CRIME, SHAME , AND COMMUNITY:
MEDIATION
AGAINST VIOLENCE

WELLNESS FOUNDATION
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

Thomas J. Scheff
Professor Emeritus of Sociology
University of California, Santa Barbara.

Part 4:

MORAL INDIGNATION;

TWO TYPES OF MORAL INDIGNATION:
SELF-RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION AND MORAL SUPERIORITY

WELLNESS LECTURE SERIES VOLUME VI
October 1996.


MORAL INDIGNATION

The aggressive emotion that predominated at the conferences I observed was moral indignation by the victim, the victim’s supporters, and when he or she was present the arresting officer. I understand moral indignation to be a particular manifestation of shame and anger. The victim, especially, is likely to feel the shame of helplessness, impotence, betrayal, and/or violation in response to the offense against her. However, this shame is usually not acknowledged,by the victim or others, but masked by the more visible emotion of anger. Repetitive and relentless anger at the offender is an effective defense against feeling shame. It is unacknowledged shame that drives repetitive episodes of moral indignation. If this shame can be acknowledged (along with other hidden emotions such as grief and fear), anger and moral indignation directed toward the offender will be relatively short-lived and constructive.

The shame component, the main emotional freight carried by indignation, is hidden even in dictionary definitions of the word indignation, which emphasize only anger. To find the shame component, one has to go to the root word, indignity, which means a humiliating insult to one’s self-respect.

How is one to detect moral indignation? One study hinted at the key indicators when it described "helpless anger" (shame- anger) in one subject, Rhoda, directed toward her aunt, Editha: "she [Rhoda] is so choked with emotion at the unreasonableness of Editha’s behavior that she cannot begin to describe it accurately."

This study describes the indicators of helpless anger, using terminology such as "helpless exasperation" and "sarcastic exasperation." Rhoda’s language implies that Editha’s "violation of normal standards is so gross to the point of straining our verbal resources."

This description of "helpless anger," and especially "exasperation," comes close to what I saw as moral indignation in the conferences. The helplessly angry person feels unable to describe the enormity of the other’s trespass, not because she is particularly unable, but because the trespass feels so overwhelming that it would defy description by anyone. The feeling that an emotion is so unmanageable is a clue to the repression of the occluded emotions that are driving the conscious one.

Furthermore, the use of "sarcastic' points toward a second dimension of indignation. The subject seems to feel that the enormity of the trespass is so glaring that her audience should (but doesn’t) feel as strongly about it as she does. The sarcasm is directed not only at the offender, but also at the audience that is not as riled about the offense as it should be.

Protracted indignation thus interferes with a feeling of mutual identification (a secure bond) not only between victim and offender, but also between the victim and the rest of the participants. To the extent that indignation, a shame-anger loop, pervades a conference, it isolates the participants from one another.

This analysis suggests a central point about the management of indignation: if it is to be discharged, the expression of anger should be reframed so that the underlying emotions (shame, grief, fear) can surface and be discharged. Unless shame is acknowledged, expressions of indignation are likely to continue without relief.The detection and reframing of moral indignation is thus a crucial component of effective conferences, requiring skill and sensitivity on the facilitator’s part.

The crucial point about moral indignation is that when it is repetitive and out of control, it is a defensive movement. It involves two steps: denial of one’s own shame, followed by projection of blame onto the offender (I am not dishonorable in any way, whereas the offender is entirely dishonorable). For the participants to identify with the offender, they must see themselves as alike rather than unalike (there but for the grace of God go I). Moral indignation interferes with the identification between participants that is necessary if the conference is to generate symbolic reparation. Thus, uncontrolled, repetitive moral indignation is the most important impediment to symbolic reparation and reintegration. On the other hand, to the extent that it is rechanneled, moral indignation can be instrumental in triggering the core sequence of reparation.

Shame-rage spirals can take forms other than moral indignation. Forms such as self-righteous rage, or "narcissistic rage", are not often seen in conferences. These other forms are likely to be more intense than indignation, and more likely to lead to verbal or physical assault. Compared to these other forms, the unacknowledged shame in moral indignation is close to the surface, and more easily accessed by skillful questioning.

TWO TYPES OF MORAL INDIGNATION:
SELF-RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION AND MORAL SUPERIORITY

In the cases I witnessed, moral indignation appeared in two forms, self-righteous indignation, the more flagrant form, and moral superiority, the more covert form.

Self-righteous indignation. This was expressed most frequently and relentlessly by the victims, but also in some cases by the victims’ supporters and even the offenders’ supporters, especially the offenders’ parents. This emotion was conveyed not only by what was said, but more strongly by how it was said, and in what context.

For example, the two victims in a fraud case in Canberra bombarded the offender with demands for material reparation (one demanded the return of the money, the other that the offender help protect the victim’s reputation). Their manner as well as their words conveyed their self-righteousness, their feelings of betrayal by the offender, their distrust of him, and their feelings of helplessness and anger. The repetition of their demands, especially,in spite of the responses by the offender, the crying of the offender’s wife, and the attempts by the facilitator and the investigating officer to intervene, clearly signaled the victims’ intense indignation. The repetition of a request, when it disregards the other’s responses, is at best challenging and in many cases actually insulting. Such repetition is disrespectful and rejecting: it implies that the indignant person is not listening to the offender, that the offender is not listening to the indignant person, or, more potently, that the offender is lying.

Self-righteous indignation was also expressed frequently and intensely in a break-in and theft case in Campbelltown. In this case, not only the victim but also the parents of the offenders expressed indignation. In the case of the victim, her flagrant indignation took the form of incredulity; she was incredulous not so much that the crime could have been perpetrated against her, but that the offenders were capable of such a deed. As for the parents, they could hardly believe that their children could be involved, that is, that the conference involved them (the parents). Similarly, the parents in a Canberra shoplifting case also expressed incredulity that their son could be a thief, but indirectly; most of their comments seemed geared to distance them from the offender (their son), because they saw themselves as hardly the kind of people to be spending time in a police station. Incredulity, hardly being able to believe what has happened, is a highly visible sign of self-righteous indignation.

Moral superiority and overt threats.

A second, more covert form of moral indignation is moral superiority. It occurs frequently in the form of lecturing to the offender, particularly by police. The arresting officer in the cases we saw in Adelaide always gave some form of moral instruction to the offender. This tactic signals the moral superiority of the instructor to the offender, and therefore threatens the bond of mutual identification between them. In one case, in Campbelltown, even the facilitator joined the chorus; he gave the offenders a lengthy lecture on the nature of conscience.

The lecture usually contained a threat as well, which also disrupted rather than forged the social bond. A threat implies that the offender is not responsible but needs an external goad to behave. When there is mutual identification, threat is unnecessary.

In Adelaide, the arresting officer always threatened the offenders with court. In the break-in and theft case we observed there, the arresting officer was at first highly respectful toward the offender, and solicitous of his rights. But later in the conference, perhaps because she felt the offender had not sufficiently expressed shame and remorse, she became very emotional, lecturing the offender on how "stupid" and "silly" it was to break the law, and on the certainty of strong punishment. At this point her outburst showed self-righteous indignation as well as feelings of moral superiority.

In the same conference, the victim of the break-in expressed moral indignation and perhaps a sense of violation by her repetitive description of each of her material losses and of the loss of the keys and locks for her house. The discussion of finding the stolen key and of the problem and cost of changing the locks went on at some length. Along with her account of the material losses, this discussion absorbed a significant proportion of the conference time.

In this instance, and in several other cases, a skilled facilitator might have been able to interrupt the display of indignation by interpreting it in terms of a sense of betrayal, helplessness, loss, and violation. (In the Canberra fraud case, however, it would have taken a great deal of skill and self- confidence on the part of the facilitator to be able to stem the torrent.) Although it may be necessary to allow a preliminary outburst of indignation at the offender, it is important that the facilitator be trained to detect repetitive waves of indignation, and that he or she be skillful enough to reframe them. To be able to manage most of their cases successfully, facilitators need to be trained not only in procedures, but also in detecting and reframing covert emotions.


BACK to the Lecture Index

BACK to Part 5
GO to Part 7

Solon's Voyage- The Index Page
Back to
Solon's Criminology


The URL for this site is http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7001/

The URL for the Wellness lecture index is http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7001/Wellness.htm


This page hosted by

This is where to get your own Free Home Page


Last updated June20, 1997

1