XVI. IS KURDISH PROBLEM THE OUTCOME OF THE NATION-STATE POLICY PURSUED BY KEMAL ATATÜRK, THE FOUNDER AND THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF TURKEY?

While the significant outcomes of the Kemalist policies still persist, it is asserted that with the democratization beginning in 1950s and its acceleration in 1980s centuries old traditions have begun to resurface; taboos have fallen; Turks speak with pride of their Ottoman heritage, and the positive aspects of Ottomanism are attempted to be synthesized with Kemalism. In this opinion, such decentralization measures as allowing ethnic and religious groups a large measure of cultural and administrative autonomy to preserve the unity of the Republic of Turkey might antagonize Kemalist and nationalist sensibilities.84 Similarly, it is argued that two different approaches on Kurdish problem in Turkey are represented by the followers of Unionist85-Kemalist path and pragmatics.86

These assertions indicate that Kemalism is misunderstood and Turkish society is not properly scrutinized. In the previous chapters it is told that people living within the borders of the Republic of Turkey have gathered under the name of "Turk" with no regard of ethnic descent and not excluding their cultural richness, and particularly, no concept of minority for the Muslim population is thinkable. The famous phrase by Atatürk, "Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk" attributes Turkishness not to one’s ethnic origin but to the will of the people in much the way a German, Briton or Greek speaks of being American after immigrating into the USA. By translating the said phrase of Atatürk as "Happy is he who is a Turk" thus attributing a racist nature to it,87 some Western journalists and authors caused public opinion to be misinformed. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the commander and statesman who in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I led the Independence War against the occupying powers in Anatolia and established the foundation of the unitary nation-state in Turkey. Admittedly, the lack of consciousness for nationhood in the Islamic world and the need for the political unity made the definition of "Turkish" reasonable and understandable.88 It was inevitable that reforms by Atatürk, which aimed at diminishing centuries old Islamic way of social structure, Ummah and replacing it with Western style secular modern structure, would get reaction. In this regard, so-called Kurdish rebellions between 1925-1939 are debatable whether they were in reaction against the abrogation of the institutions dependent on the religious privileges in social life or motivated by Kurdish nationalism.89

In the past, particularly under the military rule, some unusual treatments which were not inconsistent with the nature of military regime happened. For instance, a law which prohibited to use and publicize Kurdish as the mother tongue was enacted in 1983 (see CHAPTER XI). Turkishness was attempted to be linked to racial background.90 But generally, in the cultural aspect Kurdish identity was implicitly recognized under the name of "Turkish" carrying no racist implication. As long as the issues are not brought to the ethnic lines, language, identity and folklore are acceptable to Turkish society91 and accordingly, they do not contravene the constitutional principles which relate being Turkish to citizenship in reflection of non-racist principles of Atatürk. Consequently, the abolition of the ban introduced in 1983 on Kurdish publications, sound recordings and speeches to the public did not get reaction and it caused no significant change in social life.

Michael M. Gunter concluded that if Atatürk were alive then [ 1990] , he would not fear for granting Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish ancestry their most elemental cultural rights. This, in Gunter’s opinion, probably does not mean the proposal of a federal solution but it implies to express oneself without fear in his/her mother tongue.92 Regarding Gunter’s view, it might be argued that with the removal of the ban on mother tongue in 1991 democracy in Turkey has reached the expected level within a unitary state. In his monograph published in 1993,93 former French ambassador to Turkey, Eric Rouleau and a British specialist on Turkey, Andrew Mango, in his book published in 1994,94 write about the necessity of the freedom for the ethnically based political parties. Though it is forbidden for political parties to operate on ethnical grounds, through the exercise of the right to found political parties without any restriction as guaranteed under the Constitution new parties are formed in lieu of the ones banned by Constitutional Court.95 Or it is possible to become candidate for the general elections from political parties with differing views.96 According to Article 83 of the Constitution, Members of the Parliament shall not be held responsible for votes cast, speeches made, and opinions expressed in the course of legislative activities or for repeating and disclosing those activities outside the legislature and unless it is assented by the Parliament, they cannot be detained, questioned, arrested or tried (see CHAPTER XII). Even if parties cannot legally activate on ethnical lines, it is possible to remove that restriction within the context of Turkish democracy. Kemalist view that sets forth the indivisible integrity of Turkish nation with no ethnic discrimination gets its support not from military and bureaucratic pressure but from the democratically formed free will of the people.

84 Rouleau, "The Challenges...", p. 124.

85 "Unionist" means to be inspired by the policies of the party of "Union and Progress" whose stay of power coincided with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and which pursued nationalistic policy rather than Ottomanism.

86 Hamit Bozarslan, "Çağdaş Türkiye’de Kürt Sorununun Siyasal Yönleri" [Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey] in Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araştırma [The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview], p. 118.

87 Mark Muller, "Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation during the 1990s" in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s edited by Robert Olson (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 176.

88 Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 12.

89 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 22; Mango, Türkiye’nin... [Turkey:...], p. 58.

90 As quoted from the indictment by the Military Prosecution under Martial Law in 1971 which contained the charges of violating Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code in Tarık Ziya Ekinci, Devlet ve Ben [State and I] (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995), p. 107.

91 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 24.

92 Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 127.

93 Rouleau, "The Challenges...", p. 111 and p. 123.

94 Mango, Türkiye’nin... [Turkey:..], p. 68.

95 For instance, People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) which replaced the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) was legally founded and it currently operates. Former secretary general of DEP who was brought to preside HADEP expressed that he found most of the views of DEP correct. See Özgür Ülke, 12 May 1994.

96 Former members of the Parliament from the banned DEP were elected from the center-left party in 1991 general elections.