International
Studies Association 40th Annual Convention
16-20 February
1999, Washington, DC
CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF FR YUGOSLAVIA’S
FOREIGN
POLICY AND DIPLOMACY
By
Vatroslav
Vekaric
- Abstract
-
The
paper deals with the effects of the foreign policy and diplomatic practice
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the period
from 1992 until today. All the analyzed characteristics of contemporary
Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy indicate that FR Yugoslavia basically
still has not drawn the proper conclusions from its failures owing to the
fact that in the process of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia
its political elite started from practically unfeasible goals (having in
mind international norms and the attitudes of the major actors in the international
community). These goals were intended to be achieved in a manner and with
means that the contemporary international community does not accept. The
political elite of FR Yugoslavia seem to be permanent captives of many
illusions that have turned the country's foreign policy and diplomacy into
unsuccessful instruments of a strategy that is not based upon reality,
law and ethics. The strategic and tactical directions of Yugoslav diplomacy's
actions are mainly of a palliative, temporary and short-term character
because they are based on many unrealistic evaluations of both contemporary
relations in general, and of some concrete questions. These range from
counting on the maturing of a new "Cold War" in relations between the USA
and Russia, to expecting to benefit from Russia's destabilization and overestimating
differences in the nuances that emerge between the United States and Western
Europe and within the European Union with regard to certain aspects of
the crisis in the Balkans. However, maybe the most serious reason for the
failure of Yugoslavia's foreign policy and diplomacy lies in the lack of
readiness of its actors - on the mental and political level - to accept
democratic norms both in international and internal conduct.
1.
Aims and approach
The purpose of
this paper is to elaborate and critically comment on the effects of the
foreign policy and diplomatic practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) in the period from 1992 till today. The aim is
much more to stimulate the opening of a thorough discussion and to initiate
further research of this problem, and much less to offer final conclusions.
Although
these evaluations are believed correct, the presented theses should be
understood as preliminary since they are based upon the results of still
ongoing research; also, the phenomenon in focus is one that is still going
on. Therefore, this analysis should be understood as an initial step towards
a more precise valorization of the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia.
Its conclusions should be taken primarily as working hypotheses which will
be either challenged or confirmed to a greater or lesser extent by the
results of the research project being conducted by a team from the independent
Center for Strategic Studies from Belgrade.
Measuring
the effects of any foreign policy and/or diplomacy is an unrewarding and
rather difficult task. This is even more so when we are dealing with newly
created states which are not only in the process of establishing and promoting
their international position, but are, in a way, still in the process of
defining their national interests. Therefore, identifying the foreign policy
priorities and the organization of diplomacy in these and such countries
is objectively a far more difficult and demanding task than for states
which have already defined the elementary aspects of their national interests,
which have a democratically supported foreign policy strategy and have
an established diplomatic service.
The
assessment of any foreign policy and/or diplomacy depends upon many parameters.
In this paper, the evaluation of the effects of FR Yugoslavia’s foreign
policy and diplomacy is based on the following points:
First, how
much do foreign policy and diplomacy (which is a tool for achieving foreign
policy results) contribute to the fulfillment of national interests, goals
and values? Here one could avoid a strict definition of these notions and
make use of the already established definitions given by Valery Manilov
of the elements that constitute a substantial parameter of success of any
foreign policy and diplomacy. The absence of at least a minimal articulation
of these interests, goals and values is a serious handicap for any state
and, consequently, any diplomacy. It is beyond doubt that even the most
able diplomacy cannot be successful if the goals that it should achieve
are unclear or unrealistic, or contrary to leading tendencies in international
relations. The opposite is also true: in countries which have a clear perception
of their basic national interests, and if these interests enjoy a democratically
established internal consensus, such diplomacies have a much simpler task
- to achieve goals that are relatively known and are more or less feasible.
Second, when
it comes to the realization of interests, goals and values, does the national
diplomacy have at its disposal an articulated, not contradictory, and adequate
foreign policy strategy and defined tasks that have to be fulfilled within
the context of this strategy? Apart from the above-mentioned clear perception
of basic national interests, goals and values, a crucial prerequisite to
a successful and feasible strategy is an objective understanding of the
main parameters of the current international situation. This includes relations
among the main actors in the world and the distribution of power among
them and, in particular, the real and potential perspectives of making
alliances among those states in regard to which the established goals are
in conflict. If they want to be successful, foreign policy and diplomacy
must be able to adapt to changes in the international surroundings, to
new and emerging features of the international environment; they must be
able to use these features for the optimal valorization of their country’s
advantages or to relativize its shortcomings. To make this possible, there
must be an operational and feasible foreign policy strategy that will be
compatible with the strategy of other states. This last element is of special
significance.
The third
parameter of diplomacy’s diplomatic success that will be taken into account
in this analysis pertains to the means that a state has at its disposal
for the implementation and realization of its foreign policy strategy.
Here we have in mind, first of all, an adequate diplomatic service (apparatus),
a network of diplomatic missions, adequate financial resources and the
necessary expert support. This last point implies the need for the diplomatic
service to have at its disposal competent, well-educated and skillful people
who will be able to combine broad-mindedness and an inclination for compromise
wherever possible with a firm and convincing attitude in promoting their
country’s interests in the best way. The ability to negotiate and make
rational compromises is a crucial indicator of a diplomacy’s quality, because
this is the way to avoid unnecessary conflicts and strengthen the reputation
and credibility of the country.
Using these
parameters as a broader framework, we shall try to evaluate the successfulness
of the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia primarily through:
- the reality
of basic national interests and the feasibility of goals that should be
accomplished;
- the ability
to realistically appraise the newly established international and regional
environment and, generally speaking, current international tendencies and
attitudes towards concrete foreign policy issues that must be solved;
- the competence
of the diplomatic apparatus in regard to achieving tasks that stem from
the foreign policy strategy of the country.
Like the other
newly created states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia
has found itself in the position where it must formulate its foreign policy
strategy and establish its diplomatic service that should respond to very
complex needs (needs that every country that is looking for international
affirmation is facing); this must be accomplished as part of ongoing practice,
and in a new international and regional setting brimming with new processes.
Like the other successor countries, FR Yugoslavia has in a way "inherited"
- whether it likes it or not - the effects and practices of the diplomacy
of the disintegrated SFR Yugoslavia. It is generally accepted that during
most of its existence SFR Yugoslavia - although not a democratic country
- successfully valorized its geopolitical advantage in conditions of bloc
confrontation; the result was that the country had diplomatic "weight"
that far exceeded its size, economic and military strength, and its population.
In an
attempt to comprehend the effects and most important features of FR Yugoslavia’s
diplomacy, at least two preliminary remarks should be made:
First, the
syntagma "foreign policy of FR Yugoslavia", or "the diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia"
hardly makes any sense in view of the fact that the two federal units that
constitute FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have diametrically opposing
evaluations of the new international environment and strategic directions
upon which the foreign policy of the country should be based and upon which
its diplomacy should act. After the October 1997 elections, the conflict
between Serbia (which is in complete control of the federal government
through individuals from Montenegro who are faithful to her), and Montenegro,
headed by President Djukanovic, has evolved to the point where it is impossible
to talk about FR Yugoslavia (the federation of Montenegro and Serbia) conducting
one, unique foreign policy. However, the federal government continues to
formally respect the adopted parity with regard to the representation of
both federal units in federal bodies, hence, also in diplomacy. In these
bodies Montenegro is represented by supporters of Mr. Momir Bulatovic who
lost the elections, but in the meantime was inaugurated by Mr. Milosevic
to the position of federal Prime Minister.
Second, in
the analyzed period of 1992-1998 the informal center of the political decision-making
process in FR Yugoslavia, including foreign policy issues, was shifting
to the function held by the most influential political personality in the
country, the current president of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic. Up
to 1997 the real decision-making center with regard to foreign policy issues
was Mr. Milosevic in his capacity as the president of Serbia, one of the
federal units (in that capacity he was also one of the signatories to the
Dayton Agreements on ending the war in Bosnia). Until 1997, when Mr. Milosevic
was elected president of FR Yugoslavia, federal bodies were completely
marginalized in foreign policy decision making; after he was elected president
of Yugoslavia, they gained importance, but not in the manner envisaged
by the Constitution of the country. According to the Constitution, the
federal government has the main authority in foreign policy matters; instead
the decision-making center and essential leadership in this regard has
now shifted to the level of the president of Yugoslavia. In the entire
period being examined, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been
under the substantial control of Mr. Milosevic, and all foreign ministers
of FR Yugoslavia from 1992 until today have been high officials in the
ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and individuals enjoying Mr. Milosevic’s
highest confidence.
Hence, when
we use the syntagmas "Yugoslav foreign policy" or "Yugoslav diplomacy",
we have in mind the foreign policy/diplomacy personified by the president
of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part
of the federal government that is not recognized by Montenegro.
2. The foreign
policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia and new processes in the international
community
Changes in
the international community that occurred in the 1990s have been interpreted
by Yugoslav diplomacy in a way that, already at first glance, reflects
a deep misunderstanding of the essence and character of these changes.
The system of values established in the Cold War period has remained strongly
rooted in the standpoints and behavior of Yugoslav diplomacy, and certain
shifts in the perception of the world during 1992-1998 have been mainly
of a negative nature. The distance from the foreign outside world and deep
mistrust (especially with regard to the USA and the West in general) have
been constantly growing, and so have isolationist and xenophobic attitudes,
whilst tolerance with regard to the international community and openness
towards the world have been weakening. Among Yugoslav foreign policy decision-makers
and diplomats, values based on the realities of the world before 1989,
i.e. a world divided into blocs, were unexpectedly widespread. Now
these have been supplemented by statements from officials on the categorical
significance of secret combinations being made by "world power holders"
against small peoples and states, on the malicious intentions of most international
actors when it comes to the interests of FR Yugoslavia and, generally speaking,
on increased mistrust with regard to anything coming from the world. In
other words, there is a big gap between what has really been going on in
the international community with regard to basic social and political processes
and the rules of conduct of the international actors, on the one hand,
and what Yugoslav diplomacy has been trying to convince itself and the
domestic public is true, on the other. This is a gap, one would say, that
should cause worries.
The
above statement would be hard to prove if we were to rely solely upon the
statements of officials and programmatic declarations of the respective
organs and parties with decisive influence on the formulation of FR Yugoslavia’s
foreign policy and diplomatic methods. Namely, we find a completely different
picture on the level of programmatic statements. In contrast to the concrete
moves of diplomacy and practice developed in communication with other countries,
unfulfilled aims are set forth as strategic priorities. Thus, for instance,
Foreign Minister Mr. Jovanovic will emphasize the need for a "European
orientation for FRY" and "rapid inclusion into European integration…" .
The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia claims in its program that "FRY is
interested in cooperation with the European Union, the Council of Europe
and other European organizations and institutions…", and the former foreign
minister and current president of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic, in his
presidential campaign put forward the slogan "Both Serbia and the world",
underlining openness to the world as the basis of the country’s future
strategy. He said: "We want to achieve a substantial breakthrough and economic
development as soon as possible, to preserve peace and political stability
and not to be isolated from the world. We must be a part of the European
and world market, because this is where the future lies…".
Such
public statements could create the illusion that the foreign policy and
diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia have good and sound intentions and ideas, but
cannot fulfill them because of others. It is obvious that these statements
were meant for internal purposes, as an excuse for the clearly bad effects
of the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and for a series of diplomatic
failures that FR Yugoslavia has experienced since the disintegration of
the country. "The foreign policy and diplomacy of Serbia and FRY are guided
almost exclusively by internal aims: they are primarily subordinated to
the need of the regime and the ruling establishment to remain in power
at any cost."
Not only the
features of the country’s international position as portrayed in the country,
but also a number of concrete steps and actions taken by leading diplomats
and politicians, illustrate that Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy
understand the contemporary world in a manner that is profoundly anachronic
and wrong. If we try to systematize and generalize the standpoints and
convictions held by the regime in Yugoslavia and its diplomacy, we shall
come to the following conclusions:
Yugoslav foreign
policy and diplomacy persistently express the anachronic attitude that,
basically speaking, the international community does not have the right
to participate in solving the internal problems of third countries, and
hence in Yugoslavia, not even when these problems result from failing to
respect obligations that the state in question has undertaken by international
treaties. Yugoslav diplomacy claims that the international community can
at best suggest solutions. The referendum that was organized in mid-1998
posed a question and suggested the (negative) answer with regard to the
involvement of the international community in solving the problem of Kosovo.
It illustrated the extent to which the ruling diplomacy treats the nowadays
rather relative principle of "non-interference in internal affairs of states"
in the same way that it was treated by members of the Warsaw Treaty in
the Cold War period. However, diplomatic practice shows that FR Yugoslavia
itself does not abide by this standpoint when the pressure of the international
community forces it to accept active mediation and the "interference" of
foreign actors: the USA in the case of signing the Dayton-Paris Agreements
on ending the war in Bosnia, and the USA, the European Union and OSCE in
the case of the Kosovo crisis, and the Contact Group whose members are
the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany in all these cases.
This interference has been present in all conflicts that emerged as a result
of the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Along these same lines is the
frequently repeated standpoint of Yugoslav diplomacy that the undeniable
right of the international community to punish states and introduce sanctions
for the non-fulfillment of obligations undertaken by relevant documents
(based on the UN Charter - particularly Chapter VII in the case when a
state’s activities represent a threat to peace) represents a violation
of international law, particularly of the human and civil rights of that
country’s population.
It is
hard to avoid the impression that Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy
are captives of major illusions or willful mistakes not only with regard
to understanding the scope and nature of changes in the international community,
but also with regard to modern concepts which are nowadays the basis of
relations in the international system. Here we are dealing with illusions
and mistakes which pertain to both value-oriented standpoints (differences
in evaluating the meaning of new processes in the international community
after the end of the Cold War, of course, are legitimate and natural) and
to illusions and mistakes resulting from an insufficient understanding
of the basic changes that are deeply affecting the contemporary world.
Let us indicate just a few of the deeply rooted evaluations upon which
Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy insist:
The
first and maybe deepest illusion, one that is the basis of most of the
others, is connected to the prevailing standpoint in Yugoslav diplomacy
that changes in the international system after 1989, what is called "the
new international order", are basically bad and unfavorable, and in themselves
negative. They are seen as particularly dangerous for smaller countries
and peoples and, thus, for the fate of individuals. The objective problems
faced by countries in transition are presented as difficult and without
solution, and the democratic changes in them as the result of foreign influence
which the domestic population generally opposes. Actually, Yugoslav foreign
policy and diplomacy seem to have lost sight of the fact that the end of
the bipolar structure caused the Soviet Union, one of the most repressive
machineries in contemporary history, to withdraw from the world scene.
It was replaced by Russia - an actor with a respectable military power
oriented towards democratic changes and market values, basically oriented
towards a cooperative relationship with the West. Also, insufficient consideration
is given to the fact that, maybe more than ever in this century, the contemporary
world and especially the actors in Europe have convergent attitudes with
regard to basic values and the future of the continent, values that will
put the strengthening of democracy, market economies and scrupulous respect
for human rights in the forefront.
The
above-mentioned central illusion is the basis for all the others, those
that pertain to more concrete questions with regard to the international
community and the obligations of its actors. One of the most noticeable
has already been mentioned - not wanting to see changes concerning the
scope of states’ sovereignty. The impression is that FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy
is not sufficiently acquainted with the substantial evolution that this
concept has undergone in international law and international politics.
Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy act as if it were not true that almost
all the states in the world gathered in the United Nations have voluntarily
given up part of their sovereignty in many fields, especially in the field
of human rights, arms control and environmental protection. This is particularly
true of the members of the OSCE, an international organization that brings
together practically all the most important countries in the Northern Hemisphere
(apart from Japan and China). There is complete neglect of the fact that
the classical concept of sovereignty, which in conditions of bipolar confrontation
meant the right of states not to be questioned for actions against their
own population, has fundamentally changed. There is no indication of a
readiness to accept the fact that today states have an obligation - not
only as a political principle, but also as a concrete international legal
obligation - to respect adopted standards (for instance in the field
of peace preservation and human rights), to undertake steps in this regard
that will be transparent and to expect that inappropriate steps will be
internationally controlled and, in case of violation, punished. Yugoslav
foreign policy and diplomacy most often link this tendency to US hegemony,
and do not see that this is a level of democratic development reached by
the international community today, especially by Europe, which has advanced
the furthest in the codification of these principles (Helsinki, Paris,
etc.).
Approaching
the contemporary world in such a way, Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy
is first of all characterized by suspicion and rejection with regard to
ongoing democratization processes in the former totalitarian countries
of Eastern Europe. This consequently leads to different irrational concepts
about "conspiracies" against this or that people and the strategic
intentions of the strongest powers to inflict harm upon them. There is
no understanding, or it is hidden from the population or misinterpreted,
that in the process of change the international community has behaved -
at least in the case of the Yugoslav crisis - mainly rationally, although
not without blame. Yugoslav diplomacy is far from the assessment shared
by many objective analysts that some of the international community’s mistakes
and disorientation in handling the Yugoslav crisis have been greatly caused
by the unexpected scope of irrationality in the behavior of domestic political
forces and their readiness to disparage current mega-trends and violate
the elementary norms of international conduct, regardless of the costs.
In short, FR Yugoslavia blames international actors for all its misfortunes,
completely excluding and overlooking the guilt of domestic actors.
3. Achievements
of Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy
The international
position of FR Yugoslavia
Owing greatly
to FR Yugoslavia’s above-described understanding of changes in the contemporary
world, and its behavior and communication with other countries based upon
this understanding, FR Yugoslavia currently finds itself among a small
group of countries with an extremely unfavorable international position.
The image of FR Yugoslavia in the world is extremely low and has reached
close to the level of negative perception that is similar to or even worse
than that shared by only few countries in the world, such as Iraq, Libya,
Cuba or North Korea. FR Yugoslavia is exposed to widespread odium in the
international community, and its relations with major international organizations
and certain countries are very bad.
Unlike
other states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia has been
expelled from all the major international organizations. Its status in
the United Nations is controversial and awkward. Whilst all the newly created
states-successors of the former Yugoslavia have become members of the United
Nations according to the usual procedure, at this moment the member is
formally the former and non-existent Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia,
instead of FR Yugoslavia; the FRY delegation in New York has a sui generis
status, one that does not allow FR Yugoslavia to participate normally in
the work of the world organization, except - but only in a limited way
- concerning problems that arise from international obligations taken over
by FRY. Hence, FRY is not in the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, and without their participation the country cannot count on any significant
international economic support.
In addition,
unlike other states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia
is still in the position of an incompletely recognized or not recognized
country. Its diplomatic relations with a great number of countries in the
world (mainly the most influential) have not yet been completely defined
and cleared, and these very states are denying FR Yugoslavia normal bilateral
relations and an equal position in major international fora because of
the country’s foreign policy and internal political steps. FR Yugoslavia
maintains a liberal visa regime with a very small number of countries,
which makes travelling abroad very complicated for Yugoslav citizens.
Finally, the
problems of minority status in Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Sandjak) have factually,
politically and legally been internationalized and brought to very delicate
levels, with the gradual maturing of factors that could create a critical
mass for the further escalation of violence that would endanger world peace.
FR Yugoslavia
and the "outer wall of sanctions"
Although
the sanctions that the UN Security Council introduced against FR Yugoslavia
in May 1992 were formally lifted four years later in 1996, the so-called
"outer wall of sanctions" has remained in force as a consequence of non-compliance
with international obligations that have been taken over. They represent
an informal list that the USA and the European Union have put forward as
the precondition for their support to normalization of the international
position of FR Yugoslavia and their bilateral relations with the country.
Among
the most important demands that the proponents of the so-called outer wall
of sanctions have in regard to FR Yugoslavia are the following:
a. Strict
implementation of the Dayton Agreements, including cooperation in the extradition
of individuals accused of war crimes to the International Tribunal for
the prosecution of war crimes committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.
b. Resolving
problems pertaining to the succession of former Yugoslavia in accordance
with the conclusions of the Arbitration (Badinter) Commission, whereby
former Yugoslavia disintegrated by fragmenting into republics along the
borderlines of the federal units, and whereby none of the successor states
can count on exclusive continuity with former SFRY.
c. Solving
the problem of Kosovo and regulating the position of national minorities
in FRY in accordance with accepted international standards, and
d. Democratization
of the internal system with emphasis upon fair elections, freedom of the
media, privatization, etc.
In regard
to all the mentioned demands, Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy have
up to now acted basically in a non-cooperative manner (except in the case
of stabilization of the situation in Bosnia), assessing the so-called outer
wall of sanctions as a "dictate of the major powers" and "interference
in internal affairs", although all of these demands, in fact, are based
upon obligations that FR Yugoslavia is obliged to fulfill pursuant to its
acceptance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, the Dayton Agreements,
and OSCE documents. A critical assessment of FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy
in regard to these demands would require considerable more elaboration,
and therefore here will be stressed only the following:
When it comes
to the demand to extradite individuals accused of war crimes to the Hague
Tribunal, Yugoslav diplomacy insists upon the erroneous assertion of the
primacy of internal over international law. If it is to be understood that
by acting in this way Yugoslav diplomacy is fulfilling orders given by
higher political authorities, it is hard to understand the argumentation
used by Yugoslav diplomats when discussing this matter. The impression
is given that government "experts" do not seem to be aware that such an
approach is a wrong and nonlegal one. The evolution of international law
and the practice of states and international judicial arbitration bodies
have indisputably affirmed the standpoint that international law and obligations
deriving from it are clearly of greater legal strength than the internal
norms and internal legal order of any country. Therefore, noncompliance
in regard to international obligations implies the international accountability
of states.
When
it comes to the succession of former Yugoslavia, it remains hard to understand
why Yugoslav diplomacy insists upon continuity and thus sacrifices the
normalization of relations with the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. Readiness is even expressed to assume the huge foreign debt
of the entire former Yugoslavia when it is completely clear that, in the
economic and financial sense, this would be a worse solution than to accept
the approach that the international mediators are offering on the basis
of the conclusions of the Arbitration (Badinter) commission. If insisting
upon continuity is meant to justify war politics and represent it as "defense
of the integrity of the common state from the secessionist tendencies of
other republics", then it must be said that (apart from the fact that this
in no way justifies a war option) FR Yugoslavia is thereby, inter alia,
exposing itself to the risk of being declared formally responsible for
all the nonlegal acts and damage that the former Yugoslav Peoples’ Army
(JNA) made during 1991 and 1992. Let us leave aside the incontestable fact
that there are clearly no prospects of the international community accepting
this argumentation of FR Yugoslavia, and that persistently insisting upon
continuity is only prolonging the international isolation of the country.
The
approach of Yugoslav diplomacy to the problem of Kosovo is perhaps the
most impressive example of how the lack of good diplomacy and the proper
approach to the international factors involved can transform a problem
in which the international legal, political and historical arguments are
basically in favor of FR Yugoslavia into a situation in which these very
same arguments lose their credibility and the arguments of the opposing
side in the conflict gain in importance. The international community, particularly
the USA and the European Union, have expressed the clear resolve not to
allow further border changes in the Balkans after the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and to contribute to the solution of this overheated conflict
by offering different mediation services. The steps undertaken by Yugoslav
diplomacy, however, did not lead to developments which would correspond
to FR Yugoslavia’s interests but have instead led to multiple unwanted
effects: because of the country’s attitude to solving this problem - excessive
but ineffective use of power and absence of real readiness to negotiate
on the autonomy of Kosovo - at the end of November 1998 FR Yugoslavia was
exposed to the realistic threat of NATO air strikes. In spite of all the
previous refusals of the Yugoslav side and the already mentioned referendum
by which the Yugoslav population rejected international involvement, the
Kosovo problem became internationalized to the maximum level with the arrival
of the OSCE verification mission. The opposing side, the Albanian independence
movement, whose military wing (the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army) would
in any similar case be proclaimed a terrorist organization, has gradually
acquired legitimacy and is being treated as an internationally recognized
actor. The most recent events concerning Kosovo that were taking place
exactly as this paper was completed only confirm this evaluation: they
culminated with the even greater probability that NATO will use force following
the hasty declaration that the head of the OSCE verifiers’ mission in Kosovo
was a persona non grata.
In acting
with regard to fulfilling perhaps the most significant among the conditions
for the removal of the outer wall of sanctions, i.e. accepting the need
to democratize the country, Yugoslav diplomacy has behaved as an instrument
of and performer in a political course that is pushing the entire country
into growing international isolation. Not only did FR Yugoslavia refuse
the OSCE mission (the so-called Gonzales mission) which would have dealt
with the state of democratic freedom in FR Yugoslavia, but the entire situation
in regard to this question has been deteriorating, which makes the removal
of the mentioned "outer wall of sanctions" even more remote, bringing with
it very serious consequences for the further social, political and economic
development of the country. Instead of meeting the demands of the international
community, and particularly those of the OSCE with regard to admitting
electoral fraud at the end 1996 which led to massive protests all over
Serbia, the Yugoslav regime has continued with measures aimed at strengthening
internal repression and state control over all segments of civil society.
During 1998 legal acts were passed through which the voice of the independent
media was greatly suppressed and the traditional autonomy of the University
was removed. In addition, propagandistic and police pressure continued
against opposition parties and non-governmental organizations. The restrictive
visa policy prevented the arrival of academic and political personalities
from the world who are engaged in promoting democracy, and the recent attacks
against the USA for supporting the independent media and non-governmental
organizations showed that the regime does not have the slightest intention
of helping remove this precondition to lifting the sanctions. In such a
situation, FR Yugoslavia’s submission of a formal request for membership
in the Council of Europe (almost simultaneously with the refusal to grant
visas to prominent representatives of this very Council so they could enter
the country and participate at a meeting of experts devoted to development
of the independent media) looked like playing cynical games with the international
and domestic public.
Yugoslavia
was suspended from the OSCE after refusing OSCE monitoring missions whose
task was to monitor the protection of minority groups in the country (Kosovo,
Sandjak, Vojvodina). Thus, Yugoslavia became the only European country
without full participation in the OSCE; due to this institution’s significance,
Yugoslavia has, in fact, been removed from equal cooperation in Europe.
The lack of readiness to meet the requests of the OSCE and to enable transparency
in how the authorities treat minorities in FRY isolates Yugoslav diplomacy
from the possibility of participating in different OSCE activities whose
significance the government itself could not deny. This was proven by the
fact that FRY has twice relied upon the OSCE in crisis situations: first,
by inviting an OSCE delegation to come after the mass protests provoked
by fraud at local elections in 1996, and again at the end of 1998 (the
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement) by accepting a 2000-man mission of verifiers
that should monitor compliance with the reduction of military and police
forces in Kosovo.
Relations
of FR Yugoslavia and selected international actors
Broadening
the number of allies and strengthening established alliances is a postulate
not only of classical, but also of any modern foreign policy and diplomacy.
Judging by this criterion, the effects of Yugoslav diplomacy are quite
disastrous. Namely, today it is difficult to say that FRY has any ally
or country that basically understands and supports the international behavior
of the country and respects its interests. In an attempt to explain such
a situation, Yugoslav diplomacy has regularly tried to blame the international
community for this situation, at the same time trying to create an image
of Yugoslavia as a fortress besieged by an environment which has bad or
dishonest intentions. The strongest accusations are directed against
the USA and Germany, and criticism made by small and medium-sized countries
against Yugoslav foreign policy is frequently explained as the result of
pressure allegedly made by the USA.
There
is most probably no risk in saying that unless a country, especially if
it is in the process of transition, uses readiness to cooperate and collaborate
as the basis for its relationship with the most significant world actors
after the end of the Cold War - the USA as the only remaining superpower
and the European Union as an economic giant in its immediate neighborhood
– it has no great prospects for the improvement of its international position.
During the entire 1992-1998 period, the relations between FRY and Western
countries have been characterized by conflicts and misunderstandings and
this has been naturally reflected not only on their bilateral relations,
but also upon the activity of these countries in the UN and its specialized
agencies.
Relations
between FR Yugoslavia and the USA have been characterized in the entire
analyzed period by an ambivalence that could be called paradoxical. On
the one hand, due to their critical standpoint with regard to FRY’s foreign
policy the USA have been presented in official propaganda as the
main cause of FRY’s international isolation, and Yugoslav diplomacy joined
the official media which were systematically satanizing the USA (together
with NATO), inflaming anti-American sentiments among the population. On
the other hand, at key moments in concrete diplomatic activities, such
as the termination of the war in Bosnia and solving the Kosovo problem,
FR Yugoslavia has under pressure, as a rule, accepted the USA as a key
partner and under their patronage some of the phases in the mentioned crisis
situations were brought to an end (the Dayton Agreements 1995, the Milosevic-Holbrooke
Agreement on Kosovo 1998). This aspect of diplomatic relations between
FRY and the USA, however, is not sufficient proof or a sign that Yugoslav
diplomacy has accepted the standpoint that normalizing and promoting relations
with the USA should be at the very top of the country’s strategic foreign
policy priorities.
Yugoslav diplomacy
has insisted upon traditional, previously rooted perceptions with regard
to relations with individual countries or international organizations and
their motives vis-à-vis FR Yugoslavia that have not corresponded
with the new reality. Yugoslav diplomacy has systematically offered standpoints
on close or distant relations, friendship or hostilities, sympathies or
antipathies in regard to certain countries and international organizations.
It seems that this has been influenced not only by the attitude of individual
countries towards Serbia, Montenegro and the main actors in the Yugoslav
crisis, but also by the images on alliances that have been offered to the
citizens through propaganda from the official media during all these crisis
years. When it comes to the desirability of partners for political cooperation
with FR Yugoslavia, diplomacy has nurtured isolationist standpoints and
even animosity with regard to developing political cooperation with a great
number of countries that were considered, according to not always clear
criteria, to have an “unfriendly attitude towards FR Yugoslavia". The impression
is that those leading Yugoslavia’s foreign policy understand partnership
in political cooperation as a necessity imposed by pressure from the outside
and the "dictates" of the international community, rather than a normal
and desirable form of interaction among states. This also indicates the
notable presence of isolationist views, as well as general "disappointment"
with the political behavior of most countries in the world towards Yugoslavia.
In an attempt
to prove that there are, nonetheless, countries that side with FR Yugoslavia,
Yugoslav politicians and diplomats, and particularly the pro-government
media, have persistently tried to convince the Yugoslav public that FR
Yugoslavia has good allies in Greece, Russia and China, and occasionally
there have been evaluations that European countries such as France (recalling
the Serb-French friendship established in the First World War), as well
as Italy and Spain, have favorable attitudes towards Yugoslavia. If we
exclude the internal political motives of the regime aimed at preserving
tensions with the international community in order to justify its unsuccessful
foreign policy, it is hard to explain the arguments upon which Yugoslav
diplomacy has based such views. There is, for instance, no explanation
as to what was the basis for asserting that Greece has a particularly friendly
attitude towards FR Yugoslavia, when this country behaves no differently
from others, not to mention the fact that Greece maintains a visa regime
with FRY although it has been removed for some of the states-successors
of former Yugoslavia. How, if not by wrong convictions and propaganda needs,
to explain the "anti-Americanism" of Yugoslav diplomacy in comparison to
the perception of, for instance, France and Italy, when it is widely known
that the policies of the USA, on the one hand, and Italy and France, on
the other, mostly converge in all crucial aspects, including events in
Yugoslavia. Finally, neither Russia nor China ever used their veto right
in the UN Security Council when all the resolutions that were unfavorable
for Yugoslavia were adopted during 1992-1998.
The approach
of Yugoslav diplomacy to relations with Russia deserves special attention,
since the official treatment and evaluation of Russia and its international
role after the end of the Cold War reflects perhaps most precisely the
characteristics of contemporary Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy.
The attitude of Yugoslav official authorities with regard to changes in
Russia, as well as expectations of support for Yugoslavia’s current foreign
policy, have rested upon the assumption that a deterioration of relations
between Russia and the West, and even a new "Cold War", would be in the
interests of FR Yugoslavia. The call for restoration of the former Soviet
foreign policy was accompanied in Belgrade by support for anti-Yeltsin
and pro-Communist forces in Russia. Official evaluations of Yugoslav diplomacy
(disseminated much more through the regime’s media than the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) rested upon the hope that democratic forces in Russia
would lose power and be replaced by those which would allegedly restore
the power of the former Soviet Union. Support developed along these lines
to remove the reformers in Russia from power - the coup d’etat against
Gorbachev, Hazbulatov’s mutiny and others against Yeltsin and Ziuganov’s
electoral campaign.
This
example clearly shows just how anachronous and wrong are the judgements
upon which Yugoslav diplomacy bases its strategic orientation: counting
on a deepening of the conflict between Russia and the West (primarily the
USA) and on the Russian nationalist-communist opposition’s support of Serbia’s
interests in the Balkans. Namely, even if by some chance Yugoslav diplomacy’s
hopes were realized, there still would not be sufficient reason to believe
that Yugoslavia would gain from a revived conflict between Russia and the
West. Yugoslavia would find itself on the side that would be inferior by
all standards, particularly in economic and technological respects.
The most recent,
unsuccessful and by many parameters trivial initiative from Belgrade for
a closer alliance and institutional ties between FR Yugoslavia and Russia
and Belarus is along these lines. This initiative was met coolly even by
the "allies" of FR Yugoslavia in Russia and Belarus, so it is clear that
it was primarily intended for internal political purposes; it was aimed
at further indoctrinating the population along the lines of an anti-Western
and anti-American attitude, within the context of USA and NATO pressures
connected to the Kosovo problem.
All this clearly
illustrates that Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy are still far
from a balanced assessment of the role and possibilities of today’s Russia.
It seems that they are still not capable of understanding that a true and
realistic comprehension of the interests of both Russia and Yugoslavia
would not be protected by the creation of a new "bloc” that would be an
adversary to the West, but, on the contrary, would create the greatest
problems for Russia and Yugoslavia themselves. The fact is also neglected
that Russia has an irreversible strategic orientation to continue partnership
relations with the West (which does not mean the automatic convergence
of all their interests, judgements and foreign policy moves) and internal
stabilization, because without the support of the West Russia cannot overcome
its economic and social crisis and consolidate its international position
in the new circumstances. It seems that Yugoslav diplomacy is still far
from the assessment shared by many critics that it is hard to expect any
special quality in Russian-Yugoslav relations as long as FR Yugoslavia
is internationally isolated, and that Yugoslav-Russian relations will develop
best only after normalization of Yugoslavia’s international position and
its participation in European political and economic integration.
In solving
numerous open problems in relations with the newly created neighboring
countries, Yugoslav diplomacy has achieved partial results. The most important
question, the succession of former Yugoslavia, has not yet been solved.
Judging by the nonelastic attitude of FR Yugoslavia, which unrealistically
expects to get recognition of continuity with the former SFR Yugoslavia
similar to the manner in which the Russian Federation was recognized after
the disintegration of the USSR, in the end this problem will probably have
to be taken to international arbitration.
Relations
with Bosnia-Herzegovina have not yet been fully normalized because the
two countries have not establish regular diplomatic relations, although
they have mutually recognized each other on the basis of the provisions
of the Dayton-Paris Agreements. For the full normalization of diplomatic
relations between FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgrade demands
withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s charges of genocide against FR Yugoslavia
before the International Court of Justice in the Hague; if proved at this
court, these charges would formally establish the international legal responsibility
of FR Yugoslavia for violence during the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.
Based on endeavors by both sides, certain progress in relations between
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia has been achieved in the field of
reviving economic cooperation and traffic.
FR Yugoslavia
has not established diplomatic relations with Slovenia, either, although
both countries have separately announced declarations of recognition, under
unusual circumstances. Namely, although FR Yugoslavia unilaterally recognized
Slovenia in 1992 – when Mr. Milan Panic was Prime Minister – Slovenia ignored
or rather "rejected" this. Yugoslav diplomacy acted in the same manner
when Slovenia recognized FR Yugoslavia in 1995. Recently there have been
signs that Slovenia is strengthening its efforts to solve the problem of
establishing diplomatic relations, but these efforts are not being met
with positive reactions in Yugoslavia. The reasons for this are not completely
clear; there are indications that the present harsh attitude of FR Yugoslavia,
which is not very logical if one bears in mind the numerous mutual interests
and the realistic need to normalize diplomatic relations, results from
former animosities and "settling old accounts" among the highest representatives
of the two countries that stem from the process of former Yugoslavia’s
disintegration.
Yugoslav
diplomacy deserves the least critical remarks with regard to the way it
handled the normalization of diplomatic relations with two neighboring
countries: Macedonia and Croatia. It could even be said that the pragmatism
exercised by Yugoslav diplomacy during the process of normalizing relations
with these two countries is some sort of exception from its general practice
in solving many questions and in this regard Yugoslav diplomacy deserves
a relatively positive mark.
Diplomatic
relations between FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia were established in April
1996; Belgrade recognized Macedonia under its official name, the Republic
of Macedonia, contrary to the expectations of Greece which, as already
mentioned, Yugoslav diplomacy presents as a "faithful ally". The Agreement
on Establishing Diplomatic Relations also contained a mutually acceptable
formula pertaining to the problem of the continuity of SFRY. However, relations
between Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia have not yet been normalized to the
fullest extent. Demarcation of the common border has not yet been completed
and Belgrade also accuses Macedonia of allowing NATO and the USA to use
its territory for possible operations against FR Yugoslavia
Yugoslav
diplomacy exercised a similar pragmatism in the process of normalizing
relations with Croatia. The Agreement on the Normalization of Relations
was signed in August 1996 in Belgrade; it solved some problems and established
the principles to solve the remaining open questions, opening the way for
the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. Since then these relations
have shown a slowly improving tendency, and numerous unsolved issues are
being treated slowly but surely; this illustrates Yugoslav diplomacy’s
intention to normalize relations with Croatia, which seems to meet with
considerable understanding on the Croatian side. Apart from different approaches
to the problems of succession and continuity with regard to SFRY, the most
serious problem that has not yet been solved in Yugoslav-Croatian relations
is the problem of Cape Prevlaka in the Bay of Kotor. Contrary to the demands
of Montenegro which is most directly concerned in this issue, FR Yugoslavia
is holding back on the resolution of this problem in spite of the UN Security
Council’s clear position with regard to guiding principles. The reasons
for this delay most probably lie in certain internal political matters;
namely, the president of FR Yugoslavia, Mr. Milosevic, would like to make
the position of the president of Montenegro, Mr. Djukanovic, as difficult
as possible since Mr. Djukanovic insists on reaching an agreement about
Prevlaka with Croatia, whose standpoints he basically accepts.
4. Concluding
remarks
On the basis
of the above, one can make the rather credible conclusion that, generally
speaking, the foundations of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and the achievements
of Yugoslav diplomacy that stem from them are very unfavorable. The above
mentioned could be systematized also in the following way.
Absence
of clearly defined foreign policy goals - Yugoslav diplomacy did not have,
and does not have clearly defined foreign policy goals, the main strategic
directions that it should follow in its activity. It is the general impression
that FR Yugoslavia actually does not have a foreign policy in the full
meaning of the word. There is no articulated foreign policy concept, strategic
priorities are not known, there is no doctrinal basis of this foreign policy.
"There are only moves and extorted actions. There are activities, and there
is no policy". This statement places the burden upon the major creators
of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, but it also in a way decreases the responsibility
of Yugoslav diplomacy for the bad results; namely, without a clearly defined
foreign policy program even the best of diplomacies cannot help being reduced
to an actor in day-to-day reactions, incapable of understanding the contemporary
world, anticipating events and the strategic moves of others.
Unfeasibility
of (supposed) goals. - If it is established that the failures of Yugoslavia’s
foreign policy stem from the unclear foreign policy goals of the country,
this does not mean that such aims do not exist at all or that they were
not present in the heads of those who formulated them and had the opportunity
and the political power to try to implement them. All the characteristics
of contemporary Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy indicate that FR
Yugoslavia basically still has not drawn the proper conclusions from its
failures owing to the fact that in the process of the disintegration of
the former Yugoslavia its political elite started from practically unfeasible
goals (having in mind international norms and the attitudes of the major
actors in the international community). These goals were intended to be
achieved in a manner and with means that the contemporary international
community does not accept. After Yugoslavia disintegrated in blood, with
the culmination of the drama in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the political elite
of FR Yugoslavia seem to be permanent captives of many illusions that turned
the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy into unsuccessful instruments
of a strategy that was not based upon reality, law and ethics.
Disrespect
for international realities and democratic principles. - One more element
could be added to the mentioned basic weaknesses of the Yugoslav foreign
policy and diplomacy: since Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy are in
a constant state of confrontation with the main actors in the international
community, they are constantly in a defensive position, trying to defend
a foreign and internal policy that are hard to defend, and to justify the
Yugoslav position by arguments that do not have value in the contemporary
world. The strategic and tactical directions of Yugoslav diplomacy’s actions
are mainly of a palliative, temporary and short-term nature because they
are based on many unrealistic evaluations of both contemporary relations
in general, as well as of some concrete questions. These range from counting
on the maturing of a new "Cold War" in relations between the USA and Russia,
to expecting to benefit from Russia’s destabilization, overestimating differences
in the nuances that emerge between the United States and Western Europe
and within the European Union with regard to certain aspects of the crisis
in the Balkans because the Common European Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP)
has not yet become effective, etc. However, maybe the most serious reason
for the failure of Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy lies in the lack
of the readiness of its actors - on the mental and political level - to
accept democratic norms both in international and internal conduct.
Diplomacy
without autonomy in action. - Yugoslav diplomacy does not have the
so-much-needed room for autonomous activity that enables any diplomacy
to be an active actor and participant in the creation of strategic foreign
policy orientations and priorities. The reason for this is, on the
one hand, the already mentioned nonconstitutional taking over of authority
from the federal government by the current president of the Republic in
the domain of foreign affairs as well as the complete absence of
parliamentary control of diplomatic activities, and on the other, the lack
of high-quality diplomatic personnel. Namely, the personnel-planning policy
for the diplomatic service has many critics in FR Yugoslavia. It is generally
assessed that this policy is guided primarily by criteria of political
devotion, and very little, if at all, by expertise and experience. Career
diplomats are becoming rather rare in the highest positions of diplomacy.
Besides, among the diplomats in FR Yugoslavia - and the case is similar
with diplomats from other states in this region - the so-called "culture
of optimum solutions" is not particularly developed. It is as if the political
elite and diplomats in the Balkans were much more inclined to either maximum
fulfillment of aspirations or to total losses. This observation holds
for the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia in the entire analyzed
period from 1992-1998.
…
The sources
of all the failures of FR Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy are
numerous and complex, and their comprehensive evaluation exceeds the framework
of this paper. However, if one were to offer a basic hypothesis with regard
to the reasons for these failures, it could be the following: a national
strategy without foundations during and after the disintegration of former
Yugoslavia, as well as the political elite that emerged on these grounds,
have prevented the development of a political pluralism in FR Yugoslavia’s
society, depriving it of the possibility to build democratic institutions
and mechanisms for democratic decision making with regard to strategic
decisions, including decisions concerning the foreign policy strategy of
the country. The effects of FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy represent only one
of the consequences of the lack of democratization of the country. This
lack of democratization is caused - among other reasons - by the preservation
of political, ideological and personal continuity between the new political
elite in FR Yugoslavia and the previous one-party regime, on the one hand,
and the fetishization of remaining in power as the ultimate goal for which
the broader and long-term interests of the citizens are being sacrificed,
on the other.
Belgrade, January
1999
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