Discussion Hall

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pro Theism                                              onlookers                                                            pro Atheism

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Theist's Second Presentation: That God exists: A two-fold demonstration The demonstration of God's existence now can be addressed directly: I say, that God's existence can be demonstrated both a priori and a posteriori, that is, both from the notion of what God is and from the observed order of things caused by another. First, the demonstration a priori: That there is a notion of God is undisputed, and the meaning of this notion as regards the discussion at hand has been sufficiently discussed, namely, that God is that cause above the order of things caused by another. Now in as much as cause and the relation between cause and effect presuppose the notion of perfection, and that perfection, in its turn, presupposes a notion of gradation, it is clear that there can be no judgement of perfection in any thing unless the mind, reflecting on the relations among things known, can judge in accord with the gradation of perfection among these. But this is not possible, as Plato has amply demonstrated, unless the mind can refer itself to that which is the definition par excellence of the measure by which the mind measures. Thus in the examination of cause and effect reason must necessarily refer itself to a notion of perfection in an absolute degree. This notion of perfection without limit, self evidently includes the notion of existence, for it has never been rationally disputed that the non-existence of being qua being is to be preferred to its existence. Nor can it be, for the relation of existence to non-existence is itself bound up in the necessity of the mind to refer to a gradation of perfection, for this is what is means to make a rational judgment. Hence there cannot be any notion of cause in any degree unless there is a notion of a most perfect existing cause. Now that this most perfect existing cause does actually exists is easily demonstrated from the following reflection: there is nothing known by reason alone unless there is first something observed. That there is a notion, then, of a most perfect existing cause, cannot be unless there is a most perfect existing cause which is a cause of the things observed by men. Therefore God exists. Next, the demonstration a posteriori: There is nothing observed which does not belong to the order of things caused by another. If there were this thing, being without the cause of anything else would be God. Proof: God is that which is above the order of things caused by another. If there were more than one thing which was above the order of things caused by another, then there would have to be a common cause of both, for these would both share the notion of being without dependence on another. Which is another way of saying that what is identical in any two things has a common origin in a third thing, for unless this were true there would be nothing to cause the similarity of the two in a given respect. But "nothing" cannot be the cause of anything formally, for this would be absurd, for it does not exist to be a cause of anything. Therefore there can only be one thing in the order of things above the order of those things caused by another. Therefore there is nothing observed which does not belong to the order of things caused by another, for if there was then this would be God and the demonstration of God's existence would be self-evident. Since therefore there is nothing observed which is not caused by another, then the demonstration can move on to an analysis of the order of causes which depend one upon another. Among this order there can be no cause unless there is some other cause which caused it, since there is no member of this order that is not caused by another, as is plainly the case. But if there is no cause but that which is caused by another, this necessitates dependence of each cause upon one or more of other causes. And these in turn are dependent on another(s). However, since none of these causes can be without being caused by others in turn, there are only three possible cases to describe the collectivity of the causes in this order. The possibility of each will now be considered. Regarding the order of things caused by another there are three explanations to be considered, namely: I. That the order of things caused by another is arranged in an infinite regression of cause upon cause, so that there is neither beginning nor end of causality in this order, but only succession of prior to posterior. II. That the order of things caused by another is arranged in a circular regression so that there is neither beginning nor end, but only the succession of former to later and later to former. III. That the order of things caused by another is dependent upon a cause above the order of things caused by another, which is itself the cause of the first cause which is dependent on another, and which in turn initiates the order of causes which depend on another. But I & II are indemonstrable by reason, while III is so. Hence God exists. That III is demonstrable has bee proved by Theist in his first demonstration. That I & II are indemonstrable will be shown now. First the demonstration of the indemonstrability of thesis I: That an infinite regression of dependence in the order of causes caused by another is not demonstrable by reason is clear from the following considerations: If there were such a regression it would not be observable in itself, for the infinite is beyond observation; furthermore, what is not observable cannot be known except via its observable effects. Hence if there is an infinite regression of dependence of cause upon cause in the order of things caused by another there must be something observable that concludes to this infinite regression. But such a thing cannot be, for it must either be that order of things regressing to infinity or something else. If the former then the demonstration is a petitio principii, for the assertion that the regression is infinite cannot be on the basis of an assertion that the regression is infinite. If the later then there must be something outside of the order of things caused by another which is caused by this infinite regression. But such a thing would itself be caused and hence belong to the order of things caused by another. But a thing cannot both be and not be a member of the order of things caused by another, for this is contrary to the principle of non-contradiction, which is the foundation of reason. Hence that there is an infinite regression of causes dependent upon another is indemonstrable by reason itself. Second, the demonstration of the indemonstrability of thesis II: That a circular regression in the order of causes dependent on another is not demonstrable by reason is clear from the following considerations: If there any cause, in a circular order of causes, is must depend on a prior cause, and this prior cause must depend on something still prior, and the most prior on the most posterior, for this is what a circle is by definition. But since any cause in the order of things caused by another cannot be unless caused by another, by definition, there can be no cause in a circular regression of causes unless either one of two possibilities exists, namely, that all causes in this order exist simultaneously or that there is such an effect in each and every cause, as cause, to include the ability to be the cause of each and every other cause as cause. That all such causes would necessarily have to exist simultaneously is clear. That they could exist simultaneously is self-contradictory, for if they did then the circular regression, which arises from the succession of causes, in the order of things caused by another, would itself not be caused by another. Or in other words, the order of things which depend upon another would itself be the cause of that which is not caused by another. But this is absurd. For then a thing not caused by another would itself be caused by another. Moreover the other possibility, namely, that each and every cause in a circular order of causes, so described, would otherwise have to be the cause of such an effect as to include the ability to be the cause of every other effect. But in such a case each and every cause would be the cause of something identical to itself in a manner that would include being the cause of itself. Hence for such a circular order to exist each and every cause must be the cause of itself, but this is absurd, for such a cause would both belong and not belong to the order of things caused by another, which violates the principle of non-contradiction, which is the foundation of reason itself. Therefore that there is a circular regression of causes in the order of things caused by another is indemonstrable by reason. Since thesis I & II have been shown to be indemonstrable by reason, thesis III must be true. But for a clear exposition, this thesis will be examined more closely. That in the order of things caused by another there must be at least one thing caused by that which is not caused by another, being itself not in the order of things caused by another. Which is another way of saying that the order of things caused by another must depend upon that which is not caused by another. Nor is this contradictory for it does not involve the patent absurdity that that which is caused by another is the cause of that which is not caused by another, but rather the reasonable conclusion that that which is caused by another is itself caused by something not caused by another. Hence there is a cause of the order of things caused by another, which in itself is not observable, but which exists, this being the only rationally demonstrable explanation of the existence of the order of things caused by another. Yet some, like Hume, dispute the existence of an order of things caused by another for they deny the existence of any relation of cause and effect. Which is a patently absurd assertion for the non-existence of any relation of cause to effect it is indemonstrable by reason. It is indemonstrable by its very nature, for to demonstrate is to manifest reasons that conclude from cause to effect or effect to cause, by the very definition of "demonstration." Therefore if such were demonstrated it would disprove the very validity of the method used to so demonstrate it. Which is the epitome of self-contradition. Therefore such a thesis is absurd; and hence cannot be. Therfore there is such an observed order of things caused by another which depend initially on an existing cause which is above the order of things caused by another. But that which is above the order of things caused by another is God, by the aforesaid definition made by Theist. Therefore God exists.