DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV AREA
by
Vatroslav Vekaric
The end of Cold War and the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Eastern
Europe have created a radically new ambient in the international system,
which is as much new as unexpected. It is sufficient to recall the almost
idyllic projection of Europe and the world offered by the 1990 Paris Charter
OF THE CSCE from when the majority among us and here I count myself,
too thought that, after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe the world
will if not in its entirety, than at least the northern hemisphere
take the road towards ideals of a general rule of law, unrestrained economy
and respect for individual rights as the highest achievements of the Western
civilization, based upon the heritage of the French and American revolutions.
This initial enthusiasm with regard to the "end of history" hence, the
end of conflicting quality as the prevailing feature of the international
system has, however, rapidly fallen, pushed aside by a booming of aggressive
and fanatic nationalism in the territory of the former communist federations,
particularly in the former Yugoslavia and some parts of the Soviet Union.
As if it were illustrated that the Cold war was hiding, or allow me to
say kept in "hibernation" the explosive potentials of inter-ethnic and
inter-religious conflicting quality. There were essays on the "clash of
civilizations", on ethnic and cultural differences as the main obstacles
for implementation of the previously mentioned liberal ideals, on "ethnification"
of international relations.
The very phenomenon of nationalism became the object of revived interest
of many disciplines, particularly the political sciences, sociology, theory
of international relations, and especially in the Anglo-Saxon area
also of the discipline of strategic studies. Standpoints that nationalism
is a phenomenon that, although maybe not necessary, still is inevitable
in the process of creating nation-states became frequently expressed. This
is a process that in Western Europe was going on for many centuries and
was accomplished in the last one; now, obviously, the turn has come for
the nationalism of those peoples who, under the roof of communist totalitarianism
have missed to institutionalize their national aspirations. Such views
and apart from many similar approaches one could recall here Ernest Gelner
and his influential Nations and Nationalisms from 1983, and even
Istvan Bibo are implicitly followed by not at all encouraging conclusions:
federations, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious creations
(as were the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) nowadays have no perspective,
and historical integration endeavors, such as the European Union, are feasible
only after full satisfaction of all aspects of national aspirations.
Leaving aside these, in my view not only interesting, but also key questions
significant for understanding the reasons for disintegration and the essence
of ethnic problems in Yugoslavia and Russia, I would like to comment on
the case of Yugoslavia which, understandingly, I know best. On Russia as
an issue of our interest in this meeting I can speak only to a limited
extent since I do not systematically follow her development.
Namely, if for reasons of persuasive scientific, historical and political
argumentation I could accept the presumption that the process of disintegration
of multinational undemocratic federations as were the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, was an inevitable one, I must admit that by no means can I
agree neither as a researcher, nor as a citizen with statements that
the way in which the ethnic problem in the former Yugoslavia was dealt
with was, historically speaking, the only one possible.
No! In spite of a meager democratic tradition, in spite of an undeveloped
civil society, in spite of the Southern Balkan temperament inclined towards
violence and solving problems by "shortcuts" even if that meant war, I
think that the problems could have been solved in a more civilized manner
like this was done by the Czechs and the Slovaks, and in essence also
the Russians to the greatest extent, the Ukrainians and the majority of
other peoples of the former USSR. In other words, I think it is important
and in our part of the study, which is the basis for this talk of ours,
Vladimir Veres said it most explicitly to separate the reasons of disintegration
from the causes of war.
During the entire decisive period 1990-1992 Yugoslavia had a few chances
to transform into a confederation, similar to the Community of Independent
States in the USSR, or to disintegrate without war in accordance with the
boundaries of already established republics, with an effort to try to overcome
the real problems of the individual ethnic groups which were loosing their
state. Such disintegration with or without a loose community need not have
necessarily be understood as a tragedy given once and for ever, but maybe
rather like an incentive for democratization and creation of open societies
in this region and an embryo of future integration processes on new and
modern foundations. By this I do not want to say that I am glad that Yugoslavia
fell apart even children from bad marriages find it hard to see their
parents divorced but I only wish to say that I do not see an immediate
causal link between communism as undoubtedly an undemocratic and historically
overgrown framework in which ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia were developing
and the way hence, war, violence, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, spread
of hatred and fear in which this disintegration occurred.
I also fail to see the immediate causal link between the way in which
Yugoslavia disintegrated and the international processes that developed
after events in the East of Europe, particularly after the dismissal of
the Warsaw Pact and German unification. These circumstances were of tremendous
significance for the general European developments, and thus also for the
Balkan area, and they developed as a consequence of the implosion of the
political systems in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. I do not find, however,
one good argument for the standpoint although it is frequently mentioned
that these circumstances are to be "blamed" for the way in which the
ethnic differences and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were managed.
On the contrary: thanks to numerous advantages which she had in comparison
to other communist states-members of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia had
at least at first sight objectively more favorable starting positions
for a transition towards democratic values and an open society than was
the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, and this is well known,
prevailing were the assessments of the communist elites that now, left
without ideology and without a platform - it is necessary to find new ones;
they were found in ethnic problems and, even more, in manipulating them
and directing the collective energy in the direction of realization of
a maximum of feasible ethnic demands even if it meant going to war.
If I were to give a simplified description of the essence of the Yugoslav
ethnic conflict and the disintegration of the country I find that I am
closest to the findings of Vladimir Goati (formulated and well supported
in our study) that basically this was a conflict of two secessionist
options, which were striving towards or at least agreeing with the disintegration
of SFRY. Between the two options the Serbian-Montenegrin one, on the
one hand, and the Croatian-Slovenian one on the other there was, however,
one substantial difference; the first option was for a division of the
SFRY along ethnic, and the second one along the republican borders.
One would say: well, if all that is so, if that need not have happened,
why all these talk, when things happened the way they did.
In my view, these questions which in a way are the central issue of
this symposium must be repeated again and again, and not for reasons of
some nostalgia, but because of the future. Only comprehensive understanding
of what happened will show us the directions for what could further happen
and what could be done: how to approach the issues of democratization as
a pressing need of these territories and accomplish a democratic and civilized
management of ethnic conflicts which exist in reality and which will, no
doubt, continue to exist.
As I see the state of ethnic relations in the Balkans, it is a rather
urgent matter. Although the national states in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia are basically formed and territorially articulated some of
them could, exactly for reasons of unsolved ethnic issues, have a very
uncertain and even gloomy future. I have in mind first of all Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which still has to prove that the multi-national and federal structures
are still possible, as well as FR Yugoslavia which has still to prove that
she is capable of approaching the hard Kosovo problem in a way that will
exclude repetition of the newest history.
Therefore, I think it is important to speak about the reasons for disintegration
of the former communist federations, therefore it is important to act in
the direction that will on the basis of gained experience open room
for new approaches to ethnic problems in Yugoslavia.
Statements about communism being the only cause of problems and ethnic
conflicts will, thus, probably prove to be incorrect, at least when we
talk about Yugoslavia.
I do not say this because I have a good opinion of the communist project
on the contrary, in my view communism has for a long time to come degraded
all peoples in this territory. Therefore, attempts for its revival - which
in their most orthodox form are most frequent both in Yugoslavia and in
Russia - I would consider at least to be grotesque if I would not see them
as a serious danger, both for the future of democracy and particularly
for a decline of ethnic tensions. I say this because I think it is time
that not only the academic community, but first of all political decision-makers,
come to their senses and understand that any other direction apart from
genuine democratization of society, development of an open civil society
in general and particularly democratization of ethnic relations leads to
the irreversible disaster. That implies first of all a necessity
for change in attitude and approach to ethnic minorities in the
newly established states. Namely, if we show tolerance for the mentioned
standpoint that ethnic conflicts and the creation of nation-states must
be managed through war and violence wouldnt we at the same time say
that new wars are inevitable: for Kosovo, for non-feasibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina
as a multi-national federation, maybe a new war in Macedonia. If we were
to accept such an alleged inevitability we would automatically in my
view become accomplices in a new, maybe even greater evil than was the
one that marked Yugoslavia from 1991-1995.
In the Center for Strategic Studies, where I work, we devote special
attention to the realization of a project under the title
Possibilities
for contribution of third parties to democratic management of ethnic conflicts
in the former communist federations. We decided to conduct exactly
such a project first of all because of our conviction that the political
situations, which emerged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia not
only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also here, with us, in FR Yugoslavia, and
in our neighborhood do not yet give guarantees that the ruling elites
and the newly established institutional mechanisms will be capable of paving
alone the way toward democratic methods in solving of accumulated ethnic
problems.
The international community (despite the fact that in our country there
can be heard sometimes justified, but most frequently unjustified criticisms
on its insensitivity, selfishness, slow reacting and similar remarks),
regardless of how this might sound today is forwarding demands to the
responsible actors in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and I would
say that these demands are appropriate, adequate and from the standpoint
of avoiding a deterioration of ethnic conflicts practically the almost
only possible ones.
This is a demand for a complete and sincere respect for the Dayton,
or the Paris agreements, which means in the first place acting in the direction
of the overtaken commitment in regard to preserving the entirety of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and rejection of uncivilized, but unfortunately still rooted convictions
on "the impossibility of common life" of different nations.
This means a normalization of relations and cooperation and full mutual
recognition of all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. It is most directly
expected that Yugoslavia undertakes such steps in direction of establishing
normal diplomatic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is asked that
Croatia and FR Yugoslavia speed up the normalization of their mutual relations
as a precondition for stability of the entire region which does not mean
accepting any kind of Serb-Croat-Muslim combinations aimed at undermining
of the Dayton Agreements.
This also means a demand for a constructive and pragmatic approach of
all the actors in the process of solving problems of succession of the
former Yugoslavia and no acceptance of prolonging and manipulating these
questions that in themselves are already sufficiently complicated.
The demands of the international community sent to these territories
mean (and, in my view this is the most important aspect): a demand to essentially
democratize internal relations in Yugoslavia which, for the beginning,
will initiate when it comes to Serbia fulfillment of overtaken obligations
resulting from the Gonsales Commission report. This would also mean an
opening of a new chapter in the attitude of the government with regard
to the minority problem in Yugoslavia and specifically proving that there
is genuine readiness to solve the problem of Kosovo through mutual agreement
with the Kosovo Albanians in a democratic way and in accordance both with
the Helsinki principles and the modern standards pertaining to human rights.
Finally, this also means a constructive cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
for prosecuting war criminals in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
(not because any nation would be mentioned as a bigger or smaller culprit
for the war and crimes in these areas, but exactly to the contrary) to
stimulate the opening of a process of self-analysis and self-questioning
with regard to ones own contribution to the war; thus would be accomplished
exactly what the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia desperately need: the removal
of accusations for collective guilt, which in factcannot exist.
A normalization of the international position of Yugoslavia is nowadays
almost completely dependent on herself and on her readiness to accept that
the fulfillment of conditions for inclusion into international life on
the basis of equality is at the same time the guide to methods which should
be accepted for managing ethnic conflicts in these territories. Therefore,
I think that these mentioned demands, which are actually a list of the
necessary preconditions for accelerating democratization and alleviating
ethnic tensions, should not be understood as pressure, and certainly not
as evil interference into "our affairs", but rather as a welcome and authentic
desire of the world already tired with the Yugoslav case, to stimulate
democratic processes in the long-term European interests and, primarily,
of the citizens themselves in all the states that emerged in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia.
Kotor, June 1997