XXII. WHAT IS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PKK?
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan on November 27, 1978. Öcalan adopted then popular Marxist-Leninist ideology among the youth and reflected it unto the ideological roots of the PKK. In the foundation declaration of the PKK, full-hearted belief in the victory of Marxism-Leninism and the revolution was stressed and it was further expressed that US imperialism was the enemy of the peoples in the Middle East; it was aimed in the region to bring down the order of the collaborators and imperialists, the USA coming at the top, and popular wars in Cuba and Vietnam had served as examples. However, Öcalan has changed his views on American imperialism so radically that in his letter to US President Bill Clinton in 1995 he requested from the President to persuade Turkish government to honor PKK’s "unilateral cease-fire".
In effect, a totalitarian scheme of organization which consists of Central Committee, Presidential Council-equivalent of Politburo, and the President and the measures carried out which include killing of the opponents of Öcalan and PKK’s policy show that a typical Stalinist organizational structure prevails.114 The objectives set forth in PKK’s 5th Congress held early 1995 which include the support to revolutionary nature of scientific Socialism, initiation for establishing a revolutionary Socialist International, creation of red power bases in several areas of the land [ "Kurdistan"] , and formation of a national assembly and a provisional revolutionary government under the command of central red power base prove that the PKK did not give up Communism.115 Another indication in this line is the cooperation protocol signed between the PKK and the Communist terrorist organization, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) on 22 December 1996. The protocol outlines the methods and aims of the two organizations. As stated in the protocol, "PKK’s and DHKP/C’s struggle must be on all levels, legal and illegal, peaceful and armed"; "PKK and DHKP/C are against the regime in Turkey and they are against imperialism"; "the continuing unjust war of the ruling classes in Turkey against peoples in Turkey is being kept in motion with the support of imperialism", and "PKK and DHKP/C wish to drive out and remove all military installations in Turkey which belong to the imperialist states, and that PKK and DHKP/C will not grant the imperialist powers the right or privilege to establish military bases in the territory under PKK’s and DHKP/C’s control."
Among PKK’s targets in its "total extermination war that will be imposed through rich tactics and escalation of violence" are all economic, political, military, social, cultural and so forth institutions and organizations of the enemy [Turkey] and the persons in its service both in Turkey and "Kurdistan".116 That Marxist-Leninist PKK’s intolerance for all political, social, educational and religious views and institutions, which are not pro-Kurdish, in certain areas, mostly in Southeastern Turkey and PKK’s terrorist policy centered on escalating ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks sometimes resulting in the massacres of civilians in spite of grave problems of unemployment, poverty, housing, and health services in the region reveal the ultra-nationalist racist core of the PKK which could eventually extend to ethnic cleansing.
Even if the PKK leader, Öcalan attempts to court such opposing states as the USA and by using Islam, Iran,117 the unchanging organizational structure, ideology and terrorist methods of the PKK attest the fact that the PKK cannot distance itself from its Marxist-Leninist roots of armed struggle.
114 Erciyes University, PKK Reality, pp. 58-67; Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Separatist Terror..., p. 5; Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 85; Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 19.
115 PKK, 5. Kongre Kararlarý [5th Congress Resolutions] (Köln: Weþanen Serxwebun, 1995), p. 230 and p. 251.
116 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], p. 248.
117 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 23.