Introduction
[1] e.g., Minds, Brains, and Science
I: Searle's criticism of materialism
[2] The Rediscovery of the Mind, p. 6
[3] p. 9
[4] p. 5. Searle, quite correctly, cites the Churchlands as prime examples of users of "the heroic-age-of-science maneuver". The specific example he cites is Patricia Churchland, "Reply to McGinn", Times Literary Supplement, March 13, 1987.
[5] p. 14. Searle's discussion of the history of thought, in the entire book, deals exclusively with modern philosophy. This is an unfortunate, but very common, approach in contemporary writings on technical philosophy. Searle never mentions any philosopher earlier than Descartes. One consequence of this is that he attributes the mind-body dichotomy to Descartes, ignoring the role of earlier philosophers, most notably Plato and Augustine.
[6] p. 14
[7] p. 28
[8] p. 1
[9] p. 27
[10] p. 46. As a clear example of this argument, Searle cites Paul Churchland, "The Ontological Status of Intentional States: Nailing Folk Psychology to its Perch", Behavioural and Brain Sciences 11, 1988, no. 3: 507--508.
[11] p. 7. The examples Searle cites of this phenomenon are Armostrong's The Nature of Mind, and Dennett's Consciousness Explained.
II: The irreducibility of consciousness
[12] pp. 112--113
[13] Atlas Shrugged, p. 942. Page numbers from Atlas Shrugged refer to the paperback edition.
[14] Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, expanded second edition, p. 55.
[15] p. 119.
[16] pp. 121--122.
[17] For a detailed Objectivist analysis and criticism of representationalism, see David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses.
[18] Central to Rand's philosophy, both in epistemology and in ethics, is her distinction between the intrinsic --- that which is inherent in entities, independently of man; the subjective --- that which is created by man, independent of reality; and the objective --- that which is based on man's active identification and evaluation of the facts of reality. Searle's use of "intrinsic" is almost exactly equivalent to the Objectivist use of this term. His use of "observer-relative" covers, in Objectivist terminology, both the objective and the subjective; he mostly uses it to refer to the objective, though he conflates the two to some extent.
[19] p. 211
III: The function of consciousness
[20] p. 126
[21] pp. 65--70
[22] p. 18
[23] Atlas Shrugged, p. 962.
[24] pp. 51--52
[25] For a discussion and examples of Darwin's endorsement of teleology and the way it's been misunderstood, see James Lennox, "Darwin was a Teleologist", Biology and Philosophy, vol. 8, pp. 409--421, 1993. The fullest, most consistent explanation and defense of the nature of teleology as implied by Darwinian evolution is given by Objectivist philosopher Harry Binswanger, in The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts. The brief discussion below is based on Binswanger.
[26] pp. 106--108
[27] David Kelley, "The Nature of Free Will", taped lectures.}
[28] Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology
IV: Free Will
[29] p. 227
[30] Minds, Brains and Science
[31] David Kelley, "The Nature of Free Will", taped lectures
V: Conclusion
No footnotes.