This is a paper I wrote for a class on Asian Wars at the University of Chicago; it is actually a revision of yet another paper I had done for a Russian Civ. class. In the Russian class, I looked at the battle of Tsushima from Russian perspectives; in the Asian Wars class, I revisited the topic from the Japanese side of the conflict. What follows is the resultant, an attempt to present a balanced view of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and its most climactic naval battle. The paper went over reasonably well for my Civ. class, although not in my Asian Wars class; the Asian Wars professor, even though he had titled his class to include the subject "war", hadn't ever been particularly interested in military history -- go figure.
On May 27,1905, a historic naval engagement was fought in the Sea of Japan. Occurring near the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the battle of Tsushima was a decisive setback for the Russians, and signaled the rise of Japanese pre-eminence in the Western Pacific. The nation which had for so long rejected European influence and had been forcibly opened to the West in the mid-nineteenth century, had, as the twentieth century began, emerged as a full-fledged world power. Having built up her military strength, Japan's national growth had finally come to challenge the Russian position in the Far East, and in February 1904, war had broken out between the two countries. A surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur had given the Japanese tactical control of the seas, and aggressive maneuvers by the Japanese army pushed back the overextended Russian lines in Korea. Russia decided that it needed to reinforce its East Asian fleet in order to reverse the war's course against the Japanese, and had sent their Baltic Fleet to reinforce the naval detachment at Port Arthur. The arrival of the Baltic Fleet in the East Asian theatre lead to their immolation in the Sea of Japan, as the Imperial Japanese Navy intercepted the Russian ships, before they could reach the safety of a Russian harbour. The decisive results of this fleet action in the Tsushima Straits were not a result of exceptional Japanese action; rather, the Japanese executed simple, effective maneuvers, which succeeded so stunningly due to the ineptitude of the overmatched Russian forces.
Although bold in undertaking the risky attack on Port Arthur to begin the war in February 1904, the Japanese naval superiority was more a result of flawless execution and brazen confidence when compared with their Russian counterparts than of exceptional stratagem. The Port Arthur attack put the Russians in a defensive mindset, whose reach was broad enough to encompass the Baltic Fleet a continent away from hostilities.1 The need to reinforce their East Asian garrison against the Japanese produced the monumental effort of sending the Russian Baltic Fleet to Port Arthur, but this plan would be doomed because of geography, material, and men. The Baltic Fleet was thousands of miles from the fighting, and would first have to make an arduous voyage just to reach the battlezone. The Russian ships were inferior to their Japanese counterparts and, while perhaps a numerical match on paper, destined to be qualitatively insufficient in actual combat. The Russian sailors were woefully inadequate to fight major sea engagements: they lacked training, familiarity with their vessels, effective leadership, and suffered tremendously in morale, in all factors a stark contrast with the opposing Imperial Japanese Navy.
Although the reality of the situation would suggest desperation, the Russians began hostilities in the Russo-Japanese War with at least a paper advantage over the Japanese. Already an established great power, the Russian Far East forces were sizable, and while Japan's forces were stretched to the limit by the demands of combat, there existed in the Baltic Fleet a Russian reserve that was still numerically able to challenge the mass of the Japanese Imperial Navy, at that time commanded by Admiral Heihachiro Togo.2 The difficulty lay in the fact that this reserve force was thousands of miles from the fighting, and would have to steam halfway around the world to be of any effective use in the war. A demanding enough task in the best of times, the journey for the Baltic Fleet was complicated by the lack of overseas bases with which to support itself. While the invention of steam power freed ships from the whims of the wind, it bound them more tightly with the constraint of fossil fuel, which for the Russian ships meant coal. Without being able to use coaling stations to refuel, the Russian fleet would be left dead in the water. Other naval powers had invested heavily in building and equipping such coaling bases around the world, as exemplified by Britain's colonial possessions. Continentally-minded Moscow had not created such a network for itself, and was at the reliance of others for the Baltic Fleet's fuel as it made its journey around the world. This became an extreme problem as, repeatedly, on their voyage from the Baltic to the East Asian theatre of operations, the Russian fleet would encounter hostile ports, where they were unwelcome to replenish their supplies, both because third-party nations wished to maintain their neutrality, and because there was little incentive to help the Russians who were fairing so poorly in the war. While the Russians were stopped at Madagascar, a French-controlled location, concurrent negotiations between the French and Japanese produced an agreement that stipulated it was permissible for the Russians to stay in Madagascar as long as convenient, but if the Russian Fleet should leave the port for "...only three days, then it shall not have the right to enter a French port for three months."3 Without land-based stations to coal from, the Russian Admiralty's solution was to contract out to the German Hamburg-Amerika Line to provide sixty colliers for underway replenishment of the ships' coaling needs during the passage to the Yellow Sea. Given the potentially uncooperative weather and the difficulties of coaling at sea, this was a bold gamble, but a necessary one in order to commit the Russian reserve fleet to battle.4 Furthermore, since it was unpredictable to know when the Baltic Fleet would next have an opportunity to coal, the Russian ships had to carry more than their capacity of coal to ensure they would be able to last as long as possible; sailors resorted to stacking bags of coal on decks or in passageways onboard, contributing to the top-heaviness of the Russian vessels and aggravating a weakness already present in the design of many of the Russian ships.5
In fact, the Russian craft were inadequate for conflict with Japan in numerous ways. The best front-line vessels in the Baltic Fleet, the Suvoroff-class battleships, had, in the process of construction, additional crew accommodations and armour added above the waterline. The consequences of this "...resulted in an alarming topheaviness which meant that the lower secondary armaments could not be used in any sort of a sea...[and in addition not only]...affected their speed but also their stability...".6 Furthermore, the age of the Russian warships was significant: more than half of the principle Russian battleships at Tsushima were at least two years older than the oldest of the vessels in the Japanese fleet involved in the battle.7 This was of extra significance because during the late 1890s and early 1900s, many new developments in military technology had been emerging that outstripped the pace of development of Russian warships. Only shortly after the end of the Russo-Japanese War were many of these developments were realized in combination, with the British production of HMS Dreadnought, a ship which brought enhanced speed, gunnery, and armour protection together on the same platform.8 Dreadnought provided a naval arms revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, not for being new herself, but for bringing together existing systems, which had been trickling out in the designs of new ships being built to that point; since the Russian ships were older than the Japanese, less of these newer innovations were incorporated into the design of the Russian warships, putting them at a tactical disadvantage in combat. Far from adopting new technology, many of the Russian ships in fact still clung to antiquated features of outdated styles of warfare -- the Suvoroff class, the backbone of the Baltic Fleet's striking power, still possessed bow rams, for charging and ramming opposing ships during close quarter engagements, an occurrence that had long before passed into tactical obsolescence.9 Perhaps best representing the gap between the ships in the Russian Baltic Fleet and the contemporary needs of a naval battle was the ship Kuban. The Kuban had been converted from an inauspicious beginning as a passenger steamer into a warship, but was so inadequate to her new design that even the fleet flagship's engineer called the vessel "useless [because] She has few guns; their caliber is small, and there is no armour protection. All is wood."10
Even further diminishing the fighting capability of the Russian fleet was an inability to maintain the already limited abilities of the warships. The letters of the flagship's engineer are a litany of mechanical disasters; almost every entry containing report of some accident or mishap occurring on one of the vessels in the fleet, and how on numerous occasions the entire fleet must idle while one of its members must undergo repairs.11 Basic maintenance on the fleet was neglected due to the lack of harbor facilities to perform it in. Indecision in Moscow had resulted in a layover by the Baltic Fleet in Nosi Be in Madagascar, and this delay meant an increased danger to the warships from barnacles covering the ships' hulls; the barnacles would slow the warships' speed and meant that the precious coal was burned less efficiently. Without proper dock facilities to remove the barnacles, the Russian fleet would enter battle at a disadvantage to the Japanese, who could scrape clean the hulls of their ships in the harbors of the Japanese home islands.12 Implicitly, the abscence of the Baltic Fleet from the East Asian theatre meant that not only did Japanese Admiral Togo not have the additional enemy ships to worry about, but once they destroyed the existing Far East fleet, the Japanese were able to take advantage of the pause in naval operations to refurbish their vessels for future combat, while the Russians would have no similar refit time before having to commit to battle.
Even had the Russians been able to engage the Japanese with equivalent hardware, they still would have been at a decided disadvantage because of the quality of the crew manning the Russian ships. Russian crews lacked adequate training in naval tactics and seamanship, familiarity with their own vessels, were subject to intense morale problems that hampered their effectiveness as sailors, and had inadequate leadership. The Russians were lacking in comparison with many other naval powers in several ways: an instance is cited where German naval officers were sent to accompany Russian vessels headed to East Asia that they might observe their cruise and report back to the German navy important lessons learned from the Russian experience. The Russians never did any such thing, which prompted foreboding on the part of Russian officers: "We are still far from having a fine navy or army. It is not a question of soldiers, but of organizing a campaign, of constant preparation and foresight."13 For part of their journey, the Baltic fleet was shadowed by the British Navy, which performed flawless maneuvers and drills around the Russian ships, which clearly rattled the inexperienced sailors who were having trouble enough keeping the Russian squadron in formation. The disparity in the quality and caliber of the Russians when compared to the British was sufficient that the admiral commanding the Baltic fleet, Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was observed to make the emotional exclamation 'Those [the British] are real seamen. Oh, if only we...' ", leaving unspoken the comparative Russian shortcomings.14 Not that the Russians could do much to improve: due to insufficient warm-water training grounds under Russian control, most sailors only had six months seagoing training per year.15
The difference in training is marked besides the Japanese model. When Japan was forced open to the West in the mid-nineteenth century, a top priority was to develop a modern navy to ensure such relations were on Japan's terms. Pursuant to this, a close affinity emerged between Japan and Britain,16 partially due to the Japanese acceptance of the British model of maritime supremacy, and perhaps as a result of comparative sympathies as insular powers. Indeed, many Japanese officers were sent to England to train in the naval academies there, including a young Heihachiro Togo in 1871.17 Contemporary observations of Asian navies in the second half of the nineteenth century noted that "Japan's energies were concentrated on training personnel [while others sought to acquire material]."18 This investment in sailors paid handsome dividends during the Battle of Tsushima: Japanese gunnery would patiently wait until positions were correct and plotted out before opening fire, rather than nervously fire ineffectual premature shots.19 In comparison, a jittery member of the Russian squadron had fired off a volley in the early stages of the battle, prompting the entire Baltic Fleet to open fire unbidden.20
Further inhibiting Russian performance was an unfamiliarity with their own ships and their own harbours. A Russian related in his letters an overheard argument that occurred "...among the sub-lieutenants about how many stokeholds there were in the Suvoroff and how the boilers were placed. Officers who had been in the ship a year, and who had, by order of the admiral, kept watch in the stoke-hold, were quarreling over these things...The Japanese doubtless know our own ships better than we do ourselves."21 Later on, a concern arose in the Baltic Fleet over the port facilities at their destination of Vladivostok. (While en route, the original destination of Port Arthur had been captured by the Japanese, and the Baltic Fleet's orders were changed accordingly.) The Suvoroff battleships required docks with seventy-six feet width to service them. However, the fleet flagship's engineer thought that the width of the Vladivostok docks was only seventy-five feet wide; unfortunately, information on dock size was considered by Moscow to be a secret, and thus no one in the Baltic fleet could confirm it or not, making the Russians completely ignorant of their own port facilities.22
Plaguing the Russian sailors in addition to their sub-par training were consistent problems related to morale. Having been shadowed by the superior British units shook the Russians' confidence as they witnessed the displays of British seafaring prowess. Poor conditions, both reported from home, and experienced on the journey caused additional disheartenment and disorder amongst the Russian sailors. Complaints abounded about the excessive heat oppressing the sailors while in the equatorial regions of the Fleet's journey, as well as suffering from prickly heat, problems whose effects on the crews were magnified by ships built to operate in the arctic regions of Russian coastline.23 Old news dispatches reported mutinies in Sevastapol and fighting in Petersburg;24 a mutiny arose in one of the Baltic fleet's ships, the Malay, and had to be put down with armed force;25 another ship in the fleet, the Nachimoff, had not had bread for her crew in a substantial time, and eventually the crew grew dissatisfied and restless, which led them to start disobeying orders -- an instance yet again where force had to be resorted to in order to restore order;26 on board the battleship Orel, there are "not sailors, but convicts" and the captain of that ship furthers unrest because he "reproves the officers if they try to carry out a more severe discipline--and not only discipline, but plain order."27 A sizable percentage of sailors were discovered to be revolutionaries, whose main interest was actually in sabotaging the fleet's success that it might further unrest at home, further necessitating stringent disciplinary measures.28 A great pessimism existed amongst the sailors regarding their chances against the Japanese fleet throughout their journey: when the officers of the Baltic fleet were being toasted at a state send-off party, one of the ships' captain gloomily proclaimed " 'You wish us victory, but there will be no victory...But we know how to die, and we shall never surrender.' ".29 The captain of the flagship Suvoroff believed that "both he and his ship were doomed to destruction in the first decisive engagement" between the Russian fleet and the Japanese Navy.30 Along their journey east, the fleet received reports of Russian setbacks in the field in the Far East theatre; probably the most devastating of these was the capitulation of Port Arthur, made doubly-so the more disheartening with the news that the Japanese were raising the sunken Russian ships captured in the port with the intention of adding them to the Japanese battle fleet for use against the Russians in future operations.31 Unfortunately for the Russian sailors, there was no counterbalancing good news arriving to the fleet; inefficiencies in delivery caused long delays in mail getting to the ships, meaning sailors received little word of loved ones back home. A point was reached when the fleet hadn't received letters from home in over two and a half months, prompting harsh criticism from one officer towards the Russian Naval Command: "If they cannot do this much [providing mail] that is absolutely necessary for the moral welfare of the personnel of the fleet, how are they to contend against an enterprising foe like Japan?" and that for other sailors "disappointment is very great" at the failure to receive correspondence from home.32
If the Russian Naval Command in Moscow had its shortcomings, then they were echoed in the inadequacies of the Baltic Fleet's internal leadership. Admiral Rozhestvensky suffered from neuralgia and one of his subordinates expressed the belief that "Probably, he will not hold out until the end."33 Nor did Rozhestvensky's staff prove very distinguished: Admiral Folkersham, suffered a stroke during the trip, which incapacitated him for over a week and a half;34 and Admiral Felkerzam actually died two days before the Battle of Tsushima, although news of his death was repressed lest it harm morale, and so his ship kept his standard flying.35 Most shocking of all, was that during the course of "the seven month voyage, the admirals were never called together to discuss a detailed plan of battle, and, speaking generally, no such plan was drawn up."36 This stunning oversight clearly indicates a lack of foresight on the part of the Russian command staff for even doing the most rudimentary items to prepare for battle, especially considering the abundance of time at their disposal for such a task.
Indeed, the one time on their voyage that the Baltic Fleet did something to achieve operational surprise, rather than capitalizing on their advantageous position, the Russian command staff dragged their feet until the initiative passed back to the Japanese. Expecting that the Russians would pass through the Sunda Straits en route to Vladivostok, the Japanese had planned an ambush, only to be thwarted when the Russian Fleet instead traversed the Straits of Malacca. With the Japanese Navy out of position, the Baltic Fleet could have made a dash for Vladivostok, and successfully arrived at their objective. Instead the Russian fleet stopped at Kamranh for an extended period, allowing the Japanese time to relocate their forces and position for an attack on the Russians, potentially at Kamrahn itself.37 The lack of audacity in capitalizing on their tactical advantage was an extreme failure for the Russian command staff, especially when paralleled against the Japanese Togo, whose daring had opened the war with an improbable, yet successful attack at Port Arthur.
By some miracle, in spite of all the difficulties that could have prevented it, the Russian Fleet entered the East Asian theatre. In order to reach Vladivostok, they had to pass through the straits between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese homeland. Progressing under the cover of misty weather, the Russians had been able to avoid the Japanese fleet, until the cruiser Sinano Maru spotted the Baltic fleet near dawn on May 27,1905.38 For much of the morning, Japanese auxiliary ships shadowed the Russians with sporadic gunfire exchanged, until finally the main Japanese battle fleet hove into view.39 Both fleets maneuvered in order to try and gain a positional advantage, and in this process, the Japanese revealed their mortality, although the Russians failed to capitalize on the vulnerability:
Not wanting to order a "turn together" which would have necessitated relinquishing the head of the battle line to a subordinate officer, Admiral Togo had undertaken a riskier alternative, which exposed his fleet to a moment of vulnerability. Even had the Russians only been able to force one of the Japanese ships to drop out of the battleline, it would disrupt the remaining succession of ships, and increase the weaknesses of the Japanese formation.41 However, while the focal point of the Japanese fleet's turn drew the attention of the Russian batteries, the Russians themselves, who had been steaming in parallel columns, attempted to bring their ships together into one line; instead, orders became confused resulting in the Russian fleet's further disorganization.
In the meantime, the Japanese vessels had completed their turn and came out of it concentrating fire on the Russian flagship Suvoroff, which quickly turned ablaze, and fell out of the battleline.42 During this exchange, Admiral Rozhdestvensky received several injuries from the Japanese shellfire, including having several bone fragments penetrate his brain, effectively negating his ability to command the Russian fleet for the remainder of the battle.43 The Russian fleet's formation, disorganized from the attempted "turn together", became further disrupted as Japanese fire forced ships to drop out of the battleline, degrading any ability to coherently fight as a unit against Togo's fleet. When coupled with the speed advantage Togo's ships had over their Russian counterparts, the Japanese were able to maneuver at will, repeatedly capping the T of the Russians' ragged battleline.44 Thus left impotent, the Russian fleet, which had so courageously traversed the distance from the Baltic Sea, fell apart in the Sea of Japan, and was completely destroyed. Nineteen of the 38 Russian ships were sunk, 7 were captured by the Japanese, 6 escaped to neutral ports where they were interned for the remainder of the war, 2 scuttled themselves, one escaped back to Madagascar, and 3 managed to make it all the way to Vladivostok; comparatively, only 117 Japanese were killed in the battle, and only 3 torpedo-boats were sunk.45 The stunning defeat was sufficient to bring the Russians to the negotiating table, who had previously been resisting compromise under the hopes that the Baltic Fleet's arrival in the theatre would cause a reversal of fortune for the Russians and turn the tide against the Japanese. As part of the peace settlement brokered at Portsmouth by the American President Teddy Roosevelt, Japan gained control of Korea, half of Sakhalin Island, and a protectorate over part of Manchuria.46
Yet the success garnered Japan garnered as a result of the decisive victory at Tsushima is not to be overstated. It did force Russia to negotiate a settlement, which was of absolute necessity, because of the financial pressures the war had put Japan under, and the unlikelihood that Japan could have sustained a prolonged war.47 Yet, the Japanese victory could very well have not happened. Despite the Japanese results at Tsushima, it occurred over a rather inept opponent; Togo's fleet had along with it British observers to report back to the Royal Navy, and the Japanese Admiral feared whether or not his actions were measurable against the formidable standard of the Royal Navy.48 While effective, it is doubtful whether the same results would have been achieved against an equal. The Russian Baltic Fleet was completely inadequate for the task assigned to it: some of its ships were so woefully inferior to their Japanese counterparts, that it had been hoped only for them to serve as decoys, drawing Japanese fire away from the better Russian ships.49 It was a complete marvel that the Baltic Fleet survived intact long enough to be annihilated by Admiral Togo. While Japanese sailors and leadership proved more adept than the Russians, the Tsushima victory cannot be ascribed to genius on the part of Togo; rather it is a result of monumental incompetence by the Russians. In fact, only by sheer luck did Togo not find himself at the receiving end of a disaster comparable to what the Russians suffered. By ordering a turn in succession at the start of the battle within the range of Russian gunnery, Togo put the Japanese fleet at the mercy of the Russians. Fortunately for the Japanese, Russian accuracy had not significantly improved upon a January target practice, where "the entire squadron did not score one single hit, although the targets were stationary."50 Were he facing a competent opponent, instead of an initially inferior one whose abilities were degraded by a nearly twenty-thousand mile voyage prior to the commencement of battle, it is like that Togo would have paid dearly for his judgment in leaving the Japanese fleet in such a vulnerable position.
1. Howarth, Stephen - Morning Glory: A History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (Hamish Hamilton: London,1983), 66-67
2. Hough, Richard - The Fleet that had to Die (Viking Press: New York, 1958), 12
3. Politovsky, Eugene - From Libau to Tsushima (E.P. Dutton & Co: New York, 1906), 171 This Franco-Japanese agreement is especially important in consideration that a Russo-Frankish Entente had been in effect since 1891, so in effect, the French had been co-opted by the Japanese to turn on an ally. For more on Russo-Frankish relations, see Howard, Michael - War in European History (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1976), 105
4. Hough, 25
5. Hough, 67 - When the Baltic Fleet passed around Africa, and had made a stop at Dakar, the Suvoroff-class battleships were loaded with 2200 tons of coal, double their designed capacity of 1100 tons.
6. Hough, 21
7. Semenoff, Vladimir - The Battle of Tsu-shima (E.P. Dutton & Co: New York, 1913), 13
8. Howarth, 93
9. Indeed, the whole point of the new Dreadnought design was to emphasis stand-off warfare, where long-distance guns would decide a battle before ships would get close enough to be within range of smaller caliber weapons.
10. Politovsky, 119
11. Politovsky, 158\
12. Politovsky, 160
13. Politovsky, 137
14. Hough, 61-62
15. Hough, 19-20
16. Existing affinities were formalized in 1902 by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Support of its ally was partial reason for the British shadowing of the Russian Baltic Fleet en route to East Asia, although of equal significance was diplomatic enmity between Britain and Russia at the time as a result of an incident in the Dogger Bank. (On the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see Howarth, 40; for more on the Dogger Bank, see Walder, David - The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict 1904-5 [Hutchinson & Co: London, 1973], 186-206)
17. Falk, Edwin - Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power (Longmans, Green and Co: New York, 1936), 86-104 - Togo spent several years training in England, returning to Japan on a shakedown/delivery cruise of a battleship built for Japan by English shipyards.
18. Falk, 107 - italics are from Falk's work.
19.Falk, 393-394
20. Howarth, 90
21.Politovsky, 205
22. Politovsky, 281
23. Politovsky, 158
24. Politovsky, 118
25. Politovsky, 127
26. Politovsky, 132
27. Politovsky, 276
28. Hough, 19-20
29. Hough, 31
30. Semenoff, 38
31. Politovsky, 160
32. Politovsky, 175-176
33. Politovsky, 200
34. Politovsky, 248, 265
35. Howarth, 86
36. Howarth, 85-86
37. Politovsky, 241-242
38. Semenoff, 38
39. Semenoff, 40-50
40. Honan, William - Great Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century (Robson Books: London, 1993), 48-49 - Naval maneuvers distinguish between two fleet actions, a "turn together" and a turn "in succession". In the former, each ship changes course simultaneously, so that the end result is the entire fleet's course is altered at once. In the latter case, each ship follows the course of its predecessor as if hooked together like rail cars.
41. Howarth, 91
42. Hough, 162-170
43. Falk, 399
44. "Capping the T" refers to fleet movements where an attacking battleline steams in a line perpendicular to the opposing formation, across the forward course of the hostile ships. This maneuver allows the attacking fleet to fire full broadsides against only the front batteries of the opposing ships; the offender thus has greater firepower at the point of attack and engages the opposing ships singlely rather than as a complete battleline.
45. Howarth, 93
46. LaFeber, Walter - The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History (W.W. Norton & Co: New York, 1997), 83
47. Howarth, 102
48. Falk, 414
49. Falk, 401
50. Howarth, 85 - italics are Howarth's.
Falk, Edwin - Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power
Longmans, Green and Co: New York, 1936
Honan, William - Great Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century
Robson Books: London, 1993
Hough, Richard - The Fleet that had to Die
Viking Press: New York, 1958
Howard, Michael - War in European History
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1976
Howarth, Stephen - Morning Glory: A History of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Hamish Hamilton: London, 1983
LaFeber, Walter - The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History
W.W. Norton & Co: New York, 1997
Politovsky, Eugene - From Libau to Tsushima
E.P. Dutton & Co: New York, 1906
Semenoff, Vladimir - The Battle of Tsu-shima
E.P. Dutton & Co: New York, 1913
Walder, David - The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict 1904-5
Hutchinson & Co: London, 1973
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