East Timor Ballot for Independence
Contents:
* Details of the Independence Ballot and its aftermath.
* An opinion piece by Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Peace Laureate
* An opinion piece by Nick Tolley, Australian Liberal Students President
* Reflections of INTERFET commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove
Background
In June 1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy for the Territory of East Timor, which would keep the area as a part of the state of Indonesia. Once this proposal was set on the table, talks made rapid progress and resulted in a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal, signed in New York on 5 May 1999. The two Governments entrusted the Secretary-General of the United Nations with organizing and conducting a "Popular Consultation" in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.
To carry out the consultation, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. The 5 May agreements stipulated that, after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transition period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people.
The Ballot Result
Despite an extremely tight timetable, a high level of tension, and the Territory's mountainous terrain, poor roads and difficult communications, UNAMET registered 451,792 potential voters among the population of over 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. On voting day, 30 August 1999, some 98 per cent of registered voters went to the polls deciding by a margin of 94,388 (21.5 per cent) to 344,580 (78.5 per cent) to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence.
Following the successful conduct of the independence ballot in East Timor on 30 August 2000, the UN Secretary-General announced the result on September 4th. This was truly an historic milestone on the path to resolution of East Timor's political status. UNAMET achieved outstanding success in conducting a free and fair ballot in East Timor, under extremely difficult conditions.
Transitional Measures
In the post-ballot phase, the next critical next step in preparing for the implementation of the ballot outcome will be ratification of the result by Indonesia's MPR (People's Consultative Assembly), in accordance with Indonesia's commitments under Agreements made on May 5. International observers were reasonably confident that the MPR, in considering this issue, would respect the clearly expressed will of the East Timorese people. The Indonesians have also foreshadowed release of Xanana Gusmao, a move that will assist in persuading people from participating in violence.
The establishment of the East Timorese Consultative Commission in Dili on 31 August 2000 has already created the basis for a transitional administration..
Security Deteriorates
Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. The Indonesian authorities did not respond effectively to the violence, despite clear commitments made under the 5 May agreements. Many East Timorese were killed and as many as 500,000 were displaced from their homes, about half leaving the territory, in some cases by force.
Officially, Indonesia remained responsible for security in East Timor. It remained obliged to bring an end to the sporadic violence and intimidation that has continued since ballot day. TNI and the Indonesian police have not yet done enough to stop militia violence and impunity. Rising militia violence and retribution has created a threat to all UNAMET personnel and property, the safety of election observers, as well as the safety of other foreign nationals.
On the evening of 5 September from the UNAMET chief, Mr Ian Martin in Dili, to temporarily relocate some 300 non-essential UN staff to Darwin in the light of the deteriorating security situation. After the result of the ballot was declared, the pro-integration militias have operated throughout the territory with impunity, particularly in Dili. The failure of the Indonesian security forces is attributed by some to the power vacuum in Jakarta, where a Cabinet was not appointed until October 26.
The announcement of the result heralds a great period of uncertainty. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan had felt confident enough to authorise the commencement of the voter registration process in East Timor on 16 July. Indonesia had also shown responsiveness to UN concerns about possible violence, in particular symbolised by the visit to Dili on 12 July by senior Indonesian ministers. But although the ballot day and the counting was conducted peacefully, once the result became known violence spun out of control.
Australian Troops Arrive
A Security Council mission visited Jakarta and Dili, and the Secretary-General worked to rally support among Governments for a multinational force authorised by the Security Council to bring the situation under control. As the mission concluded its visit to Jakarta on 12 September 1999, the Government of Indonesia agreed to accept the offer of assistance from the international community. The Security Council then authorized the multinational force (INTERFET) under a unified command structure headed by Australia to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and to facilitate humanitarian assistance.
In the meantime, the United Nations began a large-scale emergency humanitarian relief effort, including airdrops of food, aid convoys and the provision of shelter and basic services. Relief workers and supplies were deployed incrementally as the security situation improved. At the same time, increasing attention was paid to the voluntary repatriation of some 250,000 East Timor from West Timor and other areas in Indonesia and the region. To finance the relief effort, a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for $199 million was launched on 27 October 1999.
Following the outbreak of violence, the Indonesian Armed forces and police began to withdraw from the territory. Indonesian administrative officials also left. On 28 September, Indonesia and Portugal, at a meeting with the United Nations, reiterated their agreement for the transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations.
Independence Ratified
On 19 October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly formally recognized the result of the consultation. Shortly thereafter, on 25 October, the United Nations Security Council by resolution 1272 (1999), established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as an integrated, multidimentional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence.
UNTAET's mandate consists of the following main elements: to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.
The hand over of command of military operations from the Australian-led INTERFET force to UNTAET was completed on 28 February 2000.
“To History’s Dustbin, Mr Keating”
by Jose Ramos Horta
Nobel Peace Laureate and Vice-President of the National Council of Timorese
[Historical note: Paul Keating was Prime Minister of Australia from 1991-1996 and Leader of the leftist Labor Party. John Howard became Prime Minister of Australia in 1996 as Leader of the centre-right Coalition Government, comprising the Liberal Party and National Party.This article first appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald on 9 October 1999 - our appreciation to them for permission to reproduce this article.]
"In my rich and rewarding life, I have met people from all walks of life: kings and queens, presidents, many humble and modest people, with whom I always enjoy sharing long conversations.
I also met Paul and Annita Keating. Mr Keating and I share the honour of being visiting professors at the UNSW and met briefly when we both were invited to an annual dinner in May 1997.
Mr Keating talked to me briefly and at one point pushed a finger on my chest in a permissive manner. I was taken aback by this liberty. He was trying to make a point that he raised the issue of East Timor with his friend Soeharto.
His manners and discourse reminded me of a second hand car salesman in downtown Los Angeles.
I had never met John Howard. Actually, we met briefly when I “ambushed” his at the APEC meeting in Auckland.
Ideologically, Howard always reminded me of the white minority leader of Rhodesia, Ian Smith. However, he has been shown to be an exceptional leader, a man with courage and integrity.
The East Timorese will forever be grateful to Australia and John Howard for their help in our darkest hours. I find it repugnant the behaviour of Mr Keating, who with no shame attacks Mr Howard and blames him for the crisis in Canberra-Jakarta relations.
Mr Keating’s friends in the Indonesian military, in the Special Forces and Army intelligence, are guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
They are the ones who by their brutal actions brought irreparable damage to Indonesia. Not Australia. And Australia is not alone in condemning Indonesia’s savagery in East Timor.
More than 50 countries lined up in the UN Security Council in attacking Indonesia.
Only Cuba, Sudan, Iraq and Libya came out defending Keating’s friends. In fact, it is President Bill Clinton Jakarta should direct its anger at for, far more than Mr Howard, it was he who delivered an unprecedented ultimatum to the Indonesian military to invite a UN-led multinational force into East Timor.
It is nauseating listening to Mr Keating’s attack on his country’s Prime Minister at a time when traditionally former leaders give public support to the serving leader or at least remain silent even when they disagree with the policies. Mr Keating was a political ally of the corrupt and repressive Soeharto regime.
He must share the blame with all his past colleagues for the decades of appeasement and servility towards the Soeharto regime, the collusion with a corrupt and arrogant army, an army responsible for countless crimes not only in East Timor but also elsewhere in the archipelago.
If down the road in the next few years Indonesia collapses into different states, the only people to blame are the military themselves for their arrogance, brutality and greed. Indonesia’s national unity and territorial are threatened not by East Timor’s independence but by decades of arrogance and impunity, disrespect for the cultural identity of the peoples in the outer islands, and the looting of their resources by greedy Javanese entrepreneurs and generals.
It is plain stupidity to suggest that one single letter by Mr Howard was responsible for President B.J. Habibie’s historical East Timor Policy shift early this year.
More than Mr Howard’s letter, there were many other more important contributing factors, namely, the economic and financial collapse of Indonesia’s economy, the diplomatic costs, the increasing pressure from the US Congress and the European Union that led to Mr Habibie’s policy shift.
Mr Howard did not suggest that Indonesia should grant independence to East Timor or to hold a referendum this year. Canberra’s position was almost identical to the approach taken Xanana Gusmao, me and Bishop Belo.
Way back in 1992 I proposed a step by step resolution of the East Timor conflict, with a referendum on final status at the end of 10 years. The Hawke and Keating governments dismissed the proposal because Jakarta was not the least interested in it.
Mr Keating argues that Mr Howard should only negotiate with a strong leader, not with a weak, transitional president. Soeharto was indeed a strong leader who ignored Mr Clinton’s direct appeal to him in November 1994 to give East Timor a special status.
And I remember how both Mr Keating and his brilliant foreign affairs minister Gareth Evans criticised the US for being too critical of Soeharto.
The struggle for justice and freedom carried its costs.
The East Timorese paid with thousands of lives their support for the Australians during World War II.
Interfet is not an Australia-dominated enterprise. It was mandated by the Security Council and enjoys the support of the whole international community.
In the case of the economic and financial crisis in the region, as well as in the case of the East Timor crisis, Australia has emerged as a reliable and indispensable power through its economic muscle and decisive leadership.
The East Timorese will be forever grateful to Australia. We will remember John Howard with gratitude and Paul Keating with contempt – or he might be discarded into the dustbin of history."
The Hypocrisy of the Left
By Nick Tolley
President of the Australian Liberal Students Federation 1998-99
East Timor has been a flag-ship issue for the Left for longer than many of them have been alive.It is an issue they have pursued with relentless vigour, relish and determination, as evidenced by their relentless plastering of East Timor across the walls of universities, and the scattering of the issue across the front pages of the scores of Left Wing papers that are endlessly pushed in the faces of indifferent passers-by.
And in recent weeks, in fierce pursuit of their policy of independence for East Timor, they have been the loudest to call for Australian intervention to mercifully rescue the East Timorese people from the ruthless oppression of Indonesian militia forces.
Yet, had the Left had the privilege of occupying the national Exchequer, military expenditure would have been slashed beyond recognition.
Had the Left had their way, we’d have had to send in a team of Ancient History academics with a troop of Welfare Officer reinforcements to bring up the rear.
It is interesting how they favour a capable and well equipped military at the drop of a hat when it suits their particular purposes, yet they are unwilling to maintain and upgrade these forces during lulls in between international crusades.
Reflections of the INTERFET Commander
Based on a speech by Major-General Peter Cosgrove
Commander of the INTERFET Operation
The Commander of the first peacekeeping force to arrive in East Timor was Major-General Peter Cosgrove, from the Australian Defence Forces. When invited to deliver a lecture at Washington’s Fort Myer in the United States, Major-General Cosgrove reflected on the insights he gained during the East Timor operation.
Major-General Cosgrove has argued that nations participating in peacekeeping should have a military force structure with high-order capabilities, rather than a light structure that specialises in the “policing plus” role of UN peace-keeping missions. He revealed that the Australian military forces had the understanding of Australia’s political leaders that the East Timor operation might lead to “quite a casualty count.” Despite this, Australia lost no troops in combat during this mission. Casualties on both sides were minimal because of the intimidating high-order structure of Australian forces, which was equipped and trained for a war situation.
Major-General Cosgrove argues that a force tailored for peacekeeping would have invited more adventurous behaviour by its adversaries. This is a serious rebuff for UN member countries which have been examining the possibility of scaled-down “lightening” forces. The most obvious example of this thinking is in New Zealand, where the leftist Labour-Alliance Government is proposing to disband the air combat capability of its defence force, leaving it with only a couple of frigates plus some light-weight army peacekeepers.
Major-General Cosgrove said “Our troops were able to demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric. Our high-end capability meant that with battle-field mobility and surveillance systems, we were able to seem ubiquitous.” He argued that a fast and less bloody success was preferable to sending in a vulnerable force with a less armoured profile. Although the force structure was more expensive, the time-frame for its operation was far shorter than if the East Timor mission had descended into a direct combat situation.
Major-General Cosgrove also argued that future mission commanders would need a sophisticated understanding of the bureaucratic modus operandi of the United Nations if they had to lead a force in conjunction with a UN mission. He also emphasised several inevitable hurdles which were important to overcome in assembling a multi-national coalition – including language and cultural differences. Liaison officers and language proficiency would be crucial to avoiding misunderstandings.