The Case for Animals’ Rights

           The concept of personhood is something elusive and provisional, uncertain and disputable, yet still so completely essential in making many a philosophical argument cogent that it cannot be ignored. In her 1973 article entitled “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Mary Anne Warren presents a list of characteristics which she claims are “most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense” and which, she subsequently states, a human fetus does not possess (Starfleet Academy Cadet Manual 121). They are, in the article’s original order:

1. consciousness;

2. reasoning;

3. self-motivated activity;

4. communication;

5. and self-awareness.

In this paper, I will attempt to effectively argue that beings of the animal kingdom have several of these definitive qualities in various combinations, thus fulfilling Warren’s formula for membership in the moral community of persons, and making her article just as applicable to biologically non-human beings as to biologically human ones.

          Warren begins her argument that a fetus does not have inalienable and inherent rights by distinguishing between what she sees as genetic humans and as moral humans. I believe this is an important distinction to make. A human in the genetic sense of the word would include any and all members of the species Homo sapiens. No member of any other species is or could be included in this definition of human. On the other hand, a human in the moral sense depends fully upon whether or not she/he/it could be considered a person; this personhood, according to Warren, does not require any specific genetic coding or membership in any one particular species. To further understand these categories, it is necessary to explore her use of the word “person.”

criterions that must be fulfilled in order for one to be considered a person. However, Warren states that it is not compulsory As stated above, there are several “attributes to be properly considered a person…neither do we need to insist that any one of these criteria is necessary for that an entity…have all of these personhoodadmits that precise explanations for each of these traits (and how and when they could reasonably be applied)--a universally ” (SACM 122). She also agreed upon definition of “consciousness,” for example--would be exceedingly difficult and problematic to establish. Nevertheless, it is clear that a logical conclusion to draw from Warrenline of reasoning is that a non-human (in the genetic sense) entity is perfectly as able to embody these provisional principles of ’s what it means to be a biologically human cousin is.“person” as its

To illustrate this, I will cite examples of animals who possess some or all of the attributes ascribed to moral personhood by Mary Anne Warren. I will start with the gorilla. To begin with creatures so similar to biological humans that they share more than 98% of our DNA may seem superfluous to the argument at hand; many of us already appear to acknowledge the fact of their intelligence and understand that these are particularly “human-like” (in the moral sense) animals. But how many of us acknowledge and accept their personhood?

These primates commonly exhibit not one but many of the qualities in question, and in cases of those who have had extensive contact with human scientists, as the female Koko has, all five defining characteristics are often present. For example, Koko has not only learned to communicate via sign language, for which she is most famous, but also paints (self-motivated activity, independent from genetic and direct external control), demonstrates that she knows she is a gorilla and that this is different from being a (genetic) human or another animal (presence of individual and/or racial self-concepts/self-awareness), is able to learn and process new information and decide what to do with it accordingly (reasoning), and most obviously, is able to feel pain and other emotions (consciousness). Koko even recognises herself in a mirror. This to me clearly denotes personhood as defined by Warren.

There are many similar cases also documented which involve chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants. Chimpanzees, for example, mimic human expressions and behaviour so thoroughly and expressively that they are often caught doing so without the human’s knowledge, behind her/his back, if you will, and seem to be making fun of her/him. In any case, the very concept of mimicry requires the mimic as subject to recognise that it and the object, that which is being imitated, are two wholly separate and distinct beings. The presence of self-awareness, communication, self-motivated behaviour, reasoning, and consciousness all seem to have a function here in the chimp’s humourous endeavors. Bottle-nosed dolphins have recently been “discovered” as self-aware creatures by scientists who can now prove that which many have known all along about these incredibly intelligent, reasoning, communicatory animals. As for elephants, it is known that when one of a herd dies, those of the deceased’s family unit will go no further in their constant quest for food and water until they have appropriately marked the place as a grave and spent time near the body, apparently in mourning. This denotes that very intense ties and emotions are common amongst elephants. Again, these are excellent examples of Mary Anne Warren’s characteristics of personhood applying to non-human beings and thus qualifying them as moral persons.

Beyond a doubt, these are only a few examples of moral personhood within the animal kingdom. An in-depth study would require far too much research, field-work, travel, and personnel (not to mention the expenses!) for such a preliminary paper as this, although it would be an undertaking worthy of scientists and philosophers alike, with the potential for further understanding high and further exploitation of persons low.

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Last updated: July 18th, 2001
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