Heritage Foundation
Issues 2000: The Candidate’s Briefing Book
International Peacekeeping
James H. Anderson, Ph.D., and Jack Spencer
The Issues
Since the end of the Cold War, the resurgence of bloody ethnic and tribal strife has generated many new demands on the U.S. military and its scarce resources. The U.S. armed forces are increasingly being deployed on Operations Other Than Warfare (OOTW) that are unrelated to their primary mission: deterring conflict through their constant readiness to fight and win wars.
President Bill Clinton made peace operations a mainstay of his foreign policy. Under a vague strategy of "enlargement and engagement" and a policy of "assertive multilateralism," the Administration has committed U.S. forces (including large numbers of ground combat troops) in a haphazard fashion to deal with a variety of international crises that have little or no connection to the nation's security interests. Whenever it commits U.S. forces, the Administration is also committing America's credibility and prestige. But this Administration has done so without clear and specific criteria to govern when, where, how, and why those forces are deployed.
Furthermore, confusion exists in Washington over the use of terms like "peacekeeping," "peace enforcement," and the more generic "peace operations." To a certain extent, this confusion reflects the inherent complexity of operations conducted in response to messy conflicts that have generally defied easy solutions. To use the term "peace" in connection with any of these operations is misleading; it implies there is little or no danger to U.S. troops. As events in Lebanon and Somalia painfully demonstrated, peacekeeping operations can be bloody and costly.
The Administration's foreign policy team appears to have learned little from the Somalia debacle in 1993; it was followed by massive interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The tragic fate that dogged the Somalia venture fortunately was not repeated in Haiti or the Balkans, although the potential for loss of American lives remains high in Bosnia and Kosovo. There have been very few casualties in these operations, and none due to direct hostilities. Nevertheless, the cost of these missions--in scarce defense dollars, in combat readiness, in the morale of the personnel involved, and in the stress on their families--is immense. The growing number of peacekeeping commitments means that the U.S. armed forces are operating at a higher tempo than at any time since the Vietnam War. And since U.S. military forces have been radically downsized under this Administration, they are continually asked to do more with less.
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). This directive was supposed to define the scope and conditions of U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping efforts, and it generally does provide restrictive conditions for peace operations. It was formulated in part as a response to the stinging criticism of the Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism. A more pungent oxymoron would be hard to find: Multilateralism is seldom assertive. The alleged superiority of multilateral action assumes that majority opinion will carry greater moral weight simply because it is the majority opinion. But intent, not the number of agents involved, is the key factor in determining the rightness or wrongness of any international action. Further, the Administration's assumption that multilateralism should be an end in itself has distorted policy debates and decisions.
Americans and their representatives in Congress appear willing to tolerate the broad use of the nation's military forces in peacekeeping and nation-building operations, and to allow the Administration to avoid accountability for their possible misuse, largely because casualties in such missions--Somalia excepted--have been low. But over time, the potential for a military disaster will continue to grow. Perhaps a disaster like the one in Somalia will occur in the Balkans if the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo under the direction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are extended indefinitely. It may also come on the heels of a genuine national security emergency, perhaps on the Korean Peninsula or in the Persian Gulf, or even in both places simultaneously. If any of these scenarios were to happen, the Administration would be hard pressed to respond promptly and forcefully, since many of America's best combat forces are likely to be tied up in non-essential operations or to have their combat readiness degraded.
Obviously, it would be unwise to rule out all U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations. In theory at least, such missions could serve a national interest. That said, however, it is equally clear that the Administration dramatically oversold the benefits of involving the United States in peacekeeping operations. An unfortunate side effect has been a growing isolationist-leaning sentiment among the American people.
In the past decade, the U.S. military has been increasingly asked to devote its scarce resources to peacekeeping missions. Too often, it has obliged. The net result is that today large portions of the military are unfit for combat, a fact recently reported in The Washington Post. 51 In the future, there are important concerns that Congress and the Administration must consider in designing a new direction for national defense.
1. The U.S. military's primary mission is to fight and defeat America's enemies should war erupt. It must be ready to fight at a moment's notice. The U.S. military should participate in peacekeeping operations only when it contributes to this mission.
2. Peacekeeping operations drain finite U.S. military resources. The U.S. military is operating at about 60 percent of its Cold War levels. Yet it is being asked to dedicate more of its scarce resources to peacekeeping missions that have no clear end in sight. For example, around 6,000 troops are currently deployed as part of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo. At the same time, other troops are preparing for deployment to replace them, and still other troops are recovering from deployment and preparing for another assignment. At any given time, up to an entire Army division could be affected by a commitment of 6,000 troops to a peacekeeping mission.
3. U.S. involvement in peacekeeping efforts is acceptable under some conditions. The United States should not reject all calls for peacekeeping assistance. The peacekeeping failures of the 1990s in Somalia and Haiti were due mainly to political miscalculations. The United States has global interests, and it is in its national interest to influence other nations to behave in a manner that advances peace. In some tightly defined cases, this could mean sending troops on peacekeeping missions.
4. Equal burden-sharing should be at the core of U.S. peacekeeping efforts. The United States should contribute to international peacekeeping efforts only to the degree that its national security interests are at stake. Often this may mean logistical, technical, and political support. In the most vital cases, which would be rare, the United States could contribute manpower.
The Facts
The Administration's policy on peace operations is spelled out in PDD 25. One of the most contentious issues between Congress and the executive branch related to peace operations is the command and control of U.S. troops. PDD 25 asserts that while the United States does not put its troops under the "command" of foreign officers, it may cede "operational control" to foreign officers for specific missions. "Operational control" is normally defined as the temporary authority to organize forces and employ them in tasks necessary to accomplish a given mission.
Peacekeeping Operations
FACT: The U.S. military is operating in some 60 locations around the world.
These non-combatant missions range from the "high-end" deployment of large combat formations for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to the "low-end" deployment of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) observers on the border between Peru and Ecuador.
Since 1982, the United States has committed 900 U.S. troops to the Sinai Peninsula as part of a multinational peacekeeping force deployed to monitor and report violations of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that followed the Camp David Accords.
FACT: The President's reasons for sending U.S. troops on peacekeeping assignments are numerous.
* Somalia. In October 1993, 19 American soldiers died in a single firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, an episode brought on by the Administration's misguided efforts at "nation building" and pursuit of elusive Somali warlords.
* Haiti. In September 1994, the Administration embarked on a massive intervention in Haiti. Despite an exhaustive U.S.-led effort to promote democracy and prosperity in Haiti, the country remains a quagmire of corruption and poverty.
* Balkans. In December 1995, President Clinton deployed 20,000 U.S. troops in a NATO mission to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The President stated that U.S. participation in the NATO Bosnia mission was to last for only one year. That pledge was broken several times, and nearly 6,000 American soldiers remain in Bosnia more than four years after their initial deployment.
* Kosovo. In June 1999, the Administration committed 6,000 U.S. troops to serve as peacekeepers in Kosovo. The President refused to speculate on how long these troops would be deployed.
* East Timor. In September 1999, the Administration committed 200 U.S. troops to provide communications, intelligence, and logistics support to the Australian-led coalition peacekeeping force of 7,500 in East Timor, Indonesia.
Peacekeeping Costs
FACT: Non-essential operations, such as peacekeeping, are expensive and may detract from more important security needs.
* The total cost for the Bosnia operation was expected to reach nearly $11 billion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1999--more than four times the Administration's original estimate.
* The cost to the United States during the first week of the Kosovo military action alone was approximately $55.7 million. The total cost to U.S. taxpayers for the military action and the subsequent peacekeeping mission, called KFOR, from the time the operation began until the end of FY 1999, is about $4.5 billion or $5 billion. That breaks down to about $40 for every American household.
* From 1996 through the first quarter of 1999, the Defense Department documented $10.6 billion in peacekeeping expenditures. 52 Specifically, the United States spent $2 billion in Haiti before pulling out. 53 In April 1999, a supplementary budget request was presented to Congress asking for $6 billion for Kosovo-related operations. The FY 2000 Pentagon budget requested $1.8 billion for Bosnia-related operations. The State Department also has a peacekeeping budget. It requested $235 million for FY 2000.
* A U.S. General Accounting Office report documented that the United States spent a total of $6.6 billion on United Nations peacekeeping efforts from 1992 to 1995. 54 The U.N. assesses the United States 31.7 percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs (for operations approved by the Security Council). 55 Legislation enacting a unilateral reduction in U.S. appropriations to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, capping the U.S. contribution at 25 percent of the total budget, was included in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1994 and FY 1995. It was passed in April 1995 as P.L. 103-236. This cap went into effect in 1996. 56
* To fund the extra costs of participating in U.N. peacekeeping activities, the Clinton Administration has relied on existing Department of Defense budgets, interdepartmental transfers, and occasional supplemental appropriations.
Impact on Combat Readiness
FACT: The number of troops deployed to a peace operation is only one-third of those actually affected by the deployment.
The "rule of three" dictates that the number of troops deflected from their primary war-fighting mission by an extended peacekeeping operation is actually three times the number deployed. For example, if one mechanized infantry brigade is deployed to Bosnia, three mechanized infantry brigades will actually be affected: the troops deployed on the mission, the troops training and preparing to deploy, and those just returning from the deployment who must spend months retraining to regain their readiness to perform traditional combat missions.
FACT: Peace operations can negatively affect combat readiness.
The impact of peacekeeping operations on readiness has been mixed. Although some occupational specialties, such as logistics and medical units, may benefit from such operations, the skills of combat units invariably atrophy. Combat units assigned to peacekeeping duties suffer from a decline in the quality and quantity of combat training exercises. Such training involves a taxing array of coordinated gunnery and maneuvering skills. The larger the unit deployed, the longer it takes to regain necessary combat skills. For example, an armored division deployed to Bosnia as part of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR), as specified by the Dayton accords, needs approximately a year to regain its former level of readiness (as a division).
* The U.S. Army estimates that after an OOTW deployment, an infantry battalion needs up to 14 months (during peacetime) to recover its warfighting capabilities.
* The U.S. military is suffering its worst personnel crisis since the draft ended in 1973. Except for the Marine Corps, all the services are struggling to attract a sufficient number of qualified recruits. Attrition is higher than normal for mid-grade officer ranks, especially among highly skilled and critical personnel like Air Force pilots and naval aviators. Many of those leaving the service at mid-career attribute their decision to the relentless pace of overseas deployments.
The Record
The Clinton Administration
The Clinton Administration has shown a disturbing tendency to "legitimize" the use of American power by subordinating it to the U.N. or other multinational bodies. This policy of "assertive multilateralism," combined with the Administration's failure to develop sound criteria to govern decisions to participate in non-combat operations, has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of such operations involving the United States that have little or no discernible benefit to the nation's security.
After the disaster in Somalia in the fall of 1993, the Administration took pains to distance itself, at least rhetorically, from the policy of assertive multilateralism. The evidence, however, suggests that the Administration remains psychologically wedded to this notion, especially when peacekeeping operations are being considered.
In Bosnia, the Administration's method of obtaining congressional approval for the operation could be characterized as "bait and switch." On November 27, 1995, the President promised that the deployment of U.S. troops would last only one year and incur limited costs. On December 2, 1995, President Clinton spoke to the troops at the U.S. Army base in Baumholder, Germany, declaring, "I pledged to the American people that I would not send you to Bosnia unless I was absolutely sure that the goals we set for you are clear, realistic, and achievable in about a year. This mission meets those essential standards." The Administration dispensed with the original timetable shortly after the November 1996 presidential election.
In December 1996, President Clinton committed the United States to an 18-month peacekeeping mission in Bosnia known as SFOR, which was scheduled to end in June 1998. 57 The President presented Congress a fait accompli: He knew Members would be reluctant to force a withdrawal through a funding cutoff while U.S. troops were on the ground. In December 1998, NATO agreed to prolong SFOR's mission indefinitely. Currently, there are about 32,000 troops stationed in Bosnia, of which 6,000 are American.
The President twice broke his pledge regarding a date for withdrawing the U.S. contingent in Bosnia, and now U.S. troops find themselves effectively committed to an open-ended mission with no exit strategy. On March 24, 1999, NATO forces began an air assault on Yugoslavia on the premise that Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic's aggression against the Serbian republic of Kosovo was an unacceptable humanitarian crisis. One of the "objectives" of the air war was to compel Milosevic to allow international peacekeepers into Kosovo (which is part of the sovereign territory of Yugoslavia). From the outset of hostilities, then, it was clear that America's highly trained fighting forces would be subjected to a draining non-combat mission. On June 9, 1999, Milosevic agreed to the terms of the Military Technical Agreement, effectively ending hostilities, and allowing peacekeeping troops in Kosovo under a U.N.-led force known as KFOR.
Stung by criticism of his broken promises in Bosnia, the President took a different approach regarding the deployment of 6,000 U.S. peacekeeping troops to Kosovo. The Administration refuses to set any end date, stranding U.S. troops in an open-ended commitment.
Plans for the Kosovo "peace" operation call for 50,000 troops, to include 7,000 Americans. Taking into account the need to rotate troops periodically, this commitment would tie up an entire U.S. Army division for perhaps an entire generation. This will place additional stress on the U.S. military, stretched thin even before the Kosovo crises began in March 1999.
Furthermore, the peacekeeping deployment would hasten NATO's transformation from a defensive military alliance to a Balkan constabulary force, a process that was already well under way with NATO's open-ended commitment in Bosnia.
The Kosovo peacekeeping mission would bring the overall number of NATO troops in the Balkans to 81,000, including 13,000 Americans. In September 1999, the Administration committed 200 American troops to assist the Australian-led peacekeeping operation in East Timor. The Administration did not specify how long the mission would last. It has hinted that it may commit additional troops in the future.
Congress
In general, Congress has failed to assert its prerogatives clearly or to act on the concerns of the American people about the Administration's misguided policy of assertive multilateralism and open-ended peace operations. Significant debate on when and where the United States should be involved in such peace operations only began with regard to Kosovo.
For example, on October 8, 1998, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) and 19 co-sponsors expressed congressional opposition "to any deployment of United States ground forces in Kosovo...for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes" in S. Con. Res. 125. Chief among their reasons was that "there is no vital United States national security interest at stake in the current violence taking place in Kosovo." A similar resolution, H. Con. Res. 343, was introduced the same day in the House.
Others in the 106th Congress attempted to curb the Administration's appetite for peacekeeping missions. For example, on April 26, 1999, during the air war in Kosovo, Representative Tillie Fowler (R-FL) introduced the Military Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Limitation Act of 1999 (H.R. 1562) to prohibit the use of Defense Department funds for the "deployment of ground elements" of the U.S. military into the former Yugoslavia "unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law."
The United States contributed the majority of resources to the Kosovo military campaign. Congress attempted to ensure that the same problem did not occur during the reconstruction and peacekeeping phase of the operation. The Kosovo Burdensharing Resolution (H. Res. 268), introduced by Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NE) on July 30, 1999, acknowledged that the United States contributed "the disproportionately large share of the costs" to the operation and sought to limit further U.S. contributions to no more than 18 percent.
What To Do In 2001
It is inevitable that there will be some tension between the President, as commander in chief, and Congress concerning the deployment of U.S. forces abroad. Clearly, when a genuine national security emergency arises, the President must act promptly to protect American lives or vital interests without the constraints of a lengthy debate and authorization process in Congress. But the peacekeeping operations of the past decade have not involved such emergencies. Congress should supply a constitutional check on executive branch profligacy with U.S. forces and military resources. Congress has the right and the authority to authorize such missions or to deny funds for them by statute if they are deemed harmful to the combat readiness of the U.S. military or the nation's interests.
Overhauling the Funding Mechanism
Currently, the Administration resorts to a variety of mechanisms--existing Pentagon budgets, interdepartmental transfers, and occasional supplemental appropriations--to pay the extra costs the U.S. military incurs through its participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. As a consequence, it is difficult to grasp the full cost of these operations. In authorizing and appropriating federal dollars, Congress should pay particular attention to remedying the depletion of the defense budget caused by unanticipated and open-ended commitments to U.N. peacekeeping operations.
When the U.N. Security Council approves a peace operation, U.N. member states are assessed automatically. The cost of America's participation in the mission comes out of a Defense Department budget that is already too lean to support standing U.S. military requirements and commitments. Any overhaul of the funding mechanism should include, at a minimum, the following elements:
ACTION ITEM: Pay for peace operations on a "pay-as-you-go" basis.
To do so, Congress must approve supplemental authorization and appropriations for any mission lasting longer than one month and costing more than a certain amount (say $25 million). This policy would create more accurate accountability and lead to a clearer understanding of what each peacekeeping operation actually costs. It would also set fiscal limits and restore Congress's proper role in authorizing such missions. At the same time, it would exempt true humanitarian emergencies (like earthquake relief) that involve the temporary use of U.S. military resources.
ACTION ITEM: Establish a firewall in the defense budget, through legislation, so that scarce defense funds are not used for non-defense expenditures.
This step would eliminate the delays, confusion, and lack of accountability inherent in budget pass-backs and transfers and in determining whether the peace operation is or is not subject to reimbursement from the United Nations. At the same time, a national security waiver should be available for the President so he is not hindered from quickly deploying U.S. forces to deal with actual challenges to vital U.S. interests or threats to American lives. In exchange, he should be required to certify that the military intervention is in response to a national security emergency that justifies operating outside the usual restrictions.
ACTION ITEM: Do not fund U.S. participation in U.N. peace enforcement operations, as defined in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, except when vital U.S. national security interests are at stake.
In a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission, the parties in a conflict have not made peace. The U.N. peacekeeping contingent must separate them, by force if necessary, and attempt to bring order to a potentially volatile situation. Clearly, the risks to the peace enforcement contingent are quite high in Chapter VII missions, and the chances of success are lower than in traditional peacekeeping operations.
Conditions for Peace Operations
ACTION ITEM: Establish clear guidelines for interventions.
The Administration should commit U.S. forces to international peacekeeping missions--and Congress should vote to support or deny support for those missions--based on the following guidelines:
1. The intervention defends or advances vital U.S. national security interests;
2. The intervention will not jeopardize the ability of the United States to meet more important security commitments;
3. The intervention will achieve political and military goals that are clearly defined, decisive, attainable, and sustainable;
4. The intervention enjoys congressional and public support; and
5. The armed forces involved in the intervention are allowed to create the conditions for its success.
ACTION ITEM: Insist that highly capable U.S. ground forces are not assigned to conventional peacekeeping missions as defined in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter.
Traditional peacekeeping operations are covered by Chapter VI of the Charter. They take place when the parties in a conflict consent to terms and invite U.N. peacekeepers to maintain the agreed zones of separation and to help implement the terms of the agreement. The dangers to peacekeepers in a Chapter VI operation are usually small.
When necessary, and to cooperate with the division of labor among NATO allies and U.N. members, the United States should offer logistics, command-and-control, and heavy lift support that the other powers cannot provide. The allied powers should supply the ground forces, to ensure that the United States reserves its core competencies and combat troops for true emergencies.
ACTION ITEM: Object to any attempts to put U.S. troops under foreign operational control, unless there are exceptional circumstances.
The United Nations does not have the political legitimacy, military authority, or institutional mechanisms and procedures with which to manage combat operations effectively. Peace enforcement operations often require combat, and combat operations require military forces that are trained to a common standard and operate under an authoritative and responsive command and control structure. The U.N. does not provide that structure. On rare occasions, U.S. troops might be put under the operational control of a close and competent NATO ally, such as Great Britain. But this should only occur in the most severe situations--for example, when mission objectives are jeopardized.
Q & A
Q. Now that the threat of a Soviet attack on Europe has disappeared, why shouldn't U.S. forces be used to support U.N. peace operations?
A. World events continue to pose dangerous and uncertain threats. America must maintain its high level of combat readiness to keep its commitments to its alliances and to protect its vital interests around the globe. Some participation in U.N. peacekeeping is acceptable, but excessive involvement in U.N. and other peace operations diverts scarce defense funds and resources that should be used to maintain that readiness.
Even though the U.S. military has been downsized by some 40 percent since the end of the Cold War, it is being asked to intervene in a growing number of peace operations. This puts great stress on service members and their families, lowering morale and heightening the early departure of highly skilled U.S. military personnel. It also wears out equipment, which is generally not being replaced. Finally, if U.S. forces are over-committed to peacekeeping missions, they may not be in a position to respond to genuine national security emergencies in the Middle East or Korea.
Q. Shouldn't the United States do its part to support the United Nations with full participation in its peacekeeping missions?
A. The United States already pays the largest share of the costs of operating the United Nations, and often incurs costs for its humanitarian and other non-combat missions for which it receives no reimbursement. From time to time, and in the right circumstances, the United States should support U.N. peacekeeping operations--primarily with logistics, strategic lift, and command, control, and communications support. But the United States should not be expected to sacrifice its unique heavy combat capabilities, which may be needed to counter true emergencies, when other U.N. countries or NATO allies could supply the constabulary-type ground forces for peacekeeping.
Q. If peacekeeping is so futile, or if it doesn't serve clear national interests, why participate at all? Should Congress outlaw all U.S. participation in peacekeeping?
A. Congress should insist on limits on the number, scope, and costs of U.S. participation in peacekeeping. But an occasion may arise when it is in the national interest to participate fully or even take the lead. To permit America to act on those rare occasions, a blanket prohibition on all U.S. peacekeeping operations should be avoided.
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