Copyright © 2003,2004 Roger F. Gay
Study Question:
Will fair share adjustment for shared parenting and visitation lead to more intense argument over the amount of parenting time granted to the non-primary parent?
Author: Roger F. Gay
This study was carried out as part of the Project for Improvement of Child Support Litigation Technology
Document History
Initialized: September 28, 1999
First posted: October 25, 1999
Edit and addition of seven citations: January 7, 2003
New release: January 10, 2003
Abstract
Will reducing child support awards to credit visitation and shared parenting arrangements lead to greater conflict over custody and visitation? There is speculation that credits provide an incentive for parents (usually the mother) to fight for sole custody and against visitation. It has also been speculated that non-custodial parents (usually the father) might fight to increase visitation for the sake of reducing the child support award.
The analysis shows that visitation credits against actual child support do not produce a financial incentive for child support recipients to avoid visitation or for non-custodial parents to increase visitation. If such perverse incentives exist, they are not the fault of credit against actual child support for time children spend with the paying parent.
It is argued that elimination of the profit margin in "child support" awards that resulted from federal family law reform will remove a systemic barrier to greater acceptance of joint custody and greater equity in post divorce parenting.
Sections
- Introduction
- Limitations of the Study
- Method
- Results
- Characteristics of the formulae
- Answering the question
- Summary and Conclusion
- Citations
Introduction
Sanford Braver raises an interesting question in his book; Divorced Dads: Shattering the Myths (page 73) [1]. There is a feeling that reducing child support awards to account for shared parenting and visitation arrangements might cause the primary parent to object to a shared parenting arrangement or greater visitation. Alternatively, a non-custodial parent might seek increased visitation solely motivated by reduction in the child support award.
How parents actually behave in or out of a courtroom and what their motives might be are subjects not directly addressed. A mathematical design study was carried out to determine where the economic incentives lie and whether they can be eliminated. To investigate this question, the cross-crediting method described in Accounting for Shared Parenting and Visitation [2] is applied to a range of circumstances. Results are compared with a derivative of the simple Arizona partial credit method. The impact of increasing or decreasing parenting time is presented as a percent of the total child support need, assuming total child support need to fairly represent the amount needed to support children.
The term total child support need used in the analysis refers to the total dollar amount needed as contributed by both parents exclusively for support of children. In order to isolate the analysis to the study question, the exact amount this term represents is not indicated. The analysis does not require anything more than reference to the total child support need. Therefore, the analysis is independent of any controversy regarding "the cost" of raising children.
The analysis shows that visitation credit does not produce a financial incentive for child support recipients to avoid visitation. In fact, if we believe that financial incentives are important, we should be asking why custodial parents are not encouraging as much visitation as possible.
No rational economic motive was found for an increase in argumentation over parenting schedules if child support represents a fair share allocation of the expense of raising children. Even fully accounting for the custodial (or primary) parent's fair share of expenses during visitation, the custodial parent always either breaks even or benefits from a higher standard of living. Unless "fixed cost," an amount protected from reduction due to visitation, is set to 0, the non-custodial parent always pays more in proportion to the amount of visitation.
The study does reveal a dangerous incentive that needs to be addressed by policy makers. Using common methods of crediting visitation, which include partial credit and no credit, a parent receives a bonus or profit merely for having won the designation "primary" or "custodial" parent. When visitation time is not properly credited, there is a profit associated with the designation, regardless of how strong or weak the designation is in relation to actual living arrangements and children's needs.
It is argued in conclusion that elimination of the profit margin in "child support" awards will remove a systemic barrier to greater acceptance of joint custody and greater equity in post divorce parenting.
Limitations of the Study
This study investigates the effect of reducing child support awards in consideration of visitation or shared parenting time. The desired analysis focuses independently on the effect of crediting direct payment of child support expenses by a "noncustodial" parent as a partial replacement for payment to a "custodial" (or "primary") parent.
It is assumed in this study, that costs are estimated with reasonable accuracy to reflect the amount that is appropriate for the primary parent to support children in the primary household full time (i.e. no visitation). It is also initially assumed that the percentage of cost that is taken as "fixed" is the correct amount. Fixed expenses are those that the primary parent continues to pay whether children are present or not. They are therefore not reduced in consideration of visitation.
Actual dollar amounts are not needed in the analysis. This analysis does not deal with issues or questions that require knowing what the correct amounts are in any particular case. The study looks at the behavior of various methods of crediting for visitation or shared parenting. Results are expressed as a percent of the total child support need.
The development of cost tables is left to future studies. To create valid cost tables, "cost" must first be defined in the context of a complete and meaningful child support theory. Developing appropriate numeric values for other variables may also be taken up in future studies, in which the PICSLT solution to the problem of adjusting the standard of living in the custodial parent household will be applied. [3]
The two formulae used in this study conform to a reimbursement philosophy of child support. One parent is treated as the primary or custodial parent. When referring to any expenditure by the parent who pays child support, it is assumed to be at the same rate as in the primary home. This means that the credit formulae are not constructed with concern for what the noncustodial parent actually spends. They are related only to the needs of children in the primary home.
A cross-crediting formula that accounts for expenses in both homes is available in Accounting for Shared Parenting and Visitation. [2] The reimbursement version of cross-crediting used in this study is a special application of the more general cross-crediting theory. The general formula includes consideration of the differing rates of expenditure in each parental household as well as fixed expenses in each.
The traditional view of child support led to nearly universal acceptance of the rule that parents should contribute to support in proportion to their relative ability to do so. This concept was built on more basic principles; that both parents have an equal duty to support their children, but the actual amount contributed by each is derived from their individual circumstances, including each parent's ability to contribute financially.
One of the formulae provides a simple credit, which means that a custodial parent's continuing duty to support during visitation is not accounted for. The cross-crediting formula does account for a custodial parent's contribution during visitation, which is expressed by giving up a portion of the reimbursement that would be received if the children stayed in the primary home full-time (i.e. no visitation). In addition, one table is provided to show the effect of giving no credit at all.
Isolating components of a child support guideline for study has more importance than the convenience it provides. A child support guideline must be comprehensible in order to work properly. Each component calculation must be performed properly so that the whole of the guideline performs properly. This means not only getting the right result, but that everything that was done to obtain the result is understood.
In the end, a complete study of child support guideline design must include the study of how all its parts work together as well as verification of the final results it provides. Maintaining a proper modularity of design is important for practical reasons. For example, arbitrarily increasing "cost" tables to compensate for inadequate design of the formula for dividing expenses results in "cost" values that are not realistic. This creates an impractical situation for those who apply them and are effected by them. As a general and practical rule of thumb, a child support guideline cannot be validated without validating the logic of each of its components independently.
Isolating components and studying them independently provides substantial benefits in the study of guideline design and maintenance of guidelines. The advantage of isolating the analysis to a component is also demonstrated in answering the study question on perverse incentives. The question can be answered specifically with regard to the crediting calculations themselves and specific problems and errors in guidelines that can lead to perverse incentives can then be systematically determined. As a result of proper identification of guideline problems, they are much easier to fix.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the behavior of divorcing parents might not always be best represented as rational economic behavior. This study can show whether or not reducing child support awards has a positive or negative economic impact in relation to the assumption that guidelines are otherwise properly designed and used. In order for the decisions parents make to reflect this reality, it is important that professional advisors, especially family law attorneys, understand the results and advise their clients appropriately.
Method
The reimbursement version of the cross-crediting formula [2] accounts for shared parenting and visitation arrangements more comprehensively than most current state guidelines. While preserving the concept of a primary home for children, it accounts for direct expenditure by non-custodial parents as a replacement for some or all of the expected expenditure by custodial parents. By replacing expenditure, it is meant that for those expenses that travel with the children, the non-custodial parent will be credited at the same rate as expected expenditure by custodial parents when the children are in the primary home.
In addition, the cross-crediting formula is based on the concept that both parents have an equal duty to support their children. As such, the parent who receives the child support payment is also obligated to provide financial support even when the children are with the other parent. The term cross-crediting is derived from the fact that that the method accounts for time children have with both parents, giving the payer credit for direct expenses during visitation as well as the recipient parent's contribution to support children during visitation.
The reimbursement version of cross-crediting preserves the concept of the children's primary residence and the primary or custodial parent. It does not account for differences in the rate of expenditure during visitation or the fixed expenses non-custodial parents have in maintaining a home in support of visitation. For more information and a deeper understanding of cross-crediting, and a complete (non reimbursement version) cross-crediting formula see the web page given in citation 2.
The reimbursement version of cross-crediting is applied in this study to show whether a fair share accounting of time with each parent would, according to rational economic rules of behavior, lead to greater arguments on increasing or decreasing children's time with non-primary parents. This is compared to a simple derivative of the Arizona method. The Arizona method provides a partial or simple credit. It does not account for any obligation to support by the primary or custodial parent during visitation. In comparison to the cross crediting formula, the Arizona method always credits visitation as though the custodial parent is unable to contribute financially.
Results of calculations are given as a percent of total child support need. The total child support need is defined as the amount needed for support of children in their primary household. By using this percent, the effect of improperly constructed numeric tables and other technical errors of guideline design are eliminated.
It is acknowledged that incorrect values for the "cost of children" (numeric table values) can themselves provide perverse economic incentives. It is a better approach to studying guideline design however, to isolate specific components and to evaluate each independently. In this way, which part of the design is to blame for errors in child support awards can be determined along with perverse incentives that are related to those errors. Technical flaws can be more easily isolated and it is easier to provide specific logical and mathematical adjustments to correct them.
The focus of this study is exclusively on the effect of crediting visitation and shared parenting time. It is therefore assumed that all else is as it should be. It can be shown objectively whether or not the child support recipient loses as a result of credits. Let us say for example, that on the basis of ability to pay, each parent is expected to pay half. If one parent pays 100% directly than the other must reimburse 50%. If the reimbursement is 75%, the recipient profits. If it is only 25%, the recipient loses.
We aren't concerned with whether the parent seeking reimbursement accurately states the cost of the thing. By stating only percentage values, we are not concerned with whether the proper total amount was $100 or $125 or something else. We assume that total child support need is exactly the amount that it should be. In a case in which each parent should pay 50%, the percent resulting from the calculation is compared to 50%. We aren't concerned with whether a dollar amount asked for or stated in a table is the right amount.
The Arizona child support commission recommended an 18.7 percent decrease in child support for visitation in the range of 20-30 percent (calculated by the number of meals at "dad's house"). It should also be noted that 25 percent corresponds to a rather traditional "standard" visitation arrangement not including vacation periods; Wednesday night and every other weekend. Note that using fractions representing the number of meals out of 21 (in a week), as the Arizona commission did, does not correspond exactly to any of the percentages shown the tables below. The value 81.3 (100 - 18.7) does fall within the range 20-30 percent visitation when the custodial parent has no ability to pay (RAP = 1) and is nearest the result for 25 percent visitation.
To give a more complete picture, results for a number of parenting arrangements are provided; from no visitation through 50-50 time-sharing. Three different ratios of parents' abilities to pay were included to represent a range that includes a high percentage of actual situations. The relative ability of the payer and recipient is represented as 1/2 (equal ability to pay), 2/3 (payer twice that of recipient), and 1 (payer is able to pay but recipient is not). Calculations are made for fixed expenses (do not move with children) at 0, 31.5, and 50 percent of total expenses. In order to support a broader discussion on shared parenting, the extended tables include more than 50 percent "visitation" time and situations in which the custodial or primary payer has the greater ability to pay.
The basic cross-crediting equation can be expressed as follows:
Recognizing that the relative abilities to pay (RAP) of a noncustodial parent (ncp) and custodial parent (cp) must sum to one and that the fraction of time (FP) children spend with each parent also sums to one, substitutions are possible, leading to simplification of the cross-crediting formula.
The Adjusted_Fraction is the fraction of the total support need that should be paid by a non-custodial parent to reimburse the custodial parent once visitation or shared parenting arrangements are accounted for.
As explained in the paper on visitation credits [2], the adjusted fraction is multiplied by that portion of the total child support need that moves with the children in order to determine the actual dollar amount to be paid. In at least some circumstances, a portion of fixed expense should be assigned as part of the child support award only in relation to the ability of each parent to pay. The term Roving is used to label the fraction of total need that travels with the children. Fixed expenses (also a fraction of total need) do not travel with the children.
The cross-crediting formula accounting for fixed and roving expenses is.
The Fixed and Roving fractions of the total child support need must also sum to one. By substitution, the simplified equation is:
The Arizona simple credit formula is derived by adding the payer's share of Fixed expenses to his share of Roving expenses. The paying parent would pay part of the Fixed expenses without credit for visitation time. Plus, he would pay a portion of the Roving expenses only for the time children spend with the recipient. Note that the recipient's share of expenses during visitation is not accounted for.
The Arizona derivative below is presented in the form most resembling the cross-crediting formula.
This equation can also be simplified by substitution.
The difference between the two equations is the term RAPncp multiplied by (Fncp x Roving). The adjustment is less than the cross-crediting method. The explanation of the Arizona credit given in Braver's book does not include consideration of the parents' relative abilities to pay. The term RAPncp that appears in the equation is borrowed from the initial calculation of unadjusted child support, where it is assumed to have been used. For example, an obligation would be calculated by looking up a number in a table and multiplying by the payer's relative ability to pay. Then the credit would be applied.
Mathematically, this means that in the end, the numeric value, the payer's relative ability to pay, and the reduced fraction accounting for visitation time would all be multiplied together. It follows mathematical law that we can perform the multiplication in any order we choose. RAPncp can be used to adjust the credit and can then be multiplied by the number extracted from the table.
Without borrowing that term, the adjustment would be written as:
This form would not be appropriate for comparison with the cross-crediting formula in this study however. What is to be shown in the application of each formula is the portion of total child support need that would be paid by one parent to the other parent. Therefore, the term RAPncp must be included.
In application we might expect as much as 50 percent of the total child support need to be fixed when the custodial parent is unable to contribute. This is the amount suggested by Robert Williams (PSI). In other situations fixed costs might more reasonably be set to the average value of 31.5 percent proposed by the Arizona commission. Other values may also be appropriate depending largely on the parents' economic circumstances. Results are also given for situations in which none of the expenses are adjudged as fixed, which may be the right value when a recipient's income is high or a recipient is remarried. Illustrating results over this range gives a broad picture useful in discussing the question that this study addresses.
Results
The first two tables below (1a-c and 2a-c) provide results using the cross-crediting and Arizona simple derivative respectively. Results are given as a percent of the total child support need, as defined above. The top row gives the percentage of time that children spend with the non-custodial (paying) parent, from 0 (no visitation) to 50 percent. The extended tables (c) give visitation times ranging from 60 to 100 percent. The first column indicates the relative ability of the non-custodial (paying) parent to support the children. The value of one half would indicate that both parents are equally able to contribute financially, while one means that the recipient parent is not able to provide but the paying parent is. The column on the right indicates the percent of total child support need that is fixed in the primary household.
Table 1 a-c shows results using the cross-crediting method (CC). Results are given as a percent of the total child support need. The left column indicates the relative ability of the paying parent to support children (RAP). The right column indicates the percent of total child support need that is fixed in the primary household. The percent time with the paying parent is indicated in the upper row, from 0 to 50 percent in sub-tables a and b, and from 60 to 100 percent in sub-table c.
| Table 1a:Cross Crediting Method | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 40 | 30 | 25 | 20 | 10 | 0 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 43.2 | 36.3 | 32.9 | 29.5 | 22.6 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 45 | 40 | 37.5 | 35 | 30 | 25 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 56.7 | 46.7 | 41.7 | 36.7 | 26.7 | 16.7 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 59.8 | 53 | 49.5 | 46.1 | 39.3 | 32.4 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 61.7 | 56.7 | 54.2 | 51.7 | 46.7 | 41.7 |
50
|
| 1 | 100 | 90 | 80 | 75 | 70 | 60 | 50 |
0
|
| 1 | 100 | 93.2 | 86.3 | 82.9 | 79.5 | 72.6 | 65.8 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 100 | 95 | 90 | 87.50 | 85 | 80 | 75 |
50
|
| Table 1b: Cross Crediting RAP Extended | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 28.3 | 23.3 | 21 | 18.3 | 13.3 | 8.3 |
50
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 26.5 | 19.6 | 16.2 | 12.8 | 5.9 | 0 |
31.5
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 23.3 | 13.3 | 8.3 | 3.3 | -6.3 | -16.3 |
0
|
| 0 | 0 | -5 | -10 | -12.5 | -15 | -20 | -25 |
50
|
| 0 | 0 | -6.9 | -13.7 | -17.1 | -20.1 | -27.4 | -34.3 |
31.5
|
| 0 | 0 | -10 | -20 | -25 | -30 | -40 | -50 |
0
|
| Table 1c: Cross Crediting Time Extended | ||||||
| RAP\Time | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | -10 | -20 | -30 | -40 | -50 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 8.9 | 2.1 | -4.8 | -11.7 | -18.5 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 6.7 | -3.3 | -13.3 | -23.3 | -33.3 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 25.6 | 18.7 | 11.9 | 5 | -1.8 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 36.7 | 31.7 | 26.7 | 21.7 | 16.7 |
50
|
| 1 | 40 | 30 | 20 | 10 | 0 |
0
|
| 1 | 58.9 | 52.1 | 45.2 | 38.4 | 31.5 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 70 | 65 | 60 | 55 | 50 |
50
|
Table 2 a-c shows results using the Simple Arizona Derivative method (SAD). Results are given as a percent of the total child support need. The left column indicates the relative ability of the paying parent to support children (RAP). The right column indicates the percent of total child support need that is fixed in the primary household. The percent time with the paying parent is indicated in the upper row, from 0 to 50 percent in sub-tables a and b, and from 60 to 100 percent in sub-table c.
| Table 2a: Simple Arizona Derivative | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 45 | 40 | 37.5 | 35 | 30 | 25 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 46.6 | 43.2 | 41.4 | 39.7 | 36.3 | 32.9 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 50 | 47.5 | 45 | 43.8 | 42.5 | 40 | 37.5 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 60 | 53.3 | 50 | 46.7 | 40 | 33.3 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 62.1 | 57.5 | 55.3 | 53 | 48.4 | 43.8 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 66.7 | 63.3 | 60 | 58.3 | 56.7 | 53.3 | 50 |
50
|
| 1 | 100 | 90 | 80 | 75 | 70 | 60 | 50 |
0
|
| 1 | 100 | 93.2 | 86.3 | 82.9 | 79.5 | 72.6 | 65.8 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 100 | 95 | 90 | 87.5 | 85 | 80 | 75 |
50
|
| Table 2b: Simple Arizona Derivative - RAP Extended | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 31. 7 | 30 | 29.2 | 28.3 | 26. 7 | 25 |
50
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 31.1 | 28.8 | 27.6 | 26.5 | 24.2 | 21.9 |
31.5
|
| 1\3 | 33.3 | 30 | 26. 7 | 25 | 23.3 | 20 | 16. 7 |
0
|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
*
|
| Table 2c: Simple Arizona Derivative Time Extended | ||||||
| RAP\Time | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 29.45 | 26 | 22.6 | 19.2 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 35 | 32.5 | 30 | 27.5 | 25 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 26.7 | 20 | 13.3 | 6. 7 | 0 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 39.3 | 34.7 | 30.1 | 25.6 | 21 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 46.7 | 43.3 | 40 | 36. 7 | 33.3 |
50
|
| 1 | 40 | 30 | 20 | 10 | 0 |
0
|
| 1 | 58.9 | 52.1 | 45.2 | 38.4 | 31.5 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 70 | 65 | 60 | 55 | 50 |
50
|
Characteristics of the Formulae
We can begin by confirming the fair share character of the cross-crediting (CC) formula by looking at the first row of results in table 1-a. This row represents the situation in which both parents are equally able to pay (RAP of the paying parent equals 1\2) and neither parent is held accountable for the expenses in the other parent's home unless the children are there (Fixed% equals 0).
As we would expect, when the time children spend in each household is equal (time equals 50 percent), the child support award is zero. Both parents are equally responsible for support of their children while in their own care. When children do not spend time with the paying parent (Time equals 0) the result is equally obvious. One parent pays the other in proportion to the parents' relative ability to pay. When time equals zero, the parent that does not care for the children pays 50 percent of the total child support need to the other. If we look at the first row of the extended time sub-table, 1-c, we can see that the results are the mirror image. If the children's living arrangements are reversed, payment would be exactly the same but in the opposite direction.
Sub-table 1-c invites a broader discussion on defining essential principles and desirable characteristics of a formula. We can often discover what is reasonable and even essential by looking at boundary conditions or extreme circumstances. Understanding the effects of a formula in extreme circumstances and at the boundaries illustrates concepts that may not be quite so apparent in typical situations. This can be useful in developing essential principles and general theory. "Boundary conditions" include known values and characteristic changes at transition points. An example of a boundary condition in child support work is state/federal welfare entitlements. If guideline designers wish to create a smooth transition between welfare and non-welfare cases, they need to match private child support with public child welfare support at the low end of non-welfare cases. Another example, provided by case law, occurs at middle income when children's "needs" have been met and further increases in custodial parent standard of living no longer have a substantial impact on meeting children's needs. All things being equal between parents is another boundary; between designations of the "primary" household, division of children's needs between households, and superior and inferior ability to pay and we know that the "reasonable" solution at that point is that no child support should be transferred between the parents.
Extreme circumstances often produce results that are obviously reasonable or unreasonable. For example, why would one parent pay 50 percent of the total child support need to the parent that spends no time with children? (sub-table 1-c, last row) Parents who do not care for children should not be child support recipients. Such situations do exist. (The parent who actually cares for the children has not been designated as the custodial or primary parent.) As a practical solution, one might suggest a change in custody of course. But what does this result say about child support theory? We have reason to question whether the need for fixed expenses is directly related to designated legal status (custodial / noncustodial) and whether they should sometimes be treated as spousal rather than child support. The problem could also be addressed by some use of a more complete cross-crediting formula that considers the child related expenses of both households. [2] A general formula might then be constructed that is dependent only on circumstances and independent of designated legal status.
Mathematical use of boundary conditions or extreme circumstances can be simply illustrated. Consider the three lines in figure 1. If we know that the two end points of the lower line are correct, then we also know that the line is correct at all points in between. We also know that the upper line is incorrect at all points. The middle line is coincidentally correct at the origin. But finding that the other end point has an incorrect value shows that all other points along the line are wrong. The same type of analysis can be used for nonlinear and multi-dimensional (more than two) relationships, with assured results acquired by checking more points. Since in this situation, we do not have empirical data to confirm theory, checking extreme conditions and boundaries provides views that we may find logically obvious, and can easily use to judge reasonableness or unreasonableness of the behavior of the theoretical equations.
Figure 1. All points on a line can be determined by specification of only two points.
We do not have to be exhaustive in defending or rejecting results in every possible circumstance in order to validate or invalidate a formula. We need only describe the proper set of characteristics sufficiently. Even unusual circumstances are important in understanding the behavior of a formula and in fact what a proper formula should be. It is only necessary to assure that the character of a formula is understood sufficiently enough to determine whether is will give appropriate results in all circumstances in which it will be applied.
The Simple Arizona Derivative (SAD) gives a corresponding result in the first columns of tables a and b. That is, when children do not spend any time with the parent designated as payer, SAD gives the same result as CC. When all is equal between the two parents, including the time children spend with them and the expenses paid directly by each parent, (50 percent time in first row of 2a) the result is not the same. One parent still pays the other 25 percent of the total child support need even though they already contribute equally through direct parenting.
Since this row represents a circumstance in which there are no fixed expenses, the correct interpretation is that the payment of 25 percent of the total child support need by one parent to the other is made solely because one parent has arbitrarily been designated an obligated payer and the other an entitled recipient. Although the fault is easier to see in some circumstances than others, it exists in all but a few extreme circumstances. The exceptions are merely coincidental; when the paying parent spends no time with the children and when the recipient cannot afford to pay anything.
Using the tables, it is easy to see the flaw in simple crediting in other circumstances. Compare all table 1 values with 31.5 percent fixed expenses for example, with the corresponding values in table 2. The cross-crediting method used does not provide any credit for visitation against the fixed expenses. The SAD method gives higher results due to the fact that it does not provide full credit against the non-fixed (Roving) expenses.
Moving to the right end of row one in table 2c, we see more obvious evidence of the flaw in SAD. When children live full time with the "other parent," that parent receives no child support at all, even when the parent that is not contributing through parenting time is equally able to pay.
In fact, we can see throughout the SAD tables (2), that there are no negative values no matter what the circumstances. The last row of table 2b shows that a parent legally designated as "noncustodial" cannot receive any support from the custodial parent even when the custodial parent can afford support and the noncustodial parent cannot. This is true no matter how much time is allocated for children to spend in each household. It can be said that the SAD method, on the whole and in the strictest sense, is not a method for determining child support because results are not consistent with supporting the needs of children.
The second and third rows of table 1a show results of the CC formula when both parents are equally able to pay, but when fixed expenses have been designated in the primary household. In the second row, 31.5 percent of total child support need has been designated as fixed. In the third row, 50 percent of the total child support need has been fixed. When children live full time in the primary household (Time equals 0) the result continues to reflect only the relative ability of the paying parent to pay, which is 50 percent in both cases. When we look at the rightmost column in table 1a, the result is also quite intuitive. All else being equal, the award is a share of the fixed expenses in proportion to the paying parent's ability to pay.
It is also rather easy to see this fair share pattern (CC, table 1) by looking the third row in table 1c. When 50 percent of expenses are fixed in the primary household, the parent designated as noncustodial would be ordered to pay even when the children spend more than 50 percent of their time with the noncustodial parent. But no payment is made to the custodial parent when the children spend none of their time there. The 50 percent fixed expenses are credited against the 50 percent owed by the "custodial parent" during "visitation."
Consider the second row of table 2a in which 31.5 percent of the total child support need is designated as fixed expense. When all else is equal (RAP equals 1\2 and Time equals 50) the noncustodial parent pays a little more to the custodial parent than the amount designated as fixed. The third row of table 2a shows what happens when the fixed need in the primary household is greater; 50 percent instead of 31.5. Comparing the two with parenting time equal (50), the payment level actually drops from being slightly higher than fixed expenses (32.9 / 31.5) to three quarters. (37.5 / 50 = 0.75)
Not only does the SAD approach fail to show a fair share characteristic, it is not consistently related to circumstances and needs. Note also another strange result. In the last column of the first three rows of table 2c, children spend no time with the "custodial parent." Yet the values correspond exactly to those for 50-50 time sharing in table 1a (RAP 1\2)
To finish this comparison, note that the last three rows of tables 1a and 2a (and 1c, 2c) give the same values for each designation of fixed need, but for different reasons. The CC formula uses the information related to the circumstances of the parents and children. A noncustodial parent is able to pay and the primary parent is not (RAP equals 1). The SAD formula never accounts for the custodial parent's obligation to support children when calculating the credit for visitation or shared parenting.
The reimbursement version of the cross-crediting method is an appropriate baseline for reasons other than that it was the standard method of calculating visitation credit under traditional (pre-federal reform) child support law. [4] First, the reimbursement version focuses solely on the needs of the custodial or primary household. It never accounts for fixed expenses in the payer's household, or what might be a higher rate of spending per unit time in the payer's household. This makes it easy to determine how the recipient is effected. Second, it does account fully for out-of-pocket "reimbursement" (or better replacement spending) by the parent who is ordered to pay child support when children are in his care. When the parent who is ordered to pay child support pays directly, the recipient of child support is simultaneously relieved of the expense. The net change is zero if this spending is fully credited against the child support award.
Although the reimbursement version of the cross-crediting method may be inadequate for dealing with some situations, particularly joint custody and shared parenting where full consideration of the expenses of both households may be appropriate, it does display reasonable fair share characteristics over a wide range of typical situations. But the reimbursement approach means that a noncustodial parent never wins financially from the exercise of visitation, and a custodial parent never loses. In fact, custodial parents often continue to benefit from a higher standard of living due to continued payment for fixed expenses. Noncustodial parents are never compensated for fixed expenses and may typically experience higher costs per unit time than custodial parents. So they are likely to always lose financially.
Answering the question
The question has been raised whether decreases in child support awards for visitation time will create conflict. Will custodial or primary parents object to visitation or shared parenting arrangements because of a corresponding reduction in the child support award? Will non-custodial parents fight for more visitation time just to decrease the child support award?
If the incentive to fight against visitation and shared parenting is assumed to be in proportion to the loss of child support, it is reasonable to want to know how great that loss will be in relation to various parenting arrangements.
When some expenses are fixed, custodial parents benefit from a higher standard of living even when the children are not in their care. This benefit is shown by comparing results for fixed expense sets with results obtained when fixed expenses are set to zero. The first two tables below (3 and 4) show the difference between the fair share distribution with Fixed% equal 0 and a range of relative ability to pay (RAP) and visitation times. The first row in each RAP set in table 3, corresponding to Fixed% = 0, is therefore zero, since it represents the baseline to which other RAP sets are compared. In tables 5 and 6, comparisons are made between fair share values over the full range of corresponding fixed expenses and results of SAD (table 5) and finally no credit at all (table 6).
It is especially clear whether the parent who is ordered to pay child support benefits from increased visitation. Only when fixed expenses are set to zero, does the payer stand to break even. (Result in table 3 or 4 is 0). Assuming however that the payer's expenses during shorter visitation times may be higher per unit time, it is doubtful that the payer breaks even, even when no expenses are fixed. When some expenses are fixed, he must carry the full burden of caring for children during visitation, all his own fixed expenses all year, as well as supplementing the custodial parent's household even when the children are in his care.
A negative value in table 3 or 4 would show a loss to the primary or custodial parent as a percent of the total child support need. There are no negative results. Assuming fixed expenses are set appropriately, the child support recipient can at worst break even. Given any positive value for fixed expenses, recipients benefit from an increased standard of living even when the children are not in their care. When there are fixed expenses, the paying parent always pays more in proportion to the amount of visitation time and the percent of fixed expenses.
The tables below vary RAP from 1\2 to 1, and include the same three percentages designated as fixed expenses as the tables above; 0, 31.5, and 50 percent. Consistent with the reimbursement philosophy, fixed expenses are never taken into account in the noncustodial household; nor is the custodial parent's obligation increased to reflect the fact that a noncustodial parent may spend more per unit time on children than the custodial parent.
The values for table 3 are easily obtained from table 1a. Values in the first three rows of table 3 have been calculated by subtracting values in the first row of table 1a from the values in each of the first three rows of 1a. This of course, gives zero as the result for the entire first row. And the difference from the first row in the other two. The baseline for each value of RAP is the row in 1a with no fixed expenses at the same value for RAP. It is apparent from the results in table 3, that the standard of living benefit for the recipient and corresponding increase in cost for the payer is a function of the percent of fixed expenses and amount of visitation time. Each set of three rows contains the same values, regardless of RAP.
Table 3 shows that fixing expenses provides the recipient parent with a standard of living benefit and the paying parent pays a higher cost in proportion to visitation.
| Table 3:Cross Crediting Method | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
50
|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0
|
| 1 | 0 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
50
|
The value in the lower right hand corner (25) corresponds to a situation in which the paying parent is able to pay but the primary parent is not (RAP equals 1). Fixed expenses are set at 50 percent of the total child support need. The paying parent provides 25 percent of total child support (50 percent annual Roving expenses for the 50 percent of the year the children are with the recipient), in addition to the 50 percent he pays for the recipient's fixed expenses for a total of 75 percent of total child support need (see table 1a).
If the calculation is performed with no fixed expenses the paying parent would pay 50 percent to the primary parent (third row from the bottom in table 1a). This would reflect the fact that the children spend 50 percent of their time in each home. The paying parent would pay 50 percent during the time the children are with him, and 50 percent to the primary parent for the time the children are with her, for a total of 100%. When the fixed expenses are set at 50 percent, the paying parent is still paying a full 50 percent of the total need while the children are in his care. But he pays 75 percent to the primary parent (last row in table 1a) and 50 percent in direct expenditure for a total of 125 percent of the total need.
Consider the right most value in the third row. In this situation the parents are equally able to pay and children spend an equal amount of time in each home. The paying parent will therefore spend 50 percent of the total need while the children are in his care. Even though the two households are equal, he also must provide for fixed expenses while the children are not in his care. This adds 25 percent to his payment. The recipient receives the additional 25 percent. Even though all is equal, the designated payer would pay 75 percent of the total child support need and the recipient only 25 percent.
Remember however, that "total child support need" defined by the reimbursement strategy, never considers the paying parent's fixed expenses. If we consider his prorated fixed costs, assuming they match those of the recipient home, his total cost is 100 percent of "total need" as it is defined. The reimbursement strategy is designed to make things work out only in the recipient home. Her total cost is 50 percent. (25 percent payment plus 25 percent receipt is a difference of 50 percent.) The paying parent loses and the recipient does not. Furthermore, if the percent designated as fixed expense overestimates fixed expenses related to children's needs, the recipient profits. Her actual cost will be lower than 50 percent.
Even fully accounting for the custodial (or primary) parent's fair share of expenses during visitation (table 3), the custodial parent always either breaks even or benefits from a higher standard of living. Unless the fixed cost is set to 0, the non-custodial parent always pays more in proportion to the amount of visitation.
The critical factor for the recipient parent is not visitation time, but the amount assigned as fixed expenses. In applying the reimbursement philosophy, the situation is not the same for the payer. When some expenses are designated as fixed, he actually pays more in proportion to the amount of visitation.
Assuming the fixed expense designation is not abused, it represents expenses that the custodial parent must continue to pay in direct support of the needs of children even when the children are elsewhere. Expenses such as day-care would obviously fall into this category, assuming the parent receiving child support continues to make the payment no matter where the children sleep at night. The day-care expense provides no direct standard of living benefit to the custodial parent (although it may indirectly). It illustrates an obvious example of a legitimate fixed expense. If the custodial parent pays the day-care bill continuously, even during periods when children spend overnights in the noncustodial home, it is not a duplicated expense. The cost to the noncustodial parent is not increased by continuing to reimburse the custodial parent for a share of the expense.
Fixed expenses relating to this investigation include housing and transportation, for example, which are typically included as part of the "cost of raising children" in standard tables. The benefits of these expenditures are shared between all members of a household. A custodial parent's standard of living is increased as a result of receiving supplementary income for such expenses. Such expenses are typically duplicated in a noncustodial parent home. It is difficult to imagine children's residual use of fixed, duplicated, continuously paid for assets like houses and cars realistically reaching as much as 50 percent, or even 31.5 percent of total need. These are values often proposed, discussed, and even applied in current guidelines even though they are not supported by economic data or valid economic studies. They have been presented as arbitrary (to be politically rather than analytically determined) "policy choices."
Table 4 shows the difference between results of the Simple Arizona Derivative and corresponding values using the reimbursement version of the cross-crediting formula, with fixed expenses in the latter set to zero.
| Table 4: Simple Arizona Derivative | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 6.6 | 13.2 | 16.4 | 19.7 | 26.3 | 32.9 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 7.5 | 15 | 18.8 | 22.5 | 30 | 37.5 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 8.3 | 10 | 13.3 | 16.6 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 5.4 | 10.8 | 13.6 | 16.3 | 21.7 | 27.1 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 6.6 | 13.3 | 16.6 | 20 | 26.6 | 33.3 |
50
|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0
|
| 1 | 0 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 15.8 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
50
|
As should be expected, the last three rows of table 4 contain the same values as the last three in table 3, when the primary parent is unable to pay. The first column represents the situation that the children never see the non-custodial parent. Those values are also the same in both tables. In all other cases, the values in table 4 are greater than the values in table 3.
Table 4 presents a dangerous incentive. As an example, the value in the upper right hand corner represents a situation in which both parents are equal in parenting time and ability to pay. Even though none of the expenses in either household are designated as fixed, one parent receives a bonus equal to 25 percent of the total child support need merely for having won the designation "primary parent." When visitation time is not properly credited, there is a profit associated with the designation, regardless of how arbitrary the designation is.
Table 5 shows the profit margin that results from giving only partial credit for the time children spend with the parent that is ordered to pay child support.
| Table 5: Profit Margin in SAD | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
0
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 3.4 | 6.9 | 8.5 | 10.2 | 13.7 | 17.1 |
31.5
|
| 1\2 | 0 | 2.5 | 5 | 6.3 | 7.5 | 10 | 12.5 |
50
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 8.3 | 10 | 13.3 | 16.6 |
0
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 2.3 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 9.1 | 11.4 |
31.5
|
| 2\3 | 0 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 5 | 6.6 | 8.3 |
50
|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0
|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
31.5
|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
50
|
Table 6 shows the pure profit with no visitation credit.
| Table 6: Profit Margin with No Visitation Credit | ||||||||
| RAP\Time | 0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
Fixed%
|
|
Any
Value |
0 | 10 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
0
|
| 0 | 6.8 | 13.7 | 17.1 | 20.5 | 27.4 | 34.2 |
31.5
|
|
| 0 | 5 | 10 | 12.5 | 15 | 20 | 25 |
50
|
|
The analysis shows that crediting a child support award for replacement of payment to the custodial parent with direct care by the non-custodial parent does not produce a financial incentive for child support recipients to avoid visitation. In fact, if we believe that financial incentives are important we should be asking why custodial parents are not encouraging as much visitation as possible. In view of the fact that at best the non-custodial parent can break even and in many cases will pay more in proportion to visitation shows that no financial incentive is created for the non-custodial parent to ask for increased visitation.
Summary and Conclusion
The initial study question is whether credit for visitation and shared parenting arrangements will lead to greater conflict over the visitation time granted to noncustodial parents. There has been speculation that credits provide an incentive for custodial parents (usually mothers) to fight for sole custody and against visitation. It has also been speculated that noncustodial parents (usually fathers) might fight to increase visitation for the sake of reducing child support awards. The analysis shows clearly that visitation credits do not produce a financial incentive for child support recipients to avoid visitation or for noncustodial parents to increase visitation. Child support recipients either break even or benefit from a higher standard of living. Payers break even or pay more in proportion to visitation time. Simply put; custodial parents never lose and noncustodial parents never win.
Assumptions served to isolate the analysis to the study of the effect of visitation credit against actual child support need. One critical assumption in this study is that the amount specified as actual child support need is correct. This term "actual child support need," is not meant as a synonym for minimum need. The assumption is intended to mean that dollar amounts specified for child support before a visitation credit is given are correct. This study has done nothing immediately to quell the controversy over what those values should be. It has even been assumed that fixed expenses have been properly handled, thus avoiding the differences of opinion that exist with respect to them. Having made these assumptions, we can conclude that a fair share cross crediting method does not produce the perverse incentives under study, nor does the alternative proposed by the Arizona child support commission.
With respect to setting fixed expenses at high levels (31.5%, 50%), there is some rational for doing so when custodial parent income is very low. [5] Low income custodial parents need support to continue to operate the children's primary household even when they are temporarily with noncustodial parents. At higher income, spending on real estate and automobiles, for example, is much less related to children's needs than to adult choices. When a custodial parent remarries, the family home is likely the joint property of the new couple. The question has been raised whether including high levels of expenses that are not directly related to children's needs is inappropriate, and whether some of those expenses should be treated as spousal rather than child support. It has been suggested that some the problem could be addressed by use of a more complete cross-crediting formula that considers the child related expenses of both households. [2] A child support formula can be constructed that is dependent only on circumstances and independent of designated legal status.
Although it may seem apparent that economic reality requires designation of a secure "primary home" when parental income is low, private correspondence with guideline theorist Judith Cassetty (U. of Wisc.) has convinced me that equal treatment of circumstances for members of low income families is possible. Cassetty's research focused primarily on child support in welfare cases. She takes a very direct approach to proposing equal outcomes for (both) parents, adjusted to children's needs. I take the view that equal treatment under law must be preserved (as does Cassetty) but focused initially on child support theory in nonwelfare cases. Historically, nonwelfare child support theory developed in the courts before being replaced by formulae due to federal mandate. Child support in welfare cases developed through welfare administration. Equal treatment under law for all parents, regardless of income, can produce theory and equations that differ from Cassetty's. But the character of results, the net result for low income families, in my mathematics, Cassetty's, and others have important similarities.
The simple Arizona derivative (SAD) produces even poorer results for noncustodial parents and better results for custodial parents. The Arizona commission's approach was proposed as a political compromise between those favoring traditional visitation credit and a more powerful group that does not want to allow any credit for visitation at all. It might also be described as a compromise between reasonable accounting and grand theft. In most states, those favoring no credit have won. Credit is not given unless "visitation" is more than 30-40 percent of the year (with so-called "thresholds" for applying crediting formulae at 20-30 percent [6]). Above that, the amount of credit is unrealistically small. Credit calculations in most states deviate farther from the fair share standard than the simple Arizona derivative.
There is also an important assumption inherent in the reimbursement philosophy. The concern is exclusively for the support of children in the primary home. The reimbursement approach treats direct care as a replacement for payment to custodial parents. It credits on the basis that a custodial parent is relieved of some expenses during visitation rather than what noncustodial parents actually spend. An Australian study has produced a careful accounting of the cost of visitation using a "budget standards approach." [7] Their conclusion is that, per unit time, visitation is significantly more expensive than costs in a primary fixed home. This strengthens the conclusions of this study. Noncustodial parents never win financially. Obvious visitation, such as transporting children from distant locations, have also not been accounted for in this study. The cost of visitation borne by noncustodial parents is higher than what may be implied directly from the details of this study.
This study has been able to look clearly and independently at the effects of using alternative equations for providing visitation credit. Having a clear understanding of this component tells us more about how to correctly account for visitation and shared parenting arrangements. It clearly answers questions about the perverse incentives under study. It has been demonstrated that use of the fair share cross-crediting method does not produce the incentives for custodial parents to fight against visitation or for noncustodial parents to increase visitation for the sake of a lower child support award. Currently, no state credits visitation as much as the fair share method and no state commission has suggested providing a greater credit. Therefore, it can safely be said that no state has or plans to use a visitation credit method that would produce the perverse incentives under study.
This does not eliminate all possible causes of such perverse incentives. The table values above were derived by assuming that the amount awarded as the "total child support need" is the correct amount. But one would have to be totally unfamiliar with the changes brought about by federal reforms to think that this is always the case. [8,9] Consider the profit margin corresponding to 31.5 percent fixed expenses and 25 percent visitation time in table 6. If the total child support need specified in a child support guideline is twice the actual child support need, then the profit is 117.1 percent rather than 17.1 percent. This is not an unusual situation today. It is worth emphasizing that a complete child support guideline is not theoretically validated unless all of its parts are shown to be valid and properly related.
If we believe in financial incentives, we can ask whether the unusually high rate of sole custodial parenting in the United States may have come about because each parental label is coupled with child support. The role of a custodial parent is strongly coupled with being an entitled recipient while the role of a noncustodial parent is strongly coupled with an obligation to pay. What if the amount awarded as child support were to become independent of these labels? If child support were merely a function of children's needs and parental sharing of financial responsibility, would there then be significantly less reason to use the labels? What if there was no financial incentive to be the custodial parent? What if the label made no economic difference at all? If parents remain in an important sense "equal" in the eyes of the law and society, will they necessarily treat one another more as equals? Might that lead to less conflict rather than more? Could it lead to a lower divorce rate?
Citations
- Sanford L. Braver, with Diane O'Connell, Divorced Dads: Shattering the Myths, New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher / Putnam, 1998
- Roger F. Gay, How to adjust for visitation and shared parenting, September 28, 1999, http://www.geocities.com/CaptolHill/5910/credit.html
- Roger F. Gay, New Equations for Calculating Child Support and Spousal Maintenance With Discussion on Child Support Guidelines, July 20, 1994 http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5910/Alimony2/ALIMONY2.htm
- Roger F. Gay, High Child Support Awards Deny Contact Between Fathers and Their Children, December 17, 1999, (Fathermag.com, www.mensnewsdaily.com, republished in In Search of Fatherhood, July-Sept., 2002)
http://www.fathermag.com/003/child-support/index.shtml - NMD Newswire: Child Support Visitation Credit Gets International Attention, July 3, 2002
http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/stories/newswire070402.htm - Robert W. Ingalls, Child Support's Wacky Math, Writers Club Press, 2002
http://www.fathermag.com/news/3766-wacky.shtml - Paul Henman and Kyle Mitchell, Estimating the Cost of Contact for Non-resident Parents: A Budget Standards Approach, Jnl Soc. Pol., 30, 3, 495-520, 2001 Cambridge University Press
- Roger F. Gay, Introduction to the Income-Shares Child Support Guideline, August 7, 2002, (Fathermag.com, www.mensnewsdaily.com, republished in In Search of Fatherhood, Oct.-Dec., 2002) http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/stories/gay080702.htm
- Roger F. Gay, The Alimony Hidden in Child Support: New Scientific Proof that Many Child Support Awards are Too High, The Children's Advocate, Jan. 1995 (republished in Fathermag.com) http://www.fathermag.com/906/alimony/index.shtml