appear to be concerted endeavors, that does not necessarily require that lawful processes could not produce these phenomenon. It is just a simple matter of those determined to construct a collectivization of America waging a war in behalf of their agenda which very frequently takes the form of pulling out all the stops in opposing those who would resist it. Those positioned in the media, for example, to make determination of what does and does not get reported (Bennet, 1988) tend to operate from a set of biases which accord preferences to items which fit their ideological slant and discard those which do not. Much of this has to do with the training and inclination which motivates such individuals to pursuit of such training and positions, and a degree of that can be laid at the feet of the operations in academia which generate these results. And yet, there is no secret board, for example, which dictates which individuals 'rise' in academia into teaching and research positions, or determine what will and will not be published. Nevertheless, throughout the so-called social disciplines (including political science, history, sociology, social work, and journalism, etc), little that is not of a decidedly liberal slant gets published, and few individuals secure appointment who do not share such ideological orientation. It is fundamentally of the nature of the liberal absolutism articulated by Louis Hartz that this occurs (Hartz 1954). But it explains how the homeless crisis, for example, came and went and why certain clips of Clinton speeches got air time while only particular ones uttered by Dole, did, and why coverage of Dole was more likely to be phrased in derogatory terms, often irrespective or completely not relating anything he said. Thus, when Dole, realizing that the media would make much of negative rhetoric against him if he spoke to the NAACP, turned down the invitation to appear, that was played to his detriment by the press, but when Clinton refused to appear before the American Legion, it got hardly any attention or mention at all. The issue is not whether or not either should not have spoken to either group, but the tenor of the spin put on each event by the mainstream media. In such an environment, reductions in the rate of growth of spending have been propagated as 'cuts' in spending when they are nothing of the sort. And yet, they are repeated by press and politician alike, like so many mocking birds, and with no orchestration of the chorus necessary, at all. It also bears consideration that a large segment of the liberal vote is simply responding to what it perceives to be its own self-interest. While only some 15% of the workforce today is unionized, approximately 42% of union members today are public employees, and so large a segment of the population is locked into dependency that it is not surprising that Democrats can count on a hefty level of support from it, assuring themselves of considerable chance for electoral success. That does not mean that there does not appear division in the ranks, but it is much more likely to appear on the other side of the aisle where the ideological orientation is much more open and in tune with some variation of 'rugged individualism' or, at least, where there can legitimately be differences of opinion. One of the reasons often mentioned for Carter's failure to win re-election in 1980 was the challenge to him by Ted Kennedy, it being assumed to have split the party and guaranteed defeat. But, it should not be overlooked that the challenge may well have been generated by the perception that Carter was going to fail in the effort. Indeed, since 1968, and even before, there has been only 1996 that did not witness such a division on the left. That fact has frequently been mentioned as one of the reasons for the low level of electoral success Democrats are normally seen as having had in seeking the White House. But the environment which determines the play given to such division is of a different character than that afforded differences on the other side of the fence. Clinton in particular has enjoyed a kid glove treatment by the media, and one not even extended to others on his side of the political spectrum. Thus, he was able to overcome the same kind of adversity that brought Gary Hart crashing down. XVII. The Spectre Haunting America A greater question may be how Ronald Reagan was able to overcome such treatment. Although Nixon was able to do so in 1968, but only just barely, he was much more successful at it in 1972. But that may be due to his inclination to advance federal authority and collectivization. After all, he is responsible for the structuring of wage and price controls, the EPA, and OSHA. And Nixon also advanced the thesis that we were "all Keynesians." Nixon, of course, ran into problems, perhaps in part due to his use of impoundment, for example, which brought the vultures down on him. The only other instance of electoral success for Republicans in seeking the White House since 1960 was George Bush, who was able to win election on Reagan's coat-tails, but only once. Ronald Reagan was successful in building a victorious coalition in 1980, even over the Anderson obstacle, largely due to the retrospective rejection of Carter. His re-election success in 1984 was clearly of a different species, however. Even in the face of an all-out blitzkrieg against him, he won handily, a success probably attributable to the impact of his programs and his character and communication skills. Nevertheless, had a force as formidable as Perot deployed against him in either 1980 or 1984 (or against Bush in 1988), the results would have been quite different. That there was no such occurrence may be attributable to lack of opposition, but it is probably more due to an inability of forces of that ilk to coalesce successfully. One might, in fact, see the Perot card as a response to such non-crystallization of opposition by one bent on manufacturing it, and with the capacity to act unilaterally to create it. That would almost require an assumption that Perot really did not want to be President -- and that may help explain much of his otherwise unfathomable conduct in both campaigns. There are a number of reasons that Bush and Dole were unsuccessful in their bids in 1992 and 1996, but the determining variable in both contests was Ross Perot. Had he not charged onto the scene in the manner in which he did, there is little question that the other forces arrayed could have risen as factors in the manner in which they did. All the others were dependent on that for the impact they had. Continue 1