One of the key themes for debate at that seminar was the uneasy
relationship between Iraq and Iran, which fought a bitter eight-year war in
the 1980s before entering a cease-fire but have yet to sign a formal
peace treaty, the developments within Iran in the regional context and the
future of Iraq.

The seminar touched upon the question whether an external party could
influence a real reconciliation between the two countries and reviewed
the “dual containment” policy followed by the U.S. The fact is that if
there is real reconciliation between Baghdad and Tehran, then the rest
of the pieces would fall into place because an Iraqi-Iranian alliance in
the real sense with the blessing of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
member countries could counter any external meddling in the region,
particularly that a regional alliance would bring in Syria as a natural
partner.

It is an eventuality that is feared by the West in the Gulf and it is
clear that the Western countries would exert all their efforts to
pre-empt an Arab-Iranian alliance in the region. The possibility of a
Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian-Gulf Arab alliance has been bothering Washington for a
long time and U.S. strategists have always made sure that any U.S. move
in the region would discourage the various parties involved in the
equation from even thinking about such an alliance. They have indeed
succeeded to a large extent.

The key to a Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian alliance is indeed Tehran. Damascus
and Baghdad have signalled that they might be able to work out a modus
vivendi between themselves. The extent of that arrangement depends on
whether they could arrive at a clear and perfect understanding that
pre-empts any question of ideological supremacy.

A clichÈ in Western parlance is that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and
Syrian President Hafez Al Assad hate each other's guts and a
reconciliation between them is impossible. However, one has to take into
consideration the impact on Saddam of the regional isolation of his country and
of the sweeping international sanctions on his people. There is a
widely held belief that Saddam has become more pragmatic since the
disastrous result of his country's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and is ready to be
as flexible as it needs to seal reconciliation with Assad.

Damascus seems to have been restraining itself from going full-steam
ahead in ties with Baghdad because of the negative consequences of such a
move on Syria's ties with the West as well as the course of the Middle
East peace process where it has been hoping to regain the Golan Heights
from Israel. Now that it has become clear that it would take more than
a nudge to prompt Israel into meeting Syrian demands, prospects for the
return of the Golan and indeed peace with the Israeli state seems to
have been pushed onto the backburner. That might prompt Damascus to look
towards Baghdad.

A Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation could be instrumental in producing a
better Iraqi-Iranian equation, but it is unlikely to make Baghdad and
Tehran the best of friends in the neighbourhood.

Although the intensity of the Iranian-Syrian relationship seems to have
cooled somewhat after Damascus went ahead with negotiations with Israel
against Tehran's liking, there is every possibility of a new warmth in
relations if both sides made the right moves. That brings the focus on
the Iranian leadership.

Today, Iran is seen as a moderate state under the leadership of
President Mohammed Khatami. But it is a bit early to judge whether he will
emerge as the winner in the ongoing tug-of-war with the conservative
hardliners who have signalled an all-out effort to fight any change in the
fundamentals that have guided the country since the 1979 revolution.

There are several scenarios in the medium term in Iran. Khatami might
succeed in the battle against hard-liners if he takes things easy and
nudges reform at a moderate pace without enraging the conservative camp
of theologians. It might take a few years to achieve that. Another
scenario is that hard-liners succeed in subduing the liberals because of the
peculiar power structure in Tehran where they enjoy an edge over the
government in the judiciary, police and religious militia. However, even
if the Khatami camp is subdued now, the drive for reforms will not be
halted and it would soon be beyond the power of the hard-liners to
control it.

Against the backdrop of such pressing preoccupations, it is highly
unlikely that Khatami will engage in reconciling with Iraq. It would be a
highly unpopular move among his own constituents to whom the memory of
the war with Iraq is all too fresh. The human as well as material loss
during the war was much heavier on the Iranian side, and few Iranian
families have been spared the scars of the conflict.

The recent intensification of anti-Iran military operations by the
Iraq-based Mujadhedeen e-Khalq, the main Iranian opposition group, is an
added factor to the elements that prevent a rapprochement between Tehran
and Baghdad. So is the presence of the main Iraqi Shiite opposition
group in Iran.

Facts that also need to be taken into consideration include Iran's
retention of over 120 military planes that were sent there by Iraq in good
faith for safekeeping during the Gulf war, and Tehran's demand for over
a trillion dollars in compensation for the losses it suffered from the
Iran-Iraq war.

As such, sealing a peace agreement and achieving reconciliation with
Iraq is not among Khatami's priorities, even if he was in a position to
exercise this option. He can take up the issue only when he is assured
of unrestricted power as head of government with no meddling from any
quarters and when he is confident that he has brought about lasting
improvements in the quality of life for Iranians.

In the interim, he has opted to maintain steady ties with Iraq,
releasing a few hundreds prisoners of war, a move seen as a pacifying gesture
after Iran launched a crackdown on vessels smuggling out Iraqi oil
along the Iranian coastline.

It is almost impossible to improve Iraqi-Iranian relationships at the
moment. It may take decades and changes in leaderships before that is
achieved, unless of course miracles occur.