When approaching the problem of Kosovo it is necessary to have
in mind the following facts that are of a general character:
a) The Kosovo conflict represents a potential hotbed of war in the Balkans,
which in the worst possible variant (unfortunately, it is the worst variants
that usually do prove true in the Balkans!) could develop into a regional
war of a more wider scope and one which - apart from Serbia (FR Yugoslavia)
and Albania - could involve also Macedonia and Greece, as well as Turkey,
necessarily implying negative consequences upon the stability of the continent
and the credibility of NATO. This danger is a rather realistic one. Besides,
the unresolved Kosovo dispute generates new and strengthens almost all
of the existing challenges that the post-Cold War order is facing - from
ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the suppression of human rights to uncontrolled
migration, drug traffic and other forms of criminal phenomena.
b) Internal instabilities and confusion that are visible nowadays exactly
in Serbia and Albania bear many uncertainties, making Kosovo an issue that
can be used for internal political purposes - something that in Serbia
is already taking place. To this one should add that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
is also not of a definitive character and that a possible "opening along
the seams" in this country could also induce the spiral aimed at searching
for violent solutions to the problem of Kosovo.
c) In essence, the problem of Kosovo is a conflict of the type "zero
sum game", which means that the parties involved should be asked to
accept profound and far-reaching compromises, for which they do
not seem to be ready at the moment. Apart from the objective aspects of
the conflict, that even in theory cannot be solved in such a way that would
leave both sides completely satisfied, there is a huge layer of wrong perceptions,
prejudices and misunderstandings that can be removed and alleviated by
patient action. Some of them could be mitigated even on the basis of positive
experience in the history of relations between the Serb and Albanian communities
in Kosovo; a certain doses of such idealism seems to be necessary in dealing
with the Kosovo conflict.
d) The Kosovo problem cannot be successfully solved either by the protagonists
in Serbia or in Kosovo that are not authentically devoted to democratic
and humanitarian principles and to the respect for human rights as the
basic category of not only the internal order of states, but also of their
mutual relations. The problem of Kosovo is a real problem which the elite
in both of the opposing sides are manipulating in order to gain/preserve
power. Therefore, the democratization of the societies in both Serbia
and Kosovo represents the conditio sine qua non for a successful process
aimed at finding solutions to the Kosovo problem.
e) For both general and "real politics" reasons it is necessary to treat
the Kosovo problem only with respect of the Helsinki principles by which
borders are not to be changed by use of force on the one hand, and
on the other with recognizing of those elements of the right to self-determination
of the Kosovo Albanians that are not endangering the first mentioned principle.
2. Outlines of a Productive Action by the International Community
If the above mentioned standpoints are correct, than they strengthen
those views which see the engagement of the international community and
the solution to the Kosovo problem based upon the following argumentation:
a) A durable solution to the Kosovo problem must be based upon a strong
pressure of the international community upon the participants in the conflict
so that they understand and accept that apart from a solution arrived at
by agreement any other approach (use of force and repression by Serbia
and using terrorism or subversion by the Kosovo Albanians, or avoiding
substantial negotiations by any of the participants) will face strongest
possible reaction by the international community and, vice versa,
that a constructive and peaceful approach will bring certain advantages
(economic assistance, investment, recognition, etc.). Although the irrational
mentality of the Balkan peoples - especially when headed by non-democratic
oligarchies - does not seem inclined to receive economic benefits in exchange
for democratic behavior, social crises will in time probably strengthen
the power of this instrument of political pressure. The parties involved
should be led to understand that the international community is not prepared
for any compromise when it comes to the necessity to broaden the processes
of democratic transition in Eastern Europe to the Balkan area and that
it is ready to intervene energetically in favor of democratic solutions
to problems, as it did partly in the last stage of the Bosnian crisis.
b) It is necessary to achieve full Euro-American consensus with
regard to the approach to the Kosovo problem and to secure a constructive
attitude of Russia. The international community should draw lessons
from the negative implications of divisions (1991-1994) between the USA
and Europe, within the European Union and between Russia and the West in
the case of the Yugoslav crisis.
c) Simultaneously with the search for concrete models for the solution
to the problem it is necessary to insist persistently and energetically
upon a democratization of Serbia and Kosovo as a part of FR Yugoslavia.
Strengthened and durable support to authentic democratic and anti-nationalist
political forces and groupings both in Serbia and in Kosovo represents
a crucial aspect of any search for adequate solutions. Appropriate
measures should, within the realm of the possible, accomplish selective
canceling of all measures that are a result of the so-called "outer wall
of sanctions" against FR Yugoslavia which affect its democratic forces,
institutions and media.
d) The solution to the Kosovo problem by creating new states in the
Balkans (Adem Demaqui's "Balkania" and similar ones), by partitioning Kosovo
or by recognizing Kosovo's independence would be too dangerous or utopian,
and due to its complicated nature and the factual impossibility to implement
it, would not produce the desired results. The problem of Kosovo should
be solved within FR Yugoslavia, with ensuring Albania's constructive
approach, and with international mediation, political and diplomatic assistance
and expertise.
e) It is necessary to create an initial model of the constitutional
status of Kosovo within FR Yugoslavia that will open the maximum of
possibilities for the Kosovo Albanians to enjoy the right to self-determination
and will give the biggest (internationally controlled) protection to all
ethnic groups. Such a model is possible only with innovative combination
of the following models:
- original autonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo within
ex-Yugoslavia;
- the contemporary constitutional position of Montenegro within FRY;
- South Tyrol;
- asymmetric federation within FRY (with the position of Kosovo that
would in fact be similar to a) the Swiss cantons, or b). Quebec);
- division of power like in the present model of South Africa where
the minority would enjoy rights that are bigger than those they would enjoy
by their number.
In essence, the position of the Albanians would be more than
that of a minority, but less than that of a state-building people,
with an adequate constitutional and practical (and internationally controlled)
guarantee of the highest standards of human rights.
f). Any of the accepted solutions would enjoy strong international guarantees
and would be set for a period of 25-30 years with the right of the involved
sides to demand - under precisely agreed procedure and with international
participation - the reconsideration of the agreed solution.
g). Actively participating in the negotiating process and observing
it, the international community would support the solution of the problem
step
by step and guarantee every achieved agreement through adequate mechanisms
of the UN and OSCE, and when needed and in accordance with estimations,
also reward them with adequate economic measures.
3. The Beginning of the Negotiation Process
a). The representatives of Serbia and of the Kosovo Albanians should
be demanded, as soon as possible, to enter negotiations with the assistance
of a mutually acceptable foreign mediator (an outstanding personality,
and with regard to nationality, preferably for instance of Italian or Spanish
nationality). Negotiations should be held in FR Yugoslavia.
b). Negotiations should be open and without any preconditions, but at
the very beginning both sides would be asked to:
The Albanians:
-
to oblige themselves not to bring into question the territorial integrity
of FR Yugoslavia;
-
to participate in the political life of Serbia (taking part in elections,
etc.);
-
to give up secessionist activity and propaganda.
The Serbs:
-
to stop repression in Kosovo, to pull out the Army of Yugoslavia form the
towns of Kosovo to the borders of FRY and to ban para-military groups;
-
to prosecute any anti-Albanian chauvinism on the basis of the existing
Yugoslav legislation;
-
approach the social, medical and educational problems in Kosovo with utmost
seriousness, and re-open the schools and return to bilingualism.
Preparations for such a beginning of the negotiating process should
be preceded by a coordinated and well prepared action of diplomatic persuasion
of both sides.
The above mentioned approach to the solution of the Kosovo problem would,
in my view, have realistic chances to succeed under the condition that
both sides show genuine interest to negotiate. If the international community
does not get doubtless proofs of such readiness, it is necessary to exert
political, diplomatic and economic pressures to this aim.
Belgrade, April 1997