Dissertation Abstract
Title: Toward a Constructivist Eudaemonism
Robert Bass
By “eudaemonism,” I refer to the common structure of the family of theories in which the central moral conception is eudaemonia, where that is understood as “living well” or “having a good life.” In the form I take to be best, the virtues are understood as constitutive and therefore essential means to achieving or having such a life. What I seek to do is to lay the groundwork for an approach to eudaemonism grounded in practical reason, and especially in instrumental reasoning, rather than in natural teleology. In the first chapter, I argue that an approach based in natural teleology will not work. In the second, I discuss the structure of eudaemonism, with the aim of showing that there is an intelligible and attractive doctrine that can be disentangled from the natural teleology. In the third, I develop an account of ordinary instrumental reasoning. In the fourth, the claims of decision theory to be an adequate formal representation of instrumental reasoning are examined and found wanting. In the fifth, I sketch an argument showing that instrumental reasoning, as explicated in the third chapter, can bear on the selection of final and ultimate ends, and that it is plausible that the instrumental approach to moral theory that I am urging yields conclusions with a eudaemonistic structure. I also indicate directions for further development and exploration.
Prospectus
The current project is an attempt to work out or develop a view that I call constructivist
eudaemonism and is shaped by my long-standing philosophical interest in
three areas. Together, they constitute the background against which what I am
trying to do should be understood. I’ll provide short labels for ease of
reference and offer some explanation of each. Then, I’ll take note of some of
the principal obstacles I see to the project and sketch what I expect to do.
The three can be termed eudaemonism, constructivism and instrumental
reason. Each, of course, will require and receive further development and
elaboration as I proceed, but as minimal accounts of what I take to be involved
in each, I offer the following:
First, I find eudaemonism an attractive structure for an ethical theory. By “eudaemonism,” I refer to the common structure of the family of theories in which the central moral conception is eudaemonia, where that is understood as “living well” or “having a good life,”[1] and to which the virtues are understood as constitutive means.[2] Though I prefer “eudaemonism” as a label, there is a close affinity or identity with some doctrines labeled “virtue ethics” or “perfectionism.”
Though I find the structure appealing and will have a great deal more to say about its details, I find it quite difficult to accept the traditional grounding of the account in natural teleology or natural ends, purposes or goals that are supposed to somehow be given to us “by nature.” In my view, for ethics, natural ends are a dead end. (Nor am I satisfied with Hurka’s “intuitive appeal is enough.”[3])
Second, I find constructivism a plausible account of what we mean or should mean by ethical objectivity. What, in short, is it for an ethical claim to be true or correct or justified? I think understanding the constructivist answer is best approached by contrasting it with two other possible answers. On the one hand are substantive moral realists[4] who think that the correctness of moral claims depends upon the existence of moral facts somewhere “out there.” On a view of this type, a correct moral claim is one that gets things right about these moral facts. At the other extreme are those who may be termed moral skeptics[5] who, in one way or another, deny that any moral claims are true or correct or (at least) that any can be known to be so. The constructivist’s approach is different than either. He agrees with the substantive moral realists that the skeptics are mistaken and with the skeptics that the mysterious properties or entities to which the substantive realists appeal either don’t exist or are epistemically not accessible to us. Instead, he holds that we can identify correct moral reasoning or, better, correct practical reasoning[6] at least to the extent of being able to recognize better and worse such reasoning. In substantive realist theories, correct moral reasoning is reasoning that tracks or tends to track the moral facts; in constructivist theories, the order of dependence is reversed: what is morally correct is whatever is picked out by correct moral reasoning.[7]
If the constructivist’s project is to be carried through, there will clearly have to be offered some kind of account of correct practical reasoning. Ideally, this account should itself be either uncontroversial or readily defensible. This brings us to the third of the three areas of philosophical interest, for I wish to suggest that a promising place to begin is with the obvious power and normative force of means-end or instrumental reasoning. Many recent thinkers have been similarly inclined,[8] but, at least as often, proposals to begin developing a moral theory grounded in instrumental reasoning have been met with skepticism, generally centering around claims that a correct moral theory must have some bearing on the ends that we ought to pursue, not just address questions about the most effective or efficient ways to pursue given ends.[9] I agree with these critics that moral theory must bear on the correctness of ends, but disagree with the claim or assumption that instrumental reasoning cannot do so. At one time, I thought (or hoped) that everything needed for moral theory could be done in terms of instrumental reasoning. I no longer think so: if we take instrumental reasoning seriously enough, we will be forced beyond it. However, it remains interesting and, I think, fruitful to see how far we can go with instrumental reasoning.[10]
The general shape of the view that I am trying to work out (to be sketched but only sketched a bit more fully below) is that, due to certain pervasive features of human life and action, especially features having to do with conflicts between or among goals, people have reasons to acquire systems of goals that have the kind of structure recommended by eudaemonism, that is, in which there is an over-arching goal of living well or having a good life to which the virtues are constitutive means. I anticipate objections from several directions. Here, I will try to indicate the lines along which I will endeavor to meet the more important of these.
In developing my account, I rely upon certain psychological assumptions about human beings,[11] and it may be objected that these are not realistic. I shall try to deal with this by dividing it into two parts. Some of the psychological assumptions I make, especially those having to do with conflict between goals and our motivational plasticity, are indeed essential to the view I am working out. I shall maintain that those assumptions are realistic. Other assumptions are useful simplifications employed for the sake of expository convenience. They need not be realistic so long as they do not distort the kinds of conclusions they are employed to defend.
Some decision theorists and partisans of instrumental reasoning will object that instrumental reasoning takes ends as given and only addresses questions about the relative efficacy of means to given ends: It can have no bearing on the correctness of ends. I believe this is a mistake. Abstractly, the relevant point can be put like this: Instrumental reasoning can bear on the correctness of ends if the selection or adoption of some end can itself be a better or worse means to some other end or ends. More concretely, this can be illustrated by the kind of motivational change that an agent may undergo in breaking a bad habit. The agent may conclude, on the basis of his existing corpus of ends, that giving up the habit (where that involves actually changing the set of ends that he seeks) will better serve his existing corpus of ends and that the costs of making the change are less than the benefits to be expected. Once he has successfully made the change, he will have a somewhat different corpus of ends.
Some moral theorists will urge that a commitment to eudaemonism involves an unattractive and unacceptable egoism. Any concerns for others will have to be mediated through their role in facilitating a good life for the agent. I agree with them that egoism is neither attractive nor acceptable, but I do not think it is required by eudaemonism. Briefly, the point may be put this way: The egoist reads the eudaemonist concern with having a good life as “having a life that is good for the agent.” But it may also (and better) be understood as “the agent having a life that is good.” What is to be understood by “a life that is good” requires further substantive argument; that a good life is one that necessarily serves or is directed to the service of the agent’s well-being is not settled by any definitional arguments about the commitments of eudaemonism.[12]
Some Aristoteleans will object that a grounding of eudaemonism in natural teleology is still feasible and appropriate.[13] Against them, I shall maintain, not that we can’t make sense of natural teleology (I believe we can), but that natural teleology, on the best understanding of it, is unhelpful for ethics, entailing counter-intuitive consequences, delivering inapplicable prescriptions and confusing explanation with justification.
Finally, some will wonder whether the kind of approach I take will lead to anything that can properly be called a moral theory. At this point, I think I can only admit that it is in principle possible that it will not. It may be, as I noted earlier, that, even assuming the success of the central arguments I am concerned to make, the resulting account of what is practically rational will not be recognizably moral. Perhaps it will be too deeply infected by contingent differences in the ends from which agents will begin their reasoning. I do not believe that is so, but can at present only offer “wait and see” as a response.
Let me present, in a bit more detail, the kind of view that I am attempting to work out. The core idea is that conflict of goals or ends gives rise to reasons for the construction of an over- arching end that plays the role of eudaemonia in the integration and harmonization of action in the service of one’s goals. Here, in outline, is the kind of picture I would propose:
Using “goals” to refer to things that are or may be sought for their own sakes, human beings start with a set of biologically hard-wired goals. In the course of maturation, we acquire additional goals, some more or less ready-made for us by our culture and education, some more individualized and (not pejoratively) idiosyncratic. Even in the case of the hard-wired goals, there doesn’t seem to be any way to represent them as all means to (or constitutive of) some over-arching end which is itself salient on the level of individual psychology. In short, the goals we have, even on the biologically hard-wired level, are independent of one another. Additionally, even though some goals are hard-wired, their relative weight or importance in decision-making doesn’t seem to be. Their weight doesn’t even seem to be fixed relative to later acquired goals. A further important fact about human goal-seeking is what I call “goal-plasticity”: within some limits (and rarely if ever simply by “an act of will”), we can acquire new goals, extinguish some that we already have and alter the relative weight or importance we attach to different goals.
Given these facts, it is virtually inevitable that, under the conditions of the real world, we will find that our goals will sometimes conflict with one another -- that is, we will find that we can satisfy one or some only at the expense of one or more others. Now, it may be -- I think it is -- uncontroversial that means can be graded as better or worse relative to a given goal. But it is not obvious how to grade actions undertaken as means when one’s goals themselves seem to point in different directions. This problem, I think, is at the root of our desire to grade lives or systems of goals as wholes as being better or worse. To put this differently, I’m denying the fairly common claim that to desire something is to judge (or be committed to judging) that it is good in some way or respect. As long as only a single goal is in question, we can manage with notions of relative efficacy. It is only once we’ve faced conflict between goals that we need to start grading goals themselves (and systems of goals, etc.)
What does this lead to? Given
goal-pluralism and conflict, there’s a problem -- to wit: satisfying or
achieving some of our goals insures frustration with respect to others. (That
frustration is a problem, I take to be very nearly analytic. If frustration isn’t
a problem with respect to some goal, it becomes implausible to say that it
really is a goal pursued for its own sake.) Given goal-plasticity, there may be
a solution. By revising or adjusting the set of one’s goals -- perhaps
acquiring new goals, perhaps eliminating some, perhaps altering relative
weights -- one can reduce or perhaps eliminate goal-conflict and its attendant
frustration. In effect, what is done amounts to adopting an over-arching goal
to which the formerly independent goals become constitutive means. The
over-arching goal prescribes something that, without a fair amount of background
(some of which I’ve tried to outline here), might sound nearly empty, viz.,
successful goal-pursuit or, perhaps better, since it is more obviously related
to the kind of eudaemonist position that I aim to be developing, comprehensively
successful living, where a life can be said to be comprehensively
successful if it is a success in all the ways that a life can reasonably be
expected to be a success.
References
Gauthier, David P. 1986. Morals by agreement. Oxford [Oxfordshire]; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The nature of morality : an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1996. Moral relativism and moral objectivity, Great debates in philosophy. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Hurka, Thomas. 1993. Perfectionism, Oxford ethics series. New York: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine M., and Onora O’Neill. 1996. The sources of normativity. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics : inventing right and wrong, Pelican books : Philosophy. Harmondsworth ; New York: Penguin.
Piper, Adrian M. S. 1986. Instrumentalism, Objectivity, and Moral Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (Number 4, October):373-381.
Schmidtz, David. 1995. Rational choice and moral agency. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
